DENECKE, J.
In 1962 the plaintiff pleaded guilty to the crimes of rape of daughter and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending, among other things, that his confession and plea of guilty to the rape charge were not voluntarily or understandingly made. He does not seek relief from the contributing conviction. The post-conviction court held a hearing and denied the petition.
We hold that the confession was not voluntarily made.
The defendant was 43 years old at the time of his conviction; he had a seventh grade education. He had no prior criminal record.
The defendant was arrested on March 28, 1962, under a warrant issued pursuant to an indictment for rape of daughter. He was taken to the county courthouse and interrogated for approximately one hour by a deputy district attorney and a deputy sheriff. The interrogation was taped; therefore, there is no dispute as to what was said. Ultimately the defendant stated he had sexual relations with his daughters.
The defendant remained incarcerated until April 2, 1962, when he was arraigned and pleaded guilty to both charges. During his incarceration only a minister visited him; however, there is no evidence that others could not have communicated with him. He was never brought before a magistrate as ORS 133.550 requires. He never had the advice of counsel.
[236]*236At the arraignment the court informed him that if he desired the court could appoint an attorney for him. The defendant stated he did not want an attorney. When the defendant indicated he wanted to waive the time given to him to plead and make his plea at that time the court asked, “Do you do that of your own free will and without any promises of any kind?” The answer was, “Yes.” The trial court informed the defendant that “this is a serious charge.” The district attorney made a statement of the charged crime and thereafter the defendant said he did not care to make any statement.
Before the interrogation commenced defendant was advised of his right to remain silent and to have counsel; however, when the defendant asked for counsel, the following occurred:
“Dorsciak: I think that mayhe I see a lawyer and then if he tells me to, you know, that the judge does that, well that’s different, but I’ve got to know, I’ve got to know for sure.
“Conn: Well, I’m certain that the attorney will tell you that—
“Dorsciak: If I could just talk to one just for a minute, he don’t have to take the case, or anything like that, if I could just talk to him and ask him some questions—
“Conn: Well, you’d have to go through proceedings for that or else make arrangements for yourself.
“Tankersley: Well, you understand that you are talking to an attorney now?
“Dorsciak: Yes.
“Conn: I’m the prosecuting attorney and I’m not trying to be unfair and I don’t care whether I have convictions or don’t but I want to be convicted [sic] [convinced] in my own mind that— * *
[237]*237The defendant repeatedly told the interrogators he did not want any publicity to embarrass his daughters. He was told there would be a lot of publicity if there were a trial; however, this could be avoided if he would tell what happened.
The interrogators also told the defendant that if he both confessed and pleaded guilty the judge would be easier on him than if he did not plead guilty or if he would not tell what happened.②
[238]*238The interrogators told the defedant that “it was up to us to a degree” to determine if the defendant were to receive any psychiatric assistance and that to make this determination he would have to tell them what happened.③
The interrogators repeatedly told the defendant they were trying to help him hut they could not do so unless he told them what happened.④
[239]*239The fact that the defendant’s request for counsel was ignored may be enough to vitiate the conviction if Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L ed2d 694 (1966), were applicable, but it is not applicable as the conviction in this case was several years before Miranda and its precursors. Guse v. Gladden, 243 Or 406, 414 P2d 317 (1966). However, “* * * the fact that a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required by Miranda, is a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later made.” Davis v. North Carolina, 384 US 737, 86 S Ct 1761, 16 L ed 895, 898 (1966). In the present case defendant was advised of his right to counsel; however, Miranda elaborated upon this right as follows: “If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before spealdng there can be no questioning.” 16 L ed2d at 707. It appears that this mandate was violated by the law enforcement officers.
Likewise, the voluntariness of a confession is suspect if it stems from an interrogation which was substituted for the statutory procedure requiring an accused to be taken before a magistrate without delay. OES 133.550.
In State v. Ely, 237 Or 329, 334, 390 P2d 348 (1964), we summarized:
“Taken as a whole, the evidence put on by the state tended to prove that the teacher, when con[240]*240fronted by charges that he had molested a child, agreed to sign a confession. However, he was told that, while the confession would be used to keep him from teaching again, his employers and the parent of the wronged child planned no criminal prosecution.
