Elledge v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedJanuary 24, 2020
Docket5:19-cv-00176
StatusUnknown

This text of Elledge v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner (Elledge v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Elledge v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, (N.D. Ala. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

KARI ELLEDGE, } } Plaintiff, } } v. } Case No.: 5:19-cv-00176-MHH } ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of } the Social Security Administration, } } Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), plaintiff Kari Elledge seeks judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Commissioner denied Ms. Elledge’s claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. After careful review, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Ms. Elledge applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. (Doc. 6-4, pp. 54, 55). Ms. Elledge alleges that her disability began on December 2, 2017. (Doc. 6-4, pp. 54, 55). The Commissioner initially denied Ms. Elledge’s claims. (Doc. 6-4, pp. 54, 55). Ms. Elledge requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Doc. 6-5, p. 16). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Doc. 6-3, pp. 24-38). The Appeals Council declined Ms. Elledge’s request for review, making the Commissioner’s decision final for this

Court’s judicial review. (Doc. 6-3, p. 2). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The scope of review in this matter is limited. “When, as in this case, the ALJ

denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review,” the Court “review[s] the ALJ’s ‘factual findings with deference’ and her ‘legal conclusions with close scrutiny.’” Riggs v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 522 Fed. Appx. 509, 510-11 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)).

The Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s factual findings. “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). In evaluating the administrative record, the Court may not “decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence,” or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Winschel v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings, then the Court “must affirm even if evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings.” Costigan v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 603 Fed.

Appx. 783, 786 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158). With respect to the ALJ’s legal conclusions, the Court must determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. If the Court finds an error in

the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that the ALJ conducted a proper legal analysis, then the Court must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d

1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991). III. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S DECISION To determine whether a claimant has proven disability, an ALJ follows a five- step sequential evaluation process. The ALJ considers:

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. In this case, the ALJ found that Ms. Elledge meets the insured status requirements through December 31, 2022. (Doc. 6-3, p. 12). Ms. Elledge has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 2, 2017, the alleged onset date. (Doc. 6-3, p. 12). The ALJ determined that Ms. Elledge suffers from the severe impairment of degenerative disc disease and the non-severe impairments of anxiety and depression. (Doc. 6-3, pp. 12, 13). Based on her review of the medical evidence, the ALJ found that Ms. Elledge does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of the listed impairments in

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Doc. 6-3, p. 14). The ALJ determined that Ms. Elledge has the residual functional capacity to perform light work. (Doc. 6-3, p. 14). “Light work involves lifting no more than 20

pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). The ALJ found that Ms. Elledge is able: to lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; she can sit, stand and walk for 6 hours total each; she can never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds and can occasionally perform all other postural activities. The claimant must avoid all exposure to workplace hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous machinery.

(Doc. 6-3, p. 14). The ALJ concluded that Ms. Elledge is able to perform her past relevant work as a floral designer and deliverer. (Doc. 6-3, p. 17). Relying on testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ found that other jobs existed in the national economy that Ms. Elledge could perform, including photocopy operator, product marker, and assembler. (Doc. 6-3, p. 18). Accordingly, the ALJ denied Ms. Elledge’s disability claims. (Doc. 6-3, pp. 18-19). IV. ANALYSIS Ms. Elledge argues that the ALJ erred in denying her claims because the ALJ

misapplied the Eleventh Circuit pain standard; the ALJ did not give appropriate weight to the opinion of Ms. Elledge’s treating physician, Dr. Walker; and the ALJ did not base her RFC determination on substantial evidence. (Doc. 8, pp. 2-3).

Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s analysis of Ms. Elledge’s pain testimony, Dr. Walker’s opinion, and Ms. Elledge’s RFC, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.

A. Pain Standard The Eleventh Circuit pain standard “applies when a disability claimant attempts to establish disability through his own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991); Coley v.

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 18-11954, 2019 WL 1975989, at *3 (11th Cir. May 3, 2019). When relying upon subjective symptoms to establish disability, “the claimant must satisfy two parts of a three-part test showing: (1) evidence of an

underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged [symptoms]; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed [symptoms].” Wilson v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lewis v. Callahan
125 F.3d 1436 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
Andrew T. Wilson v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart
284 F.3d 1219 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Renee S. Phillips v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart
357 F.3d 1232 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
Billy D. Crawford v. Comm. of Social Security
363 F.3d 1155 (Eleventh Circuit, 2004)
Bobby Dyer v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart
395 F.3d 1206 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)
Leiter v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
377 F. App'x 944 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Security
631 F.3d 1176 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Carri Carroll v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner
453 F. App'x 889 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Christopher J. Kalishek v. Commissioner of Social Security
470 F. App'x 868 (Eleventh Circuit, 2012)
Early v. Astrue
481 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (N.D. Alabama, 2007)
Dorothy Markuske v. Commissioner of Social Secuirty
572 F. App'x 762 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)
Jane E. Costigan v. Commissioner, Social Security
603 F. App'x 783 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Elledge v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/elledge-v-social-security-administration-commissioner-alnd-2020.