Supreme Court
No. 2024-314-Appeal. (WD 24-282)
E.H. Turf Supply Co., Inc. d/b/a Allen’s : Seed
v. :
Roger Tavares. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Long, for the Court. Rogerio1 Tavares (defendant or Mr. Tavares)
appeals from a Superior Court judgment entered in favor of E.H. Turf Supply
Company, Inc. d/b/a Allen’s Seed (plaintiff or E.H. Turf Supply) in the amount of
$1,703.71. E.H. Turf Supply alleged, initially in District Court, that Mr. Tavares
stopped payment on a check he tendered for services that E.H. Turf Supply
performed to fix Mr. Tavares’s tractor; Mr. Tavares appealed the District Court’s
judgment to the Superior Court. Before this Court, Mr. Tavares alleges that the
Superior Court erred in (1) allowing E.H. Turf Supply to present its case first; (2)
1 Since its inception, the caption of this case has identified Mr. Tavares as “Roger” rather than “Rogerio,” his preferred name. Out of respect for Mr. Tavares, this Court will use his preferred name. -1- ruling that certain evidence that Mr. Tavares sought to introduce was inadmissible;
and (3) failing to consider his status as a self-represented litigant during the trial.
This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the
parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be
summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and
reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that we may
decide this case without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in
this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Procedural History
This is the second small-claims action filed in District Court by E.H. Turf
Supply against Mr. Tavares. In its first complaint, filed in February 2022 (2022
complaint), E.H. Turf Supply alleged that Mr. Tavares had stopped payment on a
check tendered to E.H. Turf Supply for maintenance performed on Mr. Tavares’s
tractor; the initial complaint sought payment in the amount of $1,703. Mr. Tavares
returned the summons generated in that action without signing it, and the suit was
later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
In January 2024, E.H. Turf Supply filed the instant action in District Court
again seeking payment for services (2024 complaint). Mr. Tavares filed an answer
in which he denied the allegations in the complaint and argued that plaintiff’s
counsel had been a “no-show” on the date of trial on the 2022 complaint and that,
-2- therefore, E.H. Turf Supply’s choice to refile its complaint demonstrated “bad faith”
and a violation of the rules of professional conduct. Mr. Tavares also asserted a
counterclaim “for services not rendered” and sought $2,500 in compensatory
damages. The form on which Mr. Tavares asserted his counterclaim stated that,
“[b]y filing this counterclaim, I waive my right to appeal on the counterclaim only.”
The document further stated, in all-capital letters above the signature line, “THE
DEFENDANT WAIVES RIGHT TO APPEAL ON COUNTER CLAIM ONLY.”
The District Court held a bench trial on May 20, 2024. At the conclusion of
the trial, judgment entered in favor of plaintiff with an award of damages in the
amount of $1,500 plus costs. Mr. Tavares filed a notice of appeal on the same day
that judgment entered.
On May 30, 2024, the Superior Court issued a notice scheduling trial for
June 21, 2024; and Mr. Tavares filed a statement of the case arguing that the District
Court had “denied [him], the defendant, and a pro se litigant, the fair opportunity to
present [his] case and evidence.” Mr. Tavares argued (1) that the voluntary dismissal
of the 2022 complaint was never properly served on him; and (2) that the District
Court judge erred by accepting plaintiff’s 2024 complaint without following
“specific procedural rules to prevent abuse of the legal process,” by allowing
plaintiff to file its 2024 complaint which, he alleged, had been refiled as “a strategic
move to gain an unfair advantage in the litigation process,” and which the District
-3- Court had accepted “without proper scrutiny,” and by denying him the right to
introduce evidence at trial. Mr. Tavares also argued that the District Court was
biased in favor of plaintiff, erred by relying on the facts contained in plaintiff’s
witness’s testimony rather than his own, and by misinterpreting the evidence, which,
he urged, was inadequate to establish liability.
