Emmanuel Lopez v. County of San Joaquin, a California municipal corporation; Peter Devencenzi; Genevieve Vallotton; Phirun Var; and Does 1 through 100

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 17, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-03564
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 EMMANUEL LOPEZ, No. 2:25-cv-03564 WBS JDP 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 15 COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, a California municipal 16 corporation; PETER DEVENCENZI; GENEVIEVE VALLOTTON; PHIRUN VAR; 17 and DOES 1 through 100, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 This action originated from a series of gang-related 22 shootings between September and December 2015 in Stockton, 23 California. (Docket No. 1 Ex. A (“Compl.”) at 7.) Plaintiff 24 Emmanuel Lopez is an individual and resident of Los Angeles 25 County, California. (Id. at 5.) Defendants Peter Devencenzi and 26 Genevieve Vallotton were, at the times relevant to this action, 27 Deputy District Attorneys for the County of San Joaquin. (Id. at 28 6.) 1 Plaintiff alleges defendants knew that he did not 2 commit any of the crimes that occurred during these shootings. 3 (Id. at 6-7.) Yet, plaintiff claims, that did not deter 4 defendants from attempting to indict him via grand jury by 5 violating his constitutional rights. (Id. at 7.) 6 Specifically, plaintiff brings the following claims: 7 (1) a claim against the County, Devencenzi and Vallotton, and 8 Does 1 through 50 for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1; 9 (2) a claim against all defendants for use of fabricated 10 evidence;1 (3) a claim against all defendants for negligence; and 11 (4) a claim against all defendants for false imprisonment and 12 false arrest. (Docket No. 1 at 11-14.) Defendants now move to 13 dismiss the complaint. (Docket No. 4.)2 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 15 dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 16 upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 17 The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the 18 allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 19 inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has stated “a 20 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 21 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Further, an affirmative 22 1 In their Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1) and instant 23 motion (Docket No. 4-1 at 5), defendants point out that there is no basis for this claim under state law, and that it must be 24 brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which plaintiff appears to concede. (See Docket No. 13 at 30.) Accordingly, the court 25 evaluates plaintiff’s use of fabricated evidence claim under the federal, constitutional standard. 26

27 2 Because plaintiff’s counsel was unavailable for oral argument on the date set, the motion was taken under submission 28 and will be decided on the papers. 1 defense may be raised by motion to dismiss when “the defense 2 raises no disputed issues of fact.” Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 3 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). “In other words, dismissal based on 4 an affirmative defense is permitted when the complaint 5 establishes the defense.” U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n 6 v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis 7 in original). 8 I. Claims Against Devencenzi and Vallotton 9 Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against 10 Devencenzi and Vallotton on various grounds, including 11 prosecutorial immunity. (See generally Docket Nos. 4, 13, 19.) 12 Because the court finds that Devencenzi and Vallotton are 13 entitled to prosecutorial immunity for both plaintiff’s state and 14 federal claims, it need not address the remainder of the parties’ 15 dispute regarding those claims.3 See, e.g., Peterson v. Sutter 16 Med. Found., 615 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2022), aff'd, 17 No. 23-2911, 2025 WL 1823959 (9th Cir. July 2, 2025) (because 18 defendants “[we]re entitled to prosecutorial or quasi-judicial 19 immunity,” there was “no need to address the adequacy of the 20 claims” against them). 21 As a preliminary matter, the court notes that plaintiff 22 brings both federal and state law claims. Neither party mentions 23