“The defendant could have believed that if these three men would not prosecute him no one else was likely to do so. The state’s own testimony, therefore, would support a finding that the confession was induced by an express or implied promise of immunity from prosecution. Such a confession, if so given, would be involuntary as a matter of law. State v. Bodi, 223 Or 486, 491, 354 P2d 831 (1960).”
In this case there were no representations of immunity, but there was a representation that the court would be more lenient if defendant confessed and pleaded guilty.
In State v. Schwensen, 237 Or 506, 521, 392 P2d 328 (1964), we stated in effect that if the interrogating officer’s testimony was that “he held out to the defendant the false hope that if he changed his previous statement he would not be charged with murder, but only with rape,” the statement made in response to such representation would be considered involuntary.
We further stated in State v. Schwensen, supra: “The rule is well-established in this state that a confession of guilt is prima facie involuntary, and, therefore, a burden is placed upon the state to show that it was voluntarily made without the inducement of either fear or hope” (Emphasis added.) 237 Or at 522.
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DENECKE, J.
In 1962 the plaintiff pleaded guilty to the crimes of rape of daughter and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending, among other things, that his confession and plea of guilty to the rape charge were not voluntarily or understandingly made. He does not seek relief from the contributing conviction. The post-conviction court held a hearing and denied the petition.
We hold that the confession was not voluntarily made.
The defendant was 43 years old at the time of his conviction; he had a seventh grade education. He had no prior criminal record.
The defendant was arrested on March 28, 1962, under a warrant issued pursuant to an indictment for rape of daughter. He was taken to the county courthouse and interrogated for approximately one hour by a deputy district attorney and a deputy sheriff. The interrogation was taped; therefore, there is no dispute as to what was said. Ultimately the defendant stated he had sexual relations with his daughters.
The defendant remained incarcerated until April 2, 1962, when he was arraigned and pleaded guilty to both charges. During his incarceration only a minister visited him; however, there is no evidence that others could not have communicated with him. He was never brought before a magistrate as ORS 133.550 requires. He never had the advice of counsel.
[236]*236At the arraignment the court informed him that if he desired the court could appoint an attorney for him. The defendant stated he did not want an attorney. When the defendant indicated he wanted to waive the time given to him to plead and make his plea at that time the court asked, “Do you do that of your own free will and without any promises of any kind?” The answer was, “Yes.” The trial court informed the defendant that “this is a serious charge.” The district attorney made a statement of the charged crime and thereafter the defendant said he did not care to make any statement.
Before the interrogation commenced defendant was advised of his right to remain silent and to have counsel; however, when the defendant asked for counsel, the following occurred:
“Dorsciak: I think that mayhe I see a lawyer and then if he tells me to, you know, that the judge does that, well that’s different, but I’ve got to know, I’ve got to know for sure.
“Conn: Well, I’m certain that the attorney will tell you that—
“Dorsciak: If I could just talk to one just for a minute, he don’t have to take the case, or anything like that, if I could just talk to him and ask him some questions—
“Conn: Well, you’d have to go through proceedings for that or else make arrangements for yourself.
“Tankersley: Well, you understand that you are talking to an attorney now?
“Dorsciak: Yes.
“Conn: I’m the prosecuting attorney and I’m not trying to be unfair and I don’t care whether I have convictions or don’t but I want to be convicted [sic] [convinced] in my own mind that— * *
[237]*237The defendant repeatedly told the interrogators he did not want any publicity to embarrass his daughters. He was told there would be a lot of publicity if there were a trial; however, this could be avoided if he would tell what happened.
