Elias Anthony Stavrinides v. Patrick Broderick, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-04926
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ELIAS ANTHONY STAVRINIDES, Case No. 25-cv-04926-WHO

8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON THE MOTIONS TO 9 v. DISMISS AND MOTION TO DECLARE PLAINTIFF A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT 10 PATRICK BRODERICK, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 5, 8, 11, 15, 39 Defendants. 11

12 Before me are four motions filed by the several defendants in this case: three motions to 13 dismiss and one motion to declare pro se plaintiff Elias Stavrinides a vexatious litigant.1 The 14 motions to dismiss assert that the complaint is deficient pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil 15 Procedure 8, 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6). I agree. Defendants Diana Gomez, Michael King, Tyler 16 Harrington, Todd Hoffman, Tennis Wick, Jesse Cablk, David Rabbitt, James Gore, and Lynda 17 Hopkins (the “County Defendants”) additionally move to declare Mr. Stavrinides a vexatious 18 litigant based on his prolific filings in other courts. Because Mr. Stavrinides has only appeared in 19 this court as of the filing of the instant case, I decline to grant their motion at this juncture. For the 20 reasons explained below, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. Mr. Stavrinides’s complaint is 21 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. He may file any first amended complaint within 20 days 22 of this Order. 23 BACKGROUND 24 On June 11, 2025, Mr. Stavrinides filed a complaint in this case, alleging claims against 25 1 A fifth, administrative, motion to continue the initial case management conference has also been 26 filed. Dkt. No. 39. The initial case management conference is currently set for October 28, 2025. Because I allow Mr. Stavrinides the opportunity to amend his complaint by November 6, 2025, 27 any response is therefore due by November 20. The initial case management conference is hereby 1 the Hon. Patrick Broderick, a Superior Court Judge, and the County Defendants, adding the State 2 Bar of California as a Real Party in Interest. See Complaint (“Compl.”) [Dkt. No. 1] at 1. The 3 following is my best understanding of Mr. Stavrinides’s allegations.2 4 Mr. Stavrinides lodges what he terms a “Make Known Relator report” against all 5 individuals named in the complaint. Compl. 2–3. He alleges that the individual defendants 6 committed a conspiracy in violation of federal contracts. Compl. 3. Specifically, Mr. Stavrinides 7 alleges that Judge Broderick failed to file a surety bond that plaintiff alleges is required to fulfill 8 Judge Broderick’s role as a Superior Court Judge. Compl. 7. Likewise, he alleges that the County 9 Defendants each failed to file a surety bond that he alleges is required to fulfill their varying roles 10 as Deputy County Counsel to the Sonoma County Counsel Department, Sonoma County Code 11 Enforcement Officers, or Supervisors on the Sonoma County Board of Supervisors. Compl. 8–24. 12 He additionally names the State Bar of California as an interested party because named defendants 13 Broderick, Gomez, and King are members of the State Bar of California and he seeks that they be 14 disbarred and “recommend[ed] . . . for criminal prosecution.” Compl. 24. Mr. Stavrinides goes on 15 to allege that each of these three named defendants has committed wire and mail fraud pursuant to 16 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Compl. 29–32. 17 Finally, Mr. Stavrinides explains that he has made several public records requests over the 18 years that, in his view, “show[] millions of dollars of Federal Funds hav[e] been granted from the 19 Federal Government to what the Federal Government would have assumed would have been 20 legitimate agencies . . . .” Compl. 32. Although it is far from clear, it seems as though Mr. 21 Stavrinides alleges that those monies were misused or failed to be deposited to any government 22 entity. Compl. 33. And he alleges that each of the named individual defendants, together, 23 “operate a mutinous seditious, rebellious, treasonable and disloyal shadow government that has 24 25 2 Curiously, although Mr. Stavrinides filed his case in federal court in the Northern District of California, he contends that only the district courts of the District of Columbia and the District of 26 Hawaii have jurisdiction over his case. Compl. 3–5. His rationale appears to be that because the State Bar of California is “an arm of the Judicial Branch of the Government of The State of 27 California,” no federal judge who has a membership with the State Bar of California should be 1 falsely and fraudulently obtained and used Federal Funds to facilitate the operation of that 2 mutinous, seditious, rebellious, treasonable and disloyal shadow government.” Compl. 35. 3 The State Bar of California, Judge Broderick, and the County Defendants each filed 4 motions to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 5, 8, 15. The County Defendants also moved to declare Mr. 5 Stavrinides a vexatious litigant. Dkt. No. 11. Save for the motion to dismiss filed by Judge 6 Broderick, Mr. Stavrinides opposed each of the motions. Dkt. Nos. 16, 17, 25. See Dkt. No. 27 7 Statement of Non-Opposition. Mr. Stavrinides erroneously moved for an entry of default against 8 Judge Broderick, see Dkt. No. 34, which the clerk appropriately denied given Judge Broderick’s 9 response. Dkt. No. 37. 10 I determined that these motions were suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to 11 Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 I. Rule 8 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to include a short and plain 15 statement indicating the grounds for jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim, and a 16 demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). “The propriety of dismissal for failure to 17 comply with Rule 8 does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” 18 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, even claims that are not on 19 their face subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may still be dismissed for violating Rule 8(a). 20 Id. Although “verbosity or length is not by itself a basis for dismissing a complaint based on Rule 21 8(a),” Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008), where the 22 allegations in a complaint are “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy and largely 23 irrelevant,” the complaint is properly dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8(a), McHenry, 84 24 F.3d at 1178-79. 