[61]*61TANZER, J.
Defendant appeals his conviction of the crime of driving under the influence of intoxicants. He assigns as error the admission into evidence, over objection, of a statement he made in response to police questioning after the officer had pulled over his car. The case was tried to the court and the judge relied upon defendant’s statements in coming to its finding of guilt. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statement made after the officer had formed, but not communicated, his intention to arrest defendant was the product of custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed. We reverse and uphold the trial court.
THE FACTS
Defendant was driving his car at 2:10 a.m. on a major highway in a rural area. The officer paced defendant’s car at about 80 miles per hour and observed it weaving in the right hand lane, crossing over the fogline several times, and traveling at times close to the guardrail. The officer turned on the overhead lights on his police patrol car, and defendant brought his car to a stop at the side of the road, apparently in response to the officer’s signal given by the overhead lights.
Defendant stepped out of his car and began to walk toward the rear of the car, where he was met by the officer. The officer detected an odor of alcoholic beverage on defendant’s breath. He also noticed that defendant’s eyes were watery and bloodshot and his face was flushed.
The officer told defendant of the officer’s observations concerning defendant’s operation of the vehicle. Defendant answered that he knew he had been going too fast, that he had had a “fight” with his wife, a passenger in the vehicle, and that he had had three drinks over the course of the preceding six hours, the last two after 11:00 p.m. Defendant swayed back and forth while talking to the officer.
Before administering the field sobriety tests, the officer asked defendant how much education he had, and defendant replied, “You name it, I’ve got it.” The officer then asked defendant to say the alphabet, and defendant [62]*62did so very well. Defendant was unable, however, correctly to count backward from 100 to 85. Next, the “heel-to-toe” test was conducted on an asphalt-paved portion of the roadway with a slight uphill grade, the area being illuminated by the police car’s “rear lights” and the officer’s flashlight. Defendant did not maintain his balance well and staggered several times. When asked to stand on one leg, defendant lost his balance immediately, and on a second try maintained balance for about four seconds. Defendant did well on the “finger-to-nose” test, but when asked to say the months of the year, he so slurred his words as to be barely understandable.
At that point the officer had determined that he was going to arrest defendant for driving while under the influence of intoxicants. He did not communicate that determination to defendant or utter any words of arrest to defendant. Rather, the officer then asked defendant to rate himself on a scale of intoxication of zero to ten, zero “being like he hadn’t had anything to drink” and ten being falling-down drunk. Defendant responded that he was a “low five” and that he should not have been driving and should have let another passenger drive. It is this statement which is in issue.
The officer “then placed the defendant under arrest for DUII and read the defendant his rights at 2:20 A.M.”
THE TRIAL
Upon trial the defendant was successful in excluding from evidence a tape recording made by the officer on the scene after defendant stopped his car. Moreover, test results of a chemical analysis of defendant’s breath and related testimony were stricken because the test was found to have been improperly conducted. These rulings are not in issue.
Defendant objected to the reception of the officer’s testimony concerning the defendant’s response to the officer’s invitation to rate himself on the scale of intoxication:
“Your Honor, I’m going to object based on improper foundation because he’s in custody now and he’s having [63]*63him do tests and he’s made a determination to arrest him, he’s entitled to be advised of his rights at this point.
“Judge: Objection overruled. It seems to me he hasn’t told him he’s under arrest yet although he certainly made the decision.”
At the time of making his decision as fact finder, the trial judge stated:
“Well, I listened to this carefully and I have to disregard the evidence put in by the state on the breath test. But all in all, I’m convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was under the influence of intoxicants at the time based on the weaving which the officer testified to, the count backwards which he said he had all fouled up, the balance he said wasn’t very good, and the defendant himself — when asked to rate himself between zero and ten whether sober to real drunk — said a ‘low 5’. That indicates to me that he thought himself that he was somewhat affected. So the finding will be guilty of the charge.”
