1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CAMERON EDWARDS, Case No.: 3:24-cv-01118-JAH-SBC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; et al.,
15 Defendants. [ECF Nos. 32, 33] 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Cameron Edwards’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for a 18 temporary restraining order (“TRO”) filed on April 29, 2025. ECF No. 33. Plaintiff 19 requests that this Court issue a TRO directing the City of San Diego to issue an order 20 providing specific guidance to the San Diego Police Department on how police officers 21 engage in the “dominant aggressor” determination when responding to a domestic violence 22 dispute as required by the California Penal Code. ECF No. 33-1 at 14. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff maintains that he left an abusive relationship in March 2024 and obtained a 25 domestic violence restraining order against his abuser. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that 26 on April 16, 2024, three domestic violence incidents occurred where officers of the San 27 Diego Police Department became involved. Id. at 3. In all three incidents, Plaintiff argues 28 officers did not consider the dominant aggressor factors under California Penal Code 1 §§ 836(c) and 13701, and instead took actions against Plaintiff under the City of San 2 Diego’s Procedure 4.04. According to Plaintiff, the officers (1) did not conduct a dominant 3 aggressor analysis and produced a written report that did not consider the dominant 4 aggressor analysis or mention the term at all, (2) entered Plaintiff’s home without his 5 consent and based on the purported consent of Plaintiff’s abuser, and proceeded to question 6 Plaintiff, and (3) spoke with Plaintiff’s abuser and indicated that Plaintiff was at his 7 residence, allowing the abuser to monitor Plaintiff. Id. at 3. In applying for a TRO from 8 this Court, Plaintiff argues that the dominant aggressor factors present in the California 9 Penal Code place a mandatory duty on police officers within the state,1 that the inconsistent 10 application of domestic violence policies by police departments frustrates the legislative 11 intent and plain language of California Penal Code §§ 13701 and 836, and that the injury 12 Plaintiff suffers is the lack of compliance by the San Diego Police Department with state 13 law. Id. at 8. Plaintiff also notes that this Court denied his motion for a preliminary 14 injunction on December 6, 2024, wherein Plaintiff sought relief “requiring the City of San 15 Diego [to] amend Procedure 4.04 to include consideration of all the factors listed in the 16 dominant aggressor procedure found in P.C. §§ 137901 and 836.” Id. at 3-4. 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may grant a 19 TRO to prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). The purpose of 20 a TRO is to serve as a temporary remedy that prevents irreparable harm before a 21 preliminary injunction hearing may be held. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of 22 Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). The legal standard that applies 23 to a motion for a TRO is the same as the one applied in a motion for a preliminary 24 25 1 The four factors police officers must make reasonable efforts to analyze include: (1) the 26 intent of the law to protect victims of domestic violence from continuing abuse, (2) the 27 threats creating fear of physical injury, (3) the history of domestic violence between the persons involved, and (4) whether either person acted in self-defense. CAL. PEN. CODE 28 1 injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th 2 Cir. 2001). An applicant seeking a TRO is required to demonstrate “immediate and 3 irreparable injury, loss, or damage.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A). “Speculative injury does 4 not constitute irreparable injury” for the purposes of granting injunctive relief. Caribbean 5 Marine Serv. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). The applicant cannot 6 demonstrate immediate injury when (1) purported harm to the applicant relies on the future 7 conduct of third parties and (2) the applicant cannot demonstrate immediate risk of injury 8 by those third parties. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106-107 (1983). 9 DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiff contends he faces an imminent threat of the application of Procedure 4.04 11 by the San Diego Police Department and imminent harm from the police officers who will 12 respond to a future domestic altercation involving the Plaintiff. ECF No. 33-1 at 11. 13 Plaintiff alleges that he is now dating. Id. Plaintiff also cites to national statistics 14 purporting to show that a significant proportion of males who were identified as victims in 15 prior domestic violence incidents, and who were involved in new domestic violence 16 incidents, were subsequently identified by police as suspects. Id.2 Plaintiff also contends 17 that in half of domestic violence disputes in San Diego, police officers failed to interview 18 both parties as mandated by law. Id. at 12. 19 A. Imminent Harm 20 Plaintiff’s allegations of imminent harm require multiple steps involving third 21 parties, including (1) that Plaintiff will be involved in an altercation with his partner, (2) 22 that the police will be called, (3) that the police will apply Procedure 4.04 and misidentify 23 the dominant aggressor, and (4) the police will tangibly harm Plaintiff. Plaintiff has made 24 25 26 2 Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of statistics, his stated ownership of a dog at issue in this 27 matter, and caselaw. ECF No. 32. Even if the Court were to take judicial notice of those items, it would not change the result of this decision. Plaintiff’s request for judicial 28 1 no showing that he faces immediate harm and injury from the police absent an injunction. 2 Instead, Plaintiff has demonstrated that he may, at some point in the future, have a domestic 3 dispute with his partner that involves the police, and the police may wrongfully identify 4 Plaintiff as the dominant aggressor under Procedure 4.04 and then proceed to seize and 5 search him. The threat of conduct that may be taken by police officers at some point in the 6 future, as presented by Plaintiff, does not provide the Court with the “immediate and 7 irreparable injury, loss, or damage” necessary for issuance of a TRO. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 65(b)(1)(A).3 9 “[A]ny future threat to [Plaintiff] from the City’s policy or from the conduct of police 10 officers would be no more real than the possibility that he would again have an encounter 11 with the police” and that responding officers either apply the written policy, Procedure 12 4.04, and correctly distinguish the dominant aggressor from the victim, or apply Procedure 13 4.04 and incorrectly identify Plaintiff as the dominant aggressor, and then cause harm to 14 the Plaintiff (either by wrongfully seizing the Plaintiff or harming his property interests). 15 See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106. Instead of being “immediate,” these threats are based on a 16 17 3 Plaintiff contends that the written policy and harm he faces are sufficient to demonstrate 18 that an injury is likely to recur for purposes of obtaining injunctive relief.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CAMERON EDWARDS, Case No.: 3:24-cv-01118-JAH-SBC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; et al.,
15 Defendants. [ECF Nos. 32, 33] 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Cameron Edwards’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for a 18 temporary restraining order (“TRO”) filed on April 29, 2025. ECF No. 33. Plaintiff 19 requests that this Court issue a TRO directing the City of San Diego to issue an order 20 providing specific guidance to the San Diego Police Department on how police officers 21 engage in the “dominant aggressor” determination when responding to a domestic violence 22 dispute as required by the California Penal Code. ECF No. 33-1 at 14. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff maintains that he left an abusive relationship in March 2024 and obtained a 25 domestic violence restraining order against his abuser. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that 26 on April 16, 2024, three domestic violence incidents occurred where officers of the San 27 Diego Police Department became involved. Id. at 3. In all three incidents, Plaintiff argues 28 officers did not consider the dominant aggressor factors under California Penal Code 1 §§ 836(c) and 13701, and instead took actions against Plaintiff under the City of San 2 Diego’s Procedure 4.04. According to Plaintiff, the officers (1) did not conduct a dominant 3 aggressor analysis and produced a written report that did not consider the dominant 4 aggressor analysis or mention the term at all, (2) entered Plaintiff’s home without his 5 consent and based on the purported consent of Plaintiff’s abuser, and proceeded to question 6 Plaintiff, and (3) spoke with Plaintiff’s abuser and indicated that Plaintiff was at his 7 residence, allowing the abuser to monitor Plaintiff. Id. at 3. In applying for a TRO from 8 this Court, Plaintiff argues that the dominant aggressor factors present in the California 9 Penal Code place a mandatory duty on police officers within the state,1 that the inconsistent 10 application of domestic violence policies by police departments frustrates the legislative 11 intent and plain language of California Penal Code §§ 13701 and 836, and that the injury 12 Plaintiff suffers is the lack of compliance by the San Diego Police Department with state 13 law. Id. at 8. Plaintiff also notes that this Court denied his motion for a preliminary 14 injunction on December 6, 2024, wherein Plaintiff sought relief “requiring the City of San 15 Diego [to] amend Procedure 4.04 to include consideration of all the factors listed in the 16 dominant aggressor procedure found in P.C. §§ 137901 and 836.” Id. at 3-4. 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may grant a 19 TRO to prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). The purpose of 20 a TRO is to serve as a temporary remedy that prevents irreparable harm before a 21 preliminary injunction hearing may be held. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of 22 Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). The legal standard that applies 23 to a motion for a TRO is the same as the one applied in a motion for a preliminary 24 25 1 The four factors police officers must make reasonable efforts to analyze include: (1) the 26 intent of the law to protect victims of domestic violence from continuing abuse, (2) the 27 threats creating fear of physical injury, (3) the history of domestic violence between the persons involved, and (4) whether either person acted in self-defense. CAL. PEN. CODE 28 1 injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th 2 Cir. 2001). An applicant seeking a TRO is required to demonstrate “immediate and 3 irreparable injury, loss, or damage.