Valenta Duncan v. County of Sacramento

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00908
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VALENTA DUNCAN, No. 2:25-cv-0908-TLN-CKD (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants Alameda 18 County Sheriff’s Department and County of Sacramento1 moved to dismiss plaintiff’s second 19 amended complaint (“SAC”). Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, this matter is before the 20 undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). As set forth below, 21 plaintiff has not opposed the motion to dismiss by Alameda County Sheriff’s Department after 22 being specifically cautioned that failure to do so would be deemed as consent to grant the motion 23 to dismiss. Thus, the undersigned recommends plaintiff’s claims against Alameda County 24 Sheriff’s Department be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). As to 25 County of Sacramento’s motion, the undersigned recommends the motion to dismiss be denied. 26

27 1 County of Sacramento is also sued as Post Release Community Supervision Department, Adult Community Corrections (ACC) Division, Adult Day Reporting Center (ADRC), Sacramento 28 Adult Probation Division, and Probation Department Adult Day Reporting Center. 1 I. Background 2 Proceeding without counsel, plaintiff Valenta Duncan filed this action in the Sacramento 3 County Superior Court on September 5, 2023, naming County of Sacramento and Doe 4 defendants. (ECF No. 2 at 4-7.) Plaintiff filed the operative SAC on February 11, 2025. (Id. at 30- 5 44).2 Under the SAC’s allegations, plaintiff was pulled over by the Alameda County Sheriff’s 6 Department in San Leandro, CA, on January 20, 2023, for a missing rear license plate. The 7 deputy informed plaintiff of a no-bail warrant issued by the Sacramento County Adult Probation 8 Division. Plaintiff was never on probation in Sacramento County and explained he was 9 discharged from supervision in Alameda County two years prior. Plaintiff was arrested on the 10 erroneous warrant and taken to jail. Sacramento County officers took custody on January 23, 11 2023, and transferred him to the Sacramento County Jail. On January 30, 2023 (ten days after 12 arrest), plaintiff met with a public defender who informed him there had been an error and the 13 warrant was dismissed. Plaintiff lost his job and suffered other harm as a result. (Id. at 33-36.) 14 Plaintiff alleges a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 15 searches and seizures and references his right to [due] process of law and “right to Post Bail 16 unless denied by Law or Statute where permitted otherwise[.]” (ECF No. 2 at 35.) Plaintiff also 17 asserts a state-law negligence claim. (Id. at 36-37.) 18 Defendant Alameda County Sheriff’s Department removed the case to this court on March 19 20, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) On March 27, 2025, defendants County of Sacramento and Alameda 20 County Sheriff’s Department separately filed their motions to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 6, 7.) The 21 hearing date for both motions was vacated after plaintiff did not timely file a written opposition or 22 statement of opposition to either motion. (ECF No. 12.) By order filed on April 23, 2025, the 23 court granted plaintiff 21 days to file responses to both motions and cautioned that failure to do so 24 would be construed as non-opposition and consent to granting the motions to dismiss. (Id.) 25 On May 14, 2025, plaintiff filed an opposition to County of Sacramento’s motion to 26 dismiss, alternately requesting leave to amend if the court finds the SAC fails to state a claim 27 2 The court takes judicial notice of the pleadings filed in state court. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 28 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007). 1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 13.) County of Sacramento filed a reply (ECF No. 14.) The 2 court finds the motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g). 3 Plaintiff has not opposed the motion by Alameda County Sheriff’s Department. 4 II. Legal Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6) 5 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be warranted 6 for “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 7 cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In 8 evaluating whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as 9 true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to 10 the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 11 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Particularly because plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court liberally 12 construes the pleadings and affords plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 13 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, courts are not required to accept as true allegations that 14 are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. 15 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 III. County of Sacramento’s Motion (ECF No. 6) 17 County of Sacramento asserts the following arguments: (1) plaintiff’s claims asserting 18 violation of his Fourth Amendment rights fail as a matter of law; (2) the court should decline to 19 exercise supplemental jurisdiction; (3) the County is immune from liability for negligence under 20 Section 815 of the Government Code; and (4) any County employee would be immune for the 21 procurement of an arrest warrant pursuant to Section 821.6 of the California Government Code. 22 (ECF No. 6-1 at 3-8.) 23 A. Monell Claim against County of Sacramento 24 Section 1983, 42 U.S.C., imposes liability on any “person” who violates an individual’s 25 federal rights while acting under color of state law, which includes municipalities and other local 26 government units. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 689-90 (1978). To 27 establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a plaintiff must prove (1) deprivation of 28 a constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) this policy amounts to deliberate 1 indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind 2 the constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011); see 3 also Gant v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 617 (9th Cir. 2014). 