Opinion issued February 26, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-13-00640-CR NO. 01-13-00641-CR ——————————— DUSTIN WAYNE GLENN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 405th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Case Nos. 12CR2237, 12CR2238
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After appellant, Dustin Wayne Glenn, with agreed punishment
recommendations from the State, pleaded guilty to two separate offenses of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 1 the trial court deferred adjudication of
his guilt and placed him on community supervision for five years. The State,
alleging several violations of the conditions of his community supervision,
subsequently moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt on both offenses. After a
hearing, the trial court found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at
confinement for twelve years for each offense, with the sentences to run
concurrently. In five issues, appellant contends that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel and the trial court erred in excluding relevant punishment
evidence and not conducting a separate punishment hearing after the adjudication
of his guilt.
We affirm.
Background
In its motions to adjudicate appellant’s guilt, in regard to the first offense, 2
the State alleged that he violated the conditions of his community supervision by
committing the misdemeanor offenses of criminal trespass and resisting arrest,
failing to perform community service, failing to enroll in a domestic violence
and/or anger control program, failing to reimburse Galveston County for the
attorney’s fees of his court appointed counsel, and failing to pay a community
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (Vernon 2011). 2 Appellate cause number 01-13-00640-CR; trial court cause number 12CR2237.
2 supervision fee, a Crime Stoppers Program payment, and his court costs. In its
motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt, in regard to the second offense, 3 the State
alleged that he violated the conditions of his community supervision by
committing the above offenses, failing to perform community service, failing to
enroll in a domestic violence and/or anger control program, and failing to pay a
Crime Stoppers Program payment and his court costs. Appellant pleaded “not
true” to all of the allegations in both of the State’s motions.
At the hearing on the State’s motions, Jeff Fox, appellant’s community
supervision officer, testified that he reviewed the conditions of appellant’s
community supervision in the instant causes with appellant. And appellant signed
two forms and orally affirmed that he understood the conditions of his community
supervision. On January 24, 2013, appellant pleaded no contest to the
misdemeanor offenses of criminal trespass and resisting arrest, thereby violating
the conditions of his community supervision not to commit any new offenses.
Appellant also failed to pay a $60.00 per month community supervision fee, his
Crime Stoppers Program payments, and his court costs. He also failed to
reimburse Galveston County for the attorney’s fees of his court appointed counsel.
And appellant did not perform his community service or enroll in a domestic
violence and/or anger control program.
3 Appellate cause number 01-13-00641-CR; trial court cause number 12CR2238.
3 Appellant testified that although he pleaded nolo contendere in the county
court to the misdemeanor offenses of criminal trespass and resisting arrest, he did
so only because his counsel told him that if he did so, he could “get out,” “go
home,” and “talk to his probation officer.” Appellant explained that he did not
attend or enroll in a domestic violence and/or anger control program because he
did not have a car and “didn’t know where to go.” He also did not complete any
community service hours, although he was aware that he was required to complete
sixteen hours per month. Appellant also conceded that he did not pay his Crime
Stoppers Program payments, his monthly community supervision fee, and his court
costs. And he did not reimburse Galveston County for the attorney’s fees of his
appointed counsel. And he admitted that he could have used money that he spent
on cigarettes to pay his fees. Moreover, he knew that it was his responsibility to
comply with the conditions of his community supervision.
Appellant explained, however, that his ability to read and write is lower than
a “second grade level,” he suffers from depression, and, as a child, he had mental
health issues, including “ADHD, bipolar [disorder], [and] dyslexi[a].” Doctors
prescribed medication for these conditions, and he was “on 17 different
medications before [he] was 12 years old.” And appellant, at the time of the
hearing, was on medication for depression, which made him feel “a lot happier”
and like he does not “want to hurt [himself].”
4 Appellant’s mother, Margaret Watson, testified that he had mental health
issues while “growing up,” is “bipolar,” and was committed to “the psychiatric
ward” for five days following his commission of the instant offenses. And she
noted that when appellant is on his medication, he is “a happy person”; but when
he is not, “[i]t’s like the devil’s taken over.”
After the hearing, the trial court found all of the allegations in the State’s
motion to adjudicate to be true, found appellant guilty of the instant offenses, and
assessed his punishment at confinement for twelve years for each offense, with the
sentences to run concurrently.
