Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 12, 2022 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court CHARLES DANIEL EDEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 22-3064 (D.C. No. 5:21-CV-03266-SAC) AARON WEBB; JOSEPH TRUMBULL; (D. Kan.) AARON CROUSE,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Plaintiff Charles Eden, a Kansas state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s order dismissing his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as barred by
the statute of limitations. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
On November 15, 2021, Mr. Eden filed a § 1983 complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas against three Kansas police officers—
Defendants Aaron Webb, Joseph Trumbull, and Aaron Crouse—alleging that they
* After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the party’s request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 2
violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force while arresting him on
November 29, 2017. The applicable limitations period for Mr. Eden’s claim was two
years. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (the relevant statute of
limitations for a § 1983 claim “is that which the State [in which the cause of action
arose] provides for personal-injury torts”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (providing
a two-year limitations period for “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not
arising on contract, and not herein enumerated”). But Mr. Eden did not file his
complaint until nearly four years after his arrest.
The district court screened Mr. Eden’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
and ordered him to show cause why his action should not be dismissed as untimely.
Mr. Eden responded that his claim did not accrue until November 20, 2019, when he
received body-camera videos of his arrest. He asserted that it was only upon viewing
the footage that he appreciated “the true nature of the events which injured [his]
Constitutional Rights,” which he “had not remembered due to being suffocated to the
point of incoherance [sic] and memory loss.” R., Vol. 1 at 73. In the alternative, Mr.
Eden argued that his memory loss was a “legal disability” that would qualify for
tolling under Kansas law. R., Vol. 1 at 76. The district court rejected Mr. Eden’s
accrual and tolling arguments and dismissed his complaint. We review the district
court’s decision de novo. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).
We first address Mr. Eden’s contention that his claim accrued in November
2019. “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that
is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. The general rule
2 Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 3
is that accrual occurs “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
which is the basis of the action.” Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980, 990
(10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]t is not necessary that a
claimant know all of the evidence ultimately relied on for the cause of action to
accrue.” Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Also, we have held that Ҥ 1983 claims arising out of police actions
toward a criminal suspect, such as arrest, . . . are presumed to have accrued when the
actions actually occur.” Kripp v. Luton, 466 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal Mr. Eden essentially argues for the application of a “discovery
rule,” which “delays accrual of a claim until the plaintiff knew or should have known
the facts necessary to establish h[is] cause of action.” Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch.
Dist., 756 F.3d 1208, 1216 (10th Cir. 2014). But even if a discovery rule applies, Mr.
Eden still cannot show his claim is timely.
Mr. Eden alleged that the force used against him caused “delirium, brain
damage, extreme pain, fear, including the fear of dying, loss of oxygen, back and
neck pain, as well as posttraumatic stress disorder, and nightmares about police.” R.,
Vol. 1 at 21 (capitalization omitted). And in an affidavit submitted with his
complaint, he stated that he “suffers back and neck injuries from the crushing weight
of the Officers upon him.” R., Vol. 1 at 56. He further alleged that he had no memory
of the “events that happened to [him]” until viewing the body-camera footage. R.,
Vol. 1 at 16. What is missing, however, is any statement regarding when he first
3 Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 4
learned of his physical injuries. To be sure, he asserted in his response to the district
court’s show-cause order that he “could not have reasonably ascertained the injuries
that he sustained” until viewing the body-camera footage, R., Vol. 1 at 75; but this is
a conclusory assertion entitled to no weight absent an explanation of why he
experienced, for example, no extreme pain and no back or neck pain in the nearly two
years between his arrest and his watching the video.
Perhaps Mr. Eden is saying only that he did not know the cause of his injuries
until he observed the video. But the Supreme Court “ha[s] been emphatic that the
justification for a discovery rule does not extend beyond the injury.” Rotella v. Wood,
528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). The “discovery of the injury, not discovery of the other
elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.” Id. As then-Judge Gorsuch explained:
In the absence of contrary directives from Congress, the Supreme Court has read into federal statutory limitations periods a relatively consistent rule.
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Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 12, 2022 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court CHARLES DANIEL EDEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 22-3064 (D.C. No. 5:21-CV-03266-SAC) AARON WEBB; JOSEPH TRUMBULL; (D. Kan.) AARON CROUSE,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Plaintiff Charles Eden, a Kansas state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s order dismissing his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as barred by
the statute of limitations. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
On November 15, 2021, Mr. Eden filed a § 1983 complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas against three Kansas police officers—
Defendants Aaron Webb, Joseph Trumbull, and Aaron Crouse—alleging that they
* After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the party’s request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 2
violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force while arresting him on
November 29, 2017. The applicable limitations period for Mr. Eden’s claim was two
years. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (the relevant statute of
limitations for a § 1983 claim “is that which the State [in which the cause of action
arose] provides for personal-injury torts”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) (providing
a two-year limitations period for “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not
arising on contract, and not herein enumerated”). But Mr. Eden did not file his
complaint until nearly four years after his arrest.
The district court screened Mr. Eden’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
and ordered him to show cause why his action should not be dismissed as untimely.
