Emory Clinic v. Houston

369 S.E.2d 913, 258 Ga. 434, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 332

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: July 15, 1988
• Docket: 45362, 45374
• Status: Published

Opinions

Per curiam.

We granted certiorari to determine the scope of statutory prohibitions on the use of information produced by peer review and medical review groups in civil litigation. Emory Clinic v. Houston, 185 Ga. App. 289 (364 SE2d 70) (1987).

1. By the following clear statutory mandate, the General Assembly has placed an absolute embargo upon the discovery and use of all proceedings, records, findings and recommendations of peer review groups and medical review committees in civil litigation:

The proceedings and records of medical review committees shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a provider of professional health services arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee; and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of such committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of such committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions of such committee or any member thereof.

OCGA § 31-7-143. ¹

2. Because of this affirmative prohibition, the analysis of privileged communications of individuals is inapplicable.

A person who has nothing to waive can waive nothing. Hence, prior newspaper reports óf peer review information cannot alter the prohibition on discovery of peer review information in civil litigation. This is in accord with our holding in Eubanks v. Ferrier, 245 Ga. 763 (267 SE2d 230) (1980), in which the plaintiff’s knowledge of peer review information from a peer review committee member did not alter the prohibition. See also Morton v. Skrine, 242 Ga. 844 (252 SE2d 408) (1979), in which a physician was denied the use of his own investigatory file in his suit against the state regulatory board after an article concerning his investigation had appeared in the newspaper.

3. It follows that the source of such information is also irrelevant. Because there is, by statute, no discovery² relative to medical or peer review proceedings, it matters not whether a proposed deponent is an official of Emory Clinic, of Emory University Hospital, or of Emory University.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Smith and Gregory, JJ., who dissent.

1 The prohibitions relative to peer review organizations, found at OCGA § 31-7-133, are similar to those concerning medical review committees.

The distinction between a peer review organization and a medical review committee is understood by comparing the definitions found at OCGA § 31-7-131 (3) and OCGA § 31-7-140.

OCGA § 31-7-131 (3) provides:

“ ‘Review organization’ means any panel, committee, or organization which is primarily composed of professional health care providers. . . .” (As amended in 1984.) (In 1983, a peer review organization was defined as “any committee engaging in peer review established by one of more State or local trade or professional societies or associations.”) OCGA § 31-7-140 provides:

“ ‘[M]edical review committee’ means a committee of a state or local professional society or of a medical staff or a licensed hospital... or peer review committee, provided the medical staff operates pursuant to written bylaws that have been approved by the governing board of the hospital. . . .” (Enacted in 1983.)

2 We find no merit to Houston’s contention that a committee composed of ophthalmologists from the medical staff of Emory Clinic (the Waring Committee) failed to comply with the statutory definition of a medical review committee pursuant to OCGA § 31-7-140 at all times relevant to this litigation. Thus all proceedings, records, findings and recommendations of this committee are immune from discovery.