UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HARRY DUNN, et al.,
Plaintiffs, No. 25-cv-1844 (DLF) v.
THOMAS AUSTIN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Harry Dunn, a former officer of the U.S. Capitol Police, and Daniel Hodges, an officer of
the Metropolitan Police Department, filed this suit to compel the Architect of the Capitol to install
a plaque listing the names of officers who responded to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January
6, 2021. Before the Court are motions to intervene by Brian Mock and Cindy Lou Young, both of
whom were convicted for their actions on January 6 and later pardoned. Dkts. 12, 13. For the
reasons that follow, the Court will deny both motions.
I. BACKGROUND
Congress included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022 an expression of
gratitude to “officers of the United States Capitol Police and the Metropolitan Police Department
of the District of Columbia, as well as officers from other Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies and protective entities, who valiantly protected the United States Capitol, Members of
Congress, and staff on January 6, 2021.” Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 214(a), 136 Stat. 49, 527. To
that end, Congress mandated that, no “later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of th[e] Act,
the Architect of the Capitol shall obtain an honorific plaque listing the names of all” such officers and “place the plaque at a permanent location on the western front of the United States Capitol.”
Id. § 214(b). The Act goes on to direct the chairs and ranking members of several committees to
“jointly compile and confirm a list of the officers . . . whose names should be included on the
plaque,” id. § 214(c)(1), to include officers identified in an earlier House Resolution, id.
§ 214(c)(2).
The plaintiffs in this case responded to the events at the Capitol on January 6. Dunn is a
former officer of the U.S. Capitol Police. Compl. ¶ 4, Dkt. 1. He alleges that, while serving on
January 6, he “saw rioters attack police” and “protected injured officers” while enduring racial
epithets. Id. ¶ 17. Hodges is a current officer of the Metropolitan Police Department. Id. ¶ 4. He
alleges that he was assaulted several times while defending the Capitol. Id. ¶ 18. The plaintiffs
allege that the Architect has not installed the plaque required by the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2022, id. ¶¶ 27, 35, 38, and they seek to compel installation of the plaque at once, id. ¶ 42.
The defendants have moved to dismiss their claims. Dkt. 27. That motion remains pending before
the Court.
The putative intervenors, Mock and Young, both of whom are proceeding pro se, were
convicted for their actions at the Capitol on January 6. Mock was convicted after a bench trial on
four counts of assaulting, resisting, or impeding officers; one count of civil disorder; one count of
theft of government property; one count of entering and remaining in a restricted building or
grounds with a deadly or dangerous weapon; one count of disorderly and disruptive conduct in a
restricted building or grounds with a deadly or dangerous weapon; one count of engaging in
physical violence in a restricted building or grounds with a deadly or dangerous weapon; and one
count of committing an act of physical violence in the Capitol grounds or buildings. Am. J. at 1–
2, United States v. Mock, No. 21-cr-444 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2025), Dkt. 127. He was sentenced to 33
2 months’ imprisonment. J. at 3, Mock, No. 21-cr-444 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2024), Dkt. 116; Am. J. 3
(imposing time served). Young was convicted by a jury on one count of entering and remaining
in a restricted building; one count of disorderly and disruptive conduct in a restricted building; one
count of violent entry and disorderly conduct in a Capitol building; and one count of parading,
demonstrating, or picketing in a Capitol building. J. at 1–2, United States v. Young, No. 23-cr-241
(D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2024), Dkt. 113. She was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment. Id. at 3.
Both Mock and Young received pardons for these convictions in January 2025.
Mock moves to intervene in the plaintiffs’ case because he “[o]ppose[s] the current petition
for a one-sided memorial that exclusively honors law enforcement personnel involved in the events
of January 6, 2021, while omitting the actions taken against unarmed civilians and peaceful
demonstrators.” Mock Mot. 2, Dkt. 12. Accordingly, Mock “[p]ropose[s] a revised memorial that
includes,” among other things, a “dedicated section honoring the politically persecuted: those
January 6 defendants who were” “[i]llegally detained pretrial,” “[d]enied constitutional rights,”
and “[s]ubjected to inhumane treatment and solitary confinement for political purposes.” Id. at 2–
3.
