Riley, C.J.
Plaintiff-appellant applied to the City of Westland for permission to construct a manufacturing plant on its property. In exchange for site-plan approval and a subsequent building permit, the city council demanded the dedication of a strip of land adjacent to Newburgh Road for an unrelated road-widening project. Although the plaintiff repeatedly requested that the council remove the restriction, it did not appeal the council’s decision to a higher city authority. Nor did the plaintiff attempt to have the restriction lifted by way of a circuit court injunction or declaration.
At a council meeting on June 11, 1979, the council approved the plaintiff’s site plan subject to five stated conditions, one being the dedication of land. The plaintiff refused to give away its property and submitted no revised site plan. Thus, the [61]*61proposed building was never erected. However, the City of Westland, through formal condemnation proceedings, eventually acquired the strip of land abutting Newburgh Road.
Later, the plaintiff brought an action against the city under 42 USC 1983, alleging that the city "took” its property without just compensation and without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We are asked, in this case, to determine whether this property owner is entitled to recover damages under 42 USC 1983 for the alleged taking caused by the "wrongful” denial of a building permit. Accordingly, we must first determine the procedural prerequisites for such an action and whether this plaintiff has met them.
We hold that before proceeding under 42 USC 1983, a property owner must first obtain a final decision from the particular governmental entity that is alleged to have unconstitutionally taken his property and also attempt to obtain just compensation through inverse condemnation. In the instant case, because the conditional approval of the plaintiff’s site plan was not the city’s final disposition of the matter, we hold that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was not ripe for adjudication. We need not reach, therefore, the question whether the council’s actions actually constituted a "taking” within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to proceed to trial on its § 1983 claim.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff-appellant, Electro-Tech, Inc., manufactures electrical and electronic products. Much of [62]*62Electro-Tech’s business involves contracts with the United States military. The company’s manufacturing facility is located on Newburgh Road in the City of Westland.
Mr. Jack Beauchamp is the president and sole shareholder of Electro-Tech. In anticipation of securing additional contracts with the government and in order to more efficiently complete existing contracts, Mr. Beauchamp decided to build another manufacturing plant directly behind the existing facility. On October 26, 1978, Electro-Tech contracted with defendant, H. F. Campbell Company, to construct the new building. Pursuant to the agreement, Campbell was obligated to obtain a building permit and to complete construction by February 13,1979.
On or about March 3, 1979, Mr. Beauchamp approved Campbell’s site plan. However, before obtaining a building permit and actually beginning construction, Campbell was required to submit its plan for review by various city departments. The recommendations of these departments are then submitted to the planning commission for initial site-plan approval. The planning commission thereafter makes its recommendation to the city council for approval. After a site plan passes the council, the matter is finally submitted to the building department. The building department then examines the final site and building plans and, if approved, issues a building permit.1
On February 21, 1979, representatives of the various departments met to discuss Campbell’s proposed site plan. At that meeting, the representatives compiled a list of thirteen items which were required to be included in the site plan before submission to the planning commission and [63]*63city council. This list was forwarded by letter to Mr. Richard Wagner, the project director for Campbell. Although not included in the list, a recommendation was apparently made at this meeting to require, in exchange for site-plan approval and a subsequent building permit, the dedication of a twenty-seven-foot strip along the front of Electro-Tech’s property for the widening of Newburgh Road.2 The instant lawsuit concerns this dedication requirement.
On March 22, 1979, Mr. Wagner received a letter stating that the planning commission would recommend that the city council approve the site plan contingent upon, among other things, ElectroTech’s dedication of the strip adjacent to New-burgh Road. At trial, Mr. Beauchamp testified that, during the spring of 1979, he attended four or five council meetings protesting the city’s demand.
Nonetheless, at a meeting on June 11, 1979, with Mr. Beauchamp in attendance, the city council approved the site plan, subject to five stated contingencies:
1) Loading area should be clearly designated as such by striping and signage.
2) A second access door in the new addition is required along the north side of the building for fire protection.
3) Fire and Engineering requirements must be met on final engineering and building plans.
4) Dedication of 27 feet wide, approximately 210 feet in front of K2da for future Newburgh Road right-of-way.