25 II. Rule 12(b)(1) 26 A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court’s subject 27 matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited 1 Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party invoking the jurisdiction of the 2 federal court bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter 3 jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. Id. 4 A challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. See Safe Air Safe Air for 5 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, the jurisdictional 6 challenge is confined to the allegations pled in the complaint. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 7 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are 8 insufficient “on their face” to invoke federal jurisdiction. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. To 9 resolve this challenge, the court assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and draws 10 all reasonable inference in favor of the party opposing dismissal. See Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362. 11 “By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by 12 themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. To resolve 13 this challenge, the court “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. 14 (citation omitted). Instead, the court “may review evidence beyond the complaint without 15 converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted). 16 “Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting 17 affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must 18 furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter 19 jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 20 1040 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)). 21 III. Rule 12(b)(6) 22 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 23 if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 24 dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 25 face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when 26 the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 27 is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation 1 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. While courts do not require 2 “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to 3 relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 4 In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 5 court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 6 plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court 7 is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 8 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 9 2008). 10 If the court dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to 11 amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured 12 by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). In making 13 this determination, the court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of undue 14 delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, 15 undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” Moore v. Kayport 16 Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 17 “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however 18 inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 19 lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted); see also Bretz v. 20 Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, pro se pleadings must still 21 allege facts sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine whether a claim has been stated. 22 Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “A pro se litigant 23 must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is 24 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Cato v. 25 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 26 IV. Vexatious Litigant 27 “Flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to 1 other litigants.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990). As a result, “[t]he 2 All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides district courts with the inherent power to enter pre- 3 filing orders against vexatious litigants.” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 4 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). But “[r]estricting access to the courts is . . . a serious matter. The right of 5 access to the courts is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.” Ringgold-Lockhart v. 6 Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks, alteration, 7 and citation omitted). Because “such sanctions can tread on a litigant’s due process right of access 8 to the courts,” a pre-filing order is an “extreme remedy that should rarely be used.” Molski, 500 9 F.3d at 1057. 10 The Ninth Circuit has outlined four factors that district courts must examine before 11 entering pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants. First, the litigant must be provided notice 12 and an opportunity to oppose the order. De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147. Second, the district court 13 must “create an adequate record for review.” Id. Third, the court must “make substantive findings 14 as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions.” Id. at 1148 (internal quotation 15 marks and citation omitted). Fourth, the resulting order “must be narrowly tailored to closely fit 16 the specific vice encountered.” Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057. 17 DISCUSSION 18 I. Motions to Dismiss 19 Each of the motions to dismiss moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 20 Procedure Rule 8, Rule 12(b)(1), and Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 5 at 2, Dkt. No. 8 at 2, Dkt. No. 15 21 at 2. Judge Broderick and the State Bar’s motions likewise raise immunity concerns. Dkt. No. 5 22 at 2, Dkt. No. 15 at 2. Finally, the County Defendants additionally argue that the venue is 23 inappropriate. Dkt. No. 8 at 2. 24 As an initial matter, the State Bar notes, it is “named as a ‘real party in interest’ to this 25 action, not as a defendant.” Dkt. No. 5 at 2. In response, Mr. Stavrinides confirms his intent to 26 name the State Bar only as an interested party and not as a defendant. Dkt. No. 25 at 2. (“Elias 27 Stavrinides herein and hereby stipulates to the State Bar of California being removed forthwith 1 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Its motion to dismiss is MOOTED by this Order. 