24 3 This court recently granted defendants’ motion to dismiss in a related case concerning the same incident, finding 25 that Devencenzi and Vallotton were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lopez v. 26 Cnty. of San Joaquin, No. 2:25-cv-1792 WBS CSK, 2025 WL 3539092 27 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025). Some of what follows is reiterative of the court’s earlier analysis, with additional analysis 28 relevant to the novel claims in the instant action. 1 -- much less discusses -- whether the prosecutorial immunity 2 analysis differs in the context of state law claims. Cf. Garmon 3 v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F. 3d 837, 842-48 (9th Cir. 2016) 4 (separately analyzing “Federal Prosecutorial Immunity” and “State 5 Immunity”); Gatt v. Gascon, No. 2:24-cv-2740 FLA AGRX, 2025 WL 6 4058861 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (differentiating between 7 prosecutorial immunity in the federal and state law contexts). 8 This glaring oversight notwithstanding, the court will conduct 9 its own analysis. 10 As a defense to federal claims, absolute immunity 11 “appl[ies] with full force” to actions of prosecutors that are 12 “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 13 process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). These 14 actions include ones undertaken “in preparing for the initiation 15 of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the 16 course of [the prosecutor’s] role as an advocate for the State,” 17 such as the assembly and presentation of evidence “before a grand 18 jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been made.” 19 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). 20 “Intent should play no role in the immunity analysis.” 21 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F. 2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc); 22 see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (acknowledging that absolute 23 prosecutorial immunity could “leave the genuinely wronged 24 defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose 25 malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”). As 26 such, the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have found that federal 27 absolute immunity shields prosecutors who knowingly use false 28 testimony and suppress exculpatory evidence at trial, Imbler, 424 1 U.S. at 431; conspire with a judge to “predetermine the outcome 2 of a judicial proceeding,” Ashelman, 793 F. 2d at 1078; and 3 evaluate a witness in a manner that is “harsh, unfair or clouded 4 by personal animus,” Roe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 109 5 F.3d 578, 584 (9th Cir. 1997). 6 Devencenzi and Vallotton’s actions are covered by 7 absolute immunity as against plaintiff’s federal claim, 8 regardless of the intent governing their actions, see Ashelman, 9 793 F. 2d at 1078. Regarding whether Devencenzi and Vallotton 10 failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and knowingly used false 11 testimony, the Ninth Circuit has established that federal 12 absolute immunity extends to “the knowing use of false testimony 13 at trial” and “the suppression of exculpatory evidence.” 14 Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 15 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. This immunity applies equally to such 16 conduct when undertaken before a grand jury. See Herb Hallman 17 Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 643 (9th Cir. 1999) 18 (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 n.6 (1991)). 19 Devencenzi and Vallotton are likewise entitled to 20 California’s statutory prosecutorial immunity, which has been 21 found to be “at a minimum, coextensive with the absolute immunity 22 shielding prosecutors from § 1983 liability.” Colonies Partners 23 LP v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. 18-cv-420 JGB SHK, 2018 WL 24 6137147, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2018). Prosecutorial immunity 25 under California law is codified at California Government Code 26 Section 821.6, which provides that “[a] public employee is not 27 liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any 28 judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his 1 employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable 2 cause.” Cal. Govt. Code. § 821.6. 3 As with federal prosecutorial immunity, the California 4 statutory immunity analysis is function-based and turns on 5 conduct rather than theory. See Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 6 F. 4th 1265, 1280 (9th Cir. 2026) (“[Federal prosecutorial] 7 immunity turns on the nature of the function performed . . . and 8 is activity-based.” (internal citation and quotation marks 9 omitted)); Colonies, 2018 WL 6137147, at *12 (“[I]n order to 10 determine whether § 821.6 immunity applies, [the court] must look 11 to the conduct from which the claim arises, not merely the cause 12 of action under which the claim is pled.”); Robicheaux v. Cnty. 13 of Orange, 750 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (“[Section 14 821.6] immunity extends to any behavior that falls within the 15 common law meaning of malicious prosecution.”) 16 The Supreme Court of California recently clarified the 17 scope of Section 821.6 in Leon v. Cnty. of Riverside, 14 Cal. 5th 18 910 (2023), in holding that immunity did not apply to 19 investigatory activities independent of formal proceedings. Id. 20 at 915. Nonetheless, the court maintained that Section 821.6 21 “conferred absolute immunity against claims based on injuries 22 caused by wrongful prosecutions,” and that when this immunity 23 applies, it “is broad in the sense that it applies to every 24 [tortious or wrongful prosecution] claim whether formally labeled 25 as a claim for malicious prosecution or not.” Id. at 928. The 26 Leon court ultimately rejected the defendants’ immunity arguments 27 because the plaintiff “claim[ed] no harm resulting from the 28 institution or prosecution of judicial or administrative 1 proceedings.” Id. at 920. 