Appellant subsequently filed motions for new trial, arguing that he was “not
allowed to present evidence on the important status of [his] abnormal, deteriorated
and deteriorating mental status,” he was “entitled to a punishment hearing after the
adjudication of guilt,” and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a
hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motions.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his fifth issue, appellant argues that his counsel, appointed to represent
him at his adjudication hearing, provided ineffective assistance because counsel
“failed to adequately investigate [his] mental health history.”
Because appellant presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to
the trial court in motions for new trial and received a hearing on his motions, we
5 address his issue as a challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motions, and we
review the trial court’s denial for an abuse of discretion. Biagas v. State, 177
S.W.3d 161, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s rulings and uphold the trial
court’s ruling if they were within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Wead v.
State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We do not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court, but rather we decide whether the trial court’s
decisions were arbitrary or unreasonable. Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Biagas, 177 S.W.3d at 170. If there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the trial court’s choice between them cannot be held to be
clearly erroneous. Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453, 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A
trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no
reasonable view of the record could support the trial court’s ruling. Webb, 232
S.W.3d at 112.
We note that trial courts are in the best position to “evaluate the credibility”
of witnesses and to resolve conflicts in evidence. See Kober v. State, 988 S.W.2d
230, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). And a trial court may choose to believe or
disbelieve all or any part of the witnesses’ testimony. See id. When, as here, a
trial court makes no findings of fact regarding the denial of a motion for new trial,
we should “impute implicit factual findings that support the trial judge’s ultimate
6 ruling on that motion when such implicit factual findings are both reasonable and
supported in the record.” Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 239 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); Escobar v. State, 227 S.W.3d 123, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2006, pet. ref’d).
To prove his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show
that (1) his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068
(1984); Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In reviewing counsel’s
performance, we look to the totality of the representation to determine the
effectiveness of counsel, indulging a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance or
trial strategy. See Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 482–83 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). Appellant has the burden of establishing both prongs by a preponderance of
the evidence. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). And
his “failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates” our “need to
7 consider the other prong.” Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009).
In considering whether trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation for
potential mitigating evidence, we focus on whether the investigation supporting
counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence was reasonable. Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2003); Goody v. State, 433
S.W.3d 74, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). “While
‘Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of
mitigating evidence,’ ‘counsel can . . . make a reasonable decision to forego
presentation of mitigating evidence [only] after evaluating available testimony and
determining that it would not be helpful.’” Goody, 433 S.W.3d at 80–81 (quoting
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533, 123 S. Ct. at 2537). An attorney’s decision not to
investigate or to limit the scope of the investigation is given a “heavy measure of
deference” and assessed in light of all circumstances to determine whether
reasonable professional judgment would support the decision. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. However, a failure to uncover and present mitigating
evidence cannot be justified when counsel has not conducted a thorough
investigation of the defendant’s background. Shanklin v. State, 190 S.W.3d 154,
164 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. dism’d); see also Goody, 433
8 S.W.3d at 81 (“Counsel’s representation is ineffective . . . if counsel failed to
conduct an adequate investigation.”).
In addition to establishing a deficiency in counsel’s performance, appellant
must show that a reasonable probability exists that a fact-finder’s assessment of his
punishment would have been less severe in the absence of counsel’s deficient
performance. Bazan v. State, 403 S.W.3d 8, 13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, no pet.); Rivera v. State, 123 S.W.3d 21, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, pet. ref’d). Our prejudice analysis turns on whether counsel’s deficiency
made any difference to the outcome of the case. Riley, 378 S.W.3d at 458. It is
not enough to show that trial counsel’s errors had some “conceivable” effect on the
outcome of the punishment assessed; the likelihood of a different result must be
“substantial.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787, 792 (2011);
see also Goody, 433 S.W.3d at 81. An appellate court will not reverse a conviction
for ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase of trial unless the
defendant shows prejudice as a result of deficient attorney performance. Wiggins,
539 U.S. at 534, 123 S. Ct. at 2542; Rivera, 123 S.W.3d at 32. In reviewing
whether an appellant has satisfied this showing, we accord “almost total deference
to a trial court’s findings of historical facts as well as mixed questions of law and
fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Riley, 378 S.W.3d at
458. Further, when the trial judge presiding over a motion for new trial is the same
9 judge that presided over the trial, we presume that the judge knew how evidence
admitted at the hearing on the motion for new trial could have affected the judge’s
ruling on punishment. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 344–45 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009); Goody, 433 S.W.3d at 81. Because application of this second prong of the
Strickland analysis is dispositive of appellant’s fifth issue, we begin here.