The interrogators also told the defendant that if he both confessed and pleaded guilty the judge would be easier on him than if he did not plead guilty or if he would not tell what happened.②
[238]*238The interrogators told the defedant that “it was up to us to a degree” to determine if the defendant were to receive any psychiatric assistance and that to make this determination he would have to tell them what happened.③
The interrogators repeatedly told the defendant they were trying to help him hut they could not do so unless he told them what happened.④
[239]*239The fact that the defendant’s request for counsel was ignored may be enough to vitiate the conviction if Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L ed2d 694 (1966), were applicable, but it is not applicable as the conviction in this case was several years before Miranda and its precursors. Guse v. Gladden, 243 Or 406, 414 P2d 317 (1966). However, “* * * the fact that a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required by Miranda, is a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later made.” Davis v. North Carolina, 384 US 737, 86 S Ct 1761, 16 L ed 895, 898 (1966). In the present case defendant was advised of his right to counsel; however, Miranda elaborated upon this right as follows: “If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before spealdng there can be no questioning.” 16 L ed2d at 707. It appears that this mandate was violated by the law enforcement officers.
Likewise, the voluntariness of a confession is suspect if it stems from an interrogation which was substituted for the statutory procedure requiring an accused to be taken before a magistrate without delay. OES 133.550.
In State v. Ely, 237 Or 329, 334, 390 P2d 348 (1964), we summarized:
“Taken as a whole, the evidence put on by the state tended to prove that the teacher, when con[240]*240fronted by charges that he had molested a child, agreed to sign a confession. However, he was told that, while the confession would be used to keep him from teaching again, his employers and the parent of the wronged child planned no criminal prosecution.
“The defendant could have believed that if these three men would not prosecute him no one else was likely to do so. The state’s own testimony, therefore, would support a finding that the confession was induced by an express or implied promise of immunity from prosecution. Such a confession, if so given, would be involuntary as a matter of law. State v. Bodi, 223 Or 486, 491, 354 P2d 831 (1960).”
In this case there were no representations of immunity, but there was a representation that the court would be more lenient if defendant confessed and pleaded guilty.
In State v. Schwensen, 237 Or 506, 521, 392 P2d 328 (1964), we stated in effect that if the interrogating officer’s testimony was that “he held out to the defendant the false hope that if he changed his previous statement he would not be charged with murder, but only with rape,” the statement made in response to such representation would be considered involuntary.
We further stated in State v. Schwensen, supra: “The rule is well-established in this state that a confession of guilt is prima facie involuntary, and, therefore, a burden is placed upon the state to show that it was voluntarily made without the inducement of either fear or hope” (Emphasis added.) 237 Or at 522.
The state’s own evidence establishes that the statement was not made “without the inducement of either fear or hope.” The hope of leniency from the judge if the defendant made a statement was held out. [241]*241The fear of publicity about his daughters if he did not make a statement was emphasized by the interrogators. These tactics by the interrogators, occurring in the context previously described, lead us to the conclusion that the defendant has failed to overcome the prima facie involuntariness of the confession. The post-conviction court’s finding to the contrary is not supported by the uneontradicted evidence.
The remaining question is whether the “plea of guilty was fatally tainted by” the involuntary confession. Gladden v. Holland, 366 F2d 580, 583 (9th Cir 1966). In Pennsylvania ex rel Herman v. Claudy, 350 US 116, 76 S Ct 223, 100 L ed 126 (1956), the court stated:
“Our prior decisions have established that: (1) a conviction following trial or on a plea of guilty based on a confession extorted by violence or by mental coercion is invalid under the Federal Due Process Clause; * * 350 US at 118.
In that case the state court had not held a hearing upon the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court ordered it remanded for a hearing and observed: “It is entirely possible that petitioner’s prior confession caused him, in the absence of counsel, to enter the guilty plea.” 350 US at 122.
In Chambers v. Florida, 309 US 227, 60 S Ct 472, 84 L ed 716 (1940), two of the defendants pleaded guilty two days after a coerced confession had been obtained. Two other defendants allegedly involved in the same crime pleaded not guilty and subsequently one of these changed his plea to guilty. The other was tried, the coerced confession was introduced, and he was convicted. On certiorari to the state supreme court the court held that the confessions were coerced [242]*242and reversed all the cases without remanding. The court did not discuss whether the coerced confessions induced the plea of guilty; apparently, it assumed they did.