A one-day bench trial commenced on July 26, 2024. See G.L. 1956 § 9-12-
10. E.H. Turf Supply, as the plaintiff who filed the underlying 2024 complaint,
presented the testimony of Erik Hagenstein (Mr. Hagenstein), the president and
owner of E.H. Turf Supply, first. Mr. Tavares objected to Mr. Hagenstein being
called as a witness on the grounds that he had not received “prior notice or disclosure
of the witness, [he was] prejudice[d] due to nondisclosure” and that Mr.
Hagenstein’s testimony was irrelevant; the court overruled his objection.
Mr. Hagenstein testified regarding E.H. Turf Supply’s procedure to diagnose
and fix broken equipment. He testified that in a job like the one Mr. Tavares
requested,
“we would go through what’s to be done, performed, what parts may be involved, provide an estimate. If we’re given an approval, we go ahead and perform that work, and when the customer comes in, we basically start the machine, operate it, show them what we did, explain it, and * * * if everybody’s in agreement * * * they pay for the work done and take the unit.”
-4- Mr. Hagenstein testified that he was not directly involved with Mr. Tavares’s tractor,
but Mr. Hagenstein was nonetheless able to identify the estimate that E.H. Turf
Supply provided to Mr. Tavares. Mr. Hagenstein further testified that Mr. Tavares’s
signature was on the bottom of the estimate, that the estimate was converted into an
invoice when “everybody’s in agreement” and “the work [was] performed,” and that
the services provided for in the estimate were performed at the cost provided in the
estimate.
Additionally, Mr. Hagenstein testified that E.H. Turf Supply received a
personal check from Mr. Tavares for the full amount owed on the date of completion
of its work, a copy of which was entered into evidence without objection. E.H. Turf
Supply then released the tractor to Mr. Tavares. After receiving the check, E.H. Turf
Supply’s bank informed plaintiff that there was a stop-payment placed on the check
by Mr. Tavares. Mr. Hagenstein testified that E.H. Turf Supply then attempted to
reach out to Mr. Tavares, including by certified letter, 2 without receiving a response,
and then called the state police. Mr. Hagenstein testified that, at the time of trial,
E.H. Turf Supply had not received payment for its services.
Mr. Tavares conducted extensive cross-examination of Mr. Hagenstein,
questioning whether his company was certified to work on John Deere tractors,
2 Mr. Tavares objected to introduction of a copy of the certified letter as a full exhibit. The trial justice noted his objection but overruled it, concluding that “plaintiff ha[d] met its burden of proof by making appropriate foundation.” -5- whether E.H. Turf Supply had contacted John Deere to “assist” with the repair of the
tractor, whether Mr. Hagenstein was familiar with the type of tractor Mr. Tavares
brought in, and whether Mr. Hagenstein was confident in the accuracy and
completeness of the work performed by his employees. Mr. Tavares further inquired
into damage to the hood of his tractor, which he alleged was caused by E.H. Turf
Supply employees, and, with the assistance of the trial justice, introduced a police
report detailing that damage. However, Mr. Tavares did not ask Mr. Hagenstein any
questions about the police report.
Mr. Tavares also questioned Mr. Hagenstein about the work listed in the
estimate. Mr. Hagenstein testified that he did not recall why Mr. Tavares had
brought in his tractor. Mr. Tavares then asked whether the problems listed on the
estimate could indicate “an issue with stalling on a tractor” to which Mr. Hagenstein
responded, “I guess if it’s not charging, yes, I could see that stalling.”
On redirect examination, counsel for E.H. Turf Supply asked Mr. Hagenstein
to confirm that the estimate contained a statement at the end that read: “talked to
Roger, all set” and that Mr. Tavares had signed the estimate. Mr. Hagenstein
confirmed that that notation indicated to him “[t]hat [E.H. Turf Supply] went over
what * * * work was performed, * * * any issues he may have had, they were
addressed, and * * * it’s all set.”
