HINES, Justice.
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in
Dunagan v. State,
286 Ga. App. 668 (649 SE2d 765) (2007), to consider whether defendant Dunagan’s proffered evidence regarding the design of the intersection at which the collision at issue occurred was properly excluded. Finding that the exclusion of the proffered evidence was error, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The evidence as set forth in the opinion by the Court of Appeals, was the following: on February 17,2004, Aaron Dunagan was driving his truck south on a highway when he approached an intersection;
the posted speed limit was 65 miles per hour; warning signs of the approaching intersection were posted approximately 700 feet north of it; before he reached the intersection, the light directed at the north and south lanes of the highway changed from green to yellow; Dunagan then accelerated through the intersection, running what had become a red light, and struck a sports utility vehicle (“SUV”) attempting to turn left in front of him on its passenger side; Dunagan told a state trooper at the scene that “I tried to beat the light and didn’t make it”; although the driver of the struck SUV was unconscious at the scene, Dunagan was able to leave his vehicle without assistance; he had been drinking beer earlier in the day, smelled of alcohol, and showed signs of impairment on field sobriety tests administered at the scene; he also tested positive on two different alco-sensors; after Dunagan was arrested, he refused the State-administered alcohol test; the victim suffered severe brain damage and other injuries, is a quadriplegic, and is unable to speak or eat; a jury found Dunagan guilty of reckless driving, running a red light, and serious injury by vehicle based on reckless driving;
and Dunagan was sentenced as a recidivist.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Dunagan argued, inter alia, that the trial court committed reversible error by granting the State’s motion in limine and excluding all evidence “as to the inherent dangerousness of the intersection prior to the accident and the subsequent improvements to correct these problems.” Without explanation, the Court of Appeals expressly addressed only that portion of this enumerated error and argument regarding whether it was error to exclude evidence of prior collisions at the same intersection; it concluded that the question of whether Dunagan drove through the intersection with the reckless disregard necessary to prove both reckless driving and serious injury by vehicle had nothing to do with the history of prior collisions at the intersection, and that given that there was no evidence of a signal malfunction at the intersection, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence concerning prior incidents there as irrelevant to the question of Dunagan’s reckless disregard.
Id. at 670 (2).
Dunagan contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously decided and otherwise neglected to address his enumeration and argument that the trial court erred in excluding evidence as to both the inherent dangerousness of the intersection prior to the incident and the Department of Transportation’s subsequent corrective measures.
We agree.
Dunagan’s claim regarding the inherent dangerousness of the intersection plainly included much more than the request to admit into evidence a history of prior mishaps at the scene. He sought to introduce documentary and testimonial evidence, allegedly illustrating the hazardous design and consequent malfunctioning of the intersection during the time in question, and evidence of corrective measures taken since the collision which he hoped would demonstrate the intersection’s known design defects contributing to the collision. He argues that such evidence was crucial to defend against the criminal charges and to support his affirmative defense of accident. And indeed, such evidence was relevant to the charged crimes and to his asserted defense.
As noted, Dunagan was found guilty of reckless driving (OCGA § 40-6-390
), running a red light (OCGA § 40-6-20
), and serious injury by vehicle based upon reckless driving (OCGA § 40-6-394
), and consequently, sentenced as a recidivist (OCGA § 17-
10-7
).
He sought to argue that the design flaws, and consequent known inherent dangers, in the intersection negated the elements of criminal negligence and proximate cause in regard to the reckless driving charge and his claim of accident. As Dunagan correctly argues, criminal negligence may support the offense of reckless driving, and it is more than the negligence that might render one liable for damages in a civil suit; it is recklessness or carelessness so as to show a disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference for the safety and rights of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.
Walden v. State,
273 Ga. App. 707,710-711 (1) (616 SE2d 462) (2005). Even the found violation of a highway safety
statute, such as running a red light as in this case, may not constitute criminal negligence, unless the violation is intentional, wilful, or wanton, or though unintentional, is accompanied by recklessness or is under circumstances from which probable death or injury to others might be reasonably anticipated. Id. at 711 (1).
Any absence of criminal negligence was relevant also to the defense of accident. See OCGA§ 16-2-2.