Young similarly moves to intervene to “protect her significant interest in ensuring that any
memorialization of the events of January 6, 2021, at the United States Capitol is equitable,
inclusive, and accurately reflects the experiences of all individuals impacted by that day.” Young
Mot. 1, Dkt. 13. She argues that the defendants’ “failure to install a balanced memorial that
includes recognition of January 6 defendants and those who lost their lives violates the Equal
Protection Clause” because it “honor[s] one group (law enforcement officers) while excluding
others who were equally impacted by the events of January 6, 2021.” Id. at 2–3. Young seeks
relief in the form of an order that “any memorial installed pursuant to [the Consolidated
3 Appropriations Act of 2022] include recognition of all individuals impacted by January 6, 2021,
including the 1,585 January 6 defendants,” among others. Id. at 8–9.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “outlines two different avenues by which
a court can allow an outsider to intervene—intervention of right, and permissive intervention.”
EEOC v. Nat’l Child.’s Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Rule 24(a) provides for
intervention of right when a movant can demonstrate four requirements: “1) timeliness of the
application to intervene; 2) a legally protected interest; 3) that the action, as a practical matter,
impairs or impedes that interest; and 4) that no party to the action can adequately represent the
potential intervenor’s interest.” Crossroads Grassroots Pol’y Strategies v. FEC, 788 F.3d 312,
320 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Rule 24(b) provides for permissive intervention by a third party who either
“is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute” or “has a claim or defense that shares
with the main action a common question of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1). The Court must also
“consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original
parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). The Court retains “considerable latitude to grant or deny
intervention based on the particular circumstances of the case” under Rule 24(b). Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. EPA, 274 F.R.D. 305, 313 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation modified).
Article III of the Constitution limits the “judicial Power” of federal courts to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “[T]here is no justiciable case or controversy
unless the plaintiff has standing.” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “To
establish standing, a party must demonstrate: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized
as well as actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged
conduct; and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury will be redressed by
4 a favorable decision.” Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Wheeler, 955 F.3d 68, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation
modified). “The burden of establishing these elements falls on the party invoking federal
jurisdiction, and at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating each element.”
Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
“Intervenors seeking relief broader than or different from that sought by existing parties
must possess constitutional standing.” Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 142 F.4th 757,
764 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citing Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 440 (2017)).
“[B]ut intervenors that seek the same relief sought by at least one existing party need not do so.”
Id. (citing Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 591 U.S. 657, 674
n.6 (2020)). Although documents filed pro se are to be liberally construed, Redmond v Fulwood,
859 F.3d 11, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2017), pro se litigants are still required to prove constitutional
standing. Because a putative intervenor’s Article III standing “presents a question going to this
[C]ourt’s jurisdiction,” the [C]ourt must address it before evaluating intervention under Rule 24.
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see Conf. Grp., LLC v. FCC,
720 F.3d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
III. ANALYSIS
The Court will deny Mock’s and Young’s motions to intervene because they lack standing.
And to the extent that the putative intervenors do not need to prove Article III standing for
permissive intervention, see In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d 972,
980 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the Court will not exercise its discretion to grant their motions to intervene
under Rule 24(b).
5 A. Standing
Neither Mock nor Young has standing to intervene. Both must allege facts to support
constitutional standing because each seeks relief that is “broader than or different from that sought
by” the plaintiffs. Institutional S’holder Servs., 142 F.4th at 764 n.3. In particular, both putative
intervenors seek to compel the Architect either to install a plaque that materially differs from that
authorized by Congress or to prevent the installation of the January 6 plaque altogether. Yet
neither has identified “an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized,” let alone “a causal
connection between” such an injury and the defendants’ action or inaction. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
955 F.3d at 76 (citation modified).
Mock alleges that the “installation of any permanent public monument reflecting only the
plaintiffs’ narrative would significantly impair his constitutional rights, damage his reputation, and
mischaracterize the broader context and contested facts of January 6.” Mock Mot. 1. He further
argues that a plaque honoring only the January 6 officers would “affect[] his legal history, public
identity, and liberty.” Id. at 2.
As to the alleged violation of Mock’s unspecified “constitutional rights,” id. at 1, the Court
need “not assume the truth of legal conclusions” nor must it “accept inferences that are
unsupported by the facts set out in the [motion],” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (citation modified). Mock has not explained how the installation of a plaque honoring the
January 6 officers would violate his constitutional rights, 1 and the Court cannot infer such harm
from his motion or the attached “Proposed Answer and Opposition,” Dkt. 12-1, neither of which
identifies a concrete and particularized constitutional injury.