Appellant argues that counsel’s failure to request appellant’s medical records
“for use in the punishment phase” of the adjudication hearings prejudiced him
because “a reasonable probability exists that the court would have . . . issued a
lighter sentence.” He asserts that his medical records “demonstrate” that [his]
“mother may have abused substances while she was pregnant with [him]” and,
even if not, she and [his] father “abused substances during his childhood.”
Appellant further asserts that his “history of hospitalization for mental health issues
strongly demonstrates that his condition requires consistent attention to the mental
health problems he was born with.” Thus, if his counsel “had offered these
medical records” at the adjudication hearings, “the court would have had
information beyond the testimony of [appellant] about his mental health issues as a
child,” and the records “would have provided support” for [his] argument that
“mental health hospitalization or a lesser sentence was the proper and just result for
punishment.”
10 We note that the same judge who presided over appellant’s adjudication
hearings also presided over appellant’s motions for new trial. At the hearings on
appellant’s motions for new trial, he offered into evidence hundreds of pages of his
medical records. He asserts that his counsel should have discovered and presented
the documents to the trial court at his adjudication hearings.
Here, “[w]e presume from the trial court’s denial of [appellant’s] motion[s]
[for new trial] that the [medical records], even if discovered [by counsel and
presented at the adjudication hearing], would not have affected [the trial court’s]
decision on sentencing.” Goody, 433 S.W.3d at 81; see also Smith, 286 S.W.3d at
345 (“[W]e presume that [the trial court] knew . . . what the appellant’s testimony
. . . would be, and that, even assuming any such testimony to be accurate and
reliable, knew that it would not have influenced his” punishment determination);
Potts v. State, No. 14-10-01172-CR, 2012 WL 1380230, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 19, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding defendant did not establish prejudice where same judge who
sentenced defendant also considered motion for new trial and determined
additional testimony would not have influenced punishment assessment); Arriaga
v. State, 335 S.W.3d 331, 337 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)
(concluding defendant did not establish prejudice where trial court could have
11 concluded new testimony alleged in motion for new trial would not have
influenced its punishment assessment).
In other words, by denying appellant’s motions for new trial, “the trial court
rejected the idea that the punishment that it assessed would have been mitigated
by” appellant’s medical records. Goody, 433 S.W.3d at 81; see also Smith, 286
S.W.3d at 344 (“Only the trial judge in this case could have known what factors he
took into consideration in assessing the original punishment, and only he would
know how the defendant’s testimony, if allowed, might have affected that
assessment.”); Potts, 2012 WL 1380230, at *1 (“It was well within the trial judge’s
discretion to determine that [character witness testimony] would not have
influenced the judge’s ‘ultimate normative judgment’ in assessing punishment . . .
the trial judge simply determined the proffered testimony would not have affected
his judgment.”).
Accordingly, we hold that appellant has not established that he was
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to discover and present his medical records to
the trial court during his adjudication hearings and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellant’s motions for new trial. See Goody, 433 S.W.3d at
81.
We overrule appellant’s fifth issue.
12 Exclusion of Evidence
In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court violated his due process
right to a “full opportunity to present punishment evidence” during the
adjudication hearings because “it excluded relevant childhood mental health
evidence.”
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Where the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is within the “zone of reasonable
disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion, and the reviewing court must
uphold the trial court’s ruling. Id. We will not disturb a trial court’s evidentiary
ruling if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling. De La Paz v.
State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
In regard to punishment evidence, a defendant may offer anything that “the
court deems relevant to sentencing.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07,
§ 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2014); see also Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 626 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). Relevant evidence in this context is any
evidence that assists the fact-finder in determining the appropriate sentence to give
to a particular defendant in the circumstances presented, possibly including “the
prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, an
13 opinion regarding his character, [and] the circumstances of the offense for which
he is being tried.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1); Rogers, 991
S.W.2d at 265; see also Garcia v. State, 239 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (“Relevance in [the punishment] context is
more a matter of policy than an application of Rule of Evidence 401; it
fundamentally consists of what would be helpful to the jury in determining
appropriate punishment.”).
