Dudley v. Seed School of Washington D.C.

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: July 25, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-1300
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JERRY JASON DUDLEY,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 1300 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan

SEED SCHOOL OF WASHINGTON D.C.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jerry Jason Dudley was employed as a teacher at the SEED School of Washington, D.C.

(SEED) for a few short months until the school terminated him following a physical altercation

with another staff member. Proceeding pro se, he brought this lawsuit against the school to

challenge his termination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Defendant has

moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Mr. Dudley’s

lawsuit is time barred under Title VII. The Court agrees and grants the motion.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and

attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

Mr. Dudley began his tenure at SEED on August 3, 2022. Compl. at 4, ECF No. 1. Just a

few months later, he was placed on administrative leave then terminated the next day. See id.

(placed on administrative leave on November 21, 2022; terminated on November 22, 2022).

During his time at SEED, he “was subjected to verbal, emotional, and unprofessional harassment

22 times by a female co-worker and formally reported this to the school administration,” including

1 on November 16, 2022. Id. Yet SEED “neglected to take any disciplinary action towards the female

co-worker.” Id. SEED “failed to take corrective disciplinary actions to address the treatment to

which [he] was subjected in direct violation of their zero policy.” Id. Instead of taking disciplinary

actions against Mr. Dudley’s co-worker, SEED fired him. Id.

Mr. Dudley then filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC) alleging sex discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 6. On January 30, 2024, the EEOC

notified him that it did not intend to proceed with the investigation, and it issued a Notice of Right

to Sue informing him that any lawsuit against SEED must be filed within ninety days of receipt of

the notice. See id. at 5; Ex. 1 at 1.

B. Procedural Background

On April 30, 2024, Mr. Dudley filed this lawsuit alleging sex discrimination in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Compl. at 2–4. On January 24, 2025, the Defendant

filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot.,

ECF No. 8. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 10.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether a

complaint has properly stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Kursar v. Transp. Sec.

Admin., 751 F. Supp. 2d 154, 163 (D.D.C. 2010). “In evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the

court must ‘treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and must grant [the] plaintiff the

benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Donelson v. U.S. Bureau of

Prisons, 82 F. Supp. 3d 367, 370 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216

F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cleaned up)). But the court need not accept a plaintiff’s “legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242

2 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). “[T]he court ‘may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint,

any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of which . . .

judicial notice’ may be taken.” Donelson, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (quoting EEOC v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also Kruger v. Cogent Commc’ns,

Inc., 174 F. Supp. 3d 75, 85 (D.D.C. 2016) (considering the plaintiff’s EEO documents

incorporated by reference).

“The pro se nature of a complaint places a further gloss on the standard of review.” Shanks

v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, 134 F.4th 585, 591 (D.C. Cir. 2025). A pro se

plaintiff’s submissions must “‘be liberally construed’ and ‘held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Bowman v. Iddon, 848 F.3d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). And courts must consider the complaint “in light of all filings, including filings

responsive to a motion to dismiss.” Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 927 F.3d 539, 541 (D.C. Cir.

2019) (cleaned up). But a pro se plaintiff is not excused from complying with procedural rules and

“must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of

misconduct.’” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Jones v. Horne, 634

F.3d 588, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

The Defendant argues that Mr. Dudley’s Complaint is untimely because it was not filed

within ninety days of receiving notice of his right to sue from the EEOC. Def.’s Mot. at 2–3. The

Court agrees. And the doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel do not save Mr. Dudley.

The Court therefore grants the Defendant’s motion and dismisses the case.

3 A. Statute of Limitations

“It has long been established . . . that a statute of limitations defense that is clear on the

face of the complaint is properly brought under Rule 12(b)(6).” Byrne v. Clinton, 410 F. Supp. 3d

109, 121 (D.D.C. 2019). Under Title VII, a claimant must file a complaint “within ninety days”

after receiving notice of the EEOC’s final decision, and if adverse to the claimant, that notice is

commonly presented as a right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1); see 29 CFR

1601.28(b)(2)(3)(i). “Courts apply this limit strictly and will dismiss a suit for missing the deadline

by even one day.” Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (cleaned up); see also,

e.g., Smith v. Dalton, 971 F. Supp. 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 1997) (dismissing Title VII lawsuit filed ninety-

one days after notice of the final decision); McAlister v. Potter, 733 F. Supp. 2d 134, 142–43

(D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing Title VII claims filed ninety-two days after notice of the final decision).