5) The front greenbelt area is to be graded and sodded. [Emphasis added.]_
[64]*64Neither Campbell nor Electro-Tech attempted to appeal3 the decision of the city council or to take the matter directly to the building department. It is also established that Electro-Tech did not attempt to have the dedication condition removed by way of a circuit court injunction or declaration.
Soon after the meeting of June 11, however, Campbell began making revisions to the site plan to comply with the requests of the city council. Plaintiff claims that all of the contingencies except for the dedication were met. However, evidence adduced at trial suggests that Campbell never submitted a final site plan to the council or to the building department (which is ultimately responsible for issuing the building permit) and was, in fact, still revising through September of 1979.
Because of its failure to procure site-plan approval and a subsequent building permit, Campbell could not proceed with the construction of Electro-Tech’s new plant. Without the additional work space, Electro-Tech alleged it could not bid on several upcoming contracts and was forced to subcontract work on existing contracts in order to meet government deadlines.
On October 15, 1979, the City of Westland sent Electro-Tech a letter offering to purchase the strip of land abutting Newburgh Road. Mr. Beauchamp rejected the initial offer, maintaining that the proposed purchase price was too low. In January of 1980, the city filed a condemnation action in Wayne Circuit Court.4
On May 21, 1982, Electro-Tech brought this [65]*65action against the City of Westland,5 alleging that the city’s "extortionary” demand and "wrongful” denial of the building permit violated both state and federal law. At the pretrial motions for summary disposition, the trial court dismissed ElectroTech’s state claims as being barred by governmental immunity.
On June 11, 1985, Electro-Tech proceeded to trial on its claim under 42 USC 1983. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Electro-Tech in the amount of $433,052. On July 9, 1985, the city moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied by order entered July 23, 1985.
The city appealed, raising four issues. Reaching only the first, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in permitting Electro-Tech to proceed to trial under 42 USC 1983.6 Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated "that no violation of constitutional or federal law exists where plaintiff has merely been erroneously denied initial site approval and a building permit by a city council. Plaintiff must look for a review of that decision within the state.” 161 Mich App 622, 629; 411 NW2d 800 (1987).
On March 22, 1988, we granted leave to appeal limited to the issue whether the plaintiff’s judgment under 42 USC 1983 should be reinstated.7
II. DISCUSSION
Section 19838 provides a civil remedy to persons [66]*66deprived of constitutional rights by individuals acting under color of state law. In Parratt v Taylor, 451 US 527; 101 S Ct 1908; 68 L Ed 2d 420 (1981), a state prison inmate lost a mail-order hobby kit, valued at $23.50, when a prison official negligently handled the prison mail. The inmate brought a § 1983 action, claiming a deprivation of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 In deciding the fate of the respondent’s claim, the United States Supreme Court stated:
[I]n any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this [67]*67conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. [451 US at 535. See also Collier v City of Springdale, 733 F2d 1311, 1313 (CA 8, 1984), cert den 469 US 857 (1984).]
As in Parratt, the Westland City Council here was undoubtedly acting in its official capacity and, therefore, "under color of state law.” Our analysis, therefore, focuses, as it did in Parratt, on whether the plaintiff has been denied a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution.10
In its fourth amended complaint, upon which this case was tried, Electro-Tech alleged that the city council’s refusal to approve its site plan and building permit violated its rights to just compensation11 and due process12 under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court of Appeals ruled that Electro-Tech could not maintain an action under § 1983, concluding that no constitutional violation exists "where plaintiff has merely been erroneously denied initial site approval and a [68]*68building permit by a city council. Plaintiff must look for a review of that decision within the state. It is a review of the city’s decision and not tort remedies which we point out to plaintiff.” 161 Mich App 629.
While we are in agreement with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, we believe that its analysis is flawed by the blurring of what we believe should be three distinct inquiries: the existence of a constitutional violation, exhaustion of state administrative remedies, and ripeness. The issue whether Electro-Tech was actually deprived of its property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is distinct from the issues whether Electro-Tech was required to exhaust state administrative remedies before proceeding under § 1983 and whether the city’s decision regarding Electro-Tech’s property was final and, thus, judicially reviewable. We will, therefore, treat these inquiries separately.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
1. REGULATORY TAKING
According to the Supreme Court of the United States, a taking may occur where a governmental entity exercises its power of eminent domain through formal condemnation proceedings, see, e.g., Berman v Parker, 348 US 26; 75 S Ct 98; 99 L Ed 27 (1954) (Fifth Amendment taking), or where a governmental entity exercises its police power through regulation which restricts the use of property, see Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393, 415; 43 S Ct 158; 67 L Ed 322 (1922) (this claim may be framed as a Fifth Amendment taking or as a Fourteenth Amendment "due process” type taking). It is well established that land use regulation does not effect a taking if it "substan[69]*69tially advance[s] legitimate state interests” and does not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.”13 Agins v Tiburon, 447 US 255, 260; 100 S Ct 2138; 65 L Ed 2d 106 (1980). See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470; 107 S Ct 1232; 94 L Ed 2d 472 (1987); Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104; 98 S Ct 2646; 57 L Ed 2d 631 (1978). Regulation that "goes too far . . . will be recognized as a taking.” Pennsylvania Coal, supra, p 415.
The plaintiff in the instant case relies on two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court to support its contention that the actions of the Westland City Council constituted a "taking” of property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v Los Angeles Co, 482 US 304; 107 S Ct 2378; 96 L Ed 2d 250 (1987), the Court held that where a land-use regulation effects a "taking” of all use of property, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires payment to the property owner even where the intrusion was only temporary.
The plaintiff, in First English, owned and operated a campground for handicapped children. In 1978, when a flood destroyed the facility and much of the surrounding area, Los Angeles County passed an interim ordinance prohibiting any reconstruction in the flood area. The church then brought an inverse condemnation suit in state court, claiming that the ordinance denied the plaintiff of all use of its property. _
[70]*70The county moved successfully to strike the claim on the ground that the only relief available was a declaration that the ordinance was invalid or a writ of mandamus specifically permitting the proposed use of the land. Agins v Tiburon, 24 Cal 3d 266; 157 Cal Rptr 372; 598 P2d 25 (1979), aff'd on other grounds 447 US 255; 100 S Ct 2138; 65 L Ed 2d 106 (1980). The Supreme Court, however, recognizing the inherent unfairness of applying the Agins rule to the church’s cause of action, held that "where the government’s activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.” First English, supra, p 321.14
Electro-Tech contends that First English is analogous to the instant case because the city council’s imposition of the improper dedication requirement resulted in its temporary failure to obtain a building permit. Thus, like Los Angeles County’s flood ordinance, Electro-Tech argues that the council’s condition here "worked a taking of all use of [the plaintiff’s] property” and that no "subsequent action” by the City of Westland, not even the eventual condemnation of the twenty-seven-foot parcel, "can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation [71]*71for the period during which the taking was effective.” Id.
Recognizing the similarities between First English and the instant case, it should be noted that the First English Court expressly declined to address "the quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like . . . .” Id., p 321.
Two weeks after First English was decided, the Court decided Nollan v California Coastal Comm, 483 US 825; 107 S Ct 3141; 97 L Ed 2d 677 (1987), a case factually similar to the one before us today. In Nollan, the coastal commission issued the plaintiffs a permit to rebuild their beach house upon the condition that they allow the public an easement across their beach. The plaintiffs sued the commission in state court bn the ground that the condition constituted a taking.15 The Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that the commission’s imposition of the easement condition was not a valid land-use regulation since it did not serve public purposes related to the permit requirement. For example, although the state is authorized to pursue its comprehensive public-access program by exercising its eminent domain power and paying for such easements, it cannot compel coastal residents to give away their property in furtherance of that goal. In other words, "if [California] wants an easement across the [plaintiffs’] property, it must pay for it.” Id., p 842.
In Electro-Tech’s view, Nollan is also dispositive of the constitutional issue before this Court today. According to the plaintiff, the dedication condition [72]*72here, like the easement condition in Nollan, does not serve any public purpose related to the building permit requirement. Electro-Tech’s plans to expand its manufacturing facility are in no way related to the city’s plans to widen Newburgh Road. Thus, although Westland is authorized to pursue the goals set forth in its master plan, i.e., the expansion of Newburgh Road, it cannot, within the confines of the Fifth Amendment, compel nearby landowners to give away their property in realization of that goal.