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A). “Speculative injury does 4 not constitute irreparable injury” for the purposes of granting injunctive relief. Caribbean 5 Marine Serv. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). The applicant cannot 6 demonstrate immediate injury when (1) purported harm to the applicant relies on the future 7 conduct of third parties and (2) the applicant cannot demonstrate immediate risk of injury 8 by those third parties. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106-107 (1983). 9 DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiff contends he faces an imminent threat of the application of Procedure 4.04 11 by the San Diego Police Department and imminent harm from the police officers who will 12 respond to a future domestic altercation involving the Plaintiff. ECF No. 33-1 at 11. 13 Plaintiff alleges that he is now dating. Id. Plaintiff also cites to national statistics 14 purporting to show that a significant proportion of males who were identified as victims in 15 prior domestic violence incidents, and who were involved in new domestic violence 16 incidents, were subsequently identified by police as suspects. Id.2 Plaintiff also contends 17 that in half of domestic violence disputes in San Diego, police officers failed to interview 18 both parties as mandated by law. Id. at 12. 19 A. Imminent Harm 20 Plaintiff’s allegations of imminent harm require multiple steps involving third 21 parties, including (1) that Plaintiff will be involved in an altercation with his partner, (2) 22 that the police will be called, (3) that the police will apply Procedure 4.04 and misidentify 23 the dominant aggressor, and (4) the police will tangibly harm Plaintiff. Plaintiff has made 24 25 26 2 Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of statistics, his stated ownership of a dog at issue in this 27 matter, and caselaw. ECF No. 32. Even if the Court were to take judicial notice of those items, it would not change the result of this decision. Plaintiff’s request for judicial 28 1 no showing that he faces immediate harm and injury from the police absent an injunction. 2 Instead, Plaintiff has demonstrated that he may, at some point in the future, have a domestic 3 dispute with his partner that involves the police, and the police may wrongfully identify 4 Plaintiff as the dominant aggressor under Procedure 4.04 and then proceed to seize and 5 search him. The threat of conduct that may be taken by police officers at some point in the 6 future, as presented by Plaintiff, does not provide the Court with the “immediate and 7 irreparable injury, loss, or damage” necessary for issuance of a TRO. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 65(b)(1)(A).3 9 “[A]ny future threat to [Plaintiff] from the City’s policy or from the conduct of police 10 officers would be no more real than the possibility that he would again have an encounter 11 with the police” and that responding officers either apply the written policy, Procedure 12 4.04, and correctly distinguish the dominant aggressor from the victim, or apply Procedure 13 4.04 and incorrectly identify Plaintiff as the dominant aggressor, and then cause harm to 14 the Plaintiff (either by wrongfully seizing the Plaintiff or harming his property interests). 15 See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106. Instead of being “immediate,” these threats are based on a 16 17 3 Plaintiff contends that the written policy and harm he faces are sufficient to demonstrate 18 that an injury is likely to recur for purposes of obtaining injunctive relief. ECF No. 33-1 19 at 11 (citing to Truth v. Kent School Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2008)). In Truth, the court found that a school district’s written policy prevented the school from granting 20 plaintiff’s request to register as a student club due to the school’s Establishment Clause 21 concerns, and the court found that there was no likelihood that the school would grant plaintiff’s request in the future. Truth, 542 F.3d at 642. Unlike the written policy in Truth, 22 here the written policy does not, on its face, violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The 23 written policy in Procedure 4.04 requires that San Diego police officers distinguish the dominant aggressor from the victim and states “the dominant aggressor is the most 24 significant rather than the first aggressor.” ECF No. 33-1 at 2. While Plaintiff contends 25 that Procedure 4.04 is in contravention of state law, there is nothing facially unconstitutional about the policy, and because nothing in the text of the policy precludes 26 police officers from correctly identifying dominant aggressors under Procedure 4.04, the 27 written policy at issue does not provide Plaintiff with the “implicit likelihood” of harm in the immediate future to support injunctive relief. See Truth, 542 F.3d at 642 (citation 28 1 series of future events that may or may not happen. See id. at 111. Plaintiff’s assertion of 2 harm expected in the future is “premised on a speculative sequence of events” that does 3 not meet the imminence or immediacy requirements for issuance of a TRO. See Index 4 Newspapers LLC v. United States Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 825-26 (9th Cir. 2020). 5 B. Pattern of Official Misconduct 6 Plaintiff argues there exists a pattern of officially sanctioned misconduct that makes 7 it more likely that he will be harmed by police misconduct if the City of San Diego is not 8 enjoined. ECF No. 33-1 at 12. While Plaintiff states that each officer who responded to 9 the April 16, 2024 incident failed to apply the dominant aggressor procedure under the 10 California Penal Code, Plaintiff does not point to facts establishing that another “encounter 11 with the police” is imminent. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-106. Being in a relationship with 12 another person does not create a substantial likelihood that a domestic violence altercation 13 will occur and that police will be called, and it does not provide for the circumstances 14 warranting the extraordinary remedy of an injunction. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 15 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (finding that injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that 16 may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”). 17 An applicant for injunctive relief in the present context is required to demonstrate 18 that “he, himself, will not only again be stopped by the police” but that police will harm 19 him “without any provocation or legal excuse.” See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106 n.7. The 20 applicant may not rely on statistics to demonstrate the imminent harm he faces. See id. at 21 100, 105 (finding Lyon’s reliance on statistics of harm related to police conduct insufficient 22 to support the conclusion that he, himself faced a “real and immediate threat.”). Plaintiff 23 points to no instances since April 16, 2024 involving himself where police officers were 24 called, failed to engage in the appropriate dominant aggressor analysis, and unreasonably 25 searched or seized him. Compare Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108 (finding the “odds” of imminent 26 harm insufficient to support injunctive relief when five months had elapsed between the 27 incident and the filing of the complaint with no further encounters between Lyons and the 28 police) with Index Newspapers, 977 F.3d at 826 (finding imminent harm sufficient for 1 injunctive relief when plaintiffs had provided “powerful evidence” demonstrating federal 2 law enforcement’s “ongoing, sustained pattern of conduct that resulted in numerous 3 injuries to [plaintiffs] between the date the complaint was filed and the date the district 4 court entered its preliminary injunction.”). 5 Even if Plaintiff has suffered a harm in the past related to procedures of the San 6 Diego Police Department, Plaintiff must demonstrate imminent harm that he himself faces 7 in order to succeed on the present request for prospective relief. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 8 111-12 (holding that “[a] federal court…is not the proper forum to press such claims unless 9 the requirements for entry and the prerequisites for injunctive relief are satisfied.”). See 10 also id. at 107 n.8 (concluding that “emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not 11 a sufficient basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by 12 the defendant” and instead that “emotional upset is a relevant consideration in a damages 13 action.”). 14 C. Procedural Injury 15 Plaintiff also argues that an injury he faces includes “the lack of procedure in San 16 Diego compliant with state law.” ECF No. 33-1 at 8. If a procedural injury “may result in 17 no harm,” like by police responding to an altercation and correctly identifying the dominant 18 aggressor under Procedure 4.04, the procedural injury does not constitute “concrete harm,” 19 does not rise to the level of irreparable harm, and cannot support an injunction. See Spokeo, 20 Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016). Without a showing of particularized harm that 21 Plaintiff will immediately face absent an injunction, Plaintiff is like any other member of 22 the public who is currently in a romantic relationship and therefore lacks standing to obtain 23 injunctive relief for the lack of statutory factors present in Procedure 4.04. See Lyons, 461 24 U.S. at 111-12, and see Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 219-221 25 (1974) (affirming that “[i]t is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to 26 invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he 27 must show that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury 28 1 the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest 2 ||common to all members of the public.’’) (citation omitted). 3 CONCLUSION 4 Because Plaintiff does not demonstrate conduct by the San Diego Police Department 5 || that has “persisted for weeks” against him and is “ongoing,” Plaintiff has not demonstrated 6 ||that he faces immediate harm by police officers absent an injunction. See Index 7 || Newspapers, 977 F.3d at 826. As a result, Plaintiffs request fora TRO is DENIED. 8 9 | IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || DATED: May 15, 2025 M | | = 11 ie J JOHN A. HOUSTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28