Eden v. Weight

578 S.E.2d 769, 265 Va. 398, 2003 Va. LEXIS 47
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedApril 17, 2003
DocketRecord 021567
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 578 S.E.2d 769 (Eden v. Weight) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eden v. Weight, 578 S.E.2d 769, 265 Va. 398, 2003 Va. LEXIS 47 (Va. 2003).

Opinion

JUSTICE LACY

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Abigail Eden and Paul Shriver, co-administrators of the Estate of Sara B. Shriver, seek reversal of the trial court’s action setting aside a jury verdict in their favor and entering judgment in favor of Yvonne D. Weight and Mark J. Caraluzzi. The co-administrators filed an amended bill of complaint alleging that they were damaged as a result of their reliance upon false representations of material fact made by Weight and Caraluzzi regarding the sale of certain stock held by the Estate. Following a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Weight and Caraluzzi had engaged in construe *400 tive fraud and awarding the co-administrators a total of $156,000 in damages.

Weight and Caraluzzi filed motions to set aside the verdict which the trial court granted, holding that there was no evidence that, after July 15, 1996, the co-administrators acted to their detriment in reliance on the misrepresentations of Weight and Caraluzzi and no evidence that the co-administrators suffered any damage prior to July 15, 1996. Because we conclude that the record in this case supports the trial court’s action in setting aside the jury verdict, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

In reviewing whether a trial court erred in setting aside a jury verdict, we apply well-established principles. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict was rendered and, if there is any evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict, we must reinstate that verdict. Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 572, 544 S.E.2d 666, 673 (2001).

Sara Shriver was an original investor in, and member of the Board of Directors of Shirlington Cuisine, Inc. (SCI or the Corporation), a corporation engaged in the restaurant business. At the time of her death in 1995, SCI operated one restaurant called Bistro Bistro and a second restaurant was scheduled to open in November 1995 in Reston. The Corporation was also negotiating for the purchase of a third restaurant in Ballston. Sara Shriver died intestate on September 15, 1995, survived by six adult children, including Abigail Eden and Paul Shriver. Sara Shriver’s 140 shares of SCI stock were included in the Estate. Following her funeral, the children discussed the administration of the decedent’s Estate with Weight, an SCI shareholder and member of the Corporation’s Board of Directors. Weight was also an attorney and personal friend of Sara Shriver. Weight told the heirs that there were some restrictions on the sale of the SCI stock because the Corporation had Subchapter S status for purposes of state and federal income taxation purposes. She also told the heirs that disposition of the stock might be restricted by a shareholders’ agreement which she suggested they would find among Sara Shriver’s papers.

The heirs met again in December and designated Shriver and Eden as co-administrators of the Estate. They also decided to sell the SCI stock. They had “no sense of urgency” and planned on selling the stock sometime in the second quarter of 1996. Although they had not located a shareholders’ agreement or otherwise determined what *401 restrictions might apply to disposition of the stock, the heirs believed that they could not distribute the stock among themselves and that the sale of the stock was restricted based on the information previously given to them by Weight.

In March 1996, Shriver contacted Caraluzzi seeking help and information regarding the value of the stock and the ability of the Estate to sell the SCI stock. Based on the information in Sara Shriver’s files, Eden knew that the stock had been valued at $250 a share in the past, but because of the size and regularity of the dividends paid by the Corporation, Eden believed the stock was worth more than $250. Caraluzzi told Shriver that SCI would like to buy the Estate’s shares but suggested that Shriver and the Estate wait until May 1996 when the SCI stock would be revalued and the value would likely increase. Caraluzzi also advised Shriver that there were limitations on the number of shareholders because of the Corporation’s Subchapter S status and that, while more than one heir could hold stock, six heirs would be too many.

In April, Shriver asked Caraluzzi about the shareholders’ agreement. Caraluzzi told Shriver he could pick up a copy of the agreement at Caraluzzi’s office. The material Shriver received was only an unexecuted, partial shareholders’ agreement, containing provisions on transfer restrictions and transfers upon a shareholder’s death. After seeing this material, Shriver believed an executed copy of the full agreement existed.

In May, Shriver again asked Caraluzzi for the value of the SCI stock. Caraluzzi replied that revaluation of the stock had not yet been concluded and suggested that the Estate make SCI an offer for the purchase of the Estate’s stock. Following this conversation, Shriver discussed the matter of valuation and sale of the stock with an accountant. The accountant advised that a restaurant broker would not be interested in a minority share of the restaurant. The accountant also suggested that Shriver could compare the dividends the Estate had been receiving from SCI “to treasury bills in order to get some sort of a valuation.” On July 2, 1996, Shriver received SCI financial information for the years 1994 and 1995. Using the accountant’s suggested valuation formula, Shriver determined the SCI stock had a high value of $1,800 a share, and a low value of less than $200 per share. Shriver testified, however, that he felt he needed additional information to reach an accurate value for the stock.

Eden also contacted Caraluzzi in an attempt to determine the value of the stock. In a telephone conversation on July 2, 1996, *402 Caraluzzi told Eden that he was meeting with an accountant and would get back to Eden with the requested information within two weeks. During that conversation, Eden made the following notations: “Meeting w/ accountant 1 wk from Monday. ‘This is objective.’ Sell the treasury stock. Rules are not clear.”

When Eden called Caraluzzi two weeks later, Caraluzzi said he would not give Eden the stock value because the SCI Board of Directors had not yet approved the new value. Eden also requested a list of SCI’s shareholders, and Caraluzzi said he would have to check with Weight before releasing the list. Following these conversations, Eden was “confused, dismayed, disappointed” and “full of suspicion.”

On July 15, Eden sent the following electronic mail (E-mail) to her siblings:

Thought you all would be interested in the process Paul and I worked out for the stock.
1. ) Find out what Mark C[araluzzi] and his account think the stock is worth.
2. ) Confirm that valuation with our own “expert” and against what we know now about valuing stock.
3. ) Offer to sell the stock to the company outright for a lump sum payment due immediately. (They will not be able to do it because of cash flow.)
4.

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Related

White v. Nicholas L. Potocska, P.C.
589 F. Supp. 2d 631 (E.D. Virginia, 2008)
Supervalu, Inc. v. Johnson
666 S.E.2d 335 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2008)
Albanese v. WCI Communities, Inc.
530 F. Supp. 2d 752 (E.D. Virginia, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
578 S.E.2d 769, 265 Va. 398, 2003 Va. LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eden-v-weight-va-2003.