Eleanor McGinn v. Broadmead, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 25-1028
• Status: Published

Opinion

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-1028

ELEANOR MCGINN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BROADMEAD, INC,

Defendant - Appellee.

------------------------------

NATIONAL CELIAC ASSOCIATION; DISABILITY LAW CENTER OF VIRGINIA; AARP; AARP FOUNDATION,

Amici Supporting Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Stephanie A. Gallagher, District Judge. (1:23−cv−02609−SAG)

Argued: October 22, 2025 Decided: February 18, 2026

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Benjamin joined.

ARGUED: David John Hommel Jr., EISENBERG & BAUM, LLP, New York, New York, for Appellant. P. Thomas DiStanislao, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON USCA4 Appeal: 25-1028 Doc: 59 Filed: 02/18/2026 Pg: 2 of 14

L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Andrew Rozynski, EISENBERG & BAUM, LLP, New York, New York, for Appellant. Samuel P. Morse, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Ellen M. Saideman, LAW OFFICE OF ELLEN SAIDEMAN, Barrington, Rhode Island; Theodore R. Debonis, Steven C. Schwartz, Alicia Yeo, CHAFFETZ LINDSEY LLP, New York, New York, for Amici National Celiac Association and disAbility Law Center of Virginia. William Alvarado Rivera, Kelly Bagby, Mary William, Genevieve Fontan, AARP FOUNDATION, Washington, D.C., for Amici AARP and AARP Foundation.

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DIAZ, Chief Judge:

Eleanor McGinn has celiac disease and must keep a gluten free diet. On several

occasions, she fell ill after eating meals at her retirement community, Broadmead, Inc. So

she sued, alleging that Broadmead exposed her to gluten and discriminated against her.

The district court granted summary judgment to Broadmead. McGinn now appeals

the adverse judgment on her state-law breach of contract and negligence claims, as well as

three federal-law claims.

Finding that genuine questions of material fact remain about McGinn’s alleged

gluten exposure in January 2021, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to Broadmead on the breach of contract and negligence claims arising from that incident.

But we otherwise affirm.

I.

A.

McGinn has celiac disease and can’t eat gluten. After Broadmead assured her that

it could accommodate her diet, she signed a residential agreement. That contract specified

that Broadmead would serve “three nutritional and properly cooked meals a day from a

choice of well-balanced menus.” Joint Appendix (J.A.) 187.

1.

McGinn moved to Broadmead in October 2017. On February 22, 2018, McGinn

vomited after eating a crab cake that a Broadmead employee said was gluten free. She

informed a Broadmead manager and asked whether the crab cake contained imitation

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crabmeat, which had gluten. The manager responded that Broadmead “only use[d] real

crab meat.” J.A. 477. McGinn “let it go” and didn’t make any further inquiries. J.A. 422.

She later stated that “[i]n hindsight, I wish I had said, [t]ell me exactly how you made it.”

J.A. 422.

On June 20, 2020, McGinn ate what she thought was a gluten free stuffed tomato.

She “developed severe bloating and pain in [her] stomach followed by vomiting, diarrhea,

exhaustion and hives on [her] hands and leg.” J.A. 291, 430.

She informed Broadmead’s Chief Executive Officer about the incident. The Chief

Executive Officer responded, confirming that “there was a transcription error” on the menu

and that the stuffed tomato contained gluten. J.A. 290.

Then, on January 29, 2021, McGinn ate chicken marsala labeled as gluten free and

“became violently ill.” J.A. 442. She reported the incident to Broadmead’s Vice President

of Health Services, stating, “[t]here is no way that chicken was gluten free because I

NEVER vomit unless I consume gluten.” J.A. 592–94.

Another Broadmead administrator instructed the dining director “to determine how

this process failed.” J.A. 597. The next day, the administrator told McGinn that she had

spoken to the dining director and concluded: “[s]omewhere along the line there was a

failure and we will find it.” J.A. 595.

2.

McGinn notified the dining director about her “observations, concerns and

suggestions regarding gluten free food at Broadmead” in January 2019. J.A. 497–500. She

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expressed concern about “a serious lack of communication and consistency in presenting

‘gluten free’ selections.” J.A. 497.