Mr. Eden responded that his claim did not accrue until November 20, 2019, when he
received body-camera videos of his arrest. He asserted that it was only upon viewing
the footage that he appreciated “the true nature of the events which injured [his]
Constitutional Rights,” which he “had not remembered due to being suffocated to the
point of incoherance [sic] and memory loss.” R., Vol. 1 at 73. In the alternative, Mr.
Eden argued that his memory loss was a “legal disability” that would qualify for
tolling under Kansas law. R., Vol. 1 at 76. The district court rejected Mr. Eden’s
accrual and tolling arguments and dismissed his complaint. We review the district
court’s decision de novo. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).
We first address Mr. Eden’s contention that his claim accrued in November
2019. “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that
is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. The general rule
2 Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 3
is that accrual occurs “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
which is the basis of the action.” Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980, 990
(10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]t is not necessary that a
claimant know all of the evidence ultimately relied on for the cause of action to
accrue.” Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Also, we have held that Ҥ 1983 claims arising out of police actions
toward a criminal suspect, such as arrest, . . . are presumed to have accrued when the
actions actually occur.” Kripp v. Luton, 466 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal Mr. Eden essentially argues for the application of a “discovery
rule,” which “delays accrual of a claim until the plaintiff knew or should have known
the facts necessary to establish h[is] cause of action.” Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch.
Dist., 756 F.3d 1208, 1216 (10th Cir. 2014). But even if a discovery rule applies, Mr.
Eden still cannot show his claim is timely.
Mr. Eden alleged that the force used against him caused “delirium, brain
damage, extreme pain, fear, including the fear of dying, loss of oxygen, back and
neck pain, as well as posttraumatic stress disorder, and nightmares about police.” R.,
Vol. 1 at 21 (capitalization omitted). And in an affidavit submitted with his
complaint, he stated that he “suffers back and neck injuries from the crushing weight
of the Officers upon him.” R., Vol. 1 at 56. He further alleged that he had no memory
of the “events that happened to [him]” until viewing the body-camera footage. R.,
Vol. 1 at 16. What is missing, however, is any statement regarding when he first
3 Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 4
learned of his physical injuries. To be sure, he asserted in his response to the district
court’s show-cause order that he “could not have reasonably ascertained the injuries
that he sustained” until viewing the body-camera footage, R., Vol. 1 at 75; but this is
a conclusory assertion entitled to no weight absent an explanation of why he
experienced, for example, no extreme pain and no back or neck pain in the nearly two
years between his arrest and his watching the video.
Perhaps Mr. Eden is saying only that he did not know the cause of his injuries
until he observed the video. But the Supreme Court “ha[s] been emphatic that the
justification for a discovery rule does not extend beyond the injury.” Rotella v. Wood,
528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). The “discovery of the injury, not discovery of the other
elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.” Id. As then-Judge Gorsuch explained:
In the absence of contrary directives from Congress, the Supreme Court has read into federal statutory limitations periods a relatively consistent rule. As formulated by the Court, the clock starts running when the plaintiff first knew or should have known of his injury, whether or not he realized the cause of his injury was unlawful. Almond v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 665 F.3d 1174, 1176 (10th Cir. 2011). Mr.
Eden has provided no adequate reason to depart from the presumption that his
excessive-force claims accrued at the moment of arrest or at least shortly thereafter.
See Kripp, 466 F.3d at 1175.
We also reject Mr. Eden’s argument that he was entitled to statutory tolling
that would render his claim timely. See Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d
1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2014) (questions of tolling are generally determined by state
law in § 1983 actions). He invoked Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-515(a), which allows a
4 Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 5
person suffering from a legal disability—as relevant here, “an incapacitated
person”—to bring an action “after the person’s disability is removed.” He argued that
his memory loss constituted a legal disability and that this disability was removed
only when he viewed the body-camera videos of his arrest. But the district court,
applying the relevant statutory definition of incapacitated person,1 correctly
determined that Mr. Eden “offer[ed] no evidence that he was impaired to the degree
that he could not manage his own affairs or was not capable of meeting his essential
needs.” R., Vol. 1 at 100; see Biritz v. Williams, 942 P.2d 25, 30 (Kan. 1997) (“[A]
legal disability is defined as lacking the capacity to manage financial resources or
meet essential requirements for one’s physical health or safety.”).
We GRANT Mr. Eden’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and
remind him of his obligation to continue making partial payments until the entire
1 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 77-201 provides: In the construction of the statutes of this state the following rules shall be observed . . . Thirty-first. “Incapacitated person” means an individual whose ability to receive and evaluate relevant information, or to effectively communicate decisions, or both, even with the use of assistive technologies or other supports, is impaired to the degree that the person lacks the capacity to manage the person’s estate, or to meet essential needs for the person’s physical health, safety or welfare, as defined in [Kan. Stat. Ann.] 59-3051, and amendments thereto, whether or not a guardian or a conservator has been appointed for that person. 5 Appellate Case: 22-3064 Document: 010110780300 Date Filed: 12/12/2022 Page: 6
filing fee has been paid. We DENY Mr. Eden’s motion for appointment of counsel
and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge