COLEMAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by Hamilton E. McGowan, the defendant below, and a brother of Elbert J. McGowan, deceased, from a judgment vesting an undivided one-half interest in thirty-seven acres of land in Clarke County, Mississippi, in Dorotea Zaldivar V. De Tenorio, a non-resident alien, De Tenorio v. McGowan, 364 F.Supp. 1051 (S.D.Miss., 1973). Appellee De Tenorio claims the land by inheritance from her deceased sister, who, in turn, allegedly inherited the land from her deceased husband, Elbert J. McGowan. Both appellee and her deceased sister had been and were resident citizens of the Republic of Honduras.
Appellant argues that the widow lost her interest in the land by failing to comply with the requirements of a 1928 Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Honduras. He asks that title be confirmed in the defendants-cross-complainants.
We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In 1911, by deed of conveyance, Elbert J. McGowan became the owner of twenty-seven acres of land in Clarke County, Mississippi. In 1915 he acquired, by deed, ten additional acres. These parcels constitute the thirty-seven acres here in question.
Both deeds were properly recorded in the land deed records of Clarke County, Mississippi, on December 20, 1915. The District Court found that these conveyances vested E. J. McGowan with the fee simple record title to this land.
Between 1911 and 1914 E. J. McGowan left Mississippi and returned only twice, the last time in 1936. This was the last contact any member of the family is known to have had with him during his lifetime.
After leaving Mississippi, E. J. McGowan returned to Central America, where, in 1940, he married Maria Obdulia Zaldivar, of Honduran nationality. Although there originally were claims to the contrary, abandoned during the course of this litigation, no children were born of this union. E. J. McGowan remained a United States citizen, but died intestate on October 31, 1957, in the Republic of Panama.
Hamilton E. McGowan, of Vossburg, Mississippi, was a brother of Elbert J. [95]*95McGowan. Elbert’s United States passport designated Hamilton McGowan as the person to be notified in case of his death. In 1957, Hamilton was so notified by the United States Consul in Panama. This notification revealed that Elbert’s effects had been placed in the hands of his widow, and listed other known relatives as two brothers, Hamilton E. McGowan, of Vossburg, and M. M. McGowan, of Jackson, Mississippi. After Elbert’s death, no member of the family communicated with his widow or undertook to advise her concerning any land E. J. McGowan owned in the State of Mississippi. Neither did she, or her counsel, communicate with the McGowans. Silence reigned supreme on both sides.
In 1958, after the death of her husband, Maria Obdulia Zaldivar McGowan left Panama, went back to Honduras, and lived there with her sister, the plaintiff-appellee here, until her death. While thus residing in the Republic of Honduras, Maria died intestate on February 28, 1969, without being remarried or having any children. At no time did she ever renounce her Honduran citizenship. She was survived by one sister, appellee De Tenorio, and one brother, Felipe. Maria’s other brothers and sisters were of the half blood, and neither of her parents survived her death.
It is undisputed that the taxes on the lands in question were never paid by Elbert J. McGowan, but were always paid by his brother, Hamilton E. McGowan. In addition to paying the taxes, Hamilton E. McGowan used the land, retained the profits, and acknowledged his brother’s ownership of the land in a number of ways, such as failing to have the- tax assessment changed to him as owner and by subscribing as a witness to an oil and gas lease purportedly executed by E. J. McGowan in 1939.
In 1968, Hamilton E. McGowan filed suit in the Chancery Court of Clarke County, Mississippi, asserting title in himself by adverse possession and seeking confirmation of his alleged title to the land. Elbert’s widow, Maria Obdulia Zaldivar McGowan, was living at the time in the Republic of Honduras, but she was not named as a party to the suit, nor was she served with notice or process. A decree was entered on the complaint by default. This decree was asserted by the defendants-appellants in the District Court as res judicata. The Court held that this decree was ineffective against Maria, Elbert McGowan’s widow and appellee’s sister, for lack of due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and applicable under the terms of the Treaty between the United States and Honduras. This holding is not challenged on appeal. The District Court further held that Maria Obdulia Zaldivar McGowan’s interest in the land formerly owned by her husband, Elbert, could not be divested from her in the absence of due process of law and without just compensation. It concluded by a “liberal interpretation” of the Treaty that Maria’s heir, Dorotea, was entitled to the same protection.