1 Mock’s passing reference to “fairness, neutrality, and equal protection under the Constitution,” Mock Mot. 2, does not suffice to allege a constitutional injury for the reasons explained below.
6 Mock’s allegations about “damage [to] his reputation” and his “public identity,” Mock
Mot. 1–2, also fail. Stigmatic injuries can be “sufficient in some circumstances to support
standing.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). But any stigmatic injury must have been
“suffered as a direct result of having personally been denied equal treatment.” Id. Here, Mock
offers no allegations as to how the plaque honoring January 6 officers directly harms his reputation
or otherwise stigmatizes him, even if the Court were to accept his argument that the
congressionally mandated plaque “presents a false and one-sided narrative of the events of”
January 6. Mock Mot. 1. He says that the “government’s promotion of a false narrative
surrounding January 6” has resulted in him being “harassed in public” and “denied basic services
such as banking and employment.” Mock Reply 3, Dkt. 22. And after describing his experience
overhearing a Capitol tour guide “repeating demonstrably false claims about January 6 to visitors,”
Mock suggests that, “[f]or the government to now enshrine that narrative in bronze would be to
deepen the wound, reaffirm the injustice, and all but guarantee that these personal and professional
attacks will continue indefinitely.” Id. at 3–4. But he has offered no factual allegations to show
that installation of the plaque honoring January 6 officers would actually or imminently worsen
the pre-existing false “narrative” from which his injuries allegedly flow.
If such an “abstract stigmatic injury” from recognition of another group in a governmental
monument “were cognizable,” “standing would extend nationwide to all members of the
particular . . . groups against which the Government was alleged to be discriminating by its grant
of a” monument to another group. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755–56. As the Supreme Court explained in
Allen v. Wright, denying standing to plaintiffs who challenged the government’s grant of a tax
exemption to a allegedly discriminatory school, a general “denigration, suffered by all members
of a racial group when the Government discriminates on the basis of race” cannot be a cognizable
7 injury else “[a] black person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially
discriminatory school in Maine.” Id. at 754, 756. “Constitutional limits on the role of the federal
courts preclude such a transformation.” Id. at 756. The same principles apply to Mock’s
allegations of injury by a plaque that he may never see. Absent allegations that the plaque would
cause him actual or imminent harm, such allegations are insufficient. Accordingly, Mock has
failed to allege the prerequisite injury to support the constitutional standing that he needs to
intervene in this case.
Young’s allegations similarly fail to support the constitutional standing necessary for
intervention. She alleges that her prosecution and subsequent incarceration for misdemeanor
offenses related to January 6 resulted in the loss of her business and inflicted depression and
anxiety. Young Mot. 2. She also says that installing the plaque honoring January 6 officers will
result in “selective recognition” that “perpetuates an unequal application of the law and
exacerbates the harms suffered by [her] and others.” Id. at 3. But again, it is not clear how the
plaque, as described in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022, will “exacerbate[]” the harms
Young has allegedly suffered following January 6. Id. at 8. She says that a “plaque that solely
honors law enforcement officers would violate the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by
arbitrarily favoring one group over others equally affected, denying [Young] and similarly situated
individuals the equal protection of the laws.” Id. But these general legal assertions do not show
concrete and particularized harm to her. And Young does not support her claim that the memorial
“would perpetuate the financial and emotional harms she has endured . . . and hinder her ability to
seek fair recognition for her experiences,” id. at 6, with any facts to show that the Architect’s
hanging of the plaque would actually or imminently cause her a pocketbook injury, emotional
distress, or prevent her from asking Congress for plaque honoring January 6 defendants. Her
8 general claims about the “psychological trauma” caused by the “memorial’s selective recognition,”
Young Reply 2, Dkt. 18, are not sufficient because—much like the plaintiffs denied standing in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)—she has not said that she would imminently
observe the plaque, thereby suffering direct harm from its display, see id. at 564 & n.2. And it
goes “into pure speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who” has any connection to January 6
“anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single [plaque] . . . with which [s]he has no
more specific connection.” Id. at 567.