THE APPEAL
Upon appeal the sole assignment of error was the failure to sustain the objection to the testimony of the officer as to defendant’s response to the invitation to rate himself. In his brief, defendant made it clear that he was relying on the failure of the officer to advise defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), and several decisions of the Court of Appeals of Oregon1 pertaining to the issue of when custody has obtained. The state joined legal issue on whether defendant was in custody when the question was put to him.
The Court of Appeals held that at the time the question was asked and answered, the encounter had become a custodial interrogation, that the trial court erred in not sustaining the objection, and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We allowed the state’s petition for review, in which the state urged:
“* * * A decision by this Court is needed to bring Oregon law into conformity with the decisions of the [64]*64United States Supreme Court, and to clarify the analysis of what constitutes ‘custodial’ interrogation, especially in the context of on-the-scene questioning.”
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Defendant has not contended that any right guaranteed to him by either the constitution or the statutes of this state has been violated. His sole claim is that his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution have been invaded. We do not approach the case therefore upon any independent state ground; rather, we seek to divine what the United States Supreme Court should do if it had this case.
Defendant makes no assertion that his statements were involuntary in the sense that his will was overborne. His contention is only that the evidentiary use ■ of his statement was improper because it was the product of custodial interrogation as that term is used in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and it was not preceded by advice and waiver of rights as required in that case.
The simple answer is that defendant was not yet in custody when the challenged statement was made and Miranda procedures were not applicable.
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[61]*61TANZER, J.
Defendant appeals his conviction of the crime of driving under the influence of intoxicants. He assigns as error the admission into evidence, over objection, of a statement he made in response to police questioning after the officer had pulled over his car. The case was tried to the court and the judge relied upon defendant’s statements in coming to its finding of guilt. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statement made after the officer had formed, but not communicated, his intention to arrest defendant was the product of custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed. We reverse and uphold the trial court.
THE FACTS
Defendant was driving his car at 2:10 a.m. on a major highway in a rural area. The officer paced defendant’s car at about 80 miles per hour and observed it weaving in the right hand lane, crossing over the fogline several times, and traveling at times close to the guardrail. The officer turned on the overhead lights on his police patrol car, and defendant brought his car to a stop at the side of the road, apparently in response to the officer’s signal given by the overhead lights.
Defendant stepped out of his car and began to walk toward the rear of the car, where he was met by the officer. The officer detected an odor of alcoholic beverage on defendant’s breath. He also noticed that defendant’s eyes were watery and bloodshot and his face was flushed.
The officer told defendant of the officer’s observations concerning defendant’s operation of the vehicle. Defendant answered that he knew he had been going too fast, that he had had a “fight” with his wife, a passenger in the vehicle, and that he had had three drinks over the course of the preceding six hours, the last two after 11:00 p.m. Defendant swayed back and forth while talking to the officer.
Before administering the field sobriety tests, the officer asked defendant how much education he had, and defendant replied, “You name it, I’ve got it.” The officer then asked defendant to say the alphabet, and defendant [62]*62did so very well. Defendant was unable, however, correctly to count backward from 100 to 85. Next, the “heel-to-toe” test was conducted on an asphalt-paved portion of the roadway with a slight uphill grade, the area being illuminated by the police car’s “rear lights” and the officer’s flashlight. Defendant did not maintain his balance well and staggered several times. When asked to stand on one leg, defendant lost his balance immediately, and on a second try maintained balance for about four seconds. Defendant did well on the “finger-to-nose” test, but when asked to say the months of the year, he so slurred his words as to be barely understandable.
At that point the officer had determined that he was going to arrest defendant for driving while under the influence of intoxicants. He did not communicate that determination to defendant or utter any words of arrest to defendant. Rather, the officer then asked defendant to rate himself on a scale of intoxication of zero to ten, zero “being like he hadn’t had anything to drink” and ten being falling-down drunk. Defendant responded that he was a “low five” and that he should not have been driving and should have let another passenger drive. It is this statement which is in issue.
The officer “then placed the defendant under arrest for DUII and read the defendant his rights at 2:20 A.M.”
THE TRIAL
Upon trial the defendant was successful in excluding from evidence a tape recording made by the officer on the scene after defendant stopped his car. Moreover, test results of a chemical analysis of defendant’s breath and related testimony were stricken because the test was found to have been improperly conducted. These rulings are not in issue.