THE LAW
The applicable Mississippi statute, Section 842 of the Code of 1942 [now Section 89 — 1 — 23 of the Code of 1972, which goes back to Section 2439 of the Mississippi Code of 1892] provides:
“Resident aliens may acquire and hold land, and may dispose of it and transmit it by descent, as citizens of the state may;
but non-resident aliens shall not hereafter acquire or hold land * * *.”
This statutory provision yields, of course, to any applicable provision of any valid Treaty of the United States with a foreign country, constituting a part of the Supreme Law of the Land, United States Constitution, Article 6, Clause 2, Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 25 L.Ed. 628 (1879); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 67 S.Ct. 1431, 91 L.Ed. 1633 (1947).
The pertinent portions of the 1928 Treaty with Honduras read as follows:
[96]*96
“[From] Article I
“The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall enjoy freedom of access to the courts of justice of the other on conforming to the local laws, as well for the prosecution as for the defense of their rights, and in all degrees of jurisdiction established by law.
“The . nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive within the territories of the other, upon submitting to conditions imposed upon its nationals, the most constant protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect that degree of protection that is required by international law. Their property shall not be taken without due process of law and without payment of just compensation.
“Article IV
“Where, on the death of any person holding real or other immovable property or interests therein within the territories of one High Contracting Party, and such property or interests therein would, by the laws of the country or by a testamentary disposition, descend or pass to a national of the other High Contracting Party, whether resident or non-resident, were he not disqualified by the laws of the country where such property or interests therein is or are situated, such national shall be allowed a term of three years in which to sell the same, this term to be reasonably prolonged if circumstances render it necessary fl
By the express provisions of the Treaty, McGowan’s widow had until October 31, 1960, in which to sell the thirty-seven acres of land in Clarke County. The term for the exercise of that right might “be reasonably prolonged if circumstances render it necessary.” (emphasis ours).
Prior to the cut off date, Mrs. McGowan took no action to sell the property, nor did she do so during the ensuing nine years. Indeed, although the record shows that Mrs. McGowan, the widow, was represented by counsel in closing her husband’s affairs she died without making any inquiry or taking any action to sell the land.
The case, then, is reduced to whether under the Treaty the sister was entitled to a “reasonable prolongation” of the sale period, rendered necessary by the circumstances.
The District Court resolved the issue in the following manner, 364 F.Supp. at 1062:
“It is clear under the treaty involved herein that Maria Obdulia Zaldivar McGowan had the right to acquire realty in Mississippi by inheritance, notwithstanding the common law and statute of Mississippi to the contrary. It is not so clear that her next of kin were entitled to acquire this same inheritance when she died intestate. As to this point, in the absence of specific language in the treaty providing for this eventuality, the Court is inclined to construe the treaty liberally and hold that such heirs are entitled to the same protection under the treaty as their deceased kinswoman would have had. Nor does this Court have much judicial precedent to aid in determining under what circumstances the three year period for selling the property should be reasonably prolonged. The Court has, however, carefully weighed all of the circumstances and finds that the interest of E. J. McGowan’s widow could not be divested from her in the absence of due process of law and without just compensation, both of which are guaranteed by the treaty. Otherwise is to declare a forfeiture which is not favored in law. (emphasis added). Maria Obdulia Zaldivar McGowan had no knowledge of the provisions of the treaty or any knowledge of her inheritance or the attempted divestiture. Similarly, her heirs, plaintiff and Felipe Murillo Zaldivar, had no knowledge. Until they were made aware of their interest, the circumstances were such as to require [97]*97a prolongation of the three year period in which to divest themselves of their inherited interests, (emphasis added). The brother, Felipe Murillo Zaldivar, has within a necessarily prolonged term divested himself in favor of the" minor wards of Peter K. Smith, at one time in this action alleged to be the grandsons of E. J. McGowan. The named plaintiff, Dorotea Zaldivar V. De Tenorio, filed this suit within a reasonable time of her knowledge.
“The Court therefore finds that the named plaintiff, a resident citizen of Puerto Cortes, Honduras, is entitled to a one-half undivided interest in and to the 37 acre tract of land * * *.”
We construe the decision to stand for the proposition that the three year limitation of the Treaty is inoperative unless someone, somewhere, someway, gave Mrs. McGowan actual notice of her ownership and warned her of the Treaty limitation. At least, such was required to obviate the element of “a reasonable prolongation” if “circumstances render it necessary”. The Treaty, of course, contains no such command. The additional elements of the decision are that she could not be deprived of her property without “due process of law” and “reasonable compensation”. The ' decision does not hold that Hamilton McGowan’s status as a “fiduciary” required him to give actual notice to the widow of his deceased brother. The laws of Mississippi flatly provided that the Widow McGowan could not inherit the land. The record is totally devoid of the slightest suggestion that Hamilton McGowan had ever heard of the Honduran Treaty of 1928.