2 Judge Broderick’s motion covers many of the deficiencies discussed below and also raises 3 his immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for actions he has taken on the bench. See Munoz v. 4 Superior Court of Los Angeles, 91 F.4th 977, 981 (2024) (“[S]tate court judges cannot be sued in 5 federal court in their judicial capacity under the Eleventh Amendment.”). Mr. Stavrinides does 6 not oppose that motion. Judge Broderick is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 7 With respect to the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss, I conclude that Mr. Stavrinides 8 has failed to demonstrate that he has standing to bring this case or state a cognizable claim against 9 them. His complaint is difficult to decipher and mentions federal criminal statutes that contain no 10 private right of action. He confusingly refers to the complaint as a “Make Known Report,” 11 seemingly asserting his position as a type of relator. But he cites to no valid law that allows him 12 standing for that reason. His complaint jumps from discussing a California bond requirement for 13 all defendants to federal wire fraud for only three defendants. Compl. 7–30. The exhibits to the 14 complaint do not provide any useful context. Neither does his opposition to the County 15 Defendants’ motion. See Dkt. No. 16. For those reasons, Mr. Stavrinides’s complaint is 16 DISMISSED pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6). 17 County Defendants have provided additional documents related to matters that took place 18 in Sonoma County Superior Court concerning Mr. Stavrinides’ former property and his 19 subsequently-filed case against Judge Broderick and several of the County Defendants in that 20 court. See Request for Judicial Notice3, Dkt. No. 8. According to the County Defendants, these 21 documents show that Mr. Stavrinides has already raised the “same arguments” in Sonoma County 22 Superior Court as those he attempts to raise here. See Dkt. No. 8 at 16; Request for Judicial 23 Notice, Dkt. No. 8, Exh. 4 at 128–148. Although that complaint, already dismissed by the 24

25 3 County Defendants have filed two requests for judicial notice related to Mr. Stavrinides’s cases in state court. Mr. Stavrinides does not appear to oppose those requests for judicial notice. I 26 GRANT both. See U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts may only take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute.”); Reyn’s Pasta 27 Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “court filings 1 Sonoma County Superior Court, does share some overlap with the complaint before me, the 2 arguments are not “the same.” I therefore decline to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of res 3 judicata. See Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical-Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987–89 (9th Cir. 2005). 4 Because what Mr. Stavrinides attempts to allege in his complaint is unclear, I will allow 5 him to amend his complaint as long as he does so in good faith. To the extent that he can plead a 6 cognizable claim for relief against the County Defendants, he has one more chance to do so. 7 II. Motion to Declare a Vexatious Litigant 8 County Defendants have also moved to declare Mr. Stavrinides a vexatious litigant in this 9 court. Dkt. No. 11. They point to concerning behavior on Mr. Stavrinides’s part as a result of his 10 ongoing suits in Sonoma County Superior Court. Id. at 3–4. They acknowledge that these 11 behaviors appear to be a result of those proceedings and not the one before me. See id. at 7 (“Even 12 3 years after Judgment and more than a year after his appeal was denied, Elias Stavrinides refuses 13 to obtain the necessary permits, abate all the violations, and seek the compliance inspection 14 required by the state court Judgment. He continues to resort to antagonistic, oppressive, and 15 harassing tactics that should not be condoned by this Court.”). 16 Harassment of government employees is unacceptable in any and every circumstance. 17 This conduct must not recur. That said, there is not yet an adequate record for review in this court 18 that would allow me to make “substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the 19 litigant’s actions.” See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147. In Reply, County Defendants point to Oliver 20 v. EHM Productions, Inc. to support their argument that federal courts can declare an individual to 21 be a vexatious litigant after vexatious litigation behavior in state court. No. 23-CV-02671-VC, 22 2023 WL 6519755 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2023) (J. Chhabria); Dkt. No. 22 at 2. However, as 23 County Defendants acknowledge, the plaintiff in Oliver had a “long track record of filing 24 numerous unsuccessful lawsuits in both state and federal court.” Id. at *1 (emphasis added). 25 Because Mr. Stavrinides has demonstrated no such history here, I decline to declare him a 26 vexatious litigant today. Mr Stavrinides is forewarned that I will not tolerate abusive or harassing 27 conduct. 1 Granting Restraining Order in Sonoma County Superior Court. See Request for Judicial Notice, 2 || Dkt. No. 12, Exhs. 3-4. That includes the admonition that Mr. Stavrinides is “enjoined and 3 restrained . . . [f]rom serving or causing to be served any pleading, subpoena, letter, or any other 4 || document of any type on any County attorney or employee at a personal residence.” Dkt. No. 12 5 at 62—63 (emphasis in original). As I read it, that Order is not limited to documents related to state 6 || court proceedings only and it does apply to this federal matter. 7 Should Mr. Stavrinides exhibit behaviors in this court that violate the Sonoma County 8 Superior Court Orders, any defendant may file a renewed motion for me to consider. 9 CONCLUSION 10 For those reasons, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED 11 with LEAVE TO AMEND against the County Defendants. Mr. Stavrinides may file any amended 12 || complaint within 20 days of this Order if there is a good faith basis to do so. The motion to 5 13 || declare Mr. Stavrinides a vexatious litigant is DENIED without prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: October 17, 2025 A 16

8 Wilfam H. Orrick United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28