Ellenburg v. JA Solar Holdings Co.

262 F.R.D. 262, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33046, 2009 WL 1033362
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 17, 2009
DocketNos. 08 Civ. 10475(JGK), 08 Civ. 11366(JGK)
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 262 F.R.D. 262 (Ellenburg v. JA Solar Holdings Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ellenburg v. JA Solar Holdings Co., 262 F.R.D. 262, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33046, 2009 WL 1033362 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge.

The plaintiffs, investors who purchased or otherwise acquired American Depository Shares of the China-based solar cell manufacturer JA Solar Holdings Co., Ltd. (“JA Solar”) between August 12, 2008 and November 12, 2008 (the “class period”), bring these class actions against JA Solar, its Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Huaijin Yang, and its Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) Daniel Lui alleging false statements and non-disclosures about the financial condition of the company during the class period. Both actions are brought under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) & 78t(a), respectively, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Putative class members Biao “Bill” Chen and Lee Chen move to consolidate the class actions and also make competing applications for appointment as lead plaintiff in the consolidated action and approval of their respective choices for lead class counsel.

I

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides that “[i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may ... consolidate the actions____” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). Trial courts retain “broad discretion to determine whether consolidation is appropriate.” Johnson v. Celo-tex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1284 (2d Cir.1990).

Consolidation is plainly appropriate here. The movants each seek consolidation and the motions to consolidate are unopposed. The allegations supporting the claims asserted in each class action are almost identical. Both actions turn on the allegation that JA Solar purchased a three month, $100 million note from a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers on or about July 9, 2008, when Lehman Brothers was under severe financial distress, and that the defendants failed properly to disclose this investment and made misleading representations about the financial condition of the company in light of this investment beginning with a press release issued on August 12, 2008. On November 12, 2008, the defendants made full disclosure with respect to the effect of the investment on the financial condition of the company, and the price of the company’s American Depository Shares plummeted. (Compare No. 08 Civ. 10475 Compl. ¶¶ 3, 23-38 with No. 08 Civ. 11366 Compl. ¶¶ 4-8, 18-29.)

The factual and legal questions to be resolved in the class actions appear to be indistinguishable, and no party has suggested otherwise. Accordingly, the Court will consolidate the two class actions. See Sofran v. LaBranche & Co., Inc., 220 F.R.D. 398, 401 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (consolidating securities fraud class actions where both groups of plaintiffs requested consolidation and each action “assert[ed] essentially similar and overlapping claims brought on behalf of purchasers of [the defendant’s] securities [during the class period] who purchased in reliance of the materially false and misleading statements and omissions at all relevant times”).

II

There remains the question of who should be lead plaintiff in the consolidated class action. Bill Chen and Lee Chen each seek appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of their respective choices for lead class counsel. Bill Chen argues that he is the appropriate lead plaintiff because he has the greatest financial interest in the litigation based on his losses due to the defendants’ conduct during the class period. Lee Chen contends that Bill Chen actually enjoyed a financial gain and that his stated losses are [265]*265based on incorrect accounting.1 Lee Chen also argues that Bill Chen’s trading practices during the class period subject him to unique defenses that undermine his capacity to serve as lead plaintiff.2

Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”), the district court must “appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members that the court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members ....” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). Pursuant to the PSLRA, the Court must adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff is the person who “has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class ... and ... otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii); see also Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir.2004) (“Two objective factors inform the district court’s appointment decision: the plaintiffs’ respective financial stakes in the relief sought by the class, and their ability to satisfy the requirements of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.”). That presumption may be rebutted “upon proof by a member of the purported plaintiff class that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff ... is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii).

The PSLRA does not specify how a financial interest in the litigation is to be determined. “In determining which plaintiff has the greatest financial interest in the outcome of a securities litigation, courts have looked to four factors: (1) the number of shares purchased during the class period; (2) the number of net shares purchased during the class period; (3) the total net funds expended during the class period; and (4) the approximate losses suffered ....” In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 95, 100 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The dispute in this case revolves around the approximate losses suffered by the lead plaintiff movants because of the inventory of shares that Bill Chen held at the beginning of the class period and sold soon after the class period began.

Bill Chen claims to have lost $65,136 due to the defendants’ alleged misconduct during the class period. Lee Chen claims to have lost $39,801. However, Lee Chen argues that Bill Chen overstated his losses by using the “FirsUn, FirsMDut” accounting method (“FIFO”) while he should have used the “Last-In, FirsU-Out” method (“LIFO”). Lee Chen contends that application of the LIFO method reveals that Bill Chen actually enjoyed a financial gain where he alleges a loss.

“In the context of a securities class action, FIFO and LIFO refer to methods used for matching purchases and sales of stock during the class period in order to measure a class member’s damages.”

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Bluebook (online)
262 F.R.D. 262, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33046, 2009 WL 1033362, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ellenburg-v-ja-solar-holdings-co-nysd-2009.