Emuveyan v. Ewing

District Court, D. Utah·Decided June 23, 2021·No. 2:19-cv-00616·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION

OGHENETEGA EMUVEYAN, MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION Plaintiff, FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING PROTECTED v. INFORMATION (DOC. NO. 54)

Case No. 2:19-cv-00616-HCN-DAO STEVE EWING; GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS INC., a Utah corporation; and Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr. CLYDE COMPANIES, INC., a Utah corporation, Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg

Defendants.

Before the court is Defendants Steve Ewing, Geneva Rock Products, Inc., and Clyde Companies, Inc. (collectively, the “GRP Defendants”) Motion for Protective Order (“Mot.,” Doc. No. 54). The court heard argument on the motion on May 17, 2021. Where the GRP Defendants have met their burden of establishing the documents at issue should remain confidential, and for the reasons stated at the hearing, the motion is GRANTED. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Oghenetega Emuveyan brought this action against the GRP Defendants alleging, in part, that they discriminated against him and treated him disparately based on his race and national origin, created a hostile work environment, wrongfully terminated him, and engaged in retaliation. (Compl., Doc. No. 2-1.) Here, the GRP Defendants seek an order prohibiting Mr. Emuveyan from disclosing the GRP Defendants’ confidential business information, including employee discipline records, internal human resources notes, and incident reporting forms. (Mot. 1, Doc. No. 54.) The GRP Defendants contend they have properly designated the records as confidential pursuant to the standard protective order (“SPO”) because “the documents contain information that was not intended for public distribution as they were created and utilized, and the documents, if disclosed, risk damaging Defendants’ relationships with customers.” (Id. at 2.) Alternatively, the GRP Defendants argue even if the confidential information does not fall within the SPO’s

protection, the documents merit protection to protect employees from embarrassment. (Id.) Mr. Emuveyan opposes the motion, arguing the GRP Defendants have not meet their burden to establish the documents contain protected information. (Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Protective Order (“Opp’n”) 5, Doc. No. 67.) Even if the documents do contain protected information, Mr. Emuveyan contends the GRP Defendants have not established they will be harmed by their disclosure or that any potential harm outweighs the need for disclosure. (Id. at 6.) Lastly, even if the GRP Defendants can meet their burden, Mr. Emuveyan believes public disclosure of the documents is relevant and necessary, as they might later be used in a “potentially dispositive motion.” (Id. at 6–7.) LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the court, for good cause, to issue a protective order “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G). The party seeking a protective order must satisfy a three-factor test. First, it must show that “the information sought is a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information.” Layne Christensen Co. v. Purolite Co., 271 F.R.D. 240, 248 (D. Kan. 2010). Second, the moving party must show how disclosure of the information “might be harmful.” Id. at 249. Finally, the moving party must show the harm “outweighs the need for access.” Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Micro Tech., Inc., 142 F.R.D. 488, 491 (D. Colo. 1992). If the moving party satisfies these three requirements, the burden shifts to the party seeking the disclosure to establish the “disclosure is relevant and necessary.” Layne, 271 F.R.D. at 249. Neither party disputes that the court’s SPO governs this case. (See Protective Order,

Doc. No. 18.) The SPO defines “Protected Information” as “confidential or proprietary technical, scientific, financial, business, health, or medical information designated as such by the producing party.” (Id. at 2.) “Confidential Information,” the only designation at issue, is information that qualifies as protected information, but that is not restricted to “attorney’s eyes only.” (Id. at 3.) Pursuant to the SPO, a receiving party may challenge a designation at any time, and the SPO establishes the procedure to do so. (Id. at 10.) Ultimately, if the parties cannot resolve the issue themselves, the designating party may “move the court for a protective order or any other order to maintain the designation.” (Id.) ANALYSIS The GRP Defendants seek to maintain their confidential designation on approximately

thirty-five documents. (Mot. 3–4, Doc. No. 54.) They assert these documents consist of seven categories of documents—employee discipline records, incident reports, financial and insurance claim information, private communications regarding insurance claims, internal human resource notes, diversity statistics, and information for internal use. (Id. at 6–9.) At this stage, the GRP Defendants have met their burden. With respect to the first factor, the GRP Defendants contend the disputed records qualify as confidential commercial and private, internal company information. (Id.) And it is true that these categories of documents are generally the type of documents that “should be protected from unnecessary dissemination.” Hamilton v. Ogden Weber Tech. Coll., No. 1:16-cv-00048, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192963, at *13 (D. Utah Nov. 20, 2017) (unpublished). Further, Mr. Emuveyan agrees at least some of the information in these documents warrants protection. (Opp’n 3, Doc. No. 67.) The GRP Defendants have satisfied the first prong. Second, the court examines how the disclosure of the “information might be harmful.”

Layne, 271 F.R.D. at 249. The GRP Defendants contend dissemination of these documents would provide customers and competitors with internal policy information and harm their relationship and reputation as well as impact their ability to negotiate favorable insurance rates. (Mot., Doc. No. 54.) Further, the GRP Defendants believe dissemination would allow competitors to poach employees and customers and engage in adverse advertising. (Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order Regarding Protected Info. (“Reply”) 6, Doc. No. 74.) At this stage in litigation, in the context of a motion for protective order (as opposed to a motion to seal at the dispositive-motions stage), these general assertions are sufficient to meet the GRP Defendants’ burden to establish disclosure of these documents might be harmful. Lastly, the harm, at this stage, outweighs the need for access. There are no documents at

issue designated as attorneys-eyes only, and so Mr. Emuveyan has access to all the documents. (Reply 6, Doc. No. 74.) As Mr. Emuveyan correctly points out there “is a strong presumption in favor of public access.” Angilau v. United States, No. 2:16-00992, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197135, at *13 (D. Utah Nov. 29, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (unpublished). However, that presumption primarily applies to judicial documents. Id. at *12–13. Here, where the disputed documents are neither filed with the court1 nor connected to a dispute about a

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