Opinion
GEORGE, C. J.
Plaintiff Ardeshir Asgari was arrested and later charged with a criminal offense. He remained in custody for more than seven months, until he was acquitted following a jury trial. He sued the arresting police officers, and the city that employed them, for false arrest and related causes of action and, following a jury trial, obtained a judgment against the city and one of the officers in the amount of $1,327,000.
We granted review to decide whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a police officer’s liability for false arrest may include damages sustained by the arrestee after the filing of formal charges where, for example, the officer knowingly presented false evidence to the prosecutor. In so instructing the jury, the trial court relied upon a federal decision, Smiddy v. Varney (9th Cir. 1981) 665 F.2d 261, that determined the appropriate measure of damages in an action alleging that an improper arrest constituted an intentional invasion of civil rights under 42 United States Code section 1983. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Smiddy decision does not reflect the applicable California law, and that the jury should have been instructed that the immunity from liability for injury caused by malicious prosecution, provided to public employees by Government Code section 821.6, precludes a plaintiff in a false arrest action from recovering damages that are attributable to the period of the plaintiff’s incarceration that follows his or her arraignment on criminal charges.
I
Plaintiff Ardeshir Asgari sued the City of Los Angeles and several of its employees and agents, including Los Angeles Police Detective Ruperto V. Sanchez, for false arrest and related causes of action. Plaintiff had been arrested and prosecuted for possession for sale of a pound of heroin as the [749]*749result of an undercover narcotics investigation, and was acquitted following a jury trial.
Plaintiff testified that he was born in Iran and became a member of that country’s national wrestling team. On July 24, 1982, he defected from Iran while traveling in Venezuela with the wrestling team and eventually came to the United States. Plaintiff’s father and uncle were officials in the Iranian government and had vowed to kill plaintiff because he had defected.
In 1986 and 1987, plaintiff became a National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) All-American wrestler, finishing in the top six nationally in his weight class, and was invited to the Olympic trials. The top two finishers would make the team.
Several weeks before he was arrested,, plaintiff met Mahmoud Bassir outside the gymnasium at the college plaintiff attended. Plaintiff did not know that Bassir was a police informant. Bassir introduced himself as Mohammed Hussein, and they had a conversation in Farsi. After plaintiff’s wrestling practice concluded, plaintiff encountered Bassir outside the gym, and Bassir walked home with plaintiff. They met several times after that and became friends.
Bassir told plaintiff he was in the diamond business and had been “ripped off’ by a woman named Sylvia Reyes (who, unbeknownst to plaintiff, also was a police informant) and wanted to recoup his loss by selling her dirt rather than diamonds. At Bassir’s behest, plaintiff telephoned Reyes and said he wanted to do business. Bassir had instructed plaintiff to refer to diamonds as “medicine.” Reyes expressed interest and later met plaintiff at a Holiday Inn. Plaintiff told her he had medicine to sell, and Reyes said she would pay $35,000. Plaintiff was shocked at this figure. Bassir later told him that $35,000 was the exact amount Reyes owed him. Bassir asked plaintiff to arrange to meet Reyes once more, but told plaintiff that Bassir would conduct the transaction himself.
On December 15,1987, plaintiff met Reyes and drove her to his apartment complex to meet Bassir. They walked around looking for Bassir. Reyes said she was tired and leaned against an automobile. Reyes noticed a briefcase underneath the vehicle, picked it up, and carried it to the third floor. Reyes opened the briefcase, and plaintiff looked inside. Reyes then shut the briefcase and went back downstairs with it.
When plaintiff and Reyes reached the parking lot, several men began running toward them. Reyes dropped the briefcase, and plaintiff kicked it [750]*750underneath an automobile. The men were undercover police officers working with Detective Sanchez. Sanchez and his fellow officers arrested plaintiff and placed him in handcuffs. Plaintiff’s wallet, containing his driver’s license, was in his pocket. Plaintiff was placed in jail, where he remained for seven months and six days, missing the Olympic trials.
The evidence introduced by defendants provided a dramatically different version of the events leading to plaintiff’s arrest. In September 1987, Los Angeles Police Detective Charles Uribe arrested Bassir for possession of heroin for sale and arranged for Bassir to become a police informant. Bassir subsequently provided reliable information leading to the arrest of two drug dealers.
In December 1987, Bassir telephoned Detective Uribe, stating he had met an Iranian man who desired to sell a pound of Persian brown heroin. Because it appeared the alleged dealer was located in Orange County, Detective Uribe contacted Detective Sanchez, who assumed responsibility for the investigation.1 Detective Sanchez provided Bassir with the telephone number of Reyes, a reliable paid informant with whom Detective Sanchez had worked for more than 10 years.