A Title VII plaintiff’s failure to meet the ninety-day deadline “is an affirmative defense”

and “the burden of proof is on the party claiming the deadline was missed.” Woodruff, 482 F.3d

at 525 (cleaned up). “This period begins the day after the letter is received[] and expires on the

90th day thereafter.” Gill v. Dist. of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2012).

When “computing the ninety-day period within which the suit must be filed, the court begins

counting the day after the right-to-sue letter was received.” Akridge v. Gallaudet Univ., 729 F.

Supp. 2d 172, 178 (D.D.C. 2010) (cleaned up); see also Cooper v. Dist. of Columbia, 279 F. Supp.

3d 156, 162 (D.D.C. 2017) (same), appeal dismissed, No. 17-7160, 2018 WL 4102513 (D.C. Cir.

Jul. 25, 2018); Greer v. Bd. of Trust. of Univ. of Dist. of Columbia, 113 F. Supp. 3d 297, 306

(D.D.C. 2015) (same); see also, e.g., Howard v. Pritzker, 775 F.3d 430, 438–39 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(finding that a plaintiff must “file suit within ninety days after receiving a final agency decision”)

(emphasis added); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941, 943 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (same);

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A) (directing courts to “exclude the day of the event that triggers the period”

when “computing any time period specified . . . in any statute that does not specify a method of

computing time”).

Here, Mr. Dudley received the EEOC’s right-to-sue-letter on January 30, 2024, see Compl.

at 5, and he filed his Complaint in this Court on April 30, 2024, see Compl. Because he received

the notice on January 30, 2024, the clock began to run on January 31, 2024, and ninety days from

January 31, 2024, is April 29, 2024. Mr. Dudley thus filed his Complaint one day beyond the

statutory deadline, which is fatal. Mr. Dudley maintains that “the complaint was filed within the

ninety-day period, hence it was timely filed.” Opp’n at 1. He seems to believe that the ninety-day

clock ended April 30, 2024, when he filed this lawsuit. But his calculation is incorrect, as he failed

to include the start date, January 31, 2024, in his calculation. And his pro se status does not help

him. See Anderson v. Local 201 Reinforcing Rodmen, 886 F. Supp. 94, 97 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting

that a pro se plaintiff is “not . . . immune from the ninety-day requirement”). “No matter how slight

the tardiness, a court is not at liberty to disregard the 90–day deadline out of a vague sympathy for

any particular plaintiff.” Turner v. Afro–American Newspaper Co., 572 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73 (D.D.C.

2008) (dismissing employment discrimination lawsuit filed ninety-one days after notice of the final

decision). Mr. Dudley’s Complaint is thus untimely.

B. Equitable Tolling and Equitable Estoppel

Title VII’s ninety-day deadline is non-jurisdictional, which means that it is subject to

equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. See Wiley v. Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 2d 91, 96 (D.D.C.

2006) (citing Mondy v. Sec. of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); see also Bowden

v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he administrative time limits created by

the EEOC erect no jurisdictional bars to bringing suit. Rather, functioning like statutes of

5 limitations, these time limits are subject to equitable tolling, estoppel, and waiver.”); Smith v.

Holder, 806 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62–63 (D.D.C. 2011) (same). But these doctrines apply “only in

extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances.” Smith-Haynie v. Dist. Of Columbia, 155

F.3d 575, 579–80 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). Equitable estoppel “‘precludes a defendant,

because of his own inequitable conduct . . . from invoking [a] statute of limitations,’” and equitable

tolling “is based on the plaintiff’s inability to obtain ‘vital information bearing on the existence of

his claim’ despite ‘all due diligence.’” Hall v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 16-cv-1619, 2017 WL

9615889, at *9 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2017) (quoting Chung v. Dep’t of Justice, 333 F.3d 273, 278

(D.C. Cir. 2003)). “Thus, while the appropriateness of estoppel depends on the actions of the

defendant, the appropriateness of tolling is determined by the actions of the plaintiff.” Id.

Here, Mr. Dudley does not expressly invoke either doctrine, but in opposing the

Defendant’s motion he states that “[m]ediation was offered and the Defendant chose to walk away

twice, prolonging the resolution process and justifying any considered delays in filing.”