In February 2021, a Broadmead administrator invited McGinn to a meeting “to

review our [meal preparation] process and determine if there are other measures we can

put into place.” J.A. 595. At that meeting, a Broadmead chef said he used Rice Krispies

as crab cake filler. McGinn responded that Rice Krispies aren’t gluten free, which, in her

view, explained why she had gotten sick after eating the crab cake in 2018.

But the chef only used Rice Krispies in crab cakes for one week in January 2021,

before switching to gluten free bread crumbs. A different chef made the crab cake in 2018,

and he also used gluten free bread crumbs.

The administrator later emailed McGinn, stating that Broadmead’s crab cake recipe

calls for “only gluten free breadcrumbs.” J.A. 598. She told McGinn that Broadmead

“changed out [its] rice flour bin and . . . also moved the location of the bin so there isn’t a

possibility of any cross contamination.” J.A. 598.

3.

McGinn stopped eating at Broadmead’s dining venues around February 2021.

In March 2023, Broadmead offered to let McGinn “opt out of [her] Residence and

Care Agreement meal plan” and to apply a credit to her account. J.A. 285. McGinn didn’t

accept. She continued using her meal plan to request gluten free food, which she gave

away.

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In May 2023, Broadmead’s Chief Executive Officer invited McGinn to “provide a

list of gluten free bread products, desserts, and pasta dishes that [she] would like to see

available in the Broadmead dining venues.” J.A. 287–88. McGinn did so.

Broadmead also had several staff members complete a “gluten free certification

program.” J.A. 528–47. Additionally, it created a separate, gluten free kitchen space and

expanded its gluten free food offerings. McGinn’s expert stated that Broadmead “made

the right remedies” and is “now in a different position and a place in accommodating [her]

needs.” J.A. 737–38.

B.

McGinn sued Broadmead on September 26, 2023, alleging violations of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fair Housing Act. She

also asserted six state-law claims: breach of contract, negligence, negligent

misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of

merchantability, and breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.

McGinn moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court denied.

McGinn v. Broadmead, Inc., 1:23-cv-02609-SAG, ECF Nos. 7, 19. She then moved for

partial summary judgment on her three federal claims, and Broadmead moved for summary

judgment on all nine claims. McGinn, 1:23-cv-02609-SAG, ECF Nos. 38–39. The court

denied McGinn’s motion and granted Broadmead’s. McGinn, 1:23-cv-02609-SAG, ECF

No. 54.

McGinn appeals the district court’s order, but only as to her three federal-law claims

and her state-law breach of contract and negligence claims.

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II.

We first assess whether McGinn has standing to seek injunctive relief under the

Americans with Disabilities Act.

To have standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact, which is “(a) concrete and

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent.” Laufer v. Naranda Hotels, LLC, 60 F.4th 156,

161 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). When

seeking injunctive relief, “the plaintiff must also show a ‘real or immediate threat that [she]

will be wronged again.’” Id. (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). “The

party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing–and, at the

summary judgment stage, such a party can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set

forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.

398, 411–12 (2013) (citation modified).

McGinn contends that she has standing because she “repeatedly became sick after

eating purportedly gluten-free meals prepared by [Broadmead and elsewhere].”

Appellant’s Br. at 29 (citation modified). But past injury alone isn’t enough to show

McGinn “will be wronged again” and doesn’t confer standing to enjoin a speculative future

injury. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.

McGinn also claims that she has standing because she faces continuing harm. Why?

Because Broadmead’s policies deter her from eating at its facilities and inflict economic

harm.

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Neither injury establishes standing here. McGinn misreads our cases when she

asserts that deterrence alone is sufficient for standing. See Appellant’s Br. at 32 (citing

Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447 (4th Cir. 2017) and Daniels v. Arcade,

L.P., 477 F. App’x 125 (4th Cir. 2012)). To be sure, we’ve allowed an Americans with

Disabilities Act plaintiff to demonstrate the likelihood of future injury by alleging past

injury and a plausible intention to return for the service. See Nanni, 878 F.3d at 455–56;

Daniels, 477 F. App’x at 130. But we decided those appeals at the motion to dismiss stage.