In the affirmative defense of accident, a defendant bears the burden of establishing that his or her actions did not show an utter disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.
Davis v. State,
269 Ga. 276, 279 (3) (496 SE2d 699) (1998).
Furthermore, the question of proximate cause of the injuries at issue was probative on the charge of serious injury by vehicle based upon reckless driving, and proximate cause is a jury question. See
McGrath v. State,
277 Ga. App. 825, 828-829 (627 SE2d 866) (2006);
Baysinger v. State,
257 Ga. App. 273, 274 (1) (570 SE2d 593) (2002). Proximate cause is also relevant to the defense of accident on the criminal charges. See
Corbett v. State,
277 Ga. App. 715, 718 (1) (b) (627 SE2d 365) (2006).
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HINES, Justice.
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in
Dunagan v. State,
286 Ga. App. 668 (649 SE2d 765) (2007), to consider whether defendant Dunagan’s proffered evidence regarding the design of the intersection at which the collision at issue occurred was properly excluded. Finding that the exclusion of the proffered evidence was error, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The evidence as set forth in the opinion by the Court of Appeals, was the following: on February 17,2004, Aaron Dunagan was driving his truck south on a highway when he approached an intersection;
the posted speed limit was 65 miles per hour; warning signs of the approaching intersection were posted approximately 700 feet north of it; before he reached the intersection, the light directed at the north and south lanes of the highway changed from green to yellow; Dunagan then accelerated through the intersection, running what had become a red light, and struck a sports utility vehicle (“SUV”) attempting to turn left in front of him on its passenger side; Dunagan told a state trooper at the scene that “I tried to beat the light and didn’t make it”; although the driver of the struck SUV was unconscious at the scene, Dunagan was able to leave his vehicle without assistance; he had been drinking beer earlier in the day, smelled of alcohol, and showed signs of impairment on field sobriety tests administered at the scene; he also tested positive on two different alco-sensors; after Dunagan was arrested, he refused the State-administered alcohol test; the victim suffered severe brain damage and other injuries, is a quadriplegic, and is unable to speak or eat; a jury found Dunagan guilty of reckless driving, running a red light, and serious injury by vehicle based on reckless driving;
and Dunagan was sentenced as a recidivist.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Dunagan argued, inter alia, that the trial court committed reversible error by granting the State’s motion in limine and excluding all evidence “as to the inherent dangerousness of the intersection prior to the accident and the subsequent improvements to correct these problems.” Without explanation, the Court of Appeals expressly addressed only that portion of this enumerated error and argument regarding whether it was error to exclude evidence of prior collisions at the same intersection; it concluded that the question of whether Dunagan drove through the intersection with the reckless disregard necessary to prove both reckless driving and serious injury by vehicle had nothing to do with the history of prior collisions at the intersection, and that given that there was no evidence of a signal malfunction at the intersection, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence concerning prior incidents there as irrelevant to the question of Dunagan’s reckless disregard.
Id. at 670 (2).
Dunagan contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously decided and otherwise neglected to address his enumeration and argument that the trial court erred in excluding evidence as to both the inherent dangerousness of the intersection prior to the incident and the Department of Transportation’s subsequent corrective measures.
We agree.
Dunagan’s claim regarding the inherent dangerousness of the intersection plainly included much more than the request to admit into evidence a history of prior mishaps at the scene. He sought to introduce documentary and testimonial evidence, allegedly illustrating the hazardous design and consequent malfunctioning of the intersection during the time in question, and evidence of corrective measures taken since the collision which he hoped would demonstrate the intersection’s known design defects contributing to the collision. He argues that such evidence was crucial to defend against the criminal charges and to support his affirmative defense of accident. And indeed, such evidence was relevant to the charged crimes and to his asserted defense.
As noted, Dunagan was found guilty of reckless driving (OCGA § 40-6-390
), running a red light (OCGA § 40-6-20
), and serious injury by vehicle based upon reckless driving (OCGA § 40-6-394
), and consequently, sentenced as a recidivist (OCGA § 17-
10-7
).