See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1; see also Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1 (EEOC Agreement to Mediate) (Med. Agt.),

ECF No. 10-1. Mr. Dudley provides no further information, including dates of the mediation

efforts or whether mediation occurred during the ninety-day period after the EEOC issued its

right-to-sue letter. See generally Compl.; Pl.’s Opp’n. And the mediation agreement attached to

Mr. Dudley’s Opposition suggests that mediation was proposed during the investigation of

Mr. Dudley’s EEO charge and thus prior to the EEOC’s final decision. See Med Agt.; see also

29 CFR § 1601.20(a) (Negotiated Settlement) (“Prior to the issuance of a determination . . . the

Commission may encourage the parties to settle the charge on terms that are mutually agreeable.”

(emphasis added)); 29 CFR §§ 1601.18 (Dismissal Procedure and Authority), 1601.28(b)(2)(3)(i)

6 (Notice Of Right To Sue). Thus, any mediation efforts seem to have had no bearing on

Mr. Dudley’s late filing.

But even assuming the referenced mediation happened during the ninety-day filing

window, it is not sufficient on its own to trigger equitable tolling or equitable estoppel.

The equitable tolling doctrine tolls deadlines when a plaintiff demonstrates “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)

(same). The “extraordinary-circumstances prong” encompasses only “matters outside

[the litigant’s] control,” Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 256–57 (2016),

not circumstances that are “a product of that litigant’s own misunderstanding of the law or tactical

mistakes in litigation,” Head v. Wilson, 792 F.3d 102, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

And equitable tolling should be extended “only sparingly,” as a “garden variety claim of excusable

neglect” does not warrant equitable tolling. Irwin v. Dep’t of Vet. Aff’s, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990);

Oviedo v. WMATA, 948 F.3d 386, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (same), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 347 (2020).

Equitable estoppel requires “active steps” that the defendant took to prevent the plaintiff

from timely filing his complaint. Currier v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363,

1367 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 579. Put differently, a plaintiff must

point to some type of “affirmative misconduct” or misleading information regarding the filing

deadline on the part of the defendant. Washington v. WMATA, 160 F.3d 750, 752–53 (D.C. Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999).

Mr. Dudley cannot establish either equitable tolling or equitable estoppel. Mediation

discussions do not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” to toll the ninety-day deadline, Pace,

544 U.S. at 418, and Mr. Dudley has not alleged that the Defendant took “active steps” to prevent

7 him from filing suit or other misconduct to invoke equitable estoppel, Currier, 159 F.3d at 1367;

see also Cristwell v. Veneman, 224 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59–60 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding no equitable

estoppel or equitable tolling where the plaintiff “simply allege[d] that he was involved in mediation

and negotiations with” his employer “and merely assert[ed] in conclusory terms that he discovered

that” his employer engaged in bad faith and “us[ed] the negotiations as a means to delay his

claims”) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 61 (“To excuse filing obligations on equitable

grounds solely because parties were engaged in settlement discussions would virtually eviscerate

filing time requirements and throw the orderly and expeditious processing of Title VII cases into

even further disarray. Something more than mere participation in settlement negotiations must be

demonstrated.”); Adams v. Dist. of Columbia, 740 F. Supp. 2d 173, 190 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding

that the plaintiff’s untimely filing could not be “equitably excused because the defendant appeared

to act in bad faith during mediation” because such behavior did not constitute an “active step”

preventing the plaintiff from filing suit), aff’d in relevant part, 618 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(per curiam), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 924 (2016).

Mr. Dudley’s claim that the Defendant “walked away twice” from mediation, see Opp’n

at 1, is a far cry from alleging that it took “active steps” to prevent him from filing this lawsuit,

see Currier, 159 F.3d at 1367. To conclude otherwise would permit Mr. Dudley to evade the

statutory filing deadline simply because settlement attempts failed, which is not the law.

See Cristwell, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 61; see also Washington, 160 F.3d at 752–53 (the defendant’s

actions “tout[ing]” informal alternative dispute resolution and “lulling” the plaintiff into delayed

filing was not affirmative misconduct or extraordinary circumstance to trigger equitable tolling or

equitable estoppel); Wash. Tennis & Educ. Found. v. Clark Nexsen, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 3d 128, 133,

8 138 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that the plaintiff’s mediation demand did not constitute equitable

tolling where the plaintiff waited to file suit until after mediation attempts proved unsuccessful).

Because equitable tolling and equitable estoppel do not excuse Mr. Dudley’s untimely

filing, the Court must grant the Defendant’s motion and dismiss this case.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 8.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: July 25, 2025