Upon briefs and oral argument, our reaction to questions concerning “construction of the Treaty” is that matters of construction arise only when the language of a document is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. The District Court, and the parties, have frequently alluded to paucity of precedent involving the Treaty language involved in this litigation. A reasonable explanation for this is that the language is quite plain and clear, obviating the necessity for frequent or extensive interpretation by the Courts.
The language in the last sentence of the fourth paragraph of Article I, reads, “Their property shall not be taken without due process of law and without payment of just compensation”. This obviously refers to one of the contracting powers taking property from the citizen of the other. This is so because private parties, personal or corporate, have never had the right to take property from another. Consequently, this limitation must be construed as referring to takings by the respective signators to the Treaty from citizens of the other. The litigation now before us does not involve expropriation, eminent domain, or any similar taking of property by governmental action. Accordingly, we are unable to see how the due process feature enters this case except for Hamilton’s futile suit to acquire title, in which he obviously failed to give the notice required by Mississippi law. That failure may be explained by his ignorance, and that of his counsel, of the Honduran Treaty. Under state law, Mrs. McGowan in Honduras was clearly not a party in interest.
The Treaty nowhere hints or suggests that the Courts of the respective sovereigns are to be deprived of jurisdiction to adjudicate property rights within their respective territories. An appropriate judicial determination of title takes no property; it simply adjudicates where the title legally rests. This case deals with whether, in fact and in law, the widow of the deceased McGowan, or her heirs, have any property interest in the thirty-seven acres of land. Obviously, if within the terms of the Treaty they had any property rights it was the duty of the District Court to so hold. If there were none, a similar duty existed. As to that, all the parties here had their full day in Court and there was no denial of due process. The due process argument, therefore, is irrelevant.
This remands us to the decisive factor in the case, the application of the perti[98]*98nent provisions of Article IV, which, stripped of inapplicable language, might appropriately be defined as follows:
“Where, on the death of any person holding real or other immovable property or interests therein within the territories of one High Contracting Party, * * * such national shall be allowed a term of three years in which to sell the same, this term to be reasonably prolonged if circumstances render it necessary . . .
We construe “circumstances rendering the action necessary” to mean circumstances existing during the three year period, such as an inability to satisfactorily clear title, an inability to sell for fair market value, wilful frustration of the effort to sell, and like events.
We have already pointed out that from October 31, 1957 until February 28, 1969- — eleven years and four months— Mrs. McGowan made no effort to take any action whatever, by sale or otherwise, with reference to the property inherited, with limitations, from her deceased husband.
On what theory is it to be held, then, that this long term of inaction, almost four times the primary term prescribed by the Treaty, may at this late date be judicially prolonged as “a matter rendered necessary by the circumstances?”
The only reason advanced is that the Widow McGowan did not know of the property owned by her husband, did not know the rights conferred upon her by the Treaty, and Hamilton McGowan failed to inform her of it, although, as already stated, there is no proof that he, a layman residing in Mississippi, had any knowledge of the Treaty.
It seems likely that Mrs. McGowan did not know of the land, but the only proof to support this conclusion is the testimony of her sister, the present claimant to the property, who said that Mrs. McGowan never mentioned the existence of Mississippi or any property in it.1
Balanced against this is the fact that when her husband died in Panama, there was an intestate succession [administration] in that jurisdiction, in which the widow received all of her deceased husband’s property in that jurisdiction, and was represented by counsel. Living with her husband, an American, for eighteen years she is bound to have known that her husband had a United States passport, especially since the record indicates that she had one also. In any event, the Consular report of his death named her as his heir and named the two brothers and their addresses in Vossburg and Jackson, Mississippi, as surviving relatives. If the United States Consul obtained this information from some source other than the widow, who was the only person in Panama who could have told him of it, she at least was put on notice of it when she received as she did, a copy of the Consular report.
Conceding, however, that the widow knew nothing of the land owned by her husband the record leaves no room for doubt that she knew he had brothers in Mississippi and, if she was interested in the subject, that he might have land there.