Richardson v. Williard, 241 Or 376, 406 P2d 156 (1965), is not contrary to these decisions. In that case the defendant was represented by counsel. He gave a confession. “He now claims that he would not have plead guilty if he had then known that the confession might have been inadmissible because of our later decision in State v. Neely, 1965, 239 Or 487, 395 P2d 557, 398 P2d 482.” 241 Or at 378. We held: “Whether or not defendant knew the confession was admissible was irrelevant because the plea of guilty with the advice of counsel was a judicial admission of all the material allegations of the indictment in a most indisputable form.” 241 Or at 378.
In the present case the petitioner did not have counsel; the illegality of the confession directly affected its trustworthiness. Neither factor was present in Richardson v. Williard, supra. Prior to Richardson v. Williard we had taken a course consistent with that prescribed by the United States Supreme Court. In Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or 283, 323, 251 P2d 87, 253 P2d 289 (1953), this court stated: “A plea of guilty is a judicial confession of guilt and comes within the established rule that the Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any person in an American court by means of a coerced confession.”
In Gladden v. Holland, supra, the federal district court found both that the confession was involuntary and the plea of guilty was brought about by the making of the confession. It was also found that seven hours after the confession the defendant was convicted [243]*243and sentenced. In the present case four days elapsed between the confession and the entering of the plea.
At the post-conviction hearing the petitioner testified that one reason he pleaded guilty was to avoid publicity. The petitioner denied he was guilty of any crime against the daughter he pleaded guilty to raping although he admits he was guilty of contributing to the delinquency of the other daughter. The petitioner testified that one reason he pleaded guilty, did not ask for an attorney, and did not make any statement in court when asked by the court was that it appeared useless as he had already signed a confession.⑤
The court in Gladden v. Holland, supra (366 F2d at 583), pointed out: “The problem is analogous to that presented when a second confession, not itself imbedded in coercive circumstances, is claimed to be vitiated by an earlier coerced confession.” We had this problem in State v. Keller, 240 Or 442, 449-450, 402 P2d 521 (1965). Mr. Justice Holman there commented :
“As one studies the problem of the extent that a confession taken without constitutional safeguards contaminates a subsequent confession ob[244]*244tained after being informed of Ms rigM to counsel and to remain silent, the more it appears that no rule of simple application may be laid down. The question must be one of fact in each instance.
In State v. Keller, supra, our holding on this issue was:
“* * * When the only evidence in the record indicates that similar confessions have previously been taken under circumstances where defendant’s rights have not been preserved, we cannot in fairness to the defendant conclude that the state has discharged its burden of showing the subsequent confession, taken shortly thereafter, was admissible. * * *” 240 Or at 450.
The trial court in the present ease made a finding : “* * * [H]e [defendant] gave the plea without any threats, coercion, promises or inducements. * * * He entered his plea for what he considered good reasons and not because of any medication, lack of medication or because of nervousness.” The trial court held that the confession was voluntary and, therefore, did not make a finding on the issue of whether the plea was made because defendant had already confessed in a statement which we here hold to be involuntary.
The question of determining whether a defendant was induced to plead guilty because he had previously made an involuntary confession is difficult to, answer, just as is the problem of whether a second confession was made because a first, but involuntary or otherwise inadmissible, confession had already been given. In State v. Keller, supra, we held that upon the evidence presented the second confession was tainted as a matter of law. We conclude that a similar rule is the [245]*245most feasible method for determining the similar problem we have in this case.
When the essential facts are that an involuntary confession was secured from the defendant and subsequently he pleaded guilty to the crime confessed, and these are the facts here, the guilty plea will be presumed tainted by the confession and the plea will be deemed involuntary until the state has overcome such presumption. Evidence could be introduced tending to prove that a plea of guilty would have been entered regardless of the prior involuntary confession, but there is no such evidence in this case.
The cause is remanded to the circuit court for the county of original conviction for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.
Reversed and remanded.
For example, he was told: “The only thing — if you actually, seriously are concerned about helping your daughters, the whole thing I feel is for you to sit here and tell me the story. Your version of these things and what took place and why and that will end the matter.”