Edmundo Castillo v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedNovember 20, 2025
Docket7:25-cv-00252
StatusUnknown

This text of Edmundo Castillo v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (Edmundo Castillo v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Edmundo Castillo v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., (S.D. Tex. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT November 20, 2025 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk MCALLEN DIVISION

EDMUNDO CASTILLO, § § Plaintiff, § § VS. § Civil Case No. 7:25-CV-00252 § CVS PHARMACY, INC., § § Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

From 2022 to 2024, Plaintiff Edmund Castillo was a pharmacy technician at a CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (“CVS”) store in the Edinburg area. During that time, he was diagnosed with Level 1 Autism Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”). Castillo alleges that when he informed CVS of this diagnosis, CVS began to discriminate against him. He claims that his hours were cut and that he was subjected to a hostile-work environment. Despite Castillo’s attempts to resolve his disputes with CVS, the discrimination continued. Rather than continue to face the alleged hostile-work environment, Castillo resigned from his position at CVS and brought this lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Before the Court is CVS’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation. (Dkt. No. 10). Castillo has not filed a response. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS CVS’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation. (Id.). I. BACKGROUND1 A. CASTILLO’S EMPLOYMENT In September 2022, Castillo was hired as a pharmacy technician at a CVS store in Edinburg, Texas. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2). In that position, Castillo worked under the

supervision of CVS pharmacy management and the regional pharmacy district leader. (Id.). Castillo has been diagnosed with Level 1 ASD. (Id. at 2–3). Despite this diagnosis, Castillo alleges that he was fully capable of performing his job functions without any accommodation. (Id. at 3). After disclosing the diagnosis to his direct supervisor in November 2022, Castillo

claims he began to suffer discrimination. (Id.). Prior to November 2022, Castillo was scheduled to work an average of 30–40 hours a week. (Id.). After, Castillo’s hours were reduced to 0–5 hours a week. (Id.). Less experienced employees were also given full- time schedules during this period. (Id.). Castillo requested reinstatement of his regular hours and fair shift assignments.

(Id.). CVS refused and declined to engage in the “interactive process as required by law.” (Id.). Following these requests Castillo was subjected to a hostile-work environment. (Id.). This hostile-work environment included ridicule by coworkers, accusations of insubordination for asking questions, and unjustified disciplinary action. (Id.). Castillo filed a formal complaint with CVS’s Human Resources department in March 2023. (Id.).

1 A motion to compel arbitration is generally treated as a motion to dismiss. Vine v. PLS Fin. Servs., Inc., 689 F.App’x 800, 802 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Suburban Leisure Ctr., Inc. v. AMF Bowling Prods., Inc., 468 F.3d 523, 525 (8th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts related to the underlying dispute as true. Vine, 689 F.App’x at 802. When this failed to resolve Castillo’s complaint and the hostile work environment, Castillo resigned from his position on March 24, 2024. (Id.). B. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

Before beginning his job with CVS, Castillo executed a written CVS Health Arbitration Agreement (the “Agreement”). (Dkt. No. 10-1 at 7–8). The Agreement provides: Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims: Under this Agreement, [Castillo] and CVS agree that any dispute between [Castillo] and CVS that is covered by this Agreement (“Covered Claims”) will be decided by a single arbitrator through final and binding arbitration only and will not be decided by a court or jury or any other forum, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement. (Id. at 7). The Agreement goes on to explain the claims are subject to arbitration: Claims Covered by this Agreement: Except as otherwise stated in this Agreement, Covered Claims are any and all claims, disputes or controversies . . . that [Castillo] may have, now or in the future, against CVS . . . arising out of or related to [Castillo’s] employment with CVS or the termination of [Castillo’s] employment. Covered Claims include but are not limited to disputes regarding . . . hours of work, . . . harassment, discrimination, retaliation and termination arising under the . . . Americans with Disabilities Act. (Id.). II. LEGAL STANDARD “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (citations omitted). Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited when parties have agreed in writing to arbitrate. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for

arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”). An arbitration agreement’s enforcement involves two steps. Kubala v. Supreme Prod. Services, Inc., 830 F.3d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 2016). First, a court must determine whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate the dispute. Id. Second, a court must

determine whether the parties’ dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Id.; see also Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Samson Res. Co., 352 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2003). In the first step, the party moving to compel arbitration must prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. Grant v. Houser, 469 F.App’x 310, 315 (5th Cir. 2012). In determining whether parties agreed to arbitrate,

courts “apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.” First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1924, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). Once “competent evidence showing the formation of an agreement to arbitrate has been presented,” the party resisting arbitration must “produce some contrary evidence to put the matter ‘in issue.’” Gallagher v. Vokey, 860 F.App’x 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 9

U.S.C. § 4) (emphasis in original). To put the arbitration agreement “in issue,” 9 U.S.C. § 4, the resisting party must (1) unequivocally deny that he agreed to arbitrate and (2) produce some evidence to support this assertion, Gallagher, 860 F.App’x at 357. In the second step, courts adhere to principles of contract interpretation and “look[] to the arbitration clause itself” to determine whether the parties’ dispute falls

within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins., 921 F.3d 522, 531 (5th Cir. 2019). “When a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, the court does not have discretion to dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 475–76, 144 S.Ct.

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