Duff v. Merritt

86 F. 675, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2328
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedApril 7, 1898
DocketNos. 74-102
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 86 F. 675 (Duff v. Merritt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duff v. Merritt, 86 F. 675, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2328 (2d Cir. 1898).

Opinion

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts). It will be most convenient first to ascertain what is the total amount salved as the result of the service rendered. Inasmuch as the libelants have not appealed, it may be assumed that the district judge correctly held as to the expenses which should be deducted in order to determine the amount of cargo actually salved. It will be remembered that the ship sold for §9,100. It was held in the Eastern district (and no one disputes the finding) that the marshal’s expenses and commissions should be deducted, leaving the amount |8,962.80. ' There are other expenses, however, which are equally a charge against the proceeds, superior to the lien- of salvors, for the reason that, if they had not been incurred, this sum would not have been realized at the sale. What the vessel would bring as she lay at libelants’ wharf, Staten Island, on February 27th, just as she had been torn off the beach, leaking, and with her holds full of débris, and what she subsequently brought in Brooklyn because of these disbursements, are manifestly two widely different sums. These items are as follows: Inward pilotage, $78.34, and $90.54 for dues and fees paid the collector of the port upon entering the vessel at the custom house, do not seem to be disputed; nor does-the sum of $1.90 paid to the British consul upon entry of the vessel. There was paid $172 for towing required to get the vessel from Staten Island, where she was first taken, to Brooklyn, and into dry dock. There was paid $12 for running lines from the vessel to the wharf while she was at Brooklyn; $260 for services of a watchman to keep thieves and others from making depredations, and in order to protect her against loss from other causes; and $123 for wharfage. It was necessary for her to be alongside a wharf while discharging, and while not on the dry dock. An item of $1,207.04 paid for the use of dry dock represent s the charges for two separate dockings at the Erie Basin. The first docking was necessary in order to stop the leaks which had been caused by her stranding, and to keep the vessel afloat, and to enable temporary repairs to be made. The second docking was necessary in order to place her in a position where her bottom and hull could be examined by intending purchasers after it had been finally determined to sell her; all efforts at an adjustment without suit having failed. An item of $1,689.08 was paid for the making of temporary repairs, which were necessary in order to keep the ship afloat, and for cleaning the holds, which was necessary in order that the engines and bottom of the vessel could he examined by intending purchasers. There was also paid $96 for ballast logs, which were required to keep the vessel from capsizing after her cargo had been removed; her ballast not being such, or in such condition, as to prevent this. These items aggregate $3,129.90, to which the usual commission on disbursements, 2| per cent. ($78.24), should be added, making $3,208.14. There is no dispute as to the reasonableness of the amount of any of these charges, and it would certainly seem that they would have to he made by some one, in order to secure any substantial price for the property offered for sale. They are represented in the $9,100, and that sum, less these items, was the value of the salved vessel as she was brought to libelants’ wharf at Staten Island. Logically, they are disbursements [678]*678properly to be made by salvors, and repaid to them independent of salvage, as was done with the towage to place of sale in the case of The William Smith, 59 Fed. 615. That the money to pay these disbursements was in fact advanced by owners’ agents is no ground for declining to repay them in their proper order. And see The Waterloo, 1 Blatchf. & H. 114, Fed. Cas. No. 17,257. Deducting from the $9,100 the marshal’s charges ($137.20) and these additional disbursements ($3,208.14), there is left $5,754.66 as the true value of the salved property represented by the ship; and, since the district judge in the Southern district has found that $11,405.66 is the true value of the salved property represented by the cargo, it follows that the total amount awarded by the decrees of the two courts ($6,550.92 + $11,405.-66), viz. $17,956.58, actually exceeds the total amount salved ($5,754.66 + $11,405.66), vis. $17,160.32.

In The Bay of Naples, 1 C. C. A. 81, 48 Fed. 737, this court held that the amount of a salvage award might be reviewed and readjusted “if the decree below does not follow in the path of authority, even though no principle has been violated or mistake made,” and the award made therein by the district court was materially reduced. In the case at bar the amount awarded seems not only to be excessive, but also to be arrived at by the application of a rule of compensation not warranted by authority. The results of a somewhat comprehensive examination of the salvage cases contained in the reports of the federal courts have been, for convenience of future reference, embodied in a note annexed to this opinion. While it appears most clearly that, since the old hard and fast rule of “50(¿ of a derelict” was abandoned, the award is determined by a consideration of the peculiar facts of each case, it is none the less true that the admiralty courts have always been careful not only to encourage salving enterprise by liberality, when possible, but also to recognize the fact that it is, after all, a speculation, in which desert and reward will not always balance. It is unnecessary to rehearse here the various ingredients of a salvage service which are to be considered in determining award. The service was promptly rendered. It was arduous, long continued, and meritorious. It involved the salvors in considerable expense, not only for the wages and support of their regular crews, but also for the hire of other assistance, to the amount of $5,000. It exposed valuable property to risk. It was skillfully performed, and was rendered by salvors who maintain a most expensive plant, ready at any hour of the day or night to afford aid to vessels in distress. It happened, however, by reason of the perishable nature of the cargo, and of the way in which the vessel stranded, and the condition of wind and tide, that the skill and exertions of salvors were able to salve but a small part of the property at risk. $17,160 must be but a low percentage of the value of a 1,200-ton steamer, carrying a full Mediterranean cargo. To a certain extent, salvors were successful; to a certain extent, they failed; and it would seem that their measure of success should not be overlooked, if their business be indeed a speculative one, which no one disputes. “Regard is always paid to the value of the property saved, and an award will not be made of such an amount as to deprive its owners of the benefit of the service, with [679]*679the view of recouping to salvors their losses. It is one of the risks they run, that they xnay not be indemnified for their sacrifices. It is said that the court of admiralty has hardly ever, and then only in the case of a derelict, awarded as salvage more than half the value of the property saved.” Carv. Carr, by Sea, § 345. In the opinion filed by the district judge in the Eastern district against the ship, it is said, “No case has been found where, in awarding compensation for salvage services, the salvors have not been awarded more than the value of the services upon the basis of quantum meruit;” and therefore the conclusion was reached that something more than $17,520, which was found to be the value of the services, should be given.

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Bluebook (online)
86 F. 675, 1898 U.S. App. LEXIS 2328, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duff-v-merritt-ca2-1898.