Bassir passed on Reyes’s telephone number to plaintiff, and on December 14, 1987, plaintiff called Reyes and said he wanted to conduct some “business” concerning brown “medicine” (which Reyes took to mean brown heroin), setting the price at $35,000. They met at a Holiday Inn to discuss the transaction.
Plaintiff telephoned Reyes the following day, December 15, 1987, and stated he was ready to complete the deal. Plaintiff and Reyes met at 8 p.m. and, after plaintiff asked to see the money, they drove to the parking lot of a nearby movie theater where Detective Sanchez, posing as Reyes’s brother, approached the vehicle and showed plaintiff the money. After plaintiff produced a small sample of heroin, plaintiff drove Reyes to plaintiff’s apartment complex. Sanchez and other detectives followed surreptitiously.
Plaintiff parked his vehicle, and he and Reyes exited and walked around the complex. Plaintiff entered an apartment and returned with a briefcase. He opened the briefcase in a hallway on the second floor and removed two plastic bags containing heroin, but quickly closed the briefcase and began walking rapidly toward the staircase when he noticed one of the undercover detectives nearby.
[751]*751The other undercover detectives pursued plaintiff and found him walking in the parking lot, carrying the briefcase. Just before one of the detectives reached him, plaintiff slid the briefcase under a parked automobile. The detectives placed plaintiff under arrest and retrieved the briefcase, which contained plastic bags of heroin, plaintiff’s driver’s license, and various “school papers.” A search of plaintiff’s apartment did not reveal any evidence of drugs or drug dealing. Sanchez seized the heroin, but left the briefcase and papers at plaintiff’s apartment.
On December 16, 1987, the day following plaintiff’s arrest, Los Angeles Police Department Detective Thomas Thompson obtained a warrant pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11470, which provides that all proceeds of drug transactions are subject to forfeiture, and seized the assets in plaintiff’s bank account. These funds were returned to plaintiff following his acquittal of criminal charges.2
In closing argument at the conclusion of the trial in the present civil proceedings, plaintiff’s attorney argued that Detective Sanchez, Bassir, and Reyes were “damn liars” who intentionally had framed plaintiff. Counsel urged the jury to award damages to compensate plaintiff for spending more than seven months in jail.
At plaintiff’s request, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the decision in Smiddy v. Varney, supra, 665 F.2d 261, as follows: “Where police officers act maliciously or with reckless disregard for the rights of an arrested person, they are liable for damages suffered by the arrested person even after the district attorney files charges if the presumption of independent judgment by the district attorney is rebutted. [¶] An example of facts which would support such a rebuttal are: 1. A showing by plaintiff that the [752]*752district attorney was pressured or caused by the defendant investigating officers to act contrary to his independent judgment. [¶] 2. A showing by plaintiff that the defendant officers presented information to the district attorney that they knew to be false.[¶] Such a showing will rebut the presumption of independent judgment by the district attorney and further the police officers will not be immunized from plaintiff’s false arrest damages after the filing of the criminal complaint. These examples are not intended to be exclusive.”
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding him $1,262,000 from the City of Los Angeles and Detective Sanchez jointly ($750,000 for false arrest and false imprisonment, $400,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress, $70,000 for conspiracy, and $42,000 for conversion), plus an additional $65,000 in punitive damages from Detective Sanchez only, for a total award of $1,327,000. The Court of Appeal reversed that portion of the resulting judgment awarding damages of $70,000 for conspiracy, because this award duplicated damages assessed against defendants under other causes of action, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
As noted at the outset, we granted review to decide whether the jury instruction requested by plaintiff and based upon the decision in Smiddy v. Varney, supra, 665 F.2d 261, accurately states the applicable California law.
II
Under California law, a police officer is granted statutory immunity from liability for malicious prosecution, but not for false arrest and imprisonment.3 (Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 719 [117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865].) Government Code section 821.64 provides: “A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.”5 But section 820.4, which grants immunity for a public employee’s “act or omission, exercising due care, in the execution or enforcement of any law,” [753]*753states: “Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment."6
In Jackson v. City of San Diego (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 579 [175 Cal.Rptr. 395], the Court of Appeal concluded that the Legislature’s imposition of liability for false arrest and false imprisonment, coupled with its grant of immunity for malicious prosecution, evidenced the Legislature’s “intent that a ceiling be placed on damages which may be awarded for false imprisonment, limiting those damages to the period of incarceration beginning with the false arrest, but ending when lawful process begins.” (Id. at p. 582.) In Jackson, that meant that the plaintiff was “entitled to all the damages he suffered during the period from his warrantless arrest to the date he was rearrested pursuant to the grand jury indictment.” (Ibid.)