4 County of Sacramento argues, first, plaintiff fails to state an underlying constitutional 5 violation because he couches his claim as respondent superior liability and states the relevant 6 conduct was negligence. (ECF No. 6-1 at 4.) While plaintiff claims negligence on the part of 7 County of Sacramento or its employees, plaintiff also alleges the “outdated customary policies, 8 procedures and/or practices… allowed their agents, their employees, their representatives and/or 9 their co-defendant(s)” to violate his civil rights, including his rights under the Fourth Amendment 10 pertaining to unreasonable seizures. (ECF No. 2 at 34-35, ¶ 10.) 11 County of Sacramento argues, second, the allegations about the county’s policies and/or 12 practices do not suffice to allege a specific policy that amounts to deliberate indifference and was 13 the moving force behind any violation. (ECF No. 6-1 at 5.) In this circuit, a claim of municipal 14 liability under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even when based on a 15 bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or 16 practice. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 682-83 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Karim– 17 Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff alleges his name 18 appeared in an antiquated database as formerly having participated in the Post Release 19 Community Supervision Program, that County of Sacramento lacked jurisdiction to issue an 20 arrest warrant, and that County of Sacramento’s outdated policies or practices caused the 21 resulting alleged Fourth Amendment violation. (ECF No. 2 at 34-36, ¶¶ 9, 10, 13.) 22 County of Sacramento does not cite any authorities requiring plaintiff to more specifically 23 plead his claim. Plaintiff meets the pleading standard with respect to the alleged policy, custom, 24 or practice because the allegations give defendant fair notice to defend itself effectively, and, 25 taken as true, plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of 26 Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 27 The remaining question is whether plaintiff sufficiently alleges a specific deprivation of 28 his constitutional rights. To any extent he claims a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due 1 process rights based on the arrest or the conduct that resulted in the arrest, plaintiff does not 2 adequately allege an underlying constitutional violation. No substantive due process claim lies 3 under the Fourteenth Amendment for the arrest itself because the Fourth Amendment applies. See 4 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an 5 explicit textual source of constitutional protection” …, ‘that Amendment, not the more 6 generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’”) 7 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). 8 The loss of liberty caused by an individual’s mistaken incarceration after the lapse of a 9 certain amount of time can give rise to a due process claim where it was or should have been 10 known that the individual was entitled to release. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 683; Baker v. McCollan, 11 443 U.S. 137, 144 (1979) (detention in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the 12 lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of liberty without due process of law). 13 However, the SAC does not plead a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment relating 14 to his continued detention. The alleged policy failure resulting in the erroneous warrant is not 15 sufficient to plead an underlying Fourteenth Amendment violation. See Gant, 772 F.3d at 622. 16 Turning to the Fourth Amendment, County of Sacramento argues (1) “warrants are 17 presumed valid”; (2) plaintiff fails to allege if anyone from County of Sacramento actually 18 obtained the warrant; and (3) if the warrant were for a violation of probation or merely being 19 executed, then “perhaps these are state actions for which Eleventh Amendment immunity may 20 apply.” (ECF No. 6-1 at 4.) 21 Reviewing the arguments in reverse order, defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity 22 argument is expressed as a conditional possibility. Such an argument fails to meet defendant’s 23 burden to demonstrate the claim should be dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. 24 In addition, liberally construing the pro se pleading as the court must, plaintiff alleges 25 County of Sacramento and its purported divisions, departments, or officials were responsible for 26 issuing an invalid arrest warrant which caused a Fourth Amendment violation upon arrest. To the 27 extent County of Sacramento argues the claim should be dismissed because plaintiff fails to 28 allege a County employee actually obtained the warrant, the court rejects the argument. 1 Finally, in support of the assertion that plaintiff does not state an alleged Fourth 2 Amendment violation because warrants are presumed valid, County of Sacramento cites Franks v. 3 Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (“There is, of course, a presumption of validity with respect 4 to the affidavit supporting the search warrant.”). Franks does not itself support a conclusion that 5 plaintiff fails to allege a Fourth Amendment violation in this case and defendants provide no 6 further elaboration on this argument. 7 For all these reasons, County of Sacramento fails to meet its burden to show plaintiff’s 8 Monell claim asserting a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights fails as a matter of law. The 9 motion to dismiss should be denied on this point. 10 B. State Law Immunities 11 County of Sacramento argues it is immune from liability on plaintiff’s negligence claim 12 pursuant to Government Code § 815, which abolished common law or judicially declared forms 13 of liability and established that all public entity tort liability is statutory. (ECF No. 6-1 at 6.) 14 Liberally construing the complaint, the SAC’s caption makes clear that plaintiff brings his claim 15 under Government Code § 815.2. (ECF No. 2 at 30.) That section provides as follows: 16 (a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of 17 his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his 18 personal representative. 19 (b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee 20 of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability. 21 Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2. Given the SAC’s explicit reliance on Government Code § 815.2, 22 County of Sacramento fails to show it is entitled to immunity under Government Code § 815. 23 County of Sacramento also argues any of its employee would be immune based on 24 Government Code § 821.6. (ECF No. 6-1 at 6-8.) That section provides as follows: 25 A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the 26 scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause. 27 28 Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6. 