Dunn v. Acme Auto & Garage Co.

169 N.W. 297, 168 Wis. 128, 1918 Wisc. LEXIS 156
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 6, 1918
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 169 N.W. 297 (Dunn v. Acme Auto & Garage Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dunn v. Acme Auto & Garage Co., 169 N.W. 297, 168 Wis. 128, 1918 Wisc. LEXIS 156 (Wis. 1918).

Opinion

Rosenberry, J.

The first claim made is that the appeal should be dismissed for the reason that the order of April 5, 1918, is not appealable under sec. 3069, Stats., citing Nash v. Meggett, 89 Wis. 486, 61 N. W. 283.

The order of April 5, 1918, expressly continues the in-junctional order issued by the court commissioner except as modified by the direction for sale subject to confirmation by the court. It seems clear that the order of March 18th was modified by the order of April 5th and is therefore within the provisions of sec. 3069, Stats., and appealable, jt being an order which modifies an injunction. Brock v. Dole, 66 Wis. 142, 28 N. W. 334. It is further claimed that an or.der granting or refusing an injunction is one within the sound discretion of the court and that the action of the trial court in that respect will not.be reversed unless, so clearly wrong- as to evince an abuse of judicial power. Gowran v. Lennon, 154 Wis. 566, 143 N. W. 678; Tiede v. Schneidt, 99 Wis. 201, 74 N. W. 798.

[132]*132It is further claimed that upon this appeal this court is bound by the findings made by the trial court, citing Conger v. Dingman, 98 Wis. 417, 74 N. W. 125. The case cited is not authority for the proposition made. We think the rule is correctly stated in Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 202, 142 N. W. 595, as follows:

“Where the papers on an application for an order preserving the status quo pending the final result of t'he case show a reasonable probability of plaintiff’s ultimate success, it is well nigh an imperative duty of the court to grant such relief.”

This is true notwithstanding there is a direct conflict between the complaint and the supporting affidavits and the answer and the affidavits on the part of the defendants. Valley I. W. M. Co. v. Goodrick, 103 Wis. 436, 445, 78 N. W. 1096.

The complaint alleges with great particularity that plaintiff has been deprived of all voice in the management of the affairs of the company; that the defendants as directors and officers have failed to perform their duties and honestly and fairly to administer the affairs of the corporation; that the assets of the corporation have been wrongfully diverted by the defendants tQ their own profit; that no proper books of account are kept; and that the business is mismanaged in many particulars therein stated. The verified complaint, although many of its allegations are upon information and belief, was supported by the adverse examination of three of the defendants and by the affidavits of disinterested persons as to some of the allegations. A strong prima facie showing was made. The allegations of the complaint were directly denied by answer and there are supporting affidavits on defendants’ behalf. A showing was made which clearly entitled the plaintiff to a restraining order preserving the status quo until a trial and determination could be had unless some facts should clearly appear which made a change in the status quo necessary in order to preserve the [133]*133rights of all the parties and ultimately to do justice between them. The defendants attempted to meet this situation by the claim that the sale of the stock was necessary in order to allow the company to' comply with the statutes so as to enable it to become legally incorporated, there being prior to the sale only thirty per cent, of the capital stock issued and outstanding. It is a complete answer to this claim to say that it does not appear that fifty per cent, of the capital stock is not subscribed and it does appear that twenty per cent, of the capital stock is subscribed and paid for, and further, that if a sale of enough capital stock is made so that the total amount issued and outstanding shall be fifty per cent., the sale of the 162J4 shares is not sufficient to accomplish that purpose.

It is further claimed that the indebtedness of the company, which at the time of the sale amounted to about $11,000, it being $13,800 when the sale was authorized, required a sale of the company’s stock. The stock.sold brought to the treasury of the company $1,828.12. Five thousand dollars of the indebtedness owing was to the defendant stockholders. The application of the $1,828.12 certainly would not have much if any effect upon the financial standing of the company.

While a sale of treasury stock under some circumstances may be proper, there remains one consideration which seems to us controlling in the situation presented by this record, and that is that the court directed a disposal of the stock by a method which denied to the plaintiff his plain legal right to maintain his proportionate interest in the assets of the corporation.

It clearly appears from the complaint and supporting affidavits that it will be practically impossible to determine even approximately the value of the stock of this company until the matters set out in the complaint are fully litigated and the amount determined, if any, which the defendants shall be required to repay into the treasury of the company [134]*134on account of unlawful diversion of moneys and property belonging to- the company.

In Luther v. C. J. Luther Co. 118 Wis. 112, 122, 94 N. W. 69, it was distinctly held that, “in an already established and going corporation, an increase of capital stock, accomplished either by formal increase of the amount originally authorized or by issue of what had originally been withheld, though within the authorized amount, without first giving opportunity to- all existing stockholders to- take their proportionate shares of such increase, is wholly beyond the power, not only of the directors, but of any mere majority of stockholders.”

The question as to whether or not the rule should be applied in case of stock once issued but purchased and retired by the corporation itself was expressly reserved. While in the Luther Case a question of corporate control and management was involved, that is not the only consideration upon which the rule is founded. In the Luther Case it was said:

“While the ulfimate purpose of most stock corporations is money profit, the right of proportionate voice and influence in selection of policy and method of accomplishing that result is most important to each shareholder. It is as fundamental and vital as the right of suffrage under a representative government. . . . Each holder of a share of stock has the right that, by convincing the holders of a certain number of other shares, his policy of business be followed. Any invasion of that right is an injury to him which, from his point of view, may be greater than very considerable present money loss to the corporation. While this right must yield to a power ove'r it given by the terms of the association, still he has the right to insist that such power shall be exercised for the purposes of the whole association. It is not so when exercised for the direct purpose of depriving him of his proportionate voice and influence.” Pages 123, 124.

The stockholder is given a right to- his proportionate voice in the control of the company to protect his financial in[135]*135terest. Upon what grounds, then, can it be said that his financial interest should not be protected ?

As was said in the Luther Case,

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Bluebook (online)
169 N.W. 297, 168 Wis. 128, 1918 Wisc. LEXIS 156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dunn-v-acme-auto-garage-co-wis-1918.