The appellate court in Jackson observed that there are two ways by which to determine whether a police officer’s liability for damages caused by false arrest and false imprisonment ends when criminal charges are instituted. The first is to determine whether the institution of criminal charges breaks the chain of causation so that further damages are not attributable to the false arrest and false imprisonment. The chain of causation is broken if the institution of criminal charges constitutes an independent intervening act. The court in Jackson recognized that the determination whether the institution of criminal charges constitutes an independent intervening act depends upon the particular circumstances of each case, a process necessitating a time-consuming factual inquiry. The court in Jackson, rejecting this means of resolving the issue, instead favored an approach analyzing the Legislature’s purpose in immunizing public employees from damages for malicious prosecution while retaining liability for damages caused by false arrest and false imprisonment.7
The court in Jackson recognized the difference between the tort of false imprisonment, which is premised upon a violation of the personal liberty of another accomplished without lawful authority, and the tort of malicious [754]*754prosecution, which constitutes procuring the arrest or prosecution of another under lawful process, but from a malicious motive and without probable cause. (Jackson v. City of San Diego, supra, 121 Cal.App.3d 579, 585.) “Even though each tort may cause a person to be restrained or confined, each remains distinct, protecting different personal interests. False imprisonment protects the personal interest in freedom from restraint of movement; malicious prosecution protects the personal interest in freedom from unjustifiable litigation.” (Ibid.)
As noted above, the Legislature recognized this distinction between the torts of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution in enacting the California Tort Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.), by providing immunity for malicious prosecution (§821.6) while imposing liability for false arrest and false imprisonment (§ 820.4). To allow a plaintiff who brings an action for false imprisonment to recover damages suffered as a result of incarceration after the arrestee has been arraigned on formal charges (or after a grand jury has returned an indictment) effectively would nullify, in part, the statutory immunity for malicious prosecution. Accordingly, the court in Jackson concluded that, in light of the legislative decision to grant immunity to all public employees for malicious prosecution, “[a]s tempting as it might be to focus on the legalism of proximate cause to compensate Jackson for all damages he suffered, we cannot do so.” (Jackson v. City of San Diego, supra, 121 Cal.App.3d 579, 588.)
Federal law governing actions under 42 United States Code section 1983 (hereafter section 1983)8 for violation of civil rights, as reflected in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Smiddy v. Varney, supra, 665 F.2d 261, embodies a different rule. The plaintiff in Smiddy brought an action under section 1983 against employees of the Los Angeles Police Department for violation of civil rights caused by his arrest on a charge of murder. A criminal complaint was filed four days after his arrest; a preliminary hearing was conducted, and the plaintiff was bound over to the superior court. The superior court later set aside the information for insufficient.evidence.
The Ninth Circuit held: “Filing of a criminal complaint immunizes investigating officers such as the appellants from damages suffered thereafter because it is presumed that the prosecutor filing the complaint exercised independent judgment in determining that probable cause for an accused’s [755]*755arrest exists at that time. This presumption may be rebutted, however. For example, a showing that the district attorney was pressured or caused by the investigating officers to act contrary to his independent judgment will rebut the presumption and remove the immunity. Also the presentation by the officers to the district attorney of information known by them to be false will rebut the presumption. These examples are not intended to be exclusive. Perhaps the presumption may be rebutted in others ways.” (Smiddy v. Varney, supra, 665 F.2d at pp. 266-267.)
The Ninth Circuit thus adopted an approach—nearly identical to that rejected by the California Court of Appeal in Jackson—of determining whether the institution of criminal charges breaks the chain of causation so that further damages are not attributable to the false arrest and false imprisonment. This difference in approach arises from fundamental differences between federal law governing actions under section 1983 and California law regarding governmental liability and immunity for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.9
Governmental immunity for claims of violation of civil rights under section 1983 is not conferred expressly by statute, but is based upon a judicial gloss on section 1983. As the United States Supreme Court has stated: “Although the statute on its face admits of no immunities, we have read it ‘in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.’ [Citation.]” (Malley v. Briggs (1986) 475 U.S. 335, 339 [106 S.Ct. 1092, 1095, 89 L.Ed.2d 271]; Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation (1985) 95 Yale L.J. 126, 129 [“[I]t is important to note that the law of qualified immunity is entirely a creation of the courts, without textual basis in either the Constitution or statute.” (Fn. omitted.)].) The high court looks to whether “an official was accorded immunity from [756]*756tort actions at common law when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871,” and then considers whether Congress intended to incorporate that immunity into section 1983. (Tower v. Glover (1984) 467 U.S. 914, 920 [104 S.Ct. 2820, 2825, 81 L.Ed.2d 758].) The scope of governmental immunity available in a section 1983 action, therefore, depends upon the nature of the governmental duties performed by the defendant.
