SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
The claimant appeals from an order of the district court denying attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), on the ground that the government’s position was substantially justified. On appeal, the government raises for the first time a jurisdictional issue. It argues that as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Melkonyan v. Sullivan, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), decided after the district court’s order, the application for fees in the district court was untimely, barring the court from jurisdiction.
The procedural history of this case is important to the resolution of this jurisdictional issue. The claimant, Edward E. Gray, applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., in August of 1985. An Administrative Law Judge denied the application. The claimant then filed an action in district court seeking review of the denial of disability benefits. The district court affirmed in March of 1988. Gray then successfully appealed to this court, which held, in a divided, unpublished decision, that the Secretary had committed legal errors in reviewing the claimant’s application. Gray v. Secretary of HHS, 874 F.2d 816 (9th Cir.1989). Our mandate instructed the district court to remand to the AU for reconsideration and entry of findings in accordance with our disposition. The district court complied with that mandate and remanded to the AU on June 30, 1989.
On remand, the AU found that the claimant was entitled to benefits and entered an order on March 6,1990, which was not appealed by the government. Within 30 days of the entry of that order, the claimant filed an application for attorney’s fees under the EAJA in the district court. The district court denied the application on the merits on February 22, 1991, holding that the government’s position was substantially justified because at the time of the original administrative proceeding, the law in that area was unsettled. The district court also pointed out that this court’s lack of unanimity in ordering the remand supported a finding that the government’s position was reasonable.
At the time that the claimant filed his application for attorney’s fees in the district court, the leading Supreme Court decision on the application of the EAJA to disability claims was Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 104 L.Ed.2d 941 (1989). The issue in that case was whether attorney’s fees are available for representation in agency proceedings following a remand by a district court. The Supreme Court held that such fees are available, provided the other requirements of the Act are met, even though the fees were earned in the course of administrative, not judicial, proceedings.1 In so holding, the Court stressed the unusual character of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).2 The Act’s “de[956]*956tailed provisions” suggest “a degree of direct interaction between a federal court and an administrative agency alien to traditional review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act.” Hudson, 490 U.S. at 885, 109 S.Ct. at 2254. The Court summarized its holding as follows:
We conclude that where a court orders a remand to the Secretary in a benefits litigation and retains continuing jurisdiction over the case pending a decision from the Secretary which will determine the claimant’s entitlement to benefits, the proceedings on remand are an integral part of the “civil action” for judicial review and thus attorney’s fees for representation on remand are available subject to the other limitations in the EAJA.
Id. at 892, 109 S.Ct. at 2257-58.
The remand in Hudson, as well as the remand in this case, was pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g), which states that “[t]he court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court in Hudson recognized that the district court remand order could not constitute a final judgment because the administrative procedures on remand were “part and parcel" of the lawsuit, indispensable to determining whether or not the claimant ultimately would be a prevailing party and qualify for fees under the EAJA. Hudson, 490 U.S. at 887-888, 109 S.Ct. at 2255-56. In addition, if the government’s position denying fees for administrative proceedings were upheld, the EAJA would become a “lifeline” that was “a foot short,” a result contrary to congressional intent. Id. at 890, 109 S.Ct. at 2256.
In June of 1991, two months before the government’s brief in this appeal was filed, the Supreme Court decided Melkonyan v. Sullivan, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991). The government in this case argues for the first time on appeal that, under Melkonyan, the district court lacked jurisdiction of this claimant’s petition for fees under the EAJA. It argues that the district court’s 1989 remand to the ALJ, pursuant to our original mandate, was the final judgment triggering the 30-day time period for filing a fee application. At first blush, this argument is difficult to understand because, if accepted, it would require the applicant to apply for fees before the applicant could qualify as a prevailing party, and thus would prevent claimants like this one, and the claimant in Hudson, from ever qualifying for fees under the EAJA. This argument runs directly contrary to the EAJA’s purpose that litigants not “be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights.” Hudson, 490 U.S. at 883, 109 S.Ct. at 2253. As the Court in Hudson pointed out, “the incentive which such a system would create for attorneys to abandon claimants after judicial remand [957]*957runs directly counter to long established ethical canons of the legal profession.” Hudson, 490 U.S. at 890, 109 S.Ct. at 2256. We find that the government has misinterpreted Melkonyan, and that the district court had jurisdiction over Gray’s application.
In Melkonyan, the Supreme Court did not leave a Social Security applicant without a meaningful opportunity to apply for fees. Melkonyan appealed his denial of benefits to the district court, which remanded to the AU for consideration of new evidence. The ALJ awarded benefits to Melkonyan. One year later, the claimant filed for attorney’s fees in the district court. This circuit held that the administrative agency’s determination was the final judgment, and that therefore Melko-nyan’s application was not timely filed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that § 2412 of the EAJA requires a final judgment by a court of law, not by an administrative agency.
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SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
The claimant appeals from an order of the district court denying attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), on the ground that the government’s position was substantially justified. On appeal, the government raises for the first time a jurisdictional issue. It argues that as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Melkonyan v. Sullivan, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), decided after the district court’s order, the application for fees in the district court was untimely, barring the court from jurisdiction.
The procedural history of this case is important to the resolution of this jurisdictional issue. The claimant, Edward E. Gray, applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., in August of 1985. An Administrative Law Judge denied the application. The claimant then filed an action in district court seeking review of the denial of disability benefits. The district court affirmed in March of 1988. Gray then successfully appealed to this court, which held, in a divided, unpublished decision, that the Secretary had committed legal errors in reviewing the claimant’s application. Gray v. Secretary of HHS, 874 F.2d 816 (9th Cir.1989). Our mandate instructed the district court to remand to the AU for reconsideration and entry of findings in accordance with our disposition. The district court complied with that mandate and remanded to the AU on June 30, 1989.
On remand, the AU found that the claimant was entitled to benefits and entered an order on March 6,1990, which was not appealed by the government. Within 30 days of the entry of that order, the claimant filed an application for attorney’s fees under the EAJA in the district court. The district court denied the application on the merits on February 22, 1991, holding that the government’s position was substantially justified because at the time of the original administrative proceeding, the law in that area was unsettled. The district court also pointed out that this court’s lack of unanimity in ordering the remand supported a finding that the government’s position was reasonable.
At the time that the claimant filed his application for attorney’s fees in the district court, the leading Supreme Court decision on the application of the EAJA to disability claims was Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 104 L.Ed.2d 941 (1989). The issue in that case was whether attorney’s fees are available for representation in agency proceedings following a remand by a district court. The Supreme Court held that such fees are available, provided the other requirements of the Act are met, even though the fees were earned in the course of administrative, not judicial, proceedings.1 In so holding, the Court stressed the unusual character of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).2 The Act’s “de[956]*956tailed provisions” suggest “a degree of direct interaction between a federal court and an administrative agency alien to traditional review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act.” Hudson, 490 U.S. at 885, 109 S.Ct. at 2254. The Court summarized its holding as follows:
We conclude that where a court orders a remand to the Secretary in a benefits litigation and retains continuing jurisdiction over the case pending a decision from the Secretary which will determine the claimant’s entitlement to benefits, the proceedings on remand are an integral part of the “civil action” for judicial review and thus attorney’s fees for representation on remand are available subject to the other limitations in the EAJA.
Id. at 892, 109 S.Ct. at 2257-58.
The remand in Hudson, as well as the remand in this case, was pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g), which states that “[t]he court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court in Hudson recognized that the district court remand order could not constitute a final judgment because the administrative procedures on remand were “part and parcel" of the lawsuit, indispensable to determining whether or not the claimant ultimately would be a prevailing party and qualify for fees under the EAJA. Hudson, 490 U.S. at 887-888, 109 S.Ct. at 2255-56. In addition, if the government’s position denying fees for administrative proceedings were upheld, the EAJA would become a “lifeline” that was “a foot short,” a result contrary to congressional intent. Id. at 890, 109 S.Ct. at 2256.
In June of 1991, two months before the government’s brief in this appeal was filed, the Supreme Court decided Melkonyan v. Sullivan, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991). The government in this case argues for the first time on appeal that, under Melkonyan, the district court lacked jurisdiction of this claimant’s petition for fees under the EAJA. It argues that the district court’s 1989 remand to the ALJ, pursuant to our original mandate, was the final judgment triggering the 30-day time period for filing a fee application. At first blush, this argument is difficult to understand because, if accepted, it would require the applicant to apply for fees before the applicant could qualify as a prevailing party, and thus would prevent claimants like this one, and the claimant in Hudson, from ever qualifying for fees under the EAJA. This argument runs directly contrary to the EAJA’s purpose that litigants not “be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights.” Hudson, 490 U.S. at 883, 109 S.Ct. at 2253. As the Court in Hudson pointed out, “the incentive which such a system would create for attorneys to abandon claimants after judicial remand [957]*957runs directly counter to long established ethical canons of the legal profession.” Hudson, 490 U.S. at 890, 109 S.Ct. at 2256. We find that the government has misinterpreted Melkonyan, and that the district court had jurisdiction over Gray’s application.
In Melkonyan, the Supreme Court did not leave a Social Security applicant without a meaningful opportunity to apply for fees. Melkonyan appealed his denial of benefits to the district court, which remanded to the AU for consideration of new evidence. The ALJ awarded benefits to Melkonyan. One year later, the claimant filed for attorney’s fees in the district court. This circuit held that the administrative agency’s determination was the final judgment, and that therefore Melko-nyan’s application was not timely filed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that § 2412 of the EAJA requires a final judgment by a court of law, not by an administrative agency. The Supreme Court remanded to determine if the district court’s remand was a sentence six remand under § 405(g). A sentence six remand directs the Secretary to receive additional evidence upon a showing of good cause for failure to incorporate the evidence in a prior proceeding. Sentence six remands require the Secretary to return to the district court for an entry of final judgment. If the district court in Melkonyan did in fact enter a sentence six remand, then Melkonyan’s attorney’s fee application was not untimely.
