Enil Jabib Claros v. Sergio Albarran, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: December 2, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-09473
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ENIL JABIB CLAROS, Case No. 25-cv-09473-EMC (EMC)

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

10 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., Docket No. 5 11 Defendants.

12 13 Petitioner Enil Jabib Claros is a non-citizen from Honduras who has lived in the United 14 States for the past six years on supervised release. After Mr. Claros appeared for a reasonable fear 15 interview, he was detained by ICE agents. Mr. Claros filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 16 and a motion for temporary restraining order. Dkt. Nos. 1 & 5. On November 5, 2025, the Court 17 granted Mr. Claros’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. Dkt. No. 9. Mr. Claros now asks 18 this Court to convert its TRO into a preliminary injunction. For the reasons stated below, the 19 motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED. 20 21 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 22 Mr. Claros is 34 years old, and father to three children ages seven, nine, and fourteen. Dkt. 23 No. 5 at 6; Dkt. No. 6-3 at 1. Mr. Claros was born in Honduras but was brought to the United 24 States as a child and has lived in this country for most of his life. Dkt. No. 5 at 6. In April of 25 2011, Mr. Claros was convicted for battery. Dkt. No. 12-1. DHS encountered Mr. Claros due to 26 his conviction and served him with a Notice to Appear. Id. Mr. Claros did not contest the 27 removal order and in June of 2011 was removed from the United States. Id. In 2019, Mr. Claros 1 Upon crossing the United States border on July 7, 2019, Mr. Claros was detained by 2 Customs and Border Patrol. Dkt. No. 12-1 ¶ 14. Mr. Claros was issued a Form I-871, Notice of 3 Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order, reinstating the 2011 removal order. Id. ¶ 15. Mr. Claros 4 claimed a fear of returning to Honduras and was referred to Citizenship and Immigration Services 5 for a reasonable fear interview. Id. ICE released Mr. Claros on his own recognizance pursuant to 6 Section 236 of the immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1226) to await his Reasonable Fear 7 Interview. Dkt. No. 6-6 at 1. The release was subject to appearing for regular check-ins. Id. 8 For the next six years, Mr. Claros lived at liberty with his family in San Francisco. Dkt. 9 No. 5 at 7. In June of 2021, Mr. Claros was arrested for a felony violation of California Penal 10 Code 273.5 (domestic violence) but was not prosecuted. Dkt. No. 12-1. The San Francisco Office 11 of the District Attorney has submitted a letter stating that no formal charges were filed against Mr. 12 Claros in connection with the arrest because the matter was discharged for lack of evidence. Dkt. 13 No. 14-4. 14 On February 13, 2025, Mr. Claros filed a Form I-192, Petition for Advance Permission to 15 Enter as Nonimmigrant, as well as a Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status, which is available to 16 victims of certain criminal activity who are helpful to law enforcement in prosecuting the activity. 17 Dkt. No. 5 at 7; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U). The U Petition was based on severe child abuse 18 suffered by Mr. Claros, based on which a court ordered him removed from his parents’ custody. 19 Id. 20 On November 3, 2025, Mr. Claros appeared at the San Francisco Asylum Office for a 21 Reasonable Fear Interview, along with his counsel. Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 11. Mr. Claros testified about 22 the violence and death threats that he and his family suffered in Honduras for his political activity, 23 including being shot in the legs by the police at a peaceful protest and being detained and tortured. 24 Id. ¶12. Mr. Claros testified that in 2019, Honduran police officers ransacked his home, 25 confiscated his ID documents, physically assaulted his wife and two-year-old son, and threatened 26 to kill them. Id. ¶ 13. This incident was the catalyst for Mr. Claros and his family to flee to the 27 United States. Id. 1 reasonable fear of returning to Honduras. Id. ¶ 15. Mr. Claros told the asylum officer that he 2 wanted an Immigration Judge to review the negative reasonable fear finding and signed a 3 document to that effect. Id. ICE agents then entered the room and detained him. Id. ¶ 16. The 4 ICE agents did not explain to Mr. Claros why they were arresting him beyond stating that Mr. 5 Claros “has a deportation order.” Id. 6 On November 4, 2025, Mr. Claros filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. Dkt. 7 No. 5. On November 5, this Court granted the motion. Dkt. No. 9. The next day, ICE released 8 Mr. Claros. Dkt. No. 10. ICE ordered Mr. Claros to appear at the ICE office on November 7 and 9 provided him with a check-in date of November 28. Dkt. No. 14-1. 10 On November 10, an IJ found that Mr. Claros had a reasonable fear of persecution or 11 torture in Honduras. Dkt. No. 14-2 (Order of Immigration Judge). The IJ vacated the prior 12 negative Reasonable Fear Interview determination and placed Mr. Claros in withholding-only 13 proceedings. Id. Mr. Claros’ initial scheduling hearing in his immigration case is set for May 5, 14 2026. Dkt. No. 14-3. 15 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish “[1] that he is likely to succeed on 18 the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] 19 that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 20 Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can 21 only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser showing than likelihood of 22 success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips 23 sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the Wild 24 Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 25 “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 26 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