Under federal law, judges are granted absolute immunity “for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” (Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 554 [87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288].) Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity from damages arising from “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,” because such activities are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 [96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128].)
“For executive officials in general, . . . qualified immunity represents the norm.” (Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 800, 807 [102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732, 73 L.Ed.2d 396].) Police officers are granted a qualified immunity shielding them from liability for damages caused by their official acts “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (Id. at p. 818 [102 S.Ct. at p. 2738].) Under federal law, therefore, a police officer is liable for all damages proximately caused by his or her official acts that a reasonable person would have known to violate clearly established rights, including such acts that would constitute malicious prosecution. (Cook v. Sheldon (2d Cir. 1994) 41 F.3d 73, 79 [“Section 1983 liability may also be anchored in a claim for malicious prosecution, as this tort ‘typically implicates constitutional rights secured by the fourteenth amendment, such as deprivation of liberty.’ [Citation.]”].)
California law regarding the presence or absence of governmental immunity for false arrest and malicious prosecution differs in at least two respects from federal law governing immunity from actions under section 1983. First, governmental immunity under California law is governed by statute. Second, Government Code sections 820.4 and 821.6 focus upon the nature of the alleged tort, rather than the nature of the governmental duties performed by the defendant.
As noted above, California law grants immunity to any “public employee” for damages arising from malicious prosecution. (§ 821.6.) “Although Government Code section 821.6 has primarily been applied to immunize prosecuting attorneys and other similar individuals, this section is [757]*757not restricted to legally trained personnel but applies to all employees of a public entity. [Citation.]” (Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1436 [246 Cal.Rptr. 609].) Section 821.6 “applies to police officers as well as public prosecutors since both are public employees within the meaning of the Government Code.” (Randle v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 449, 455.) “Immunity under Government Code section 821.6 is dependent on how the injury is caused . . . .” (Baughman v. State of California (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 182, 192 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 82]; Amylou R. v. County of Riverside (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1211 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 319].)
Under California law, a police officer may be held liable for false arrest and false imprisonment, but not for malicious prosecution. (§§ 820.4, 821.6.) The tort of false imprisonment is defined as “the ‘unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.’ ” (Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 715 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 872 P.2d 559].) The confinement must be “ ‘without lawful privilege.’ ” (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1123 [252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46].) By contrast, “Malicious prosecution ‘consists of initiating or procuring the arrest and prosecution of another under lawful process, but from malicious motives and without probable cause. . . .’” (Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 12 Cal.3d 710, 720, original italics.) “False arrest or imprisonment and malicious prosecution are mutually inconsistent concepts, the former relating to conduct that is without valid legal authority and the latter to conduct where there is valid process or due authority.” (Randle v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 449, 456; cf. McKay v. County of San Diego (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 251, 256 [168 Cal.Rptr. 442] [an officer who obtains an arrest warrant based upon deliberately false information and personally executes the warrant with malice may be liable for false arrest pursuant to Civil Code section 43.55 (former section 43.5, subdivision (a)), which provides conditional immunity for an officer who executes an arrest warrant only if the officer “acts without malice”] and Harden v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 7, 17 [263 Cal.Rptr. 549] [the rule in McKay applies where the officer did not make the arrest personally, but “took a very active role in actually securing the arrest warrant and participated in having it served by a fellow police officer under his own authority”].)
Plaintiff contends that his false imprisonment “continued from the date of his arrest to the date of his release from prison” more than seven months later. That is incorrect. Plaintiff’s false imprisonment ended when he was arraigned in municipal court on the felony complaint seven days after he was arrested. At that point, plaintiff’s confinement was pursuant to lawful process and no longer constituted false imprisonment.
