Luther v. C. J. Luther Co.

94 N.W. 69, 118 Wis. 112, 1903 Wisc. LEXIS 5
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedMay 29, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by64 cases

This text of 94 N.W. 69 (Luther v. C. J. Luther Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luther v. C. J. Luther Co., 94 N.W. 69, 118 Wis. 112, 1903 Wisc. LEXIS 5 (Wis. 1903).

Opinion

The following opinion was filed March 21, 1903:

Dodge, J.

Were Clarence J. Luther the sole plaintiff, we should have little doubt that he ought to be dismissed from a court of equity without relief, for the reason that his own conduct has been so in outrage of his duties as a director and officer of the corporation that no court can patiently listen to his prayer for enforcement of fiduciary principles and duties. That objection does not, however, exist to some of the other plaintiffs, who, as stockholders, ask that their rights be protected as to them. The circuit court has found, and we find, nothing of misconduct in their relations to the company.

The salient facts presented by the findings are that the governing board of directors of this corporation were divided into two factions — G. J. Luther on the one hand, interested only in the profits which the corporation might make,, and to • that end interested that it should buy its supplies as cheaply as possible; on the other hand, T. A. Boemer and If. W. Bolens, largely interested in the company from which supplies were mainly purchased, and therefore anxious to have such purchases continue, and at prices profitable to the seller. Here was presented a question of corporate policy which the stockholders, subject to temporary control by the [122]*122directors, bad the ultimate right to decide according to majority vote. In that situation, Bolens and Boerner, availing themselves of the temporary constitution of the board, exercised the power thus vested in them to sell a quantity of unissued stock to a confederate of theirs for the purpose of placing in hands favorable to their policy a majority of the total corporate stock. Such sale is attacked primarily on the ground that, in an already established and going corporation, an increase of capital stock, accomplished either by formal increase of the amount originally authorized or by issue of what had originally been withheld, though within the authorized amount, without first giving opportunity to all existing stockholders to take their proportionate shares of such increase, is wholly beyond the power, not only of the directors, but of any mere majority of stockholders. This doctrine rests on the idea that, while its own corporate stock is property, so that the sale and disposition thereof involve questions of business policy properly controllable by the directors’ or stockholders’ meeting, the original issue thereof involves something more; that the latter act goes to underlying organization — modifies the fundamental arrangement and proportions of the members. This doctrine is supported by overwhelming and almost unconflicting array of authority, from which we need cite but a few illustrative cases and text book discussions. Cook, Stockholders (3d ed.) §§ 284, 286, 662; 2 Beach, Pr. Corp. §§ 473, 474; 2 Thompson, Comm. Corp. § 2040; Taylor, Pr. Corp. (5th ed.) § 569; Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364; Reese v. Bank of Montgomery Co. 31 Pa. St. 78; Electric Co. v. Edison E. I. Co. 200 Pa. St. 516, 50 Atl. 164; Jones v. C. & M. Railroad, 67 N. H. 119, 38 Atl. 120; Humboldt D. P. Asso. v. Stevens, 34 Neb. 528, 52 N. W. 568; Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 140, 16 N. W. 854; Dousman v. Wis. & L. S. M. & S. Co. 40 Wis. 418. It has not yet been decided in this state whether the reasons on which rests this rule of law are sufficient to impose such [123]*123limitation upon the powers of directors in our corporations, resting, as they do, upon sec. 1776, Stats. 1898, which provides that “the stock, property, affairs and business of every such stock corporation shall be under the care of and be managed by a board of directors,” etc. The Minnesota court, in face of a similar statute, has held affirmatively. Jones v. Morrison, supra. The question will be worthy of careful consideration when its decision becomes necessary.

For the purposes of the present case, it is not necessary to consider the unissued stock otherwise than as mere property, over which the powers of the directors are the same as over any other assets of the corporation, namely, to sell to whom and at such prices as to them shall seem best for the corporation and all its stockholders, in the honest exercise of the discretion and- trust vested in them. Even then, however, their duties with reference thereto are fiduciary; they are bound to act uberrima fides for all stockholders. To dispose of or manage property of the corporation to the end and for the purpose of giving to one part of their cestuis que trustent a benefit and advantage over, or at the expense of, another part, is breach of such duty, especially when the directors themselves belong to the specially benefited class. In re The Taylor Orphan Asylum, 36 Wis. 534; Eschweiler v. Stowell, 78 Wis. 316, 47 N. W. 361; Spaulding v. North Milwaukee T. S. Co. 106 Wis. 481, 494, 81 N. W. 1064; Goodin v. Cincinnati & W. C. Co. 18 Ohio St. 169; Farmers’ L. & T. Co. v. N. Y. & N. R. Co. 150 N. Y. 410, 44 N. E. 1043. It cannot matter how this result is accomplished, nor what the form of the undue benefits conferred or acquired. The benefit to the one class or the injury to the other need not be pecuniary. While the ultimate purpose of most stock corporations is money profit, the right of proportionate voice and influence in selection of policy and method of accomplishing that result is most important to each shareholder. It is as fundamental and vital as the right of suffrage under a representa[124]*124tive government. While a governmental act may not take away from any class of citizens property or physical liberty, yet if, contrary to the fundamental law of organization, it abates their suffrage, it would be held void. Each holder of a share of stock has the right that, by convincing the holders of a certain number of other shares, his policy of business be followed. Any invasion of that right is an injury to him which, from his point of view, may be greater than very considerable present money loss to the corporation. While this right must yield to a power over it given by the terms of the association, still he has the right to insist that such power shall be exercised for the purposes of the whole association. It is not so when exercised for the direct purpose of depriving him of his proportionate voice and influence. That is not a legitimate manner for those temporarily vested with power to perpetuate the policy which they favor. Nothing can be more fallacious in corporate or in popular government than the argument that because they honestly believe their policy right, and another dangerous, they may rightfully invade the field of the suffrage upon which policy rests, and disfranchise, in whole or in part, those who disagree with them. We have said this much of perhaps rather trite and elementary philosophy because the conclusions of the trial court seem to rest on the argument that, because the majority of the directors honestly considered Clarence J. Luther’s control of corporate management dangerous, they might properly exert their power over unissued stock in order to colonize enough new votes to turn the majority supporting Luther s policy into a minority.

Since the trial court has found, and upon sufficient evidence, that the purpose of the sale of the new stock was to take from the faction supporting Luther’s

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
94 N.W. 69, 118 Wis. 112, 1903 Wisc. LEXIS 5, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/luther-v-c-j-luther-co-wis-1903.