27 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 3 A. Mr. Claros Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits, or at Least Raises Serious Questions 4 The Due Process Clause protects all persons within the United States from being “deprived 5 of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. It is settled law 6 that the Due Process clause applies to noncitizens within the United States “whether their presence 7 here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); 8 Trump v. J. G. G., ––– U.S. ––––, 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1006 (2025) (“It is well established that the 9 Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings.”). 10 To determine the process due, this Court and others in this district have applied the three- 11 part test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See e.g., Calderon v. Kaiser, No. 25- 12 CV-06695-AMO, 2025 WL 2430609, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2025); Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser, 13 No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025); Hernandez Nieves v. 14 Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06921-LB, 2025 WL 2533110, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). The Ninth 15 Circuit has “assume[d] without deciding” that Mathews applies in the immigration detention 16 context. Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022); see also Pinchi v. Noem, No. 5:25- 17 CV-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at n. 2 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (collecting cases where the 18 Ninth Circuit has applied Matthews in due process challenges to removal proceedings).1 19 Mathews requires consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the 20 risk of an erroneous deprivation; and (3) the Government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 21 Here, all three factors suggest that Mr. Claros has a right to a pre-detention hearing before a 22 neutral arbiter. 23 24 1. Mr. Claros Has a Liberty Interest 25 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 26

