Drammeh v. Uber Technologies Inc

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided September 27, 2022·No. 2:21-cv-00202·Unknown

Opinion

The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

DRAMMEH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-202-BJR v.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC., et al., MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs Amie Drammeh and Yusuoha Ceesay, representing the estate of Cherno Ceesay (“Ceesay”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this lawsuit against defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) and Rasier LLC1 (together, “Defendants”) alleging that Defendants’ negligence caused the wrongful death of Ceesay, a driver for Uber who was killed by two passengers.2 Before the 1 Plaintiffs’ complaint describes Rasier as “a wholly owned subsidiary of Uber Technologies and . . . the party that directly contracts with drivers.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 15. Neither party describes Rasier as separate from Uber in any legally relevant way. 2 The two passengers have been charged but have not yet been tried. See Pl. Opp’n, Dkt. 123 at 7 (stating that they are “awaiting trial”). However, for purposes of this order, the Court will assume the allegations against them are true. Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Having reviewed the motion, the record of the case, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. II. BACKGROUND A. Ceesay’s Murder On the evening of December 13, 2020, Ceesay responded, using Uber’s smartphone app, to a call to pick up and ferry passengers in Issaquah, Washington. See Dkts. 129-1, 129-2. These passengers were Olivia Bebic and Devin Wade (hereinafter, the “Assailants)—nonparties dismissed from this action last year. Police Rpt., Dkt. 129-1 at PDF 4-7. The Assailants requested a ride through the app, and Ceesay accepted it. Id. The app notified Ceesay of the pick-up location the Assailants had entered. Id. Ceesay was found dead in his car minutes after he had at arrived at the pick-up location. Id. at PDF 6. Ceesay’s car had crashed into a tree about 100 feet from the pick- up location, and Ceesay had multiple stab wounds. Id. The Assailants had fled the scene. Id. An Issaquah Police investigation concluded that the Assailants created a fake Uber account, requested a ride, and murdered Ceesay in a botched carjacking. Id. at PDF 6-7. The allegedly fake account was registered under the name “Stephanie Tylor.”3 Def. MSJ, Dkt. 93 at 8 n.4. Defendants admit that this account was created and used to request a ride just before the attack on Ceesay. Id. When the account was created, Uber verified that the phone number used to register was in the account-holder’s possession (“SMS verification”) and verified that the account was attached to a valid payment method. Id. The Assailants used a prepaid cell phone and a prepaid gift card, both of which are anonymous in that they are not attached to a named account-holder. See Dkt. 129-13. 3 An account under Bebic’s name was created about two hours before the Tylor account was created. Pl. Opp’n, Dkt. 123 at 5 n.16. On the day after Ceesay’s murder, the Issaquah Police contacted Uber’s Law Enforcement Response Team seeking information about Ceesay’s passengers, and Uber identified the Tylor account as the last ride accepted by Ceesay. Pl. Opp’n, Dkt. 123 at 7 nn. 29-30. The police traced the phone to the Assailants, who were arrested on December 15, 2020. Police Rpt., Dkt. 129-1 at PDF 6-10; see also Dkt. 129-13. Based on interrogations and other information gathered about the Assailants, the police concluded that the two “stabbed [Ceesay] to death in the course of trying to steal his car.” Police Rpt., Dkt. 129-1 at PDF 4. B. The Uber App Uber’s ride-sharing service uses a smartphone app to connect available drivers with people requesting rides. Def. MSJ, Dkt. 93 at 3-4. Riders must create an account in order to request a ride. Id. at 4. Creating an account entails entering a name, email address, and cell phone number and agreeing to various terms and conditions. Id. As noted above, Uber employs SMS verification to confirm that someone is not attempting to create an account using a phone number that is not their own. Id. When a rider uses a phone number to set up an account, a text message containing a code is sent to that phone number, and the rider must then enter the code in the Uber app. Id. A particular phone number may only be used for a single account, “which limits [a] person from creating duplicate accounts.” Id. A particular rider is also prohibited from created multiple accounts using different phone numbers. Id. Uber uses an automated program called “Mastermind” to “assist in identifying potential risk and fraud.” Id. at 5. Although the exact means of identifying fraud are proprietary and technical, Uber states that Mastermind generally considers: (1) whether the account is similar to other accounts that have been used for fraud; (2) whether the account is similar to other accounts that have not yet been used for fraud but “show suspicious behavior or may be bots;” (3) “whether new users have ‘Uber,’ ‘Support,’ or certain other words in their account names which are correlated with fraud.” Id. The Mastermind analysis of the information entered by the new user may result in them being prevented from creating an account. Id. Drivers also must create an account in the driver version of the app. Id. Creating a driver account entails more steps and more verification than a rider account. Drivers “(1) submit personal identifying information; (2) upload copies of a valid driver’s, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration; (3) pass a criminal background check (performed by a third-party) and a driving history check; (4) pass an examination testing [their] knowledge of risk factors for crimes against drivers; and (5) confirm their vehicle has passed a uniform vehicle safety inspection.” Id. at 5-6. Defendants note that some of the training and testing that Uber drivers undergo relates to potential risks to drivers’ safety. Id. at 6. C. Uber’s Relationship with Drivers The parties agree that, at least nominally, Uber drivers are independent contractors. Id. at 7; Dkt. 15 ¶ 2. Defendants describe Uber drivers as having “sole control of the means and manner in which [they] provide[] transportation services and . . . complete discretion to determine the manner in which to operate [their] business.” Def. MSJ, Dkt. 93 at 7. Drivers use their personal vehicles and are solely responsible for maintenance and any physical safety measures they choose to implement. Id. Defendants also state that drivers control the routes they take to a passenger’s destination. Id. Plaintiffs’ characterization of Uber’s business implies more control over drivers. Plaintiffs note that drivers may only find customers through the Uber app, as Uber “forbids ‘street hails.’” Pl. Opp’n, Dkt. 123 at 10. In controlling the digital interface between drivers and riders, Uber controls and supplies “all information Drivers and Riders get about each other.” Id. (emphasis removed). From a driver’s perspective, it appears that this information is limited to the passenger’s provided name and pick-up location. Id. Uber itself possesses some additional information about riders and uses this information to “verify” their accounts. Id. at 13. This verification essentially amounts to ensuring the account is not duplicative or obviously fraudulent and checking that the payment method is valid. Id. Plaintiffs claim that, in December 2020, a person could nevertheless create an account and order a ride “completely anonymously” and note that Uber did not require any kind of identity verification as long as payment can be authorized. Id. (emphasis removed). Uber did not have any mechanism for verifying that a person opening an account was using their real name, email address, or phone number, and riders could use a form of payment not attached

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