E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States

296 F. Supp. 823, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136, 23 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 727, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13270
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedFebruary 14, 1969
DocketCiv. A. No. 3256
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 296 F. Supp. 823 (E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 823, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136, 23 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 727, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13270 (D. Del. 1969).

Opinion

OPINION

CALEB M. WRIGHT, Chief Judge.

This is an action by plaintiff, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (du Pont), for recovery of a portion of the internal revenue tax paid to defendant, United States of America (Government), for the calendar year 1954. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1); venue is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (2). Two issues are before the Court for decision: first, whether the proceeds of an exclusive license of du Pont’s Brazilian nylon patents, taxed as ordinary income in 1954, should have been treated as capital gains; secondly, whether certain legal expenses incurred by du Pont in conjunction with the reorganization of a subsidiary corporation pursuant to an anti-trust decree, taxed [826]*826as capital expenditures in 1954, should have been treated as ordinary and necessary business expenses. In view of the dissimilarity between the two issues, each will be considered separately.

I. THE BRAZILIAN PATENTS ISSUE.

A brief summary of the terms and background of the complex transactions which constitute the substance of plaintiff’s cause of action is requisite to an adequate understanding of this issue.

Du Pont is a recognized pioneer in the manufacture and development of synthetic linear polyamides, commonly known as nylon. To protect its interest in the various inventions in the nylon field, du Pont has acquired scores of patents, both domestic and foreign, covering everything from nylon to nylon intermediates to facilities, apparatus, and machinery for the manufacture of nylon. Many of these patents have, from time to time, been the subject of sale, assignment or license.

In 1951 du Pont began negotiations with a French company, Societe Rhodiaceta (Rhodiaceta), and its Brazilian subsidiary, Companhia Brasiliera Rhodiaceta (CBR), for the purpose of licensing du Pont’s Brazilian nylon patents. Du Pont had dealt extensively with Rhodiaceta prior to that time regarding certain of du Pont’s European patents; indeed, Rhodiaceta had been assigned all rights under those patents in 1946.1 The 1951 negotiations continued until March, 1952 when two agreements, one with Rhodiaceta and one with CBR, were consummated.

The 1952 CBR agreement (Ex. 6) was a simple nonexclusive license agreement whereby du Pont agreed to license use of its patents in return for royalties. The true royalty was 5% of sales; however, as security for payment, CBR agreed to pay a 7% royalty, 2% of which was to be held in escrow and eventually released, not to CBR, but to its parent, Rhodiaceta.

The 1952 Rhodiaceta agreement (Ex. 5) was somewhat more complex. In return for a release from all royalties ever owing to Rhodiaceta under a 1948 agreement granting du Pont a license for the manufacture of cellulose acetate, du Pont made three commitments: First, du Pont agreed to release Rhodiaceta from its obligation to pay royalties based on French production of nlyon. Secondly, du Pont agreed to hold in escrow 2% of the royalties paid by CBR with eventual payment of the reserves to Rhodiaceta. Finally, du Pont agreed to bring up to date the technical information or know-how supplied to Rhodiaceta under the 1946 du Pont-Rhodiaceta agreement. This last provision also permitted Rhodiaceta to transmit the newly acquired know-how to CBR in the event the 1952 CBR agreement became effective.

The 1952 CBR agreement, however, did not become effective. Shortly after its execution, the Brazilian government forced its abandonment by refusing to permit CBR to enter into a royalty agreement requiring a long-term drain on Brazil’s scarce dollar reserves. In addition, Brazil purportedly expressed its dissatisfaction with nonexclusive patent licenses. Transcript of Trial, September 18, 1968, pp. 52-58.

Notwithstanding the failure of the CBR agreement, the 1952 Rhodiaceta agreement, with the exception of the 2% escrow provision, became effective and the transfer to Rhodiaceta of up-to-date know-how was fully performed. Tr. 52.

Efforts to adjust the Brazilian situation to a posture acceptable to the parties and the Brazilian government commenced shortly after abandonment of the 1952 CBR agreement. A satisfactory solution was finally reached in 1954 with the execution of two new agreements. The dominant agreement (Ex. 21) was between du Pont and Rhodia[827]*827ceta and provided that, in return for payment of $3,500,000 in United States dollars, du Pont would permit Rhodiaceta and CBR to examine its Martins-ville, Virginia nlyon plant for the purpose of updating know-how and would grant an exclusive license of the Brazilian patents to Rhodiaceta on terms set forth in Article V of the agreement. Article V reads as follows:

“(a) Effective as of the date of execution by CBR of an agreement with DU PONT substantially in the form of attached Exhibit B, DU PONT hereby grants to RHODIACETA:

(1) a license under all Brazilian patents listed in * * * Exhibit A, any and all Brazilian patents issuing on the patent application listed in said Exhibit and any and all extensions or revivals of any of said patents
(1) to make, use and sell any poly-amide in any form,
******
(iii) to make and have made facilities, apparatus and machines and use the same, in RHODIACETA’S plants, in the manufacture of poly-amide products * * *; and
(2) the right to sublicense CBR under all of the Brazilian patents licensed by section (1) of this paragraph
(i) to make, use and sell any poly-amide in any form,
******
(iii) to make and have made facilities, apparatus and machines and use the same, in CBR’S plants, in the manufacture of polyamide products * * *,

and to grant to CBR the right to sub-license any party under said patents to make, use and sell any polyamide in any form.

The license and right to sublicense granted by this paragraph (a) shall be exclusive except for the following nonexclusive rights reserved to DU PONT:

(a') the right under any aforesaid patent to import into Brazil and to sell and to sell for use any product lawfully manufactured in the United States * * * and
(bO the right to convey to any party a non-exclusive immunity under any aforesaid patent to import into Brazil and to sell and to sell for use any product lawfully manufactured in the United States * * * » 2

The second 1954 agreement (Ex. 22) was between du Pont and CBR. It recited the terms of the dominant agreement relating to sublicensing and the import exceptions to the Rhodiaceta license. Consideration for the CBR agreement was $2,000,000, $250,000 of which was categorized as consideration for cancellation of the 1952 CBR agreement.3

The net effect of the two agreements was to transfer rights in the Brazilian patents to CBR for a consideration of $5,500,000 so that CBR could begin the manufacture of nylon in Brazil. The actual reason for the complex, three-party arrangement was apparently to avoid the international exchange problems which had occurred in 1952.

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Bluebook (online)
296 F. Supp. 823, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136, 23 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 727, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/e-i-du-pont-de-nemours-co-v-united-states-ded-1969.