27 1 While the Government does not “concede” that the Mathews test governs, the Government offers 1 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 2 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “A protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from 3 physical restraint.” Rodriguez v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01111-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 U.S. Dist. 4 LEXIS 172756, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2025) (citing Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147-49, 117 5 S. Ct. 1148, 137 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1997)). “[E]ven when an initial decision to detain or release an 6 individual is discretionary, the government’s subsequent release of the individual from custody 7 creates “an implicit promise” that the individual’s liberty will be revoked only if they fail to abide 8 by the conditions of their release.” Calderon, 2025 WL 2430609, at *2 (citing Morrissey v. 9 Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “The fact that a decision-making process involves discretion 10 does not prevent an individual from having a protectable liberty interest.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 11 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Accordingly, a noncitizen released from custody pending 12 removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See e.g., 13 Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser, 25-cv-06248-BLF, at 6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (collecting cases); 14 Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022). 15 In this case, Mr. Claros gained a liberty interest when the Government elected to release 16 him on July 8, 2019 on his own recognizance. Dkt. No. 12-7. This Court and many others in this 17 district have held that such a release implies a promise not to re-detain so long as the individual 18 abides by the terms of his release. See e.g., Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 19 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179594, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2025); Calderon, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20 163056, 2025 WL 2430609, at *2. 21 The Government does not contest that it elected to release Mr. Claros on his own 22 recognizance six years ago and does not argue that he violated any term of that release. See 23 generally Dkt. No. 12. Instead, the Government argues that his current detention was legitimate 24 under the authority of Section 1231, which allows for discretionary detention. But the fact that 25 Mr. Claros may have been subject to discretionary detention at some earlier point under 8 U.S.C. § 26 1231(a), the statute governing noncitizen ordered removed, does not negate his liberty interest 27 where he had been released on his own recognizance instead of being detained. 1 within the 90-day removal period after the removal order becomes final, the noncitizen shall be 2 subject to supervision. A noncitizen inadmissible under 8 USC 1182 “may” be detained beyond 3 the removal period, but “if released, shall be subjection to the terms of supervision in paragraph 4 (3).” These terms require the noncitizen to periodically appear before immigration officers, to 5 submit to examinations, to provide information upon request, and to obey reasonable written 6 restrictions. Section 1231(a)(3). At the time of the re-detention herein, Mr. Claros was on 7 supervisory release. 8 Moreover, there are limitations on revocation of supervised release. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 9 provides that supervised release may be revoked if the non-citizen violates the conditions of 10 release. The regulation also provides that certain officials may revoke release as an exercise of 11 discretion, where “revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate Commissioner” and “(i) The purposes of release 12 have been served; (ii) The alien violates any condition of release; (iii) It is appropriate to enforce a 13 removal order or to commence removal proceedings against an alien; or (iv) The conduct of the 14 alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that release would no longer be appropriate.” 8 C.F.R. 15 § 241.4(l)(2). Upon revocation, the non-citizen is to be notified of the reasons for revocation and 16 be provided “an initial informal interview promptly” after arrest and provided with the 17 “opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 18 241.4(l)(1). 19 The Government does not even contend that it complied with all the requirements of 8 20 C.F.R. § 241.4, and the record before the Court reflects that it did not do so. Mr. Claros was not 21 provided with a notification stating a reason for revocation or provided with an opportunity to 22 contest the revocation. Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 16-18; Dkt. No. 12-7. The Government now argues that 23 revocation of Mr. Claros’ supervised release was appropriate under the regulations because the 24 release had served its purpose once he completed his credible fear interview. Dkt. No. 12 at 5. 25 However, this is an impermissible post-hoc justification for Mr. Claros’ arrest. See e.g., Garcia v. 26 Kaiser, No. 4:25-cv-06916-YGR, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178531, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 27 2025) (declining to consider post-hoc rationalization for detention raised for the first time in 1 determination of revocation, much less the reason for any revocation, and states only that Mr. 2 Claros was advised that he was “under arrest for violating immigration law.” Dkt. No. 12-7 at 2. 3 Even were this justification not post-hoc, it is insufficient. Mr. Claros appealed his reasonable 4 fear determination before he was arrested, meaning that the reasonable fear process was still ongoing at the time of his arrest and thus that the release had not “served its purpose.” Indeed, just 5 days after Mr. Claros was detained, an immigration judge reversed the negative determination 6 made at his reasonable fear interview and scheduled him for further proceedings. Dkt. No.14-2; 7 Dkt. No. 14-3. 8 In Alva v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06676-RFL, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163060 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9 21, 2025), the district court granted a preliminary injunction under almost identical circumstances 10 as those here. Like Mr. Claros, the petitioner in Alva re-entered the United States after a prior 11 removal. Id. at *2. His removal order was reinstated, but he was released on supervision and for 12 six years lived in the community and attended regular check-ins. Id. at *3. In August, 2025, after 13 appearing for his reasonable fear interview and receiving an adverse determination—which he 14 appealed on the spot—, he was detained by ICE, with Section 1231(a) cited by the Government as 15 the basis for detention. Id. at *4. The court found that Section 1231(a) provides for discretionary, 16 not mandatory, detention of noncitizens like Mr. Alva or Mr. Claros. Id. at *6-7. When the 17 Government exercises that discretion in favor of supervised release, this creates a protected liberty 18 interest. Id. at *9 (citing Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Just as 19 people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a liberty interest, so too does [a noncitizen 20 released from immigration detention] have a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on 21 bond.”); see also Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05436, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138205, at 22 *13 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (non-citizen subject to Section 1231(a)(6) has protected liberty 23 interest). Here, too, Mr. Claros has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. 24 The Government cites Johnson v. Guzman-Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021) for the 25 proposition that individuals detained under § 1231(a)(6) are “not entitled” to a bond hearing, but 26 Johnson was a statutory construction case that held that Section 1231, rather than Section 1226, is 27 the applicable detention authority for non-citizens subject to reinstated orders of removal. The 1 Johnson did not consider a due process claim. Id. at 532-33. Indeed, concerning due process, the 2 Ninth Circuit has observed that the “liberty interests of persons detained under § 1231(a)(6) are 3 comparable to those of persons detained under § 1226(a),” which does provide for bond hearings. 4 Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2011). The caselaw governing “prolonged detention” cited by the Government is likewise 5 inapplicable here.2 These cases concern already detained non-citizens seeking a second custody 6 determination due to the passage of time. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684 (2001). But 7 Mr. Claros was initially released by the Government, not detained, and has been living on his own 8 recognizance in his community for six years. Nothing in the prolonged detention caselaw 9 “provides the government with carte blanche to re-detain noncitizens without any process so long 10 as the detention lasts under three months.” Alva, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163060, at *10–11 11 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678). 12 Because Mr. Claros has a significant liberty interested in his continued freedom, the first 13 factor favors him. 14

