Dounce Al Dey v. Eye Express Optical

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 28, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-03861
StatusUnknown

This text of Dounce Al Dey v. Eye Express Optical (Dounce Al Dey v. Eye Express Optical) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dounce Al Dey v. Eye Express Optical, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK OLIVER-VAUGHN DOUNCE AL DEY, Plaintiff, 22-CV-3861 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL EYE EXPRESS OPTICAL, WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under various federal and state laws, alleging that Defendant violated his rights. By order dated May 20, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead a claim under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough

facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff Oliver-Vaughn Dounce Al Dey invokes both the Court’s federal question and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and purports to assert claims under multiple federal and state laws. He sues Eye Express Optical, a private optometrist and retail eyeglass and lens store located in Bronx County, New York. The following allegations are taken from the complaint. On February 2, 2022, Plaintiff went to Eye Express to get replacement lenses for his eyeglasses. An employee named Nicole told Plaintiff that he was required to wear a mask in the store to help prevent the spread of Covid-19. Plaintiff states that he was previously told over the phone that he did not need to wear a mask, “but at appointment by racial decriminalization discriminated against plaintiff at there office because of medical condition can’t breath.”1 (ECF 2, at 1.) Nicole told Plaintiff that if he did not put a mask on she would “call the police or security to have plaintiff remove” from the store. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]here was also no sign by consumer affair posted or exempt federal law, office agent in violation 42 USC 12132 section no displayed for exemption violate

241, 242,” and that Nicole said “she don’t care about the law because its her rules.” (Id.) Plaintiff sent Defendant a “notice of claim,” which he attaches to the complaint, in which he threatened to sue Defendant “for pain suffering cause by your delay plus punitive damages $100,000.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff’s notice stated that if Defendant would “remedy the issue by March 9, 2022” by replacing his lenses, he would withdraw his claim. (See id. at 1-2.) Defendant responded by informing Plaintiff that it does not “want to service plaintiff any more.” (Id. at 2.) The complaint references several federal and state statutes. For example, under the heading “Jurisdiction,” Plaintiff lists 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242; and 42 U.S.C. § 12132. (See id. at 1.) He also references several state laws and attaches

excerpts from news articles pertaining to mask mandates. Plaintiff seeks “75,000 dollars fine to be paid the [sic] the government for violation of APA HIPPA the law plus punitive damages disbursement damages to plaintiffs to deny service, statement there no action going on in any court within this matter pertaining to plaintiff knowledge.” (Id. at 3.)

1 Except where indicated by brackets, the Court quotes the complaint verbatim. All errors are in the original. DISCUSSION A. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant

acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty.

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Dounce Al Dey v. Eye Express Optical, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dounce-al-dey-v-eye-express-optical-nysd-2022.