Doyal Development Co. v. Blair

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Doyal Development Co. v. Blair

211 S.E.2d 642, 133 Ga. App. 613

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedDecember 5, 1974

Docket49799, 49800

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 211 S.E.2d 642 (Doyal Development Co. v. Blair) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Doyal Development Co. v. Blair, 211 S.E.2d 642, 133 Ga. App. 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).

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Opinions

Webb, Judge.

1. "The appellants contend that the trial court erred in entering judgment against them without first finding the facts specially and in failing to state separately its conclusions of law as required by Code Ann. § 81A-152(a) . . . In 5A Moore’s Federal Practice (2dEd.) 2706, § 52-06 [1] it is stated: 'The purpose of findings of fact is threefold: as an aid in the trial judge’s process of adjudication; for purposes of res judicata and estoppel by judgment; and as an aid to the appellate court on review.’ The findings of the trial court in this case (and in the case sub judice) are sufficient to enable this court to understand clearly the basis of its decision and the conclusion of law reached by it.” General Teamsters Local Union No. 528 v. Allied Foods, Inc., 228 Ga. 479, 480 (1) (186 SE2d 527). If defendant wished to insist that the conclusions of law be formally separated from the findings of fact, "it should have been requested as authorized by Code Ann. § 81A-152(b).” Faucette v. Faucette, 228 Ga. 201 (3) (184 SE2d 586). Since the detailed findings are quite sufficient for purposes of review, we will not remand solely for the purpose of curing formal defects which would not affect the result reached here. Collins v. Collins, 231 Ga. 683 (1) (203 SE2d 524).

2. The evidence amply supports the findings and the [614]*614judgment, no error of law appears for any reason assigned, and the judgment will not be disturbed. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 777 (186 SE2d 154); Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Atlantis Realty Co., 128 Ga. App. 662, 664 (1) (197 SE2d 749); Searcy v. Godwin, 129 Ga. App. 827, 829 (2) (201 SE2d 670); Kingston Development Co. v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, 348 (1) (208 SE2d 118).

Argued October 3, 1974 Decided December 5, 1974 Rehearing denied December 19, 1974 Rolader, Barham, Davis, Graham & McEvoy, D. W. Rolader, for appellant. McHaney & Lynn, Robert L. McHaney, Jr., for appellee.

3. In the cross appeal, no error appears in the failure of the trial court to award attorney fees and expenses of litigation for the mere refusal of defendant to pay a disputed contractual claim. Lovell v. Frankum, 145 Ga. 106, 109 (4) (88 SE 569); D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Nelson-Brantley Glass Co., 119 Ga. App. 599, 602 (2) (168 SE2d 176); Colbert Co. v. Newsom, 125 Ga. App. 571, 573 (8) (188 SE2d 266); Williams v. Bell, 126 Ga. App. 432, 435 (3) (190 SE2d 818).

Judgments affirmed.

Bell, C. J., Deen, P. J., Quillian, Clark, Stolz and Marshall, JJ., concur. Pannell, P. J., concurs in the judgment. Evans, J., dissents.

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Webb, Judge.

1. "The appellants contend that the trial court erred in entering judgment against them without first finding the facts specially and in failing to state separately its conclusions of law as required by Code Ann. § 81A-152(a) . . . In 5A Moore’s Federal Practice (2dEd.) 2706, § 52-06 [1] it is stated: 'The purpose of findings of fact is threefold: as an aid in the trial judge’s process of adjudication; for purposes of res judicata and estoppel by judgment; and as an aid to the appellate court on review.’ The findings of the trial court in this case (and in the case sub judice) are sufficient to enable this court to understand clearly the basis of its decision and the conclusion of law reached by it.” General Teamsters Local Union No. 528 v. Allied Foods, Inc., 228 Ga. 479, 480 (1) (186 SE2d 527). If defendant wished to insist that the conclusions of law be formally separated from the findings of fact, "it should have been requested as authorized by Code Ann. § 81A-152(b).” Faucette v. Faucette, 228 Ga. 201 (3) (184 SE2d 586). Since the detailed findings are quite sufficient for purposes of review, we will not remand solely for the purpose of curing formal defects which would not affect the result reached here. Collins v. Collins, 231 Ga. 683 (1) (203 SE2d 524).

2. The evidence amply supports the findings and the [614]*614judgment, no error of law appears for any reason assigned, and the judgment will not be disturbed. Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775, 777 (186 SE2d 154); Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Atlantis Realty Co., 128 Ga. App. 662, 664 (1) (197 SE2d 749); Searcy v. Godwin, 129 Ga. App. 827, 829 (2) (201 SE2d 670); Kingston Development Co. v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, 348 (1) (208 SE2d 118).

Argued October 3, 1974 Decided December 5, 1974 Rehearing denied December 19, 1974 Rolader, Barham, Davis, Graham & McEvoy, D. W. Rolader, for appellant. McHaney & Lynn, Robert L. McHaney, Jr., for appellee.

3. In the cross appeal, no error appears in the failure of the trial court to award attorney fees and expenses of litigation for the mere refusal of defendant to pay a disputed contractual claim. Lovell v. Frankum, 145 Ga. 106, 109 (4) (88 SE 569); D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Nelson-Brantley Glass Co., 119 Ga. App. 599, 602 (2) (168 SE2d 176); Colbert Co. v. Newsom, 125 Ga. App. 571, 573 (8) (188 SE2d 266); Williams v. Bell, 126 Ga. App. 432, 435 (3) (190 SE2d 818).

Judgments affirmed.

Bell, C. J., Deen, P. J., Quillian, Clark, Stolz and Marshall, JJ., concur. Pannell, P. J., concurs in the judgment. Evans, J., dissents.

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