15 2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation Is High 16 The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, also weighs in Mr. Claros’ favor. 17 Once a liberty interest is established, the question is whether process – a hearing – would lessen 18 the risk of an erroneous detention. Where an individual has not received a bond or 19 redetermination hearing, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high.” Singh v. 20 Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801, 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025). While the 21 Government argues that Mr. Claros is a flight risk or danger to the public due to “multiple 22 criminal arrests and a conviction for battery,” the sole conviction the Government raises is from 23

24 2 The parties also dispute whether Mr. Claros’ removal is “reasonably foreseeable,” given that he has now been found to have a credible fear of returning to Honduras, but this question is only 25 relevant if the Court applies the prolonged detention cases. In any case, Mr. Claros’ removal is not reasonably foreseeable, given that he is in withholding proceedings as to his country of origin, 26 Honduras, and the mere possibility that the Government could attempt to remove him to some other, unidentified country does not meet the standard of reasonable foreseeability. See e.g., 27 Karem Tadros v. Noem, No. 25cv4108 (EP), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113198, at *10 (D.N.J. June 1 2011. Dkt. No. 12 at 8; Dkt. No. 14 at 3. The Government previously made the determination to 2 release Mr. Claros on his own supervision despite this 2011 conviction. Dkt. No. 6-6 at 1; Saravia 3 v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. 4 Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018) (decision to release reflects “a determination by the 5 government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk”). While the 6 Government also raises a single post-2011 arrest, Mr. Claros has presented evidence that he was 7 not arrested under state law, because he was released without the filing of a criminal complaint. 8 Dkt. No. 14-4 (Letter from San Francisco District Attorney); Cal. Pen. Code § 849(c) (arrest in 9 these circumstances deemed “detention only”). Given the other evidence of Mr. Claros’ six-year 10 history of compliance with ICE check-ins, his many recent appearances before ICE and the 11 immigration court, and the letters of attestation from his community, it is not clear that an 12 immigration judge would find him a flight risk or danger to the community. In short, there is no 13 adverse evidence suggesting Mr. Claros presents a greater flight risk now than when he was 14 released, especially given that he has since received a favorable determination on his fear of 15 persecution. The second factor thus slightly favors Mr. Claros. 16 17 3. The Government’s Interest 18 The Government has failed to show any countervailing interest against a providing a pre- 19 detention hearing. “In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ 20 cost.” Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (citing Doe v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-00647-DJC-DMC, 21 2025 WL 691664, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). There is no concern with a hearing delaying the 22 Government’s efforts to remove Mr. Claros either. Any such delay would be minimal, and in any 23 case, Mr. Claros is now in withholding proceedings due to the immigration judge’s reversal of the 24 asylum officer’s reasonable fear determination. The Government conducting a pre-detention 25 hearing will not obstruct this process. 26 While the Government argues that an additional hearing “adds further congestion to an 27 already backlogged immigration-court system,” the Government cannot raise a self-created 1 2025), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2025/11/immigration-courts-understaffed-and- 2 overwhelmed-as-trump-administration-surges-enforcement-hiring/ (number of immigration judges 3 has dropped from 700 to 600 primarily due to involuntary terminations by the current 4 administration). And detention for its own sake is not a legitimate governmental interest. Pinchi 5 v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) 6 (“Detention for its own sake, to meet an administrative quota, or because the government has not 7 yet established constitutionally required pre-detention procedures is not a legitimate government 8 interest.”). 9 10 B. Mr. Claros Faces Irreparable Harm 11 Mr. Claros has demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of temporary 12 relief. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that he faces is in itself an immediate and 13 irreparable harm. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 14 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th 15 Cir. 2017) (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Warsoldier 16 v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005). “[I]t follows inexorably from [the] 17 conclusion” that Mr. Claros’ detention without a hearing is “likely unconstitutional” that he has 18 “also carried [their] burden as to irreparable harm.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. 