DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 30, 2021
Docket1:17-cv-04576
StatusUnknown

This text of DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd (DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT a SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SS DATE FILED: 3/30/21 DOUBLELINE CAPITAL LP, et al. Plaintifts, 17-CV-4576 (GHW) (BCM) -against- ODEBRECHT FINANCE, LTD., et al., OPINION AND ORDER Defendants.

BARBARA MOSES, United States Magistrate Judge. By letter-motion dated May 12, 2020 (Pl. Ltr.) (Dkt. No. 109), plaintiffs DoubleLine Capital LP, DoubleLine Income Solutions Fund, and DoubleLine Funds Trust seek sanctions against defendants Odebrecht, S.A. (OSA), Construtora Norberto Odebrecht, S.A. (CNO), and Odebrecht Engenharia e Construgdo S.A. (OEC) — specifically, a mandatory adverse inference instruction at trial — as a remedy for defendants having intentionally destroyed the encryption keys needed to access the "MyWebDay" platform, which was an internal, "shadow" accounting system used to track the illicit bribe payments underlying this securities fraud lawsuit. Jd. at 2. Defendants principally argue that sanctions would be inappropriate because plaintiffs have not (and cannot) demonstrate that the lost information cannot be replaced in discovery, and therefore have not shown that any relevant facts "have been rendered unavailable by virtue of the 2016 destruction of the MyWebDay encryption keys." Def. Opp. (Dkt. No. 110) at 3. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part. I. BACKGROUND This action had its genesis in a long-running, international bribery scheme, during which defendants bribed "government officials in Brazil and at least 12 other countries in order to influence the award of large constructions contracts" to themselves. Third Amend. Compl. (TAC) (Dkt. No. 61) 62. Defendants have since admitted their criminal conduct in multiple jurisdictions.

The sections below describe the parties involved, and recount the events underlying the litigation, only to the extent relevant to the pending sanctions motion. A. Parties Defendant OSA is a Brazilian corporation that "through various subsidiaries and operating entities, conducts business in the construction, engineering, infrastructure, chemicals, utilities and

real estate businesses in Brazil and throughout 27 other countries, including the United States." TAC ¶ 30. Defendant CNO, an OSA affiliate, was Latin America's "largest engineering and construction company," and it was also "one of the largest such companies in the world." Id. ¶ 36. Defendant OEC, an "integral subsidiary of Odebrecht," became the "direct controller of CNO on March 31, 2015," and since then, "CNO has essentially become an empty shell and OEC substituted itself in as the replacement to CNO in all respects." Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiffs purchased a "significant quantity" of two bonds issued by OSA at prices close to par. TAC ¶¶ 25, 230.1 Plaintiffs purchased these bonds between May 2013 and March 2015. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.

B. The Underlying Bribery Scheme In or around 2006, defendants created a standalone division of OSA called the "Division of Structured Operations," which plaintiffs allege "was created for the sole purpose of functioning as a 'bribe department' that made illicit payments to governmental officials in exchange for the receipt of lucrative public contracts by CNO." TAC ¶ 64. The then-CEO of OSA, Marcelo Odebrecht, later admitted that "between 0.5% and 2.0% of [OSA's] revenue was directed to illicit bribes." Id. ¶¶ 66-67.

1 The bonds at issue were the 7.125% Notes due June 26, 2042 and the 7.50% Perpetual Notes. TAC ¶ 25 (collectively the Notes). The Division of Structured Operations was able to conceal these "massive illicit payments" by omitting them from CNO's and OSA's formal accounting records, where they would have been reflected in their financial results and also would have been reported to external auditors. TAC ¶¶ 68-69. Instead, it "tracked these expenses on two 'shadow' systems that could only be accessed

by members of the Division." Id. One such system was called "MyWebDay," which "was used for making payment requests, processing payments and generating spreadsheets tracking all illicit bribe payments." Id. The other such system was called "Drousys," which "allowed members of the Division of Structured Operations to communicate with each other and other co-conspirators using secure emails and instant messages." Id. C. Lava Jato Investigation In or around 2014, Brazilian authorities began investigating suspected corruption of another Brazilian multinational corporation called Petróleo Brazileiro S.A., better known as Petrobras. TAC ¶ 81. The investigation, initially covert, was called "Lava Jato," which translates to "Operation Carwash," and "did not originally focus on Odebrecht or CNO." Id.2 Soon after, the

United States and Switzerland launched their own investigations. Id. The investigations began to focus on OSA after the arrest of its CEO, Marcelo Odebrecht, on charges of corruption and money- laundering, on June 19, 2015. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 82. Following that arrest, the market price of the securities

2 Though not initially the target of the corruption investigations, OSA was directly embroiled in the bid-rigging scheme involving Petrobras. Between 2004 and 2012, OSA made illicit "payments to, and for the benefit of, foreign officials, including Brazilian politicians and Petrobras executives and employees, in order to secure contracts with Petrobras." Plea Agreement, United States v. Odebrecht, S.A., No. 16-CR-643 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2016), ECF No. 10, Ex. 1 (SOF), ¶ 33. More specifically, OSA met with other construction companies in order "to evaluate and divide up future contracts for Petrobras projects" among themselves. Id. ¶ 34. Once it was decided which company or companies would be responsible for a given project (and the price Petrobras felt was appropriate), it was agreed among the co-conspirators that only that company would "present a qualifying bid," while the other companies "would present proposals that would ensure the predetermined company's winning bid." Id. at issue in this action declined 6.7% in the case of the 7.125% Notes and 10% in the case of the 7.50% Notes. Id. ¶ 233 & n.51. Thereafter, the bribery scheme continued to publicly unravel when, among other things, Brazilian authorities filed formal charges against Marcelo Odebrecht in July 2015 for his role in bribing Brazilian officials. Id. ¶ 246. On December 10, 2015, Marcelo

Odebrecht resigned as the CEO of OSA. Id. ¶ 248. OSA issued a press release announcing his resignation while also maintaining that he was innocent of the bribery charges. Id. Aware that authorities had launched criminal investigations, defendants sought to keep themselves "out of the crosshairs . . . by concealing or destroying evidence of their criminal activities." TAC ¶ 82. For example, defendants tried to "bribe foreign officials to prevent their compliance with requests for information from these investigators" and "order[ed] their employees to take steps to evade authorities, including by moving aspects of the [Division] of Structured Operations outside of Brazil, including relocating its two principal officers to Florida." Id. Most importantly (for purposes of the sanctions motion), in January 2016, "after Lava Jato and the investigations by the United States and Swiss authorities were well known to Defendants, they

intentionally destroyed physical encryption keys that were needed to access the MyWebDay system." Id. ¶ 281; see also SOF ¶ 73. The fact of the destruction is undisputed. D. Plea Agreement On December 21, 2016, OSA entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. TAC ¶ 272; see also Plea Agreement, U.S. v. Odebrecht. "Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, OSA: 1) pleaded guilty to violating the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (15 U.S.C.

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Bluebook (online)
DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doubleline-capital-lp-v-odebrecht-finance-ltd-nysd-2021.