Duarte v. Highland Light Steam laundry Company

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 3, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-00990·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SONY MARISOL ORTEGA DUARTE, Plaintiff, 21-CV-0990 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND HIGHLAND LIGHT STEAM LAUNDRY INC., Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this action pro se action and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). By order dated February 16, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to either refile her complaint, which was written in Spanish, with an English translation, or file an amended complaint in English. (ECF 4.) On April 2, 2021, the Court received an amended complaint in English. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is

entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings her claims using the Court’s amended complaint for employment discrimination form. She checks the box on the form to assert claims under the New York City Human Rights Law but does not check any of the boxes to assert claims under any federal antidiscrimination statutes. (ECF 5, at 1.) On the section of the form asking her to list the discriminatory conduct forming the basis of her complaint, Plaintiff checks the box for “[r]etaliation.” (Id. at 2.) The facts section of the amended complaint form states in its entirety, “I used to be absent due to my children. My work place is a huge place and with a lot of employees who are able to take my work over.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff indicates that the alleged discriminatory acts occurred on April 2, 2019, and she checks the box to assert that Defendant “is still committing these acts against” her. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff writes that she does not remember the date on which she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and she checks

the box to indicate that the EEOC “has not issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter.” (Id. at 4.) DISCUSSION A. Rule 8 Plaintiff’s bare allegations that she was absent from work because of her children and that her employer retaliated against her do not state a claim for a violation of Plaintiff’s rights. The amended complaint does not include any facts about what defendants did or failed to do that violated Plaintiff’s rights. Plaintiff’s amended complaint thus fails to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as she has not alleged any facts showing that she is entitled to relief. B. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) Because Plaintiff’s allegations suggest she may have missed work because of family

obligations, the Court construes the amended complaint as an attempt to assert claims under the FMLA.1 The FMLA provides that certain eligible employees are “entitled to a total of 12 work weeks of leave during any 12-month period” for any one of several reasons enumerated in the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The FMLA covers, among other things, leave that is necessary “[b]ecause of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee in order to care for such son or

1 The Court also notes that in her original complaint, Plaintiff checked the box on the form to assert claims under the FMLA. daughter,” id. § 2612(a)(1)(A), or “[i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition” id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). An employee who takes approved FMLA leave generally has the right to return to the same position that the employee held before taking leave, or to an “equivalent position with

equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Id. § 2614(a)(1)(B); Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017). The FMLA “creates a private right of action to seek both equitable relief and money damages against any employer . . . should that employer interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of FMLA rights.” Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a plaintiff can bring claims against an employer either for interfering with the exercise of FMLA rights or for retaliating against an employee who does exercise FMLA rights. See Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 2016).

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Duarte v. Highland Light Steam laundry Company, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

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