1 Section 821.6 protects public employees from liability only for malicious prosecution and 2 not for false imprisonment. Sullivan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 719 (1974). 3 “Malicious prosecution ‘consists of initiating or procuring the arrest and prosecution of another 4 under lawful process, but from malicious motives and without probable cause[.] The test is 5 whether the defendant was actively instrumental in causing the prosecution.” Id. at 720 (emphasis 6 in original) (cleaned up). “Although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the torts of 7 false arrest and malicious prosecution, the critical difference is whether there is valid legal 8 authority for the arrest.” Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1998); 9 see also Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 757 (1997), as modified on denial of 10 reh’g (Mar. 17, 1997) (“False arrest or imprisonment and malicious prosecution are mutually 11 inconsistent concepts, the former relating to conduct that is without valid legal authority and the 12 latter to conduct where there is valid process or due authority.”). 13 County of Sacramento argues the alleged invalid obtaining of an arrest warrant and 14 subsequent detention is considered malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 6-1 at 7.) However, the case 15 cited as support is distinguishable. In Scannell v. Cnty. of Riverside, 152 Cal. App. 3d 596, 608 16 (Ct. App. 1984), the plaintiff alleged “criminal proceedings against him were instituted with the 17 full knowledge of all defendants that he had previously been granted immunity from prosecution 18 for the charged offenses.” Id. at 607. The state court of appeal found the plaintiff had alleged 19 malicious prosecution, not false imprisonment, because he alleged that only the arrest warrant 20 was invalid and did not allege the arrest itself or subsequent detention was invalid. Id. at 608. In 21 this case, in contrast, plaintiff alleges the warrant, his arrest, and subsequent detention were 22 legally unauthorized. 23 County of Sacramento also notes courts have found a claim based on “negligent 24 investigation which leads to an arrest” to sound in malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 6-1 at 7.) 25 Such a situation also involves valid legal authority for the arrest, which is not the case here. 26 Under the allegations in the SAC, the arrest was not procured under lawful process, and there was 27 no legal authority to arrest or detain plaintiff. County of Sacramento does not meet the burden to 28 show plaintiff’s negligence claim should be dismissed based on the state law immunities asserted. 1 IV. ACSD’s Unopposed Motion (ECF No. 7) 2 Alameda County Sheriff’s Department (“ACSD”) asserts the following arguments: (1) 3 ACSD was not properly substituted in as a Doe defendant; (2) plaintiff’s claims are time-barred 4 due to lack of relation back; (3) there is no vicarious liability under Section 1983; (4) any and all 5 state-law claims are barred by non-compliance with the California Government Claims Act; (5) 6 any and all state-law claims against ACSD are barred by Cal. Gov’t Code § 815, and (6) the 7 complaint fails to state a claim for Unlawful/False Arrest under the Fourth Amendment, Due 8 Process under the Fourth Amendment [sic], and punitive damages. (ECF No. 7 at 2.) Plaintiff has 9 not opposed the motion by ACSD. 10 As set forth above, by order filed on April 23, 2025, the court informed plaintiff his failure 11 to timely file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the two pending motions to dismiss 12 violated Local Rule 230(c) and granted plaintiff 21 days to file written oppositions. (ECF No. 12 13 at 2.) The court specifically warned plaintiff “Failure to do so will be deemed a statement of non- 14 opposition and consent to the granting of the motions….” (Id.) Plaintiff opposed County of 15 Sacramento’s motion to dismiss but did not oppose ACSD’s motion to dismiss. 16 “District courts have inherent power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that 17 power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal of a claim or action. Thompson v. Housing 18 Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). In determining whether to dismiss 19 an action, the court considers several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 20 litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) 21 the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 22 drastic sanctions. Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 23 The court has considered the factors set forth above and finds they favor dismissal of 24 plaintiff’s claims against ACSD under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at this 25 time. Following the court’s specific warning, plaintiff’s failure to oppose the motion to dismiss 26 constitutes plaintiff’s consent to dismissal of his claims against ACSD. Moreover, his failure to 27 comply with the court’s order and applicable rules as to the motion by ACSD indicates he has 28 abandoned his claims against ACSD. 1 IV. Recommendation 2 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 3 1. The motion to dismiss by County of Sacramento (ECF No. 6) be denied. 4 2. Plaintiff's alternate request for leave to amend the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5 against County of Sacramento (ECF No. 13) be denied as unnecessary. 6 3. Plaintiffs claims against Alameda County Sheriff's Department be dismissed with 7 prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for □□□□□□□□□□□ 8 failure to prosecute and failure to comply with applicable rules and a court order. 9 4. The motion to dismiss by Alameda County Sheriff's Department (ECF No. 7) be 10 denied as moot. 11 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 12 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 13 || days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 14 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 15 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 16 || shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within seven (7) days after service of the 17 || objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 18 || District court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 19 | F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 || Dated: November 5, 2025 / a8 } i | / p , {a ce

22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 |] 8, dunc25cv0908.mtd 25 26 27 28