Emery v. State

Utah Supreme Court

Emery v. State

483 P.2d 1296, 26 Utah 2d 1, 1971 Utah LEXIS 640

CourtUtah Supreme Court

DecidedApril 13, 1971

Docket12173

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 483 P.2d 1296 (Emery v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296, 26 Utah 2d 1, 1971 Utah LEXIS 640 (Utah 1971).

Pincite

Opinions

HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a complaint for wrongful death of a voluntary patient¹ in the State Hospital, where such dismissal was based on sovereign immunity generally, and by way of exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,² wherein the State waives such immunity except under provisions reciting specific circumstances, — the pertinent one about which we are concerned here being Subsection 10(10) ³ of the above mentioned Act. Affirmed.

There is no contention made that the decedent was admitted to the hospital other than as a voluntary patient under Sec. 64— 7-29, U.C.A.1953 (Footnote 1, below). Appellant does urge that being a voluntary patient, her injury did not “arise(s) out of the incarceration” in a “jail” or “other place of legal confinement,” where sovereign immunity is perpetuated under the legislation. This is based on an assumption that by using the word “incarceration,” the legislature must have meant “confinement” in a “jail,” under some sort of compulsion, and that there is none here.

We are of the opinion that in reading the whole section, the words “other place of legal confinement” obviously referred to something other than a “jail” or “state prison,” including a hospital where one cannot be released without some kind of permission.

Appellants point out that a voluntary patient is entitled to the protection of Secs. 64 — 7-30 ⁴ and 31 ⁵ of the act. Against this conclusion we hold no brief, — but we can[3]*3not agree with counsel that the patient here “could have, at her written request, been released forthwith,” — and that ergo, she was not an inmate of or a person under restraint at or was free to leave the hospital forthwith, upon request. There was no request here for a release, but even so, counsel’s urgence that there was or is no involuntary confinement or restraint under the act cannot stand the test of the statute cited in such conclusion, and such contention amounts to nothing save a non sequitur.

It is true that a patient may demand his release forthwith,- — except that he cannot obtain it if the superintendent, within 48 hours of such demand or request, goes to court to prevent it, which action, if pursued successfully may result in no release at all, and may result in “confinement” or “incarceration” for the patient’s lifetime. Hence, it is obvious that the patient is “confined” against his will for whatever period of time he has been at the hospital, up to the time he demands his release, and even then he is confined for another 48 hours waiting for the superintendent to act, and thereafter for an undetermined time if the latter is successful in obtaining a judicial commitment until the further order of the court or hospital authority. We think the legislature had no intention of waiving sovereign immunity in the case where a hospital attendant or guard is involved any more than it did where a nurse in a prison or a jailer is involved, and in logic and sense it seems that to treat the two differently would reflect a departure from legislative intent, simply by playing upon the adjectives “voluntary” and “involuntary,” when it is obvious that there was a “confinement” at the time of injury where no question of release was involved and at a time when no choice had been made.

As a practical, not legal, matter, perhaps, it seems obvious that to hold otherwise would be to dry up a salutary and wholesome procedure designed to ease the stigma of an official adjudication that one is insane, — a result that friends and relatives would unrelish, abhor and be unwilling to accomplish, thus denying to many an unfortunate a treatment sorely needed. Secondly, at the other end of the spectrum, the hospital authorities and attendants would hesitate to accept “voluntary” patients, and no doubt would refuse to admit them, preferring not to face a lawsuit, when they would be immune therefrom by the simple device of accepting only those admitted by [4]*4judicial decree. Certainly the legislature did not intend such a result when they employed the words “incarceration” and “place of legal confinement” as they did, and certainly they implemented such words in a fashion so that even a “voluntary” patient was as much confined as was an “involuntary” one until certain steps were taken to obtain a “release,” — which must have been something other than “freedom,” —namely, “confinement.” We might suggest that a voluntary patient at the hospital is as much “confined” and has as little freedom as a mentally alert trusty in a jail or prison.