Defendant objected to the reception of the officer’s testimony concerning the defendant’s response to the officer’s invitation to rate himself on the scale of intoxication:
“Your Honor, I’m going to object based on improper foundation because he’s in custody now and he’s having [63]*63him do tests and he’s made a determination to arrest him, he’s entitled to be advised of his rights at this point.
“Judge: Objection overruled. It seems to me he hasn’t told him he’s under arrest yet although he certainly made the decision.”
At the time of making his decision as fact finder, the trial judge stated:
“Well, I listened to this carefully and I have to disregard the evidence put in by the state on the breath test. But all in all, I’m convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was under the influence of intoxicants at the time based on the weaving which the officer testified to, the count backwards which he said he had all fouled up, the balance he said wasn’t very good, and the defendant himself — when asked to rate himself between zero and ten whether sober to real drunk — said a ‘low 5’. That indicates to me that he thought himself that he was somewhat affected. So the finding will be guilty of the charge.”
THE APPEAL
Upon appeal the sole assignment of error was the failure to sustain the objection to the testimony of the officer as to defendant’s response to the invitation to rate himself. In his brief, defendant made it clear that he was relying on the failure of the officer to advise defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), and several decisions of the Court of Appeals of Oregon1 pertaining to the issue of when custody has obtained. The state joined legal issue on whether defendant was in custody when the question was put to him.
The Court of Appeals held that at the time the question was asked and answered, the encounter had become a custodial interrogation, that the trial court erred in not sustaining the objection, and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We allowed the state’s petition for review, in which the state urged:
“* * * A decision by this Court is needed to bring Oregon law into conformity with the decisions of the [64]*64United States Supreme Court, and to clarify the analysis of what constitutes ‘custodial’ interrogation, especially in the context of on-the-scene questioning.”
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Defendant has not contended that any right guaranteed to him by either the constitution or the statutes of this state has been violated. His sole claim is that his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution have been invaded. We do not approach the case therefore upon any independent state ground; rather, we seek to divine what the United States Supreme Court should do if it had this case.
Defendant makes no assertion that his statements were involuntary in the sense that his will was overborne. His contention is only that the evidentiary use ■ of his statement was improper because it was the product of custodial interrogation as that term is used in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and it was not preceded by advice and waiver of rights as required in that case.
The simple answer is that defendant was not yet in custody when the challenged statement was made and Miranda procedures were not applicable. Justice Lent, in dissent, however, would hold as did the Court of Appeals that once the officer decided to arrest defendant, defendant was not actually free to leave and was in custody even though the officer had not so informed him. Justice Linde, in dissent, would hold that whenever an officer investigating a crime, whether a traffic crime or not, stops a car and asks questions, that is sufficient detention to be deemed custody for purposes of triggering Miranda requirements. To fully examine these views, we must more closely inquire into the meaning of “custody” as used in Miranda.
Miranda is a Fifth Amendment case dealing with voluntariness. The issue of voluntariness put the defendant’s subjective state in issue, not the officer’s. The historical setting and the text of Miranda indicates that its purpose was to simplify judicial determinations of volun-tariness of statements made in custody. Miranda was preceded by a generation of cases in which the court made case-by-case determinations of voluntariness from the “totality of the circumstances,” e.g., defendant’s age, educa[65]*65tion and intelligence, the length of interrogation, access to family or counsel, etc., as to whether defendant’s will was overborne.2 An obvious intended effect of laying out specific procedures for advice and waiver of rights prior to custodial interrogation in Miranda was to eliminate the necessity of making circumstantial determinations about the subjective state of each defendant and to substitute a simple advice- and-waiver procedure to be followed whenever a readily discernible objective fact exists, i.e., custody. If those procedures are followed, voluntariness may generally be inferred.3 Absent custody, as here, the law of the pre-Miranda totality-of-circumstances cases continues to apply. Were we to decide that the officer’s subjective state (i.e., his uncom-municated intention to arrest) triggered Miranda procedures, that holding would be exactly contrary to the purpose of the Miranda opinion: Instead of looking to an objective event, i.e., custody, we would look to a subjective state — the officer’s, not the defendant’s. That cannot be.