-6- After redirect examination, and while Mr. Hagenstein was still on the stand,
Mr. Tavares sought to introduce invoices from three businesses other than E.H. Turf
Supply. The first was an invoice from a John Deere dealer in Massachusetts. The
plaintiff objected. Mr. Tavares explained that he sought to introduce the exhibit to
show that “the belts that [E.H. Turf Supply] said they * * * replaced * * * [still]
needed to be replaced” after the tractor was picked up, corroborating his defense that
there were still issues with his tractor after plaintiff’s service. The trial justice
sustained plaintiff’s objection on the grounds that the invoice constituted hearsay,
marked the invoice for identification only, and instructed Mr. Tavares that he was
permitted to testify about the steps he took after picking up the tractor from E.H.
Turf Supply.
Next, Mr. Tavares sought to introduce a second invoice for items he had
purchased before he brought his tractor to E.H. Turf Supply. That invoice, which
was admitted as a full exhibit, showed that he had purchased hydraulic fluid on
November 17, 2020.
Finally, Mr. Tavares sought to introduce a third invoice from another repair
shop. The plaintiff restated its objection to that exhibit, and the exhibit was marked
for identification. Mr. Tavares then showed Mr. Hagenstein the third invoice and
asked why a subsequent repair shop would have flushed hydraulic fluid from the
tractor “within a short time frame” after E.H. Turf Supply said it did the same thing.
-7- Mr. Hagenstein explained that the other shop’s invoice reflected that “a transmission
* * * was swapped from another model” and the fluid listed on their invoice was
“new transmission fluid.”
Before the close of testimony, the trial justice asked Mr. Tavares whether he
had “anything [he] want[ed] to tell me that [he] ha[dn’t] already told me?” Mr.
Tavares testified that Mr. Hagenstein was not credible “given his limited experience
with the John Deere tractor 332 model and the lack of evidence supporting his shop’s
certification to work on John Deere diesel engines.” Mr. Tavares also stated that
Mr. Hagenstein’s “failure to adequately communicate” with him about the parts
needed to fix his tractor and the fact that E.H. Turf Supply had to consult a John
Deere dealer during their repairs “raises concerns about the thoroughness and the
reliability of the repairs performed.” Mr. Tavares also took issue with the fact that
Mr. Hagenstein was “not the mechanic” and that his testimony differed from the
bookkeeper who testified for E.H. Turf Supply in District Court. Mr. Tavares
asserted that these factors “collectively diminish[ed] the truthfulness, the
trustworthiness of [Mr. Hagenstein’s] testimony * * *.”
The trial justice subsequently issued her decision from the bench. The court
summarized the procedural history of the case and detailed the testimony heard at
the trial. She noted that Mr. Hagenstein testified that the services outlined in the
estimate, which was converted into an invoice, had been performed; that the cost of
-8- the services was accurate; and that Mr. Tavares made a payment for the services
reflected in the estimate, a copy of which he received at the time he picked up the
tractor. The trial justice found that defendant owed $ 1,703.71. The trial justice also
found that it was undisputed that Mr. Tavares paid that amount and that he then
stopped payment on his check. The trial justice acknowledged that defendant “did
testify, without objection, that he did not believe the work was performed,” but that
there was no admissible evidence to substantiate that belief “because the [c]ourt has
not allowed the introduction of full exhibits * * * [from] subsequent companies that
have looked at the tractor.” The trial justice therefore found that E.H. Turf Supply
was entitled to judgment in the amount of $1,703.71.
The Superior Court entered judgment on August 29, 2024. Mr. Tavares filed
his notice of appeal to this Court on September 3, 2024.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews “the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury”
deferentially. Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 68 A.3d 425, 433 (R.I. 2013) (quoting
Pelletier v. Laureanno, 46 A.3d 28, 35 (R.I. 2012)). As a result “we will not disturb
the findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury unless such findings are clearly
erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence
or unless the decision fails to do substantial justice between the parties.” Id. at
433-34 (quoting Grady v. Narragansett Electric Company, 962 A.2d 34, 41 (R.I.
-9- 2009)). However, “we review de novo the trial justice’s conclusions of law.” Id. at
434.
Analysis
On appeal, Mr. Tavares argues, first, that the trial justice erred in denying him
the right to obtain discovery about plaintiff’s witness, Mr. Hagenstein, and that Mr.
Hagenstein’s testimony was irrelevant. Second, he contends that the trial justice
erred when she allowed plaintiff to present its argument first, relied on testimony
from witnesses who were not well informed on the complexities of the repair of his
tractor in reaching her conclusion, and excluded evidence of repairs from other
dealers, all of which amounted to structural error. And, third, Mr. Tavares argues
that the trial justice erred in failing to consider his status as a self-represented
litigant.3
A. Mr. Hagenstein’s Testimony
The defendant first contends that the trial justice erred in denying him the
opportunity to obtain discovery with regard to Mr. Hagenstein’s trial testimony and
certain exhibits presented at trial. He further contends that Mr. Hagenstein was a
surprise witness, and that Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony was irrelevant. Mr. Tavares
3 Mr. Tavares makes certain arguments in his statement filed pursuant to Article I, Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure regarding the conduct of the trial in the District Court. However, because this appeal arises from a de novo trial before, and entry of judgment by, the Superior Court, we confine our review to that proceeding and judgment. - 10 - objected to Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony at trial, and the trial justice overruled his
objection.
The defendant’s arguments are without merit. First, Mr. Tavares’s allegation
that the trial justice erred in denying him discovery with regard to Mr. Hagenstein’s
testimony and plaintiff’s exhibits is without merit because Mr. Tavares was not
entitled to discovery in Superior Court on appeal from the District Court. Rule 81(b)
of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states that, on appeal from the District
Court, “[t]he provisions of Rules 26 through 37, relative to discovery, shall not be
applicable” unless a party makes a showing that lack of discovery will result in
injustice or undue hardship. Therefore, Mr. Tavares was not entitled to discovery of
plaintiff’s witnesses or evidence, and there is no indication that Mr. Tavares ever
argued that the lack of discovery would result in injustice or undue hardship. As a
result, he was not entitled to pretrial discovery of Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony. For
this reason, there is similarly no merit to Mr. Tavares’s assertion that Mr. Hagenstein
was a surprise witness or that he suffered trial by ambush.
Second, Mr. Tavares argues that the testimony Mr. Hagenstein provided was
irrelevant because he did not possess specific knowledge about the model tractor that
Mr. Tavares asked E.H. Turf Supply to fix. Evidence is “relevant” when it renders
any fact of consequence more probable than it would be without the evidence. R.I.
R. Evid. 401. Here, the de novo trial before the Superior Court was aimed at
- 11 - discerning whether Mr. Tavares was obligated to tender payment to E.H. Turf
Supply for services rendered. Mr. Hagenstein testified regarding Mr. Tavares’s
delivery of the tractor to E.H. Turf Supply, E.H. Turf Supply’s procedures for
assessing the tractor and confirming repairs with the owner, Mr. Tavares’s
acceptance of the estimated cost of the repairs, and Mr. Tavares’s payment of the
cost of repairs after work had been completed but prior to stopping payment on his
check. Each of these facts were necessary for the trial justice to make the ultimate
determination regarding whether Mr. Tavares was liable for the unpaid invoice, and
his testimony was therefore relevant.
Mr. Tavares nevertheless suggests that, because Mr. Hagenstein did not
possess working knowledge of the mechanical issues associated with his particular
tractor, all of Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony was irrelevant and should not have been
admitted. This argument, however, conflates substantive knowledge of the
mechanical issues for which Mr. Tavares initially contacted E.H. Turf Supply with
Mr. Tavares’s obligation to pay for services rendered under the invoice to which he
provided his consent. This latter question was the only question presented to the
Superior Court at the de novo trial, and because Mr. Hagenstein’s testimony was
relevant to that question, the trial justice did not err in admitting or relying on Mr.
Hagenstein’s testimony.
- 12 - B. Procedural Issues
Mr. Tavares next argues that the trial justice committed error when she
allowed E.H. Turf Supply to present its evidence first and forced him to present his
evidence second. Specifically, Mr. Tavares argues that “the Trial Court’s decision
to allow [E.H. Turf Supply] to proceed and make [its] argument before [him]
affected [his] ability to properly present his arguments and satisfy his burden of proof
as the Appellant.” This argument likewise fails.