CALLISTER, C. J., and CROCKETT, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a complaint for wrongful death of a voluntary patient¹ in the State Hospital, where such dismissal was based on sovereign immunity generally, and by way of exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,² wherein the State waives such immunity except under provisions reciting specific circumstances, — the pertinent one about which we are concerned here being Subsection 10(10) ³ of the above mentioned Act. Affirmed.

There is no contention made that the decedent was admitted to the hospital other than as a voluntary patient under Sec. 64— 7-29, U.C.A.1953 (Footnote 1, below). Appellant does urge that being a voluntary patient, her injury did not “arise(s) out of the incarceration” in a “jail” or “other place of legal confinement,” where sovereign immunity is perpetuated under the legislation. This is based on an assumption that by using the word “incarceration,” the legislature must have meant “confinement” in a “jail,” under some sort of compulsion, and that there is none here.

We are of the opinion that in reading the whole section, the words “other place of legal confinement” obviously referred to something other than a “jail” or “state prison,” including a hospital where one cannot be released without some kind of permission.

Appellants point out that a voluntary patient is entitled to the protection of Secs. 64 — 7-30 ⁴ and 31 ⁵ of the act. Against this conclusion we hold no brief, — but we can[3]*3not agree with counsel that the patient here “could have, at her written request, been released forthwith,” — and that ergo, she was not an inmate of or a person under restraint at or was free to leave the hospital forthwith, upon request. There was no request here for a release, but even so, counsel’s urgence that there was or is no involuntary confinement or restraint under the act cannot stand the test of the statute cited in such conclusion, and such contention amounts to nothing save a non sequitur.

It is true that a patient may demand his release forthwith,- — except that he cannot obtain it if the superintendent, within 48 hours of such demand or request, goes to court to prevent it, which action, if pursued successfully may result in no release at all, and may result in “confinement” or “incarceration” for the patient’s lifetime. Hence, it is obvious that the patient is “confined” against his will for whatever period of time he has been at the hospital, up to the time he demands his release, and even then he is confined for another 48 hours waiting for the superintendent to act, and thereafter for an undetermined time if the latter is successful in obtaining a judicial commitment until the further order of the court or hospital authority. We think the legislature had no intention of waiving sovereign immunity in the case where a hospital attendant or guard is involved any more than it did where a nurse in a prison or a jailer is involved, and in logic and sense it seems that to treat the two differently would reflect a departure from legislative intent, simply by playing upon the adjectives “voluntary” and “involuntary,” when it is obvious that there was a “confinement” at the time of injury where no question of release was involved and at a time when no choice had been made.

As a practical, not legal, matter, perhaps, it seems obvious that to hold otherwise would be to dry up a salutary and wholesome procedure designed to ease the stigma of an official adjudication that one is insane, — a result that friends and relatives would unrelish, abhor and be unwilling to accomplish, thus denying to many an unfortunate a treatment sorely needed. Secondly, at the other end of the spectrum, the hospital authorities and attendants would hesitate to accept “voluntary” patients, and no doubt would refuse to admit them, preferring not to face a lawsuit, when they would be immune therefrom by the simple device of accepting only those admitted by [4]*4judicial decree. Certainly the legislature did not intend such a result when they employed the words “incarceration” and “place of legal confinement” as they did, and certainly they implemented such words in a fashion so that even a “voluntary” patient was as much confined as was an “involuntary” one until certain steps were taken to obtain a “release,” — which must have been something other than “freedom,” —namely, “confinement.” We might suggest that a voluntary patient at the hospital is as much “confined” and has as little freedom as a mentally alert trusty in a jail or prison.

CALLISTER, C. J., and CROCKETT, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

483 P.2d 1296, 26 Utah 2d 1, 1971 Utah LEXIS 640, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/emery-v-state-utah-1971.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack