Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.

12 F. Supp. 632, 1935 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1189
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedOctober 30, 1935
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 12 F. Supp. 632 (Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632, 1935 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1189 (S.D. Cal. 1935).

Opinion

*634 YANKWICH, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above).

The right of a person in literary work exists at common law, and may' be protected irrespective of copyright. The law of copyright has merely provided an additional method whereby an author by registering his work establishes his right as of the date of registration with the Register of Copyrights, so that he may be in a position to show by the official registration the date of the publication of his original composition. The right which the copyright law protects differs in no respect from any other form of personal property in the protection which the common law throws about it. Its basis is the right to every one to the fruit of his labor. These principles are adverted to merely for the purpose of emphasizing the foundation upon which the law of copyright is based.

The law is desirous of protecting a person in the fruits of his literary labors. In determining whether there has been use or appropriation of the labor of another, whether under the common law or under the law of copyright, certain fundamental principles apply.

In 13 Corpus Juris, I find on page 1145 a very succinct statement of the principles applicable to dramatic works: “Dramatic compositions are the most valuable of all literary works, and for that reason are entitled to a great measure of protection. The unauthorized performance of a single scene in a copyright play may constitute an infringement. And in the case of copyright in books or other literary works the part taken must be material, and there must be a substantial identity, pro tanto, with the original composition in order to constitute piracy, and that identity must be due to copying and not to mere coincidence such as may exist even in the case of works independently produced. Where the two productions produced the impression on spectators that they were substantially the same, one will be held to be a colorable imitation of the other. But a substantial similarity founded on coincidence, or the use of old or stock situations, or common sources, and not the result of piracy, direct or indirect, is insufficient to establish infringement; nor is the taking of a general idea or scheme sufficient. The common stock of dramatic ideas cannot be exclusively appropriated by anyone. Originality in dealing with incidents familiar in life or fiction lies in the association and grouping of those incidents in such a manner that the work under consideration presents a new construction or a novel arrangement of events. A copyright protects this element of originality, and it is an infringement to appropriate a novel combination of old or stock situations, or to take elements of literary or dramatic value with which an author has dressed up an old plot. An indirect, as well as a direct taking constitutes an infringement.”

In the note to this text are found many cases. I find reference to a well-known English case, Chatterton v. Cave, 3 A. C. 483, 501, in which it is said: “An idea may be taken from a drama and used in forming another without the representation of the second being a representation of any part of the first. For example,—I have no doubt that Sheridan, in composing ‘The Critic’ took the idea from ‘The Rehearsal,’ but I think it would be an abuse of language to say that those who represent ‘The Critic’ represent ‘The Rehearsal’ or any part thereof; and, if it were left to me to find the fact, I should, without hesitation, find that they did not.” This statement is quoted with approval in Eichel v. Marcin (D. C. N. Y. 1913) 241 F. 404, 408.

The dramatic situations which form the stuff of drama are few. The entire dramatic literature of the world can be reduced to some three dozen situations. In fact, an ingenious Frenchman has written a book in which, after analyzing the entire dramatic literature from the time of the Greek and Hindu dramas to the present time, he concludes that all these dramatic works present, in variant form, the few situations which he has analyzed. A rule, therefore, which would place originality not in the manner of treatment of a theme, but in the theme, would place the “hack writer” upon the same footing with the genius. And so the law, realistic in this respect, places originality where it belongs. In the books dealing with the subject, and particularly in the series of books which the United States government has published on copyrights, being Copyright Office Bulletins Nos. 17, 18, and 19, and subsequent volumes, we find many illustrations of the application of the general principles which are stated in the quotation from Corpus Juris. I wish to refer to some of them, chosen from a large mass of material I have accumulated in the trial of cases of this character. Where plays *635 are dissimilar in thought, character, text, and situations, there can be no infringement merely because both made use of an old situation. This is particularly true where the points of essential difference so far outnumber the points of similarity that “it is difficult to understand how any one could persuade himself that the one was borrowed from the other.” Hubges v. Belasco (C. C. N. Y. 1904) 130 F. 388; Stevenson v. Harris (D. C. N. Y. 1917) 238 F. 432.

Even though there are characters in both plays having similarity and some instances of similar phraseology, when the theory of the two plays is entirely different, there is no infringement. Vernon v. Sam S. & Lee Shubert, Inc. (D. C. N. Y. 1915) 220 F. 694. The connection between the two works must be obvious to the ordinary reader or observer. Bachman v. Belasco (C. C. A. 2d Cir. 1915) 224 F. 817; Roe-Lawton v. Hal. E. Roach Studios (D. C. Cal. 1927) 18 F.(2d) 126. Protection is extended to the means of expression, not to the plot. Dymow v. Bolton (C. C. A. 2d Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 690; Eichel v. Marcin, supra; London v. Biograph Co. (C. C. A. 2d Cir. 1916) 231 F. 696.

A person may take the same fundamental idea as that of another work, and if in developing it the incidents in which it is developed are substantially different, if the idea is worked out on different lines, so that the two works bear no real resemblance to each other, there will be no infringement: Rees v. Melville, MacGillivaray Copyright Cases, 1910-1916, p. 168; Bagge v. Miller (Ch. D.) MacGillivaray Copyright Cases, 1917-1923, p. 178.

In Bagge v. Miller, supra, although the central idea of a sketch and a. play was found to be the same (compulsory truth-telling by means of a bet), the idea being stock, no infringement was found to exist.

In another English case, Vining v. Evett, MacGillivaray Copyright Cases, 1910-1916, p. 188, the court made a similar ruling where the story turned around a band of brigands with a lair in the mountains. The court held that choosing the mountains as the locale for the story, even in conjunction with the fact that in both stories the plot turned around a band of brigands who had a lair in the mountains, was not an infringement, because the idea was stock.

In Eichel v. Marcin, supra, the court was confronted with a. claim of similarity between the two stories, “Cheating Cheaters” and “Wedding Presents,” both being “crook plays” of the type that was rather common at the time. In discussing the question of similarity the court uses this language: “The object of copyright is to promote science and the useful arts.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Thompson v. Looney's Tavern Productions, Inc.
204 F. App'x 844 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Florida, 1978)
Alexander v. Haley
460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. New York, 1978)
Zachary v. Western Publishing Co.
75 Cal. App. 3d 911 (California Court of Appeal, 1977)
Gardner v. Nizer
391 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. New York, 1975)
Orson Welles v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
308 F.2d 810 (Ninth Circuit, 1962)
Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp.
178 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. New York, 1959)
Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
174 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. California, 1959)
Richards v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
161 F. Supp. 516 (District of Columbia, 1958)
Tralins v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.
160 F. Supp. 511 (D. Maryland, 1958)
Greenbie v. Noble
151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. New York, 1957)
Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.
137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. California, 1955)
Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc.
208 F.2d 185 (Eighth Circuit, 1954)
Weitzenkorn v. Lesser
256 P.2d 947 (California Supreme Court, 1953)
Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc.
108 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Missouri, 1952)
White v. Kimmell
94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. California, 1950)
Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc.
221 P.2d 95 (California Supreme Court, 1950)
Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
221 P.2d 73 (California Supreme Court, 1950)
Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc.
90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. California, 1950)
Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co.
85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. California, 1945)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 F. Supp. 632, 1935 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/echevarria-v-warner-bros-pictures-inc-casd-1935.