The declaration attached to Young’s motion mentions “social isolation and stigmatization
resulting from [her] status as a January 6 defendant,” in addition to “verbal attacks and
harassment.” Young Decl. 2, Dkt. 13-1. But she makes no effort to tie those harms to the
Architect’s installation of—or failure to install—the plaque as described in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2022. Young cites Campell v. District of Columbia, 894 F.3d 281 (D.C.
Cir 2018), for the proposition that she is entitled to “stigma-plus” standing because her “stigmatic
harm is accompanied by tangible losses,” thereby “distinguishing [her] case from unrelated
bystander grievances.” Young Reply 2 (citing Campell, 894 F.3d at 284). A “stigma-plus claim,”
however, requires that the government “take[] certain adverse actions and [that] those actions
create a stigma or other disability that foreclose[s] the plaintiff ’s freedom to take advantage of
other employment opportunities.” Campbell, 894 F.3d at 284 (citation modified). Even assuming
that the installation of the plaque sought by the plaintiffs constitutes “adverse” government action,
Young has still failed to allege any facts to show that the plaque would actually or imminently
cause her to miss an opportunity or suffer any other particularized harm. Accordingly, she, like
Mock, has not alleged facts to show an injury for constitutional standing purposes.
* * *
9 Because neither Mock nor Young alleges sufficient facts to support the constitutional
standing that they need as intervenors seeking broader relief than the plaintiffs in this case, the
Court will deny their motions to intervene.
B. Rule 24
Mock’s and Young’s lack of standing forecloses their efforts to intervene as of right, so the
Court will not proceed with analysis under Rule 24(a). But “‘[i]t remains . . . an open question in
this circuit whether Article III standing is required for permissive intervention.’” Defs. of Wildlife
v. Perciasepe, 714 F.3d 1317, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Endangered Species, 704 F.3d
at 980). “The uncertainty about whether standing is required for permissive intervention remains
today.” In re Endangered Species, 704 F.3d at 980; see Cigar Ass’n of Am. v. FDA, 323 F.R.D.
54, 66 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting the open question); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 738 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2024) (same).
To the extent that Mock and Young do not need to prove Article III standing for permissive
intervention, the Court will not exercise its discretion to grant their motions to intervene under
Rule 24(b) because neither has shown a “conditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A). 2 Nor has either demonstrated that the “claim” for a different memorial
2 Mock cites his “direct and legally protectable interest” in “preventing the government from memorializing a false narrative that affects his legal history, public identity, and liberty.” Mock Mot. 1–2. But “[t]o be protected by means of intervention, the interest must be a legal interest as distinguished from interests of a general and indefinite character.” United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation modified). Mock’s general claims about protecting history, identity, and liberty have no grounding in any legal right conferred on him by § 214, any other statute, or the Constitution. Mock cites Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), for the proposition that he enjoys a “fundamental liberty interest in being free from reputation defamation by the very institution that deprived him of his freedom based on false pretenses.” Mock Reply 2. Yet he has not identified any characteristic of the congressionally mandated plaque that would be defamatory to him. And Young seems to trace her interests to her “Fifth Amendment equal protection rights.” Young Reply 2. But, again, she has failed to explain how the installation
10 from that sought by the plaintiffs and described by Congress “shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact.” Id. 24(b)(1)(B). And even if either had done so, “[i]n exercising
its discretion, the [C]ourt must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Id. 24(b)(3). The putative intervenors’ request for
a substantially different memorial—one that honors the January 6 defendants alongside the
January 6 officers—would unduly delay and prejudice the original plaintiffs’ request for
installation of a plaque that conforms with § 214 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022.
Accordingly, the Court will deny the putative intervenor’s motions for permissive intervention. 3
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Brian Mock’s and Cindy Lou Young’s Motions to Intervene,
Dkts. 12, 13, are denied. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this
memorandum opinion.
______________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH March 30, 2026 United States District Judge
of a plaque honoring January 6 officers harms any of her legally cognizable interests, let alone offer any facts that might show that Congress’s decision to honor law enforcement could trigger heightened scrutiny or lacks a rational basis. 3 Because the Court will deny the motions to intervene, it will strike Young’s extraneous filings, Dkts. 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40, which she did not have leave to file as a non-party to this suit.