Mr. Tavares appealed the District Court judgment to Superior Court under a
statute entitled “Claim of appeal of superior court.” Section 9-12-10. Under that
statute, an appealing party has a statutory right for the Superior Court to exercise its
independent judgment in passing on the merits of the case by holding a new trial.
Val-Gioia Properties, LLC v. Blamires, 18 A.3d 545, 549 (R.I. 2011). When the
Superior Court holds a new trial, what we call a de novo trial, it is “conducted as if
there had been no trial in the first instance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1737 (10th ed.
2014). Therefore, Mr. Tavares’s appeal proceeded under the Superior Court Rules
of Civil Procedure regarding trials in that court. Rule 43(f)(1) of those Rules states
that the party bearing the burden of proof shall open and close the case at trial. See
Super. R. Civ. P. 43(f)(1).
In hearing the case anew, the Superior Court was required to assess the merits
of E.H. Turf Supply’s 2024 complaint as if it had been first filed in Superior Court.
- 13 - E.H. Turf Supply, as the plaintiff in the 2024 action, bore the burden of proof to
show that Mr. Tavares owed that company money for services rendered on his
tractor. Thus, under the Superior Court Rules, E.H. Turf Supply and not Mr. Tavares
was required to open the case because it was the party that bore the burden to prove
the allegations in the 2024 complaint. See Super. R. Civ. P. 43(f)(1). Therefore, Mr.
Tavares’s argument that the trial justice erred in allowing E.H. Turf Supply to
proceed first is without merit.
C. Evidentiary Error
Mr. Tavares also alleges that the trial justice violated his right to due process
when she excluded particular pieces of evidence that he attempted to introduce at
trial. It is well established that the admissibility of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial justice, and this Court will not interfere with the trial justice’s
decision unless a clear abuse of that discretion is apparent. ADP Marshall, Inc. v.
Brown University, 784 A.2d 309, 314 (R.I. 2001).
Mr. Tavares sought to introduce three exhibits: an invoice from a
Massachusetts John Deere dealer (which was marked for identification), and two
other invoices, one from before E.H. Turf Supply’s repairs (which was admitted as
a full exhibit), and one from after (which was marked for identification). The trial
justice determined that invoices marked for identification purposes only were
hearsay and therefore could not be admitted as full exhibits. Because the second
- 14 - invoice was admitted as a full exhibit, we confine our review to assess whether the
trial justice committed an abuse of discretion by marking the first and third exhibit
for identification purposes only.
The trial justice did not abuse her discretion in finding that the first and third
exhibits were hearsay and marking them only for identification purposes only. Our
rules define hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” R.I. R. Evid. 801(c). Mr. Tavares informed the trial justice that he sought
to introduce the first invoice to show “the issues that [he] was still having” after
picking the tractor up from E.H. Turf Supply. In essence, Mr. Tavares sought to use
the statements in this invoice and the third invoice regarding later repairs to his
tractor as proof that E.H. Turf Supply had not completed its obligation to repair the
tractor. In order to be admitted on this basis, the statements in the invoices would
need to be accepted as reliable proof. Under our rules, however, the invoices would
be inadmissible for that purpose unless, among other things, someone from the
business who created the invoice could attest that the invoice was accurate. See R.I.
R. Evid. 801(c); 803(6) (defining the regularly conducted activity exception to
hearsay). Because no one from those dealers was present to testify regarding their
contents, the invoices were inadmissible for the truth of their contents, and the trial
- 15 - justice did not abuse her discretion by allowing them to be marked for identification
purposes only.
