The Amethyst

1 F. Cas. 762, 2 Ware 28, 2 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 312, 1840 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedJanuary 21, 1840
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 1 F. Cas. 762 (The Amethyst) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. 762, 2 Ware 28, 2 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 312, 1840 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15 (D. Me. 1840).

Opinion

WARE, District Judge.

This is a case of salvage of a vessel and cargo, found derelict [763]*763■and saved, under circumstances of considerable peril and severe labor; and it cannot be doubted that a liberal reward ought to be allowed, unless the claim of the salvors has been forfeited or impaired by misconduct on their part. It is contended that there has been such misconduct as ought justly to go ■either in diminution or to a forfeiture of their claims. The fact relied upon, as impairing their merits, is their refusal to accept the aid of the Only Son, in saving and securing the property, in consequence of which, it is argued that the vessel was finally lost upon the rocks, when the additional strength of another vessel might have saved her and brought her into port. It is contended that the master and crew of the Only Son being on the spot with their vessel, and ready to assist in the salvage, the libellants were bound to accept their assistance, and ■admit them as joint salvors; and they have in fact appeared and filed a claim for a share of the salvage.

As to the claim of the master and crew of the Only Son, it is to be remarked, that in the controversy that arose between the parties, they did not claim nor ask to be admitted as joint salvors. They claimed the sole and exclusive possession of the wreck, as being first in discovering and taking possession of it. Their avowed purpose was to exclude the libellants entirely, and take her into port themselves.

It is clear, upon the evidence, that when the Only Son discovered the wreck, it was in the legal possession of the libellants. The proof is that they discovered and boarded it on the evening of the 7th of May. They left no hands on board, it is true, to retain the -actual and corporeal possession during the night, nor could men have remained on board during the night, without -some risk ■of life. But they lay by in company, near the wreck, for the purpose of taking her in tow the next morning. The title which is acquired to property by finding, is a species of occupation; and it is laid down as a rule of law, by the civilians, that the mere discovery or sight of the thing is not sufficient ■to vest in the finder a right of property in the thing found. Pothier, Traite, de la Proprie-te, No. 63. His title is acquired by possession, and this must be an actual possession. He cannot take and keep possession by an •■act of the will, oeulis et affectu, as he may when property is transferred by contract, :and the possession given by a symbolical delivery. To consummate his title, there must be a corporeal prehension of the thing. Though it is said that it is established by •custom (moribus receptum est) and that such was the ancient law of the Romans, when two are near together, or in company, where the thing is found, that the title is acquired in common. Pothier, Pandects, 41, 1, 8; Heineccius, Recitationes in Instit., § 350; Voet ad Pandect, 41, 1, 9. Upon these principles, the discovery of the wreck left derelict, by the three schooners, and the boarding her from one of them, was sufficient to give them the right of possession. The three which were in company when she was discovered were entitled to share equally in the good fortune, though she was boarded and the actual possession taken by only one, for those who boarded took possession for the benefit of all. [See note at end of case.]

The right of possession having become perfect, was not lost by temporarily leaving the wreck, without the intention of ultimately abandoning it, but with the purpose of returning and resuming the actual possession, and carrying her to a place of safety the next morning. Things being once in our possession remain so, while they are subject to our custody, and are so situated that we can resume the actual possession at pleasure; and this principle is equally applicable whether the right of dominion is acquired by finding or by an onerous title. Pothier, Traite de la Possession, No. 79; Yinnius. In Just. Inst. lib. 2, 1, 18. When, therefore, the wreck was discovered by the Only Son, on the morning of the 8th, the fishermen, though not in the actual possession, pedis positione, had that kind of possession that preserved all the possessory rights which they acquired the night before. Having discovered and taken the property into their hands, they had a right to retain it for the purpose of carrying it to a place of safety, and entitling themselves to the reward allowed in such cases, and to exclude all others from interfering with their possession. They had not only acquired rights, but had come under obligations with respect to the property. The finder of property, left derelict at sea, does not acquire the dominion or the absolute property in what is found. He acquires the right of possession only, with a title to a reasonable reward for his services, when the property is brought to a place of safety. The finders were, therefore, bound, unless they chose to abandon it, to exert themselves with all due care, fidelity, and vigilance, to preserve and protect the residuary interest remaining in the true owners. The master and crew of the Only Son, although they doubtless supposed that they were the first discoverers of the wreck, had no right to disturb the possession of the libellants; and as they were not in sight when the schooners first discovered and took possession of it, they have no just grounds for claiming to be admitted as joint salvors.

But although the libellants may have had the right of exclusive possession, they were bound to use every reasonable precaution to insure the safety of the property, for the benefit of the owners, and it is argued, therefore, that it was their duty to accept the aid of the Only Son, though they might thereby diminish their share of the salvage. It is true that salvors are bound to act with good faith towards the owners, and this obliges [764]*764them to use all reasonable and available means to insure the safety of the property. They are influenced, primarily, in engaging in the service, by the expectation of reward. But when once they have engaged in the business, their own interest is not alone involved. When the goods are rescued from danger and brought to a place of safety, they are saved for the owner, after deducting a just and proper compensation for the salvors. A person undertaking to save derelict goods stands, in relation to the owner, somewhat in the character of a negotiorum gestor of the Roman law, that of a voluntary agent who interferes in the affairs of another without a mandate or authority, and he is bound to act for the interest of the owner as well as his own. Generally the interest of both will be the same, that of conveying the goods to a place of safety without loss and expense; but if it is otherwise, it would be a violation of good faith for a salvor to look solely to the enhancing of his reward at the expense of the owner. The golden rule, of dealing with others as we would have others deal with us, is a principle of social duty, deeply laid in morals and in the constitution of human nature; and in these cases of providential calamity, it is a rule of law as well as of morals. If the finder cannot, with his own force, convey the property to a place of safety, without imminent risk of a total or material loss, he cannot, consistently with his obligations to the owner, refuse the assistance of other persons proffering their aid, or exclude them from rendering it, under the pretext that he was the first finder and had thus gained a right to the exclusive possession. The principles of good faith are of universal obligation, and binding in all cases in which the interests of others are involved.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1 F. Cas. 762, 2 Ware 28, 2 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 312, 1840 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-amethyst-med-1840.