[758]*758As recognized by the Court of Appeal in Jackson v. City of San Diego, supra, 121 Cal.App.3d 579, the Legislature’s imposition of liability when a police officer causes a suspect to be confined unlawfully (false arrest), coupled with the Legislature’s grant of absolute immunity when a police officer, maliciously and without probable cause, causes a suspect to be confined through the initiation of lawful process (malicious prosecution), evidences a legislative intent to shield police officers from liability for damages that are attributable to a suspect’s incarceration after the institution of lawful process. It follows that a police officer’s liability for false arrest does not include damages caused by incarceration following the arrestee’s arraignment on formal charges.10
Attempting to engraft upon California law the federal rule embodied in Smiddy v. Varney, supra, 665 F.2d 261, would produce absurd results.11 If a police officer falsely arrested a suspect and then knowingly provided false [759]*759information to the prosecutor, the officer could be found liable for damages arising from the entire period of the suspect’s incarceration. But the officer would enjoy absolute immunity if, instead of arresting the suspect, the officer proceeded directly to the prosecutor and maliciously and knowingly provided false information that led to the filing of criminal charges. Such conduct would constitute malicious prosecution, and the officer would enjoy absolute immunity from liability under section 821.6. (Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 12 Cal.3d 710, 720; Tur v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 897 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 470]; Amylou R. v. County of Riverside, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1210; Collins v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d 671, 678.) A police officer also would be immune from liability if the officer lawfully arrested a suspect, but thereafter maliciously and knowingly provided the prosecutor with false information that led to the filing of criminal charges against the suspect. A police officer’s liability for damages arising from the filing of criminal charges, in conjunction with his or her malicious provision of false information to the prosecutor, should not depend upon whether the filing of criminal charges was preceded by an unlawful arrest.
Plaintiff contends that, “[u]nder principles of waiver and estoppel,” defendants are precluded from arguing that the trial court erred in giving the challenged instruction based upon the decision in Smiddy v. Varney, supra, 665 F.2d 261, because defendants also relied upon the decision in Smiddy in requesting an instruction stating a different proposition.12 We do not agree. Citing a particular decision as authority for a requested jury instruction does not preclude a party from arguing on appeal that the trial court erred in giving a different instruction based upon the same decision but stating a different proposition of law.
Plaintiff mistakenly relies upon the rule stated in Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 241, 255 [259 Cal.Rptr. 311], that “ ‘[a] party may not complain of the giving of instructions which he has requested. [Citation.]’ ” That rule does not apply in the present case, because defendants did not request the challenged instruction.
We hold that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, in accordance with the decision in Smiddy v. Varney, supra, 665 F.2d 261, that a [760]*760police officer’s liability for false arrest may include damages sustained by the arrestee after the arrestee has been arraigned on criminal charges where, for example, the officer knowingly presented false evidence to the prosecutor. This error prejudiced defendants, because it appears likely the jury based its award of damages for false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress in large part upon the circumstance that plaintiff was incarcerated for more than seven months and, as a result, lost his opportunity to compete in the Olympics.13 (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 570 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298].) The focus of plaintiff’s argument to the jury regarding damages was the length of plaintiff’s incarceration and the resulting frustration of plaintiff’s Olympic aspirations. Plaintiff’s trial counsel began his argument concerning damages by referring to the length of plaintiff’s incarceration: “Being in jail for seven months and six days, away from your wife of one year, away from everything you like to do is a terrible, terrible, terrible thing. The Orange County jail as we all know is not a pleasant place to be. [¶] Now take that seven months and six days and add to that the fact that you are innocent....[¶] Think if you would of what goes through your mind for every one of those 216 days and every hour and every minute of what that does to you knowing that you’re there and you shouldn’t be there.” Plaintiff’s counsel emphasized this point by returning to it in concluding his final summation: “[Defendants] have to prove that it was reasonable to arrest him and put him in jail for seven months and six days and destroy his dream. They took from him what no one else could, and they did it intentionally, ... but I think today is the day when someone says Sanchez, you’ve got to answer. Please make him answer. Thank you.” Accordingly, defendants are entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages for false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress.14
Defendants further contend the judgment should be reversed because the trial court refused their request that the jury be instructed in accordance [761]*761with section 821.6, as follows: “A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause. [¶]A preliminary hearing and criminal trial are judicial proceedings within the meaning of this instruction. [¶] A narcotics asset forfeiture hearing is a judicial proceeding within the meaning of this instruction.” We agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal that the trial court did not err in refusing this instruction, because no evidence was introduced establishing that a narcotics assets forfeiture hearing took place. (Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th 548, 572.)
Ill
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed to the extent it affirms the award of damages for false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as related punitive damages,15 and is affirmed in all others respects. The Court of Appeal is directed to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.