This inexorably brings us to the uniformly followed principle of Mississip[99]*99pi real property law that once a deed of conveyance is lodged with the proper officer for public record in the county where the land is located it is, from that moment, constructive notice to the world, Aultman v. Kelly, 236 Miss. 1, 109 So.2d 344 (1959); Frierson Building Supply v. Pritchard, 253 Miss. 541, 176 So.2d 301 (1965). The public land records are open to anyone who wishes to look. All her counsel had to do was make inquiry.
Represented by counsel, as she was, in an estate which was formally administered in Panama, we must hold that Mrs. McGowan’s failure over a period of nearly twelve years to have the records examined, or to make any inquiry whatever, although assisted by counsel, totally negates the existence of circumstances necessitating a prolongation of the three year period in which she had the clear right to sell this land and receive the proceeds.
To hold otherwise would be to say that the Treaty Makers intended that property rights within their respective jurisdiction may be left in limbo for so long as alien owners choose not to make inquiry as to the possible existence of title, open and available to the world. This could not further, but would damage, the property rights of the citizens of either jurisdiction, something they both had a duty to protect and no doubt intended to protect.
We are not altogether without precedent in the cases dealing with Treaty rights such as we now have before us.
A case similar to the one at bar is Miller v. Clausen, 8 Cir., 1924, 299 F. 723, appeal dismissed 269 U.S. 595, 46 S.Ct. 105, 70 L.Ed. 431 (1925). In Miller, one Andrew Hansen died in 1911 in the United States owning property here, leaving as his sole heir at law his father, Hans Christian Hansen, who was a resident and citizen of Germany. The United States had a Treaty with Germany similar to the one here involved, but with nothing comparable to Article I in the Honduran Treaty. Hans Christian Hansen, still in Germany, died in 1916. He left as his heirs brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces. Only one of these heirs was a resident of the United States, i.e., Catharina Clausen. Thus, five years after he acquired an interest in the land from Andrew Hansen, Hans died without having made any conveyance thereof.
In 1919 the Alien Property Custodian seized the property. Catharina Clausen then filed a petition in the County Court in Nebraska to have herself declared the sole heir at law of Andrew Hansen and the Court so decreed. She then brought an action in the United States District Court against the Alien Property Custodian and the Treasurer of the United States to require delivery to her of the property. The other heirs of Hans Christian Hansen took the position that they acquired title as heirs of Hans Christian Hansen. The Eighth Circuit held, however, that the only person who could acquire property through Andrew Hansen was Catharina Clausen, who acquired same as a direct heir of Andrew Hansen and as the only one who was a resident of the United States. The Court in so holding used the following language:
“Therefore, on the death of Andrew Hansen, something less than a fee simple absolute, a base or qualified fee or a terminable fee vested in Hans Christian Hansen, and the remainder vested in Catharina Clausen, and after a reasonable time had elapsed without Hans Christian Hansen having availed himself of the rights given him by the treaty, there was a failure of the conditions imposed by the treaty, the title of Hans Christian Hansen failed by operation of law, the statute came into full force and effect, and the full fee-simple title vested in Catharina Clausen.” 299 F., at 727.
Appellee De Tenorio distinguishes this holding by pointing out that the Treaty involved in Miller did not have a clause which prohibited the taking of property without due process of law and without payment of just compensation, as does Article I of the Treaty with Honduras. [100]*100We have already disposed of this argument., supra.
It is urged that under the facts of this case Hamilton McGowan was “fiduciary” to the widow of his deceased brother. For reasons quickly to be stated we hold that Hamilton was not a fiduciary to his former sister-in-law.
Prior to October 31, 1957, the date of Elbert’s death, such a relationship could not have arisen' because Elbert was the sole owner of the Clarke County property, acting in his own right. Before Hamilton McGowan so much as knew of the existence of a sister-in-law (which was learned from the Consul’s death report), the relationship had been dissolved when Elbert died childless, Wilbe Lumber Company v. Calhoun, 163 Miss. 80, 140 So. 680 (1932). Mrs. McGowan was an adult, not a lunatic, and personally a total stranger to her former brother-in-law. Neither before nor after October 31, 1957, did Hamilton McGowan see Mrs. Elbert McGowan or have the first word of communication with her, directly or indirectly, written or oral. In this set of circumstances a fiduciary relationship was totally nonexistent.