The language in Melkonyan which gives rise to the government’s jurisdictional challenge in this case is language which suggests that in a sentence four remand, the district court order of remand is itself the final judgment for purposes of the EAJA. The Court’s opinion in Melkonyan states that: “[i]n sentence four cases, the filing period begins after the final judgment (‘affirming, modifying, or reversing’) is entered by the court and the appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no longer appealable.” Id. — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2165. The government argues that under this definition, the district court’s final judgment was the remand to the AU on June 30, 1989, pursuant to our appellate mandate.
In reacting to this tension between the language in Melkonyan and the holding in Hudson, the circuits have proposed numerous interpretations which avoid the jurisdictional barrier the government here seeks. One approach has been for the courts to find that there are some sentence four remands in which the district court retains jurisdiction until after the administrative decision on remand. See Labrie v. Secretary of HHS, 976 F.2d 779 (1st Cir.1992); Hafner v. Sullivan, 972 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.1992); Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Aug. 26, 1992) (No. 92-361); Welter v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 674 (8th Cir.1991). A second approach has been to define an order that vacates and remands for further proceedings as a sentence six remand, which requires a return to the district court. See Young v. Sullivan, 972 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.1992); Damato v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 982 (7th Cir.1991). A third approach, offered by an unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion, applies Melkonyan on a prospective basis only, and is discussed in Labrie, 976 F.2d at 784. One Fifth Circuit opinion found that a 30-day requirement under Melkonyan applied, but used its equitable discretion to allow consideration of the application, in order to avoid unfairness to the applicant. See Luna v. Department of HHS, 948 F.2d 169, 173 (5th Cir.1991) (plaintiff is entitled to “equitable tolling” of the 30-day time limit because the district court “purported to retain jurisdiction, thus unwittingly misleading [the plaintiff] to think that no final judgment was being entered.”). Since Luna, the Fifth Circuit has held that a fee application in the district court is premature at the time of a sentence four remand to the agency if there is not yet an award, and therefore a prevailing party, in the agency proceedings. Bertrand v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir.1992).
In this circuit’s only post-Melkonyan opinion, Scanlon v. Sullivan, 974 F.2d 107 (9th Cir.1992), the district court had remanded Scanlon’s suit for disability benefits for additional proceedings and findings [958]*958in an order that explicitly required the Secretary to file the new findings and the new judgment with the district court. On remand, Scanlon was found eligible for disability benefits. Neither Scanlon nor the Secretary returned to the district court for entry of a final judgment. Scanlon applied for fees. The Secretary argued that under Melkonyan, the district court’s remand order was a final judgment. Without any analysis of Melkonyan, we found that “[t]he words used by the district court belie such an interpretation." Id. at 108. We held that the district court did not yet have jurisdiction over the claimant’s EAJA petition for attorney’s fees because the Secretary had not returned to the court upon completion of the remand proceedings. Since no final judgment was entered, the district court did not yet have jurisdiction. The First Circuit has described our decision in Scanlon as an implicit adoption of the First, Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ broad interpretation of sentence four remands to include retention of district court jurisdiction until after the administrative hearings. Labrie, 976 F.2d at 784 n. 9.
In line with our decision in Scan-lon and consistent with the decisions of other circuits, we must endeavor to harmonize the decision in Melkonyan with the decision in Hudson; Melkonyan did not overrule Hudson, but stated that its holding was consistent with Hudson. — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2162. Such reconciliation of the two decisions is not difficult in this case. Here, all administrative proceedings on remand and attorney’s fee litigation in the district court were conducted after Hudson was decided. Those proceedings were therefore conducted with the understanding that the district court retained jurisdiction in the case and that the remand order was not a final judgment divesting it of any jurisdiction to consider either the findings of the Secretary on remand or the availability of fees. Melkonyan was decided after the district court entered its order denying fees, and was not a sentence four case; it should not affect the district court's jurisdiction over this sentence four remand. We join the First, Eighth and Tenth Circuits in concluding that Hudson is controlling in these cases. We agree that:
[WJhen a judicial remand order in Social Security disability cases contemplates additional administrative proceedings that will determine the merits of the claimant’s application for benefits, and thus will determine whether the claimant is a prevailing party, the district court retains discretion to enter a final judgment for EAJA purposes after the proceedings on remand have been completed. On the other hand, if the remand order directs the Secretary to award benefits, the claimant is a prevailing party and the remand order is the final judgment for EAJA purposes.
Labrie, 976 F.2d at 786 (quoting Hafner, 972 F.2d at 250-51). We agree that the district court retained such jurisdiction during a remand ordered prior to Melkonyan, at least in the absence of an express intent to the contrary. Id. We therefore conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s fee application.
On the merits, however, we agree with the district court that the fee application was properly denied. From our analysis of this case, it is clear that the appellant raises no serious issue on the merits with respect to the district court’s order. The government’s position was substantially justified. The evidence in the administrative record was conflicting and a panel majority remanded for additional findings. It did not hold that appellant must prevail, and the dissenting judge believed he should not have. See Gray v. Secretary of HHS, 874 F.2d 816 (9th Cir.1989). The decision upon which the majority relied had not been handed down when the government established its position. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying appellant’s application.
AFFIRMED.