On the basis of First English and Nollan, Electro-Tech argues that the City of Westland "took” its property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, Electro-Tech contends that it has properly asserted a claim for damages against the city under § 1983.16 The city, on the other hand, argues that there was no "taking” because it did in fact condemn and pay Electro-Tech for the twenty-seven-foot strip of land adjacent to Newburgh Road._
[73]*73Having reviewed the record in this case, we find that the "taking” involved in the § 1983 action is different than the "taking” involved in the city’s condemnation action. The subject of the § 1983 suit is the property upon which Electro-Tech intended to build, while the subject of the condemnation suit was the twenty-seven-foot parcel abutting Newburgh Road.
We agree, on the basis of Nollan, that had the city actually enforced the dedication requirement, a "permanent physical occupation” of ElectroTech’s land (i.e., the twenty-seven-foot parcel) would have resulted.17 We note, however, that the city eventually paid Electro-Tech for this parcel'of land. Similarly, in Nollan, a permanent physical invasion of the plaintiff’s property (i.e., the land upon which the public easement was to be placed) did not occur because the commission’s threatened action never came about. The Nollan Court simply held that the easement condition did not advance any legitimate state interest. Id., p 841.18_
[74]*74We acknowledge the obvious similarities between Nollan and the instant case.19 Nollan, however, is procedurally distinguishable from the instant case because ripeness (finality) was never an issue there. Unlike the city council in the instant case, the commission in Nollan apparently placed only one condition, albeit improper,20 on the issu[75]*75anee of the building permit. Thus, the plaintiffs there had no further steps to go through before coming to court to contest the improper condition. In the instant case, the council had imposed, in addition to the improper dedication requirement, four "valid” conditions on the issuance of the permit. Because Electro-Tech failed to remedy these valid requirements or to submit a revised site plan evidencing compliance therewith, it was unclear whether or how much the improper condition interfered with the owner’s investment-backed expectations. Electro-Tech’s claim, therefore, was not ripe for review. See discussion of Williamson Co Regional Planning Comm v Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 172; 105 S Ct 3108; 87 L Ed 2d 126 (1985), in section n(c).
Because we conclude in section n(c), that the City of Westland had not made a final determination regarding the disposition of Electro-Tech’s property, we need not decide at this time whether Electro-Tech has established an unconstitutional taking.
2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Justice Brickley asserts that a property owner like Electro-Tech may "advance a [substantive] due process claim separate and distinct from the regulatory taking due process claim” discussed in this opinion. Post, p 94. Justice Brickley contends that Electro-Tech has, in the instant case, established "arbitrary] and capricious[ ]” action on the part of the city council in imposing the dedication condition in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., p 92.
In support of these assertions, Justice Brickley relies on Nollan, supra, and Daniels v Williams, 474 US 327, 337; 106 S Ct 662; 88 L Ed 2d 662 [76]*76(1986). In our view, Justice Brickley mistakenly relies upon Daniels to support the alleged constitutional violation in the instant case. In Daniels, the plaintiff, a state prison inmate, claimed that he was deprived of due process when he slipped and fell on a pillow left on the jail stairs by a prison guard. The Court held that the Due Process Clause is not implicated by a state official’s negligent act causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property. Id., p 328.
Unlike Daniels, the instant case involves a land use restriction. We recognize that at least two federal circuits have employed substantive due process in analyzing similar land use restrictions. See, e.g., Bateson v Geisse, 857 F2d 1300 (CA 9, 1988); Bello v Walker, 840 F2d 1124 (CA 3, 1988), cert den 488 US 868; 109 S Ct 176; 102 L Ed 2d 145 (1988). But see Chiplin Enterprises, Inc v City of Lebanon, 712 F2d 1524 (CA 1, 1983). We find it significant, however, that the Supreme Court has yet to employ such an approach in cases involving the wrongful denial of a land use permit. In Nollan, for example, the Supreme Court not only applied a traditional regulatory taking analysis, but it repeatedly referred to the case as one involving a taking.21
We are not suggesting, however, that ElectroTech was foreclosed from asserting a substantive due process claim in the instant case. In fact, we [77]*77agree with Justice Brickley that both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have acknowledged the possibility of substantive due process claims in response to governmental regulation of property. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272 US 365; 47 S Ct 114; 71 L Ed 303 (1926); Goldblatt v Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590; 82 S Ct 987; 8 L Ed 2d 130 (1962); Kropf v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich 139; 215 NW2d 179 (1974); Cryderman v City of Birmingham, 171 Mich App 15; 429 NW2d 625 (1988). Our review of the record here, however, indicates that this case was tried as a regulatory taking due process claim.
In part i of his opinion, Justice Brickley himself acknowledges that a property owner may properly assert that a land use restriction " 'goes so far that it has the same effect as a taking by eminent domain [and] is an invalid exercise of the police power, violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ ” Post, pp 93-94 citing Williamson. It is apparent in the instant case that Electro-Tech has asserted such a taking claim from the start. See plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint and brief on appeal in this Court.
Furthermore, the plaintiff here clearly tried its case on a regulatory taking due process theory. The record reveals that the trial court instructed the jury on the "deprivation of property without due process of law.” There was no instruction relating to substantive due process or to the "arbitrary” or "unreasonable” nature of the council’s dedication requirement.22_
[79]*79As explained by Justice Brickley, "[r]egardless of the manner in which a 'regulatory taking’ claim is framed, whether as a violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment or of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the claim does not ripen until the landowner has received a final decision regarding the application of the regulation or ordinance to the particular piece of property. Williamson, supra; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v Yolo Co, 477 US 340; 106 S Ct 2561; 91 L Ed 2d 285 (1986).” (Post, p 94.) Because the City of Westland did not have the opportunity to make a final decision regarding Electro-Tech’s property, see section ii(c), we hold that its claim was not ripe for judicial review.
B
EXHAUSTION OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
In Patsy v Florida Bd of Regents, 457 US 496, 550; 102 S Ct 2557; 73 L Ed 2d 172 (1982), the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing an action under 42 USC 1983.23 The plaintiff in Patsy filed a § 1983 action [80]*80in federal district court, alleging that her employer intentionally denied her employment opportunities solely on the basis of her race and sex. The employer successfully moved to dismiss because the plaintiff had not exhausted available administrative remedies. However, the Supreme Court, examining the legislative history of 42 USC 1983 and noting "the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights,” decided not to overrule its prior decisions that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action.24
Although Patsy unequivocally establishes that Electro-Tech was not required to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing its § 1983 claim, other Supreme Court and lower federal court cases dealing specifically with regulatory taking have focused on the importance of obtaining a final decision from the governmental entity that is alleged to have acted unconstitutionally.
c
FINALITY
In Williamson Co Regional Planning Comm v Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, supra, 192-193, the Supreme Court stated:
The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually [81]*81distinct . . . from the question whether an administrative action must be final before it is judicially reviewable. While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a deñnitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]
In Williamson, the plaintiff bank brought a § 1983 action against the county. The plaintiff claimed, as Electro-Tech does in this case, that the local government’s temporary refusal to allow development of its property constituted a compensable taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court, however, did not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim because it found the action unripe.
The Williamson Court set forth two finality requirements which must be satisfied before a plaintiff may bring an action under § 1983 for damages resulting from an unconstitutional regulatory taking. First, the Court required that the plaintiff obtain a ñnal decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property. Id., p 186, citing Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc, 452 US 264; 101 S Ct 2352; 69 L Ed 2d 1 (1981).
According to Williamson, requiring a final decision from the appropriate administrative body prior to initiating a § 1983 action "is compelled by the very nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause.” Williamson, supra, p 190.
[82]*82Although "[t]he question of what constitutes a 'taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty,” Penn Central Transp Co v New York City, 438 US 104, 123 [98 S Ct 2646; 57 L Ed 2d 631 (1978)], this Court consistently has indicated that among the factors of particular significance in the inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Those factors simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question. [Id., pp 190-191. Citations omitted.][25]
In light of Patsy, the Williamson Court reasoned that although the plaintiff would not be required to appeal the planning commission’s decision to the zoning board of appeals,26 it would be required to seek variances which "would result in a conclusive determination by the Commission whether it would allow [the plaintiff] to develop the subdivision in the manner [originally] proposed.” Id., p 193 (emphasis added).