19 Further, Mr. Claros has demonstrated that his detention will work irreparable harm on his 20 health and wellbeing, as well as the health and wellbeing of his family. Dkt. No. 5 at 24; Dkt. No. 21 6-3 (Declaration of Julia Marilin Claros, Wife of Mr. Claros) (describing the impact of her 22 husband’s detention on herself and her children, particularly in light of her ongoing medical 23 issues, for which she was recently hospitalized); Dkt. No. 6-4 (Declaration of Bryan Josue Ortiz, 24 Brother of Mr. Claros) (describing the impact that Mr. Claros’ detention has had on himself, as 25 well as Mr. Claros’ wife and children, noting Mr. Claros’ close involvement in his children’s 26 lives); Dkt. No. 6-5 (Letter from Natalia Arguello, Tenderloin Community Elementary School 27 Social Worker) (declaring that Mr. Claros’ detention threatens the emotional, psychological, and 1 therapy for past trauma, and emphasizing the “loving and engaged role” that Mr. Claros plays in 2 his children’s lives); see also Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995 (recognizing as irreparable harm the 3 “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities, the economic burdens imposed on 4 detainees and their families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms to children of 5 detainees whose parents are detained”). 6 The Government argues that Mr. Claros’ claimed irreparable harms are “too tenuous” to 7 support a preliminary injunction because the harm arises from detention itself, not the absence of a 8 bond hearing. Dkt. No. 12 at 10. The Government’s theory is apparently that, because Mr. Claros 9 could still hypothetically be re-detained after notice and a hearing under the preliminary injunction 10 he seeks, he suffers no irreparable harm from being detained in violation of his constitutional 11 rights. This argument does not follow. The harm of an unconstitutional detention is different in 12 character than the harm from a legal detention after constitutionally sufficient process. The 13 possibility that Mr. Claros could be detained legally under the preliminary injunction he seeks 14 does not obviate the harm he would suffer from a likely unconstitutional detention. See 15 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Moreover, the government’s assertion that he may be detained in 16 any event after a due process hearing is speculative on the current record. 17 The Government also repurposes its merits arguments, contending that Mr. Claros has 18 failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, that there is no irreparable harm because 19 detention during removal proceedings is “valid”, and that Mr. Claros can only seek review of his 20 detention after six months. Dkt. No. 12 at 10. But the Court has already found otherwise, as 21 discussed above. 22 23 C. The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest Favor Mr. Claros 24 As this Court and others in this district have concluded under similar circumstances, “the 25 potential harm to the government is minimal.” Pablo Sequen, 2025 WL 2203419, at *3. While 26 the Government asserts a “public interest in the application of the law,” the government is not 27 “harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” 1 No. 25-cv-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179594, at *39 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2025) 2 (“[T]he Government faces no real injury from abiding by the Constitution.”). On the contrary, as 3 this Court has observed in similar circumstances, “summarily detaining noncitizens who dutifully 4 appear at ICE offices and immigration courts undermines legitimate government interests.” 5 Aceros, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179594, at *38 (emphasis added). Indeed, the DHS has previously 6 recognized that “[e]xecuting civil immigration enforcement actions in or near a courthouse may 7 chill individuals’ access to courthouses, and, as a result, impair the fair administration of justice.” 8 Id. (citing Department of Homeland Security, April 27, 2021 Civil Immigration Enforcement 9 Actions in or Near Courthouses Memorandum). 10 At most, the government faces a short delay in re-detaining Mr. Claros and the “minimal 11 cost” of a custody hearing. See Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 U.S. 12 Dist. LEXIS 132500, at *22 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025); Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 13 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). Faced with “a conflict between [administrative] 14 concerns and preventable human suffering, [the Court has] little difficulty concluding that the 15 balance of hardships tips decidedly in [Petitioner’s] favor.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996) (quoting 16 Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983). 17 The balance of hardships thus tip sharply in favor of Mr. Claros. Moreover, the 18 public interest also weighs heavily in favor of granting temporary relief. “[T]he public has a 19 strong interest in upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth 20 Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge 21 M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) 22 (cleaned up); see Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002 (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the 23 violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted)); Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 24 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional 25 right has been violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). 26 The final factor thus favors relief.

27 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the forgoing reasons, Mr. Claros’ request for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED. 3 The Government is ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from 4 (1) Re-detaining Mr. Claros without a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral 5 decisionmaker where the Government bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and 6 convincing evidence that Mr. Claros is a flight risk or a danger such that his physical 7 custody is required; and 8 (2) Removing Mr. Claros from the United States pending these proceedings. 9 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. a 12

13 Dated: December 2, 2025

15 2 EDWARISM. CHEN a 16 United States District Judge

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