Ealy v. Superintendent of Groveland Correctional Facility

680 F. Supp. 2d 445, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1582, 2010 WL 271340
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 8, 2010
Docket1:06-cr-00218
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 680 F. Supp. 2d 445 (Ealy v. Superintendent of Groveland Correctional Facility) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ealy v. Superintendent of Groveland Correctional Facility, 680 F. Supp. 2d 445, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1582, 2010 WL 271340 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).

Opinion

ORDER

RICHARD J. ARCARA, District Judge.

The above-referenced case was referred to Magistrate Judge Victor E. Bianchini, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On December 3, 2009, Magistrate Judge Bianchini filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending that petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice.

The Court has carefully reviewed the Report and Recommendation, the record in this case, and the pleadings and materials submitted by the parties, and no objections having been timely filed, it is hereby

ORDERED, that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge Bianchini’s Report and Recommendation, petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed with prejudice.

The Court finds that petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and therefore denies his motion for a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

The Clerk of Court shall take all steps necessary to close the case.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

VICTOR E. BIANCHINI, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

Pro se petitioner Dale R. Ealy has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus *447 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 which has been referred to the undersigned by Chief United States District Judge Richard J. Arcara pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). (Docket No. 12).

On October 24, 2008, in response to an inquiry by Ealy, this Court sent a letter to Ealy enclosing a current copy of the docket sheet. On October 31, 2008, the Court’s letter was returned as undeliverable to the United States District Court in Buffalo. The Court has received no correspondence from Ealy from that time. On November 6, 2009, this Court issued an Order sent to the last address that Ealy had provided to the Court an Order directing him to verify with the Clerk of the District Court an address where papers may be served upon him. The Order directed a response from Ealy by December 1, 2009, and stated that Ealy’s failure to provide an updated address within the required time shall result in this Court issuing a Report and Recommendation to recommending that the case be dismissed with prejudice. On November 17, 2009, this Order was returned as undeliverable to the District Court.

II. Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute and Comply with Court Orders

Federal courts are vested with the authority to dismiss a plaintiffs action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute; this power, which is “necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the District Courts” has a long history at common law and “has been expressly recognized in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)[.]” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). Rule 41(b) provides, in pertinent part as follows:

Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.... Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 41(b); accord Link, 370 U.S. at 630, 82 S.Ct. 1386. The Supreme Court explained in Link that “[t]he authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” 370 U.S. at 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386.

As a matter of this District’s Local Rules, both attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to immediately notify the Court and opposing parties of any change in their address or contact information. Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(d) requires that a party proceeding pro se “must furnish the Court with a current address at which papers may be served on the litigant.... In addition, the Court must have a current address at all times. Thus a pro se litigant must notify the Court immediately in writing of any change of address. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of the case with prejudice.” Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(d) (emphasis supplied).

Given the return of the Court’s 2008 letter and 2009 Order as undeliverable, Ealy has failed keep the Court informed as to his current address at which papers may be served and has failed to comply with Local Rule 5.2(d) and the order directing him to provide an updated address. Because Ealy is a pro se peti *448 tioner, he should be afforded greater leeway in regard to his compliance with the Court’s procedural rules. See LeSane v. Hall’s Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir.2001). Ealy’s failure to update his address, however, “is no small matter.” Jackson v. Rabideau, No. 9:04-CV-1096(LEK/GHL), 2007 WL 911846, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2007) (citing Dansby v. Albany County Corr. Facility Staff, No. 95-CV-1525, 1996 WL 172699, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1996) (Pooler, D.J.) (“It is neither feasible nor legally required that the clerks of the district courts undertake independently to maintain current addresses on all parties to pending actions. It is incumbent upon litigants to inform the clerk of address changes, for it is manifest that communications that communications between the clerk and the parties ... will be conducted principally by mail.”) (citations and quotation omitted in original)); see also Michaud v. Williams, No. 98CV1141, 1999 WL 33504430, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1999).

The Second Circuit has “has repeatedly detailed factors ... to be considered before dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, and these factors significantly cabin a district court’s discretion under Rule 41(b), so that deference is due to the district court’s decision to dismiss a pro se

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Bluebook (online)
680 F. Supp. 2d 445, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1582, 2010 WL 271340, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ealy-v-superintendent-of-groveland-correctional-facility-nywd-2010.