At summary judgment, it’s not enough for McGinn to claim that she “obviously has

a plausible intent” to resume eating at Broadmead. Reply Br. at 6. She must proffer facts

and evidence. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 411–12. But she hasn’t pointed to anything to

show she would ever eat again at Broadmead. Just the opposite: even after Broadmead

implemented the changes McGinn requested, she still refused to eat there.

Nor has McGinn suffered economic harm. Six months before she sued, Broadmead

agreed to let her opt out of its meal plan. McGinn declined and continued to order and

receive gluten free meals that she gave away.

Because McGinn lacks standing, we can’t review her Americans with Disabilities

Act claim for injunctive relief.

III.

Next, we turn to Broadmead’s argument that McGinn forfeited review of her Fair

Housing Act and Rehabilitation Act claims.

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When a litigant doesn’t “present any argument in its opening brief taking issue with

[a] facet of the district court’s holding,” we will “conclude that it has [forfeited] any

challenge to the district court’s judgment on that ground, and we will affirm.” Foodbuy,

LLC v. Gregory Packaging, Inc., 987 F.3d 102, 120 (4th Cir. 2021).

In her opening brief, McGinn addressed only the first part of the district court’s

reasoning that her federal claims accrued in January 2019 and so were untimely. She didn’t

address the court’s holding that the continuing violation doctrine, which tolls the limitation

period for new violations, doesn’t apply for failure to accommodate claims outside the

hostile workplace context. See J.A. 818 (citing Szedlock v. Tenet, 61 F. App’x 88, 93 (4th

Cir. 2003)). Because McGinn didn’t address the court’s alternate ground for dismissing

her Fair Housing Act and Rehabilitation Act claims, she has forfeited the challenge.

In any event, the statute of limitations bars McGinn’s federal claims.

Fair Housing Act claims have a two-year limitations period, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 3613(a)(1)(A), and because the Rehabilitation Act doesn’t specify, we apply Maryland’s

general three-year limitations rule, see Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (West

2025).

We review a district court’s statute of limitations decision de novo. See Chambers

v. N.C. Dep’t of Just., 66 F.4th 139, 141 (4th Cir. 2023). “A civil rights claim accrues

when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the

action.” A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation

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modified). But, under the continuing violation doctrine, if a plaintiff “can show that the

illegal act did not occur just once, but rather in a series of separate acts, and if the same

alleged violation was committed at the time of each act, then the limitations period begins

anew with each violation.” Id. (citation modified).

McGinn contends that the district court erred in holding that her federal claims

accrued in January 2019 when she first informed Broadmead of its alleged failure to

accommodate her disability. She says that her communications with Broadmead in March

2023 constituted a new violation, which restarted the limitations period.

That’s not right. The unpublished case that McGinn cites, Hill v. Hampstead Lester

Morton Ct. Partners LP, holds that “a plaintiff who renews a request for a previously

denied accommodation may bring suit based on a new discrete act of discrimination if the

defendant again denies the request.” 581 F. App’x 178, 181 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation

modified).

But Broadmead didn’t deny McGinn’s request. When McGinn asked for more

gluten free options in March 2023, Broadmead assured her that its “Dining and Hospitality

team continually identifies new products for all diet types and integrates them into [its]

dining program.” J.A. 285. Broadmead’s Chief Executive Officer also invited McGinn to

provide a list of gluten free options she’d like Broadmead to offer, and McGinn sent her a

list. There’s no evidence of a new violation.

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Because McGinn’s claims accrued in January 2019, the limitations periods for the

Fair Housing Act and the Rehabilitation Act ended in January 2021 and January 2022,

respectively. She didn’t file suit until September 2023, which was too late for either claim.

IV.

We turn next to McGinn’s contention that Maryland’s discovery rule saves her

breach of contract and negligence claims premised on an alleged gluten exposure from a

crab cake in February 2018.

Generally, Maryland applies a three-year limitations period for civil claims. See

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (West 2025). But the discovery rule provides

an exception. It protects plaintiffs “where it was not reasonably possible to have obtained

notice of the nature and cause of an injury,” and it tolls the limitations period “until the

time the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of diligence, should have discovered,

the injury.” Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 756 A.2d 963, 973 (Md. 2000).

Maryland courts apply a two-part test to determine whether the exception applies.

First, they ask whether the claimant had the “actual knowledge necessary to cause an

ordinarily diligent plaintiff to make an inquiry or investigation.” State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Lennox, 422 F. Supp. 3d 948, 964 (D. Md. 2019) (citation modified). Second, they assess

whether “a reasonably diligent inquiry would have disclosed whether there is a causal

connection between the inquiry and the wrongdoing.” Id. Whether “a party is on inquiry

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is not always a question of fact, and not always a question for the jury.” Est. of Adams v.

Cont’l Ins. Co., 161 A.3d 70, 91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).

McGinn asserts that the district court erred in determining that the limitations period

barred her breach of contract and negligence claims arising from the alleged gluten

exposure in 2018. McGinn thinks the court should have applied the discovery rule because

“she did not know—and could not have known—until [February] 2021” that Broadmead

used gluten containing Rice Krispies as a filler in its crab cakes. Appellant’s Br. at 46; J.A.

46.

But McGinn doesn’t satisfy the conditions to invoke the discovery rule. After

McGinn became ill, she contacted Broadmead staff to ask whether the crab cake she’d

consumed contained imitation crabmeat. Broadmead confirmed that it didn’t, and she “let

it go” without making any further inquiries. J.A. 422. McGinn later conceded that she

wished she had asked how Broadmead prepared the crab cake but didn’t. So McGinn had

actual knowledge of both the need to inquire and that her limited inquiry wasn’t reasonably

diligent.

Because McGinn’s alleged gluten exposure occurred in February 2018, the three-

year limitations period ran in February 2021. She didn’t file suit until September 2023, so

her breach of contract and negligence claims arising from that incident are barred by the

statute of limitations.

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C.

In any event, McGinn can’t prevail on those claims because the evidence that she

suggests creates a dispute of a material fact is speculative. See United States v. 8.929 Acres

of Land, 36 F.4th 240, 252 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he nonmoving party must rely on more

than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another,

or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” (citation modified)).

McGinn contends that because Broadmead’s chef told her that he used gluten

containing Rice Krispies to make a crab cake in 2021, Broadmead must have done the same

in 2018. But the evidence doesn’t support that conclusion. The chef who prepared the

crab cake in 2021 used Rice Krispies for “[p]robably no longer than a week” before

switching to a gluten free alternative, and the other chef who made the crab cake in 2018

used gluten free bread crumbs. J.A. 373, 677.

McGinn identifies no contradictory evidence and so her claims fail on the merits.

Lastly, we assess whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment to

Broadmead on McGinn’s breach of contract and negligence claims from an alleged gluten

exposure after she ate chicken marsala in January 2021. We agree with McGinn that it did.

McGinn contends that the district court so erred because it didn’t consider all the

evidence. She emphasizes that the court didn’t account for the Broadmead administrator’s

statements that 1) she instructed the dining director “to determine how this process failed,”

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J.A. 597, and 2) “[s]omewhere along the line there was a failure and we will find it,” J.A.

595.

McGinn is right that the district court overlooked the administrator’s statements

when concluding that McGinn did “not adduce[] sufficient non-speculative evidence to

show that this amounted to a breach [of contract]” or “a duty of care.” J.A. 827, 829. The

statements acknowledging a failure are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

A jury may well find that the statements are admissions of wrongdoing. Or a jury

may find that they are mere promises that Broadmead would investigate the matter, without

accepting responsibility. But that’s for a jury to decide and weigh alongside the other

evidence.

* * *

In sum, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Broadmead on

McGinn’s breach of contract and negligence claims arising from the alleged gluten

exposure in January 2021. We remand for further proceedings on those claims. We

otherwise affirm.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED