Emil Tucker v. United States

Ninth Circuit

Emil Tucker v. United States

467 F.2d 1106

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 10, 1972

Docket72-1871

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 467 F.2d 1106 (Emil Tucker v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Emil Tucker v. United States, 467 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1972).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant’s allegations that he was not advised as to the consequences of his guilty plea, and that he was unaware of the Count II charges against him are clearly refuted by the transcript of the proceedings. Appellant was specifically informed by the court that he could be sentenced “for a period of five years in prison, a $10,000 fine or both.” He indicated that he understood

The record also indicates that the trial judge asked appellant whether he had read the Count II charges, to which he replied affirmatively. Furthermore, the trial judge made an extensive inquiry as to appellant’s understanding of the charges.

Appellant’s strongest support for his insistence that he was promised leniency is presented in affidavits submitted by his wife and son, taken one year after sentencing, alleging that an agreement was in fact entered into. But communications occurring between the Assistant U.S. Attorney, appellant’s counsel and appellant, all occurring shortly after sentencing, fail to mention or suggest any promise of leniency, other than that appellant was to receive “an official government letter indicating [his] cooperation.”

The allegations cannot be described as other than “vague” and “conclusionary.” Reed v. United States, 441 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1971); Meeks v. United States, 427 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1970). They were properly refuted.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

Appellant’s allegations that he was not advised as to the consequences of his guilty plea, and that he was unaware of the Count II charges against him are clearly refuted by the transcript of the proceedings. Appellant was specifically informed by the court that he could be sentenced “for a period of five years in prison, a $10,000 fine or both.” He indicated that he understood

The record also indicates that the trial judge asked appellant whether he had read the Count II charges, to which he replied affirmatively. Furthermore, the trial judge made an extensive inquiry as to appellant’s understanding of the charges.

Appellant’s strongest support for his insistence that he was promised leniency is presented in affidavits submitted by his wife and son, taken one year after sentencing, alleging that an agreement was in fact entered into. But communications occurring between the Assistant U.S. Attorney, appellant’s counsel and appellant, all occurring shortly after sentencing, fail to mention or suggest any promise of leniency, other than that appellant was to receive “an official government letter indicating [his] cooperation.”

The allegations cannot be described as other than “vague” and “conclusionary.” Reed v. United States, 441 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1971); Meeks v. United States, 427 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1970). They were properly refuted.

Affirmed.

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467 F.2d 1106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/emil-tucker-v-united-states-ca9-1972.

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