He sought to argue that the design flaws, and consequent known inherent dangers, in the intersection negated the elements of criminal negligence and proximate cause in regard to the reckless driving charge and his claim of accident. As Dunagan correctly argues, criminal negligence may support the offense of reckless driving, and it is more than the negligence that might render one liable for damages in a civil suit; it is recklessness or carelessness so as to show a disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference for the safety and rights of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.
Walden v. State,
273 Ga. App. 707,710-711 (1) (616 SE2d 462) (2005). Even the found violation of a highway safety
statute, such as running a red light as in this case, may not constitute criminal negligence, unless the violation is intentional, wilful, or wanton, or though unintentional, is accompanied by recklessness or is under circumstances from which probable death or injury to others might be reasonably anticipated. Id. at 711 (1).
Any absence of criminal negligence was relevant also to the defense of accident. See OCGA§ 16-2-2.
In the affirmative defense of accident, a defendant bears the burden of establishing that his or her actions did not show an utter disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.
Davis v. State,
269 Ga. 276, 279 (3) (496 SE2d 699) (1998).
Furthermore, the question of proximate cause of the injuries at issue was probative on the charge of serious injury by vehicle based upon reckless driving, and proximate cause is a jury question. See
McGrath v. State,
277 Ga. App. 825, 828-829 (627 SE2d 866) (2006);
Baysinger v. State,
257 Ga. App. 273, 274 (1) (570 SE2d 593) (2002). Proximate cause is also relevant to the defense of accident on the criminal charges. See
Corbett v. State,
277 Ga. App. 715, 718 (1) (b) (627 SE2d 365) (2006). Thus, any evidence of known design defects in the intersection was relevant on the issue of proximate cause of the collision, and would bear directly upon the ultimate issue of Dunagan’s guilt of the charged crimes. The admission of any relevant evidence is favored, even if its probative value is slight; evidence of questionable or doubtful relevancy or competency should be admitted and its weight left for the jury to determine.
Baker v. State,
246 Ga. 317, 319
(2) (271 SE2d 360) (1980);
Howell v. State,
278 Ga. App. 634, 638-639
(3) (629 SE2d 398) (2006).
What is more, the Court of Appeals has acknowledged that evidence, including Department of Transportation records, that shows a documented history of problems in an intersection is relevant and admissible in a criminal prosecution for the offense of serious injury by vehicle. See
Gibson v. State,
280 Ga. App. 435, 436 (1) (634 SE2d 204) (2006). In
Gibson,
the Court of Appeals held that the trial attorneys rendered deficient performance by, inter alia, “failing to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation concerning the history of malfunctions at [the] intersection [at issue].” Id. at 437 (1). Indeed, that Court characterized documentary evidence of signal light malfunctioning at the intersection in question as “critical evidence,” and found that the trial attorneys had rendered deficient performance also in failing to introduce such evidence. Id. The State attempts to
distant the present case from
Gibson
by claiming that there is no issue of a malfunctioning traffic signal. But, Dunagan’s counsel argued to the trial court about the mistiming of signal lights as part of the alleged design defect of the intersection. Moreover, even assuming the functioning of traffic signals is not at issue in this case, the
Gibson
analysis acknowledges the importance of evidence which might provide information about the functioning of the intersection at the time of the collision giving rise to the criminal prosecution.
Decided May 19, 2008.
H. Maddox Kilgore, Stephen F. Lanier,
for appellant.
Leigh E. Patterson, District Attorney, Charles S. Cox, Assistant District Attorney,
for appellee.
As to the evidence of subsequent modifications to the intersection, it was admissible not only to attempt to show that there were known flaws in the intersection, and hence known dangers, at the time of the collision but also that the Department of Transportation was the responsible party.
This is so because “[generally, evidence implicating another named [party] as the actual perpetrator of the crime is relevant and admissible as tending to exonerate the defendant.”
Azizi v. State,
270 Ga. 709, 714 (6) (512 SE2d 622) (1999).
Certainly, the admissibility of evidence is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court.
Simmons v. State,
282 Ga. 183, 187 (10) (646 SE2d 55) (2007);
Howell v. State,
supra at 638-639 (3). But, that discretion can be abused, and so it was in the present case. The trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude Dunagan’s evidence of the design of the intersection prior to and subsequent to the wreck.
Consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
All the Justices concur.