Although article 37.07 allows a fact-finder to consider a wide range of
evidence in determining the appropriate punishment for a defendant, such evidence
must still satisfy Texas Rule of Evidence 403. See Ellison v. State, 201 S.W.3d
714, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting article 37.07 allows “a jury to consider a
wide range of evidence in determining” punishment); Lamb v. State, 186 S.W.3d
136, 143 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“Although a trial court
possesses wide latitude in determining the admissibility of evidence presented at
the punishment phase of trial, admitted evidence must satisfy Rule 403.”);
Henderson, 29 S.W.3d at 626 n.11 (admissibility of relevant punishment evidence
subject to rule 403). In other words, “relevant evidence [that is] otherwise
admissible under [a]rticle 37.07 is inadmissible if it fails to comport with Rule
403.” Lamb, 186 S.W.3d at 144. Rule 403 provides that “evidence may be
14 excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . considerations of
undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in excluding his “mother’s
testimony on his mental health history” because his “mental health history,
including his childhood mental health issues, was relevant to the judge’s
punishment decision.”
The State objected to Watson’s testimony about appellant’s mental health
during childhood as not relevant, and the trial court sustained the objection.
Appellant’s counsel then argued that such information “would be relevant to the
Court in determining punishment,” to which the court responded that it had “made
[its] ruling.” Subsequently, appellant’s counsel made the following offer of proof.
I would anticipate that this witness can provide testimony that can provide mitigating circumstances for [the trial court] in determining [appellant’s] future punishment. . . . I would think that the Court would want that sort of information and it would be helpful to the Court in determining his future punishment.
We note that appellant, himself, testified at the adjudication hearings as to
his mental health issues “when [he] was a kid,” and he explained that he suffered
from “ADHD, bipolar [disorder], and dyslexi[a].” He took “17 different
medications” before the age of twelve, but stopped taking them because he “almost
died” when his “heart almost exploded.” Appellant also stated that he currently
15 suffers from depression for which he takes medication. And when he is on
medication, he feels “a lot happier” and “do[esn’t] want to hurt [himself].”
Further, although Watson was not allowed to go into specifics about
appellant’s mental health issues as a child, she did testify that appellant had
suffered from mental health issues while he was “growing up.” And Watson noted
that appellant is “bipolar” and had been committed to “the psychiatric ward” for
five days following the aggravated assaults. Moreover, she explained that while
appellant is on medication, “[h]e’s a happy person, smiles, upbeat, cheerful, just
friendly, loving person, loves everybody, will do everything in the world for you.”
And she noted that when appellant is not on medications, “[i]t’s like the devil’s
taken over.”
Thus, the record reveals that appellant was able to present evidence about his
mental health issues, including issues during his childhood, at the adjudication
hearings. Although the trial court excluded Watson’s testimony regarding any
specifics of appellant’s mental health issues as a child, the admission of similar
evidence mitigates against any harm he might have suffered. See Mosley v. State,
983 S.W.2d 249, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (concluding admission of evidence
similar to that excluded mitigated against possible harm). Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court did not violate appellant’s right to due process by excluding
Watson’s testimony about his childhood mental health issues.
16 We overrule appellant’s first issue.
Separate Punishment Hearing
In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court violated his due
process right to a “full opportunity to present relevant punishment evidence”
because “it did not grant [him] a separate punishment hearing after adjudicating his
guilt.”
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “[i]f community
supervision is revoked after a hearing . . . , the judge may proceed to dispose of the
case as if there had been no community supervision.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 42.12, § 23(a) (Vernon Supp. 2014). Thus, when a trial court adjudicates
a defendant’s guilt after having deferred adjudication, the court must afford the
defendant an opportunity to present punishment evidence. See Issa v. State, 826
S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 42.12, § 5(b) (“After an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including
assessment of punishment, . . . continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been
deferred.”).