Relatedly, Mr. Tavares also argues that the trial justice’s purported errors
constituted a fundamental or structural error that affected the fairness of the
proceeding. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the trial justice
did not commit error during the Superior Court trial; and, consequently, there is no
“structural error” on which to reverse the trial justice. Further, even if we concluded
that the trial justice had committed error, this Court has not formally adopted the
“structural error” or “defect” framework explained by the Supreme Court in Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), on which Mr. Tavares principally relies. And
even if we decided to look to Fulminante for guidance, it is distinguishable. That
case, and the cases cited therein, primarily concern overt constitutional violations
affecting the framework of the trial itself. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10 (citing
cases involving exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury,
deprivation of the right to counsel, and violations of the right to self-representation
and to a public trial). Our review of the record in this case, however, does not reveal
the kinds of constitutional deprivations identified in Fulminante as warranting
- 16 - reversal under the structural error framework. Therefore, we decline to reverse the
trial justice on that ground.
Mr. Tavares additionally cites Rule 61 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure for the proposition that “errors that affect the substantial rights of the
parties” provide grounds to reverse a judgment. However, that rule contains an
important caveat omitted from Mr. Tavares’s citation: that “no error in either the
admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling * * * is
ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict” unless it is inconsistent
with substantial justice. Super. R. Civ. P. 61. Here, Mr. Tavares’s primary
contentions of error relate to the introduction and presentation of evidence and the
availability of discovery. By its own terms, those are not the types of errors that
Rule 61 is designed to rectify. And, because the trial justice’s decisions did not
interfere with Mr. Tavares’s ability to mount a defense, her rulings were not
inconsistent with substantial justice. See id. Accordingly, Rule 61 is not a viable
ground on which this Court can reverse the trial justice.
D. Self-Represented Litigant
Finally, Mr. Tavares alleges that the trial justice failed to consider his status
as a self-represented litigant when presiding over his trial. Mr. Tavares is correct
that trial justices should be considerate towards self-represented litigants, but those
litigants choosing to proceed without an attorney are still bound by the Superior
- 17 - Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Oliveira v.
Levesque, 294 A.3d 994, 998 (R.I. 2023) (“[A]lthough ‘pro se litigants are often
granted greater latitude by [a] court,’ they are not exempt from our rules.”) (quoting
Terzian v. Lombardi, 180 A.3d 555, 558 (R.I. 2018)). When an individual elects to
proceed as a self-represented litigant, they undertake a difficult task; but the courts
“cannot and will not entirely overlook established rules of procedure” just because
a litigant is self-represented. Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580, 585
(R.I. 2005) (quoting Gray v. Stillman White Co., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I. 1987)).
The trial justice reasonably provided Mr. Tavares with significant leeway
during the course of the trial. The trial justice assisted Mr. Tavares by explaining
the process for introducing and using evidence presented for his defense. During the
Superior Court proceeding, the trial justice explained her rulings to make sure Mr.
Tavares understood them. Moreover, when Mr. Tavares attempted to introduce his
first and third invoices as exhibits, the trial justice allowed him an opportunity to
explain how they would be used, then ruled that they were inadmissible as full
exhibits, but instructed Mr. Tavares that he could testify about the events
surrounding their creation. The trial justice further conferred with Mr. Tavares to
determine whether he wanted to be a witness himself and, when he elected to take
the stand, asked, “is there anything you want to tell me that you haven’t already told
me?” Mr. Tavares was subsequently able to provide testimony, which would have
- 18 - been otherwise absent from the record, on the reasons why plaintiff’s version of
events should not be believed. Mr. Tavares’s status as a self-represented litigant
does not afford him any greater rights than any other litigant appearing in our courts,
and yet the trial justice provided him with considerable flexibility to present a
defense to E.H. Turf Supply’s allegations. On the record before us, we cannot say
that the trial justice erred in her management of this de novo trial.
Conclusion
For the reasons contained herein, the judgment of the Superior Court is
affirmed. The papers may be returned to the Superior Court.
- 19 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
E.H. Turf Supply Co., Inc. d/b/a Allen's Seed v. Title of Case Roger Tavares. No. 2024-314-Appeal. Case Number (WD 24-282)
Date Opinion Filed July 15, 2025
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long
Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter
For Plaintiff:
Jonathan J. Lucido, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendant:
Roger Tavares, pro se