Applying these principles to the instant case,27 [83]*83we would hold that although Electro-Tech was not required to appeal the council’s initial site-plan decision to the zoning board of appeals, the plaintiff was required to obtain a final decision from the city before bringing an action under 42 USC 1983.28 In light of the circumstances surrounding [84]*84the "conditional approval” of Electro-Tech’s site plan, we are persuaded that the plaintiff had not yet completed the available procedures which might have enabled it to build according to the plans it had originally submitted for approval.
At the June 11, 1979, city council meeting, the council had imposed, in addition to the dedication requirement, four conditions for obtaining final site-plan approval and a subsequent building permit.29 Electro-Tech admits that none of the four additional conditions were objectionable, and, although it proceeded to remedy the deficiencies, it failed to submit a final site plan (either to the council or to the building department) reflecting at least those changes.30
The record further indicates that although all of the city departments participate in the decision-making process, the ultimate decision regarding building requests lies with the building department. As stated previously, the building department is responsible for examining the final site and building plans (as well as the final report from the engineering department) and, if everything is [85]*85approved, for ultimately issuing the building permit.31
These facts, in our view, support the conclusion that the process for obtaining the city’s permission to build had not yet been completed. The fact that the council’s approval was "conditional” indicates that the entire matter had not yet been finally resolved and that Electro-Tech would have to submit an amended site plan before it could begin building. As indicated in Williamson, until all five of the council’s objections, including the four "valid” conditions, are addressed and finally resolved (either by compliance or by refusal to comply), it is impossible to accurately determine the extent to which the plaintiff’s land retained any reasonable beneficial use or the extent to which the plaintiff’s expectation interest had been destroyed32_
[86]*86We agree with Justice Brickley that the building department has no authority "to override a condition imposed by the city council.” Post, p 107. However, this fact does not obviate the need for obtaining a final decision from the city in this case. The fact that the building department cannot overrule the city council does not, as Justice Brickley suggests, reduce the Williamson finality requirement to a mere exercise in futility.33
The Supreme Court’s primary purpose in mandating a final decision from the appropriate administrative body was to establish the existence of a "taking” and the extent to which it has harmed the plaintiff. Thus, while a final decision by the [87]*87building department in the instant case probably would not have resulted in approval of the site plan or the issuance of a building permit, it would have indeed resolved any issue regarding the four "valid” conditions and would have established a basis upon which a factfinder could conclude that "but for” the improper dedication requirement, Electro-Tech would have been able to "derive economic benefit” from its land. Williamson, supra at 191.34
In light of the record in the instant case as well as the purpose underlying the Williamson finality requirement, we reject the plaintiff’s assertion that it would have been futile to submit an amended site plan to the building department.
The second finality requirement set forth by the Williamson Court is that a taking claim is not ripe until a plaintiff has sought compensation through state procedures. The Court reasoned:
The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation. Nor does the Fifth Amendment require that just compensation be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a " 'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation’ ” exist at the time of the taking. . . . Similarly, if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation. [Id., pp 194-195. Citations omitted; emphasis added.]_
[88]*88The Supreme Court reaffirmed its finality requirements in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v Yolo Co, supra. Similarly, the lower federal courts have followed suit in requiring that a plaintiff first obtain a final decision from the governmental entity that is alleged to have taken property without just compensation and utilize the state procedures for obtaining just compensation before the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim will be considered ripe for adjudication. Bateson, supra; A A Profiles Inc v City of Ft Lauderdale, 850 F2d 1483 (CA 11, 1988); Austin v City & Co of Honolulu, 840 F2d 678 (CA 9, 1988), cert den 488 US 852; 109 S Ct 136; 102 L Ed 2d 109 (1988); Kinzli v City of Santa Cruz, 818 F2d 1449, 1453-1455 (CA 9, 1987), cert den 484 US 1043; 108 S Ct 775; 98 L Ed 2d 861 (1988); Ochoa Realty Corp v Faria, 815 F2d 812, 816-817 (CA 1, 1987); Norco Construction Inc v King Co, 801 F2d 1143, 1145-1146 (CA 9, 1986); Anthony v Franklin Co, 799 F2d 681, 683-684 (CA 11, 1986); Union Pacific R Co v Idaho, 654 F Supp 1236, 1243-1244 (D Idaho, 1987); Kaiser Development Co v City & Co of Honolulu, 649 F Supp 926, 938-943 (D Hawaii, 1986); Ross v City of Berkeley, 655 F Supp 820, 840-842 (ND Cal, 1987); JBK, Inc v Kansas City, 641 F Supp 893, 908-909 (WD Mo, 1986).
Like the State of Tennessee in Williamson, the State of Michigan recognizes a cause of action for a de facto taking. Const 1963, art 10, § 2; Hart v Detroit, 416 Mich 488; 331 NW2d 438 (1982); In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project, 376 Mich 311; 136 NW2d 896 (1965); Foster v Detroit, 405 F2d 138 (CA 6, 1968); In re Acquisition of Virginia Park, 121 Mich App 153; 328 NW2d 602 (1982); Detroit Bd of Ed v Clarke, 89 Mich App 504; 280 NW2d 574 (1979).35 An inverse or reverse condem[89]*89nation suit is one instituted by a landowner whose property has been taken for public use "without the commencement of condemnation proceedings.” Hart, supra, p 494. Under Michigan law, a "taking” for purposes of inverse condemnation means that governmental action has permanently deprived the property owner of any possession or use of the property. Id., pp 501-502. When such a taking has occurred, the Michigan Constitution entitles the property owner to just compensation for the value of the property taken. Id., p 494.
Further, Michigan law also recognizes a cause of action for inverse condemnation in cases, like this one, without a physical taking of property, where it is alleged that the effect of a governmental regulation is "to prevent the use of much of plaintiff’s property ... for any profitable purpose.” Grand Trunk W R Co v Detroit, 326 Mich 387, 392-393; 40 NW2d 195 (1949). For example, in Spanich v Livonia, 355 Mich 252, 259-265; 94 NW2d 62 (1959), this Court acknowledged that the application of a zoning ordinance to a particular property can constitute an unconstitutional taking.
Generally, the remedy in such cases is a declaration that the regulation is unconstitutional and void. Schwartz v City of Flint, 426 Mich 295, 308; 395 NW2d 678 (1986); Delta Charter Twp v Dinolfo, 419 Mich 253, 268-269; 351 NW2d 831 (1984). Assuming, however, that the plaintiff shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a proposed specific use of the property is reasonable, the trial court may additionally declare the use to be reasonable and enjoin the municipality from interfering with that use. Schwartz, supra, pp 325-329. [90]*90Although we found the notion "appealing,” Schwartz, supra, p 324, this Court has yet to decide whether plaintiffs may also be compensated for temporary regulatory takings. Recently, however, in Poirier v Grand Blanc Twp, 167 Mich App 770, 774; 423 NW2d 351 (1988), the Court of Appeals adhered to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in First English, supra, stating:
[It is well established] that regulation that goes too far will be recognized as a taking. Where government action works a taking, that necessarily implies the constitutional obligation to pay just compensation. That the regulation was an interim one or could be invalidated did not preclude an award for damages. The Court held that " 'temporary’ takings . . . are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.” Where government activities effect a taking, the mere invalidation of the offending ordinance does not relieve the government of its duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective. The Court did not distinguish between takings accomplished by the use of police power or by eminent domain. The key consideration was whether there had been a taking. [Citations omitted and emphasis added.][36]
Having examined the entire record in this case, we are persuaded that Electro-Tech attempted to pursue an inverse condemnation action in state court37 and that the trial court improperly disposed [91]*91of this claim on governmental immunity grounds.38
In light of both finality requirements set forth in Williamson, however, we find that the plaintiff here has, at the most, satisfied only the second requirement. The fact that Electro-Tech was not permitted to pursue its inverse condemnation action does not obviate the fact that the plaintiff had not yet obtained a final decision from the City of Westland regarding its request to build. Accordingly, we hold that Electro-Tech has brought its § 1983 "taking” claim prematurely.
hi
In light of Williamson and its progeny*, we are persuaded that Congress did not intend 42 USC 1983 to be an immediate tort recovery act for every person adversely affected by a local agency’s initial zoning or building decision. In the instant case, because the conditional approval of the plaintiff’s site plan was not the city’s final disposition of the matter, we hold that the plaintiff’s action under 42 USC 1983 was not ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals._
[92]*92Boyle, Archer, and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Riley, C.J.