2 Here, all of plaintiff’s harm is traceable to “the 3 institution or prosecution of judicial or administrative 4 proceedings,” namely his grand jury indictment. Plaintiff refers 5 to four instances of injurious conduct relevant to his claims, 6 all of which are described as results of the “indictment against 7 [plaintiff] before the Grand Jury” (See Compl. at 8-10.) The 8 complaint is permeated with descriptions of activity which can 9 only be described as prosecutorial: defendants acted “[i]n 10 preparation for the hearing,” they “elicited testimony . . . 11 before the Grand Jury,” “continued with charges against 12 [plaintiff]” and “proceeded to prosecute [him].” (Compl. at 8- 13 11.) Plaintiff’s attempt to circumvent immunity through 14 strategic claim-labeling is thus unsupported by the complaint, 15 whose factual predicate rests entirely on defendants’ 16 prosecutorial conduct in connection with grand jury proceedings. 17 Accordingly, because Devencenzi and Vallotton are 18 entitled to both federal and state prosecutorial immunity for 19 their actions, the court will dismiss plaintiff’s claims against 20 them. 21 II. Claims Against the County 22 Plaintiff also names the County as a defendant to all 23 four claims. However, the complaint makes no effort to plead 24 liability of the County under Monell v. Department of Social 25 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) on plaintiff’s federal claims. 26 Rather the complaint only provides one basis for liability 27 against the County: in his third claim, plaintiff alleges the 28 County “is vicariously liable for the acts of” defendants. 1 (Compl. at 13.) 2 California Government Code § 815.2(a) does provide 3 respondeat superior liability against public entities for “injury 4 proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee” of that 5 entity. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a). But as defendants point 6 out, this liability is cabined by Section 815.2(b), which states 7 that “a public entity is not liable . . . where the employee is 8 immune from liability.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(b). 9 Correspondingly, courts have consistently held that 10 public entities cannot be held vicariously liable when the 11 underlying employee conduct is statutorily immune. See, e.g., 12 Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 752 n.5 (1995) 13 (“Section 815.2, subdivision (b), provides derivative immunity 14 for the public entity[.]”); Jones v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 15 11-cv-2851 SJO VBKX, 2012 WL 12844754, at *13 (C.D. Cal. 2012) 16 (finding that “municipal County Defendants are . . . immune 17 pursuant to [Section 815.2(b)]” after finding immunity for 18 individuals’ conduct); Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. 19 App. 4th 1033, 1050 (2007) (“Individual defendants are immune 20 from liability [under Section 821.6] . . . [t]he city also is 21 therefore immune from liability[.]”). Having found that 22 defendants Devencenzi and Vallotton are entitled to prosecutorial 23 immunity under Section 821.6, the court in turn finds the County 24 likewise immune from liability under Section 815.2(b). 25 Plaintiff’s complaint offers no other theory under 26 which the County may be held liable for the actions of Devencenzi 27 and Vallotton or any other theory for why the County may be held 28 liable independently. Accordingly, the court will dismiss me EEE INE OE I EEE IE III EEE INDE EEE EIDE IRE USES ISO EE

1 plaintiff’s claims against the County. 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 3 dismiss (Docket No. 4) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 4 Counts I, II, III, and IV are DISMISSED.#4 5 Plaintiff has twenty-one (21) days from the date of 6 this Order to file an amended complaint if he can do so 7 consistent with this Orde~ . 8 | Dated: March 16, 2026 Cee OE on EE pete (hk. WILLIAM B. SHUBB 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 4 The complaint also names Officer Var as a defendant in claims 2, 3, and 4. (Compl. at 11-14.) However, plaintiff’s complaint mentions Var only once, noting merely that he at one 22 point “took a recorded statement” (Id. at 8), and is otherwise devoid of factual allegations as to him. Plaintiff then names 23 | Var in his claims, recites the applicable legal standard, and baldly asserts that “as a result of [his] conduct, [plaintiff] 24 was harmed.” (Compl. at 11-14.) This generalized claim 5 language, unsupported by any factual specificity whatsoever, > represents “exactly the type of ‘unadorned, the-defendant- 26 unlawfully-harmed-me accusations’ that fail to state a claim or meet Rule 8’s pleading requirement.” Mendoza v. Amazon.com 27 Services LLC, 2025 WL 2257483, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2025) (citing Iqbal, 566 U.S., at 678). Accordingly, the complaint 28 | will be dismissed as against defendant Var as well.