Although a defendant is entitled to present punishment evidence at a hearing
following an adjudication of his guilt, it is a statutory right that can be waived. See
Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Lopez v. State, 96
S.W.3d 406, 414 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d); Foster v. State, 80 S.W.3d
17 639, 641 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). To preserve error, a
defendant is generally required to make a timely objection in the trial court. TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1. And, in order to successfully complain on appeal about the denial
of the opportunity to present punishment evidence, a defendant must first make an
objection in the trial court or, if there is no opportunity to object, timely file a
motion for new trial. See Vidaurri, 49 S.W.3d at 886. If he files a motion for new
trial, he should indicate with some specificity in the motion the evidence that he
would have presented if the separate hearing had been provided. See Salinas v.
State, 980 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d).
Here, appellant asserts that although he “did not have an opportunity to
object to the trial court’s failure to grant a separate punishment hearing,” he
“preserve[d] error through timely raising the objection in [his] motion[s] for new
trial.” However, appellant, in his motions for new trial, only argued that the trial
court should have granted him new trials because it failed to give him a separate
punishment hearing after adjudicating his guilt. Notably, appellant, in the motions,
did not apprise the trial court of any additional evidence that appellant would have
offered. See Salinas, 980 S.W.2d at 521; see also Lopez, 96 S.W.3d at 415 n.3
(although defendant, in his motion for new trial, “did complain of a lack of a
separate punishment hearing,” he “did not specify” the evidence he “would have
presented”); Hardeman v. State, 981 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
18 Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (“[A]ppellant’s motion for new trial only complained that
the motion to adjudicate proceeding ‘was invalid’ because the trial court imposed
punishment ‘without conducting a separate hearing after the finding of guilt’. . . .
Without having apprised the trial court of what additional evidence would have
been offered, appellant has not preserved this complaint for appellate review.”),
aff’d, 1 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Because appellant, in his motions for
new trial did not inform the trial court of the evidence that he would have
presented during separate punishment hearings, we hold that he has not preserved
this issue for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
We overrule appellant’s second issue.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Misdemeanor Proceedings
In his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motions for new trial because his counsel, appointed to defend him in the county
court at law in his misdemeanor criminal-trespass and resisting-arrest cases,
provided him with ineffective assistance, rendering his pleas in the cases
involuntary. Appellant asserts that “[t]he State should not have been able to
benefit from [his] misguided [pleas] to criminal trespass and resisting arrest” by
using those convictions as grounds to adjudicate his guilt in his aggravated assault
cases.” Appellant requests that we “reverse [his] misdemeanor convictions” and
remand the instant cases for new adjudication and punishment hearings.
19 In order for this Court to review appellant’s challenge to his convictions for
the misdemeanor offenses of criminal trespass and resisting arrest on direct appeal,
appellant was required to file notices of appeal of the convictions within thirty days
after the sentences were imposed on January 24, 2013. See TEX. R. APP. P.
26.2(a)(1). Appellant did not file any notice of appeal from his January 24, 2013
misdemeanor convictions. Without a timely notice of appeal, we are without
jurisdiction to address the merits of appellant’s argument that his misdemeanor
convictions should be reversed because he involuntarily entered his pleas due to
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998); Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Moreover, we note that the trial court also adjudicated appellant’s guilt in
the instant cases on other grounds. It expressly found that appellant had violated
the conditions of his community supervision by failing to perform community
service, failing to enroll in a domestic violence and/or anger control program,
failing to reimburse Galveston County for the attorney’s fees of his appointed
counsel, and failing to pay a community supervision fee, his Crime Stopper
Program payments, and his court costs. And, proof of a single violation of his
conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support the trial court’s
adjudication of his guilt. See Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980); Canseco v. State, 199 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
20 Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Here, appellant has not challenged any of the other
grounds supporting the trial court’s adjudication of his guilt of the instant offense.
We overrule appellant’s third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court in each cause. 4
Terry Jennings Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Keyes.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
4 In his fourth issue, appellant contends that the Galveston County Court at Law No. 3 erred in denying the petitions for writs of habeas corpus that he filed there, challenging his convictions for the offenses of criminal trespass and resisting arrest. Appellant has separately appealed the county court’s denials of his applications for writs of habeas corpus, and we address appellant’s challenges in a separate opinion. See Glenn v. State, 01-14-00042-CR & 01-14-00195-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 26, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).