The answer to Justice Linde’s thesis requires a review of the nature of the restriction which in Miranda is referred to as “custody.” The premise of Miranda is that custody is an inherently coercive situation and that procedural safeguards are a necessary device to assure volun-tariness in answering custodial interrogation. The intertwined relationship of custody, coercion and safeguards was clearly stated as the underpinning of the Miranda opinion:
“* * * We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the [66]*66privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” 384 US at 467.
“Custody” is an “elastic” term which in criminal law generally denotes “imprisonment.” Black’s Law Dictionary. The concern of the court in Miranda touched coercive situations less restrictive than actual imprisonment. Part I of that opinion dwells extensively on the court’s concern about the potential evils of arrests on suspicion for the purpose of incommunicado, knee-to-knee, unceasing interrogation in the gray, windowless recesses of police stations, intended to obtain evidence of guilt to warrant a formal arrest. The totality-of-circumstances cases involving that widespread practice culminated with Escobedo v Illinois, 378 US 478, 84 S Ct 1758, 12 L Ed 2d 977 (1964). In retrospect, Escobedo was a false start: it applied Sixth Amendment analysis based on whether defendant was a “focal suspect.” In Miranda, the court corrected course and returned to Fifth Amendment analysis of volun-tariness of custodial interrogation. In doing so, the court specified that it intended a broader meaning of custody which would include situations short of imprisonment, such as detention for questioning:
“* * * By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.4 * * *
The significance of the disjunctive definition is emphasized by repetition. In later passages the opinion says:
“The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. * * *”
“To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to [67]*67questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. * * *” (Emphasis added.) 384 US at 477-478.
The “otherwise deprived” phrase was intended to more fully explain the meaning of “custody”; it was not intended to describe another class of situations to which Miranda was applicable in addition to custody. Rather, the phrase reflects a realistic recognition that imposition of custody is not always formal. Custody may commence without the word “arrest” being uttered. Involuntariness which presumably is caused by the police-dominated atmosphere of custody, and which the Miranda procedures are intended to overcome, is equally likely in circumstances which are situationally equivalent to actual custody, whether a formal arrest has been made or not.
A review of post-Miranda United States Supreme Court cases and our own interpretive cases persuades us that the phrase “otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,” blurs the “bright line” somewhat, but was intended to refer to situations which are inherently coercive in the way that formal custody is deemed to be inherently coercive. It refers to situations of greater deprival of freedom of action than the ordinary stop of a car (or of a pedestrian, for that matter), but short of formal arrest.
The four cases decided under the name Miranda v. Arizona all involved actual custody, so there was no occasion to elaborate on the intended meaning of the alternate phrase. There are a few post-Miranda United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the meaning of custody other than imprisonment, i.e., the phrase “otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” In Orozco v Texas, 394 US 324, 89 S Ct 1095, 22 L Ed 2d 311 (1969), the court made clear that Miranda was equally applicable to custody outside the confines of police stations. There, four policemen, investigating a homicide, entered a suspect’s bedroom uninvited. They identified him, arrested him and then questioned him.4 That was held to be [68]*68custodial interrogation even though in the defendant’s residence. By the use of italics, the court indicated that this situation of questioning following an arrest illustrated what they had meant to describe by their “otherwise deprived” phrase:
«* * * According to the officer’s testimony, petitioner was under arrest and not free to leave when was questioned in his bedroom in the early hours of the morning. The Miranda opinion declared that the warnings were required when the person being interrogated was ‘in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ * * (Emphasis in Orozco opinion.) 394 US at 327.
[69]*69In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 93 S Ct 2041, 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973), the United States Supreme Court was asked to rule that custodial consent to search should be subject to the same procedures as those imposed in Miranda for custodial questioning. That case, like this, involved an investigative stop of an automobile. The court declined to apply Miranda, primarily because Fourth Amendment searches are subject to different considerations than Fifth Amendment interrogation. The court took pains, however, to point out that common highway stops are not what they intended to describe in Miranda as custodial. The court stated:
“* * * Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or in a person’s home or office, and under informal and unstructured conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning. The police may seek to investigate further suspicious circumstances or to follow up leads developed in questioning persons at the scene of a crime. These situations are a far cry from the structured atmosphere of a trial where, assisted by counsel if he chooses, a defendant is informed of his trial rights. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 394 U.S. 238, 243, [23 L Ed 2d 274, 89 S Ct 1709 (1969)]. And, while surely a closer question, these situations are still immeasurably far removed from ‘custodial interrogation’ where, in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, we found that the Constitution required certain now familiar warnings as a prerequisite to police interrogation. Indeed, in language applicable to the typical consent search, we refused to extend the need for warnings:
‘Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. * * * When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigations may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law [70]*70enforcement.’ [Miranda v. Arizona,] 384 US, at 477-478.”
(Emphasis added.) 412 US at 231-232.
This court has previously examined the nature of restraint which triggers the need for Miranda safeguards. Although the cases differ on their facts, they demonstrate the principle that actual (not potential) custody or significant deprival of freedom is what triggers the Miranda safeguards.
In State v Travis, 250 Or 213, 441 P2d 597 (1968), this court upheld use of statements made to an investigating officer during interrogation conducted in a police car, without an arrest. We recognized, as in Orozco, that Miranda applies to questioning outside the police station. We also recognized (as Miranda states in its footnote 4, set out above) that actual custody in the form of arrest or restraint, not mere focal suspicion, is the triggering event. This court said:
“The badge of a police officer representing governmental authority, in and of itself, may have a subtly coercive effect. But we cannot believe that any psychological pressure emanating from an officer’s authority is likely to cause an innocent person, who knows that he is free to come and go, to confess a crime he did not commit. Nor is a question by an officer likely to produce involuntary self-incrimination on the part of a guilty person if that person is not under arrest or under any other form of restraint.
“The basis of the exclusionary rule is the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compulsion. The Miranda case held that police custody is ‘inherently coercive.’ If, in fact, there is no custody, there is no danger that a coercive environment will be created. There is no need, therefore, to indulge in a fictitious assumption that we are preventing coercion when we exclude otherwise admissible evidence.” 250 Or at 217.
It is also significant to this case that the court went on to note and implicitly reject early post-Miranda cases from elsewhere which held that Miranda applies to “field interrogation of suspects * * * if police have probable cause to believe the suspect is guilty.” ibid.
In State v Taylor, 249 Or 268, 437 P2d 853 (1968), an officer investigating an accident, questioned defendant [71]*71at the scene. The defendant gave incriminating answers indicating he had been drinking intoxicants. The officer’s observations also indicated that defendant was intoxicated. Upon completion of the interrogation, the defendant was formally arrested. The officer testified, however, that from the beginning he would not have allowed the defendant to leave until the investigation was completed.5 Thus, in Taylor, as here, questioning occurred at a time when the questioning officer had subjectively determined that he would not allow the defendant to leave, i.e., that he would deprive the defendant of his freedom of action in a significant way, but had not yet actually restrained him or communicated that intention to the defendant. In that situation, this court held that actual custody, not the police officer’s subjective intent as to action not yet taken, is controlling.
“It will be noted that [Miranda, Escobedo and two Oregon cases] deal with ‘custodial interrogation.’ The thrust of each is the danger of compulsory self-incrimination that arises out of the psychological effect of the custodial atmosphere which tends to overpower the mental resistance of a suspect or an accused when questioned. Miranda states ‘that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.’ (Emphasis supplied.) 384 US 436, 467.
[72]*72“There is nothing in any of these decisions that denies the police the right in on-the-scene investigations to interview any person not in custody and not subject to coercion in any form for the purpose of determining whether a crime has been committed and who committed it.
‘* * * General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.’ Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 US 436, 477-478.
Nor is there otherwise an iota of evidence that the statements made by the defendant were in anywise the result of compulsion.” State v Taylor, 249 Or at 271-272.
It is possible that the defendant in this case was motivated by a purpose less lofty than “responsible citizenship,” but he was not yet subject to the coercion which inheres when custody begins. More likely, a driver who voluntarily undergoes field sobriety tests does so in hopes that he will pass them and not be arrested. We never see those cases. Miranda deals only with the pressure which inheres in custody, not that which may inhere in trying to avoid custody. The opinion of this court in Taylor correctly applies the holding of Miranda.
Finally, in State v Mathiason, 275 Or 1, 549 P2d 673 (1976), the defendant came to a police station upon the officer’s invitation. He was told that he was a suspect in a burglary and that there was evidence of his guilt, but that he was not under arrest. He answered questions and was allowed to leave. By a 4-3 decision, this court held that Miranda compliance was required because the questioning took place in a “ ‘coercive environment’ ” equivalent to the Miranda phrase “ ‘the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation.’ ” 275 Or at 4-5.
Our holding was reversed in Oregon v Mathiason, 429 US 492, 97 S Ct 711, 50 L Ed 2d 714 (1977). The United States Supreme Court made clear that its holding in Miranda regarding custody was intended to be applied literally rather than expansively. That court held:
[73]*73“Our decision in Miranda set forth rules of police procedure applicable to ‘custodial interrogation.’ ‘By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ 384 U.S., at 444. Subsequently we have found the Miranda principle applicable * * * to questioning taking place in a suspect’s home, after he has been arrested and is no longer free to go where he pleases, Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
“In the present case, however, there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way. * * * It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody ‘or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’
“Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a ‘coercive environment.’ Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited.” (Original emphasis.) Oregon v Mathiason, 429 US at 495-496.
There are factual differences between this case and Mathiason, to be sure, but Mathiason reflects continuing adherence of the United States Supreme Court to what it held in Miranda and gives no evidence of any intention to expand that holding.
Justice Linde suggests that the rule of custody should be more definite so that police officers will know with greater certainty when to follow Miranda procedures. Perhaps so, but any uncertainty exists by virtue of the [74]*74imprecision of the phrase “otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” We cannot improve on the Miranda opinion; we can only do our best to discern and apply its meaning.
In summary, Miranda, and the subsequent cases of the United States Supreme Court and this court dealing with custody as that term is used in Miranda, hold that actual custody or deprival of liberty in a significant way greater than that involved in on-the-scene investigation is the triggering event for Miranda safeguards. In the absence of actual custody or a significant deprival of liberty, there is not the subjective pressure upon a defendant which inheres in actual custody that Miranda was intended to overcome. If an officer merely intends to restrict freedom or impose custody, but has not yet communicated that intention or converted it into action, the pressures with which Miranda deals have not necessarily come into being. It would be an unwarranted extension of Miranda to apply it to inchoate, contemplated custody that exists only as a subjective intention in the mind of the officer as to future action. Actual custody, not intended custody, is the so-called “bright line” triggering device.
Justice Lent, in dissent, argues:
«* * * There js nothing in Miranda that says that the defendant must be aware that he is in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.” 293 Or at 89.
It is true that the Miranda opinion does not expressly exclude every possible misinterpretation, but the interpretation by the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the underlying rationale of Miranda: Psychological pressures upon a defendant inhere in the fact of custody which are not necessarily present where there is no custody. It is also inconsistent with all subsequent interpretive cases dealing with custody.6
[75]*75We therefore conclude that Miranda was intended to apply to custodial situations or those situations of deprival of freedom which are sufficient in degree and apparent indefiniteness to be similarly inherently coercive. To decide this case, we need not define the line with greater precision than in Miranda; here, it is sufficient to conclude that the Miranda definition of custody refers to restrictions of greater magnitude and apparent duration than exist in an ordinary investigative traffic stop such as this.
Therefore, we would conclude that the statements in issue were properly admitted because they were the product of noncustodial questioning and because there were no indicia of involuntariness in the totality of the circumstances.
The Court of Appeals is reversed; the district court is affirmed.