Neither did such a relationship arise from the conflicting interests of Hamilton and Mrs. Elbert McGowan in the title to the land. When Elbert drew his last breath on October 31, 1957, the widow was vested with title to the land which her husband had formerly owned, with sole power of disposition, subject to defeasance only in the event of her own failure to comply with the terms of the Honduran Treaty. On the other hand, Hamilton’s interest in the land was a vested remainder, which Mrs. McGowan could defeat at pleasure by complying with the Treaty. See Mississippi College v. May, 235 Miss. 200, 108 So.2d 703 (1959).
Consequently, Hamilton McGowan was neither a tenant in common nor a joint tenant with his former sister-in-law. His interest conflicted with hers to the extent that he could only hope for title in fee if she failed to exercise her right of disposition in compliance with the Treaty. The fiduciary principles usually applicable to such tenancies in common simply did not apply here. In the total absence of an agreement to the contrary, the hostility of Hamilton’s interest to that of his sister-in-law was the antithesis of a fiduciary relationship. No law could require him to aid a total stranger to defeat his own title.2
Neither does the fiduciary argument attribute proper significance to the indisputable fact that under Mississippi law real property could not be inherited by a Central American alien. If Hamilton McGowan acted in reliance on the Mississippi statute prohibiting inheritance of real property by aliens, and if he did not know of the Honduran Treaty, then he was guilty of no intentional dereliction for, in the absence of the Treaty, no duty could have existed. The record in this case is totally bare of any evidence of treaty knowledge on the part of Hamilton.
The legal brook in this litigation ultimately runs down to the proposition which the District Court seems to have adopted, that is, with no more communication or contact than he had with his former sister-in-law, the failure of Hamilton McGowan to give her actual notice of the existence of the land and of her Honduran Treaty rights establishes, within the terms of the Treaty, the required “necessity” for the prolongation of the specific three year term in which Mrs. McGowan could have freely sold the land. Indeed, the effect of the District Court judgment is that this “necessity” would continue until someone, somewhere, someway, should give actual notice to an alien inheritor of land, or to [101]*101those who inherit from the original inheritor, and so on down the line.
Such a construction of the Treaty, where there are aliens in the chain of title would make a shambles of land titles. That is exactly what happened here. There was no effort to enforce the Treaty rights until an oil well had been brought in, whereupon the Treaty was dusted off in an effort to scramble the title, an eventuality which surely must have been beyond the anticipation of those who drafted, signed, and ratified the Treaty in an effort, for a reasonable time, to confer upon aliens a right which by state law was categorically denied.
Accordingly, we hold that the primary term in which Mrs. McGowan could have exercised the Treaty right of disposal expired on October 31, 1960; that during that time frame, and for the remaining eight years of her life, no existing necessity was claimed by her for the prolongation of the three year period. Neither have the subsequent heirs established any such necessity. The total inaction reflected by this record cannot, by some kind of judicial wand waving, be converted into “a necessity”.
We need not reach or decide what rights Mrs. McGowan’s heirs might have had if she had died during the three year period prescribed by the Treaty. She lived on until 1969, taking no action, under the Treaty or otherwise.
There are sundry other arguments which have not gone unnoticed.
Appellee turns the spotlight on Section 842 of the Mississippi Code of 1942, which allows non-resident alien citizens of Syria or the Lebanese Republic to inherit property from citizens or residents of Mississippi, but denies that right to all other non-resident aliens. Hence, she argues that the statute “denies to these selected aliens the equal protection of the law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment [and] constitutes an unconstitutional intrusion by the state into the field of foreign affairs which is entrusted to the President and Congress”.
Resident aliens, lawfully in the United States, are undoubtedly entitled to the equal protection of the law, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). It is equally obvious that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its own terms, has no application to aliens not within the jurisdiction of the United States.
“Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The Mississippi statute was not attacked in the District Court and there was no request that a three judge court be convened. In any event, when the statute was last amended, Chapter 237, Laws of Mississippi of 1940, it contained the usual severability clause [Section 4]. Additionally,' if the statute, as presently written, were to be invalidated, necessitating a return to the previously existing valid statute3 the legal status of the plaintiff-appellee as a non-resident alien would remain the same. To go a step further, if all the statutes were to be set aside, the status of the non-resident alien under the common law would prohibit her owning title to land in Mississippi, Scottish American Mortgage Company v. Butler, 99 Miss. 56, 54 So. 666 (1911).
Appellee suggests that if she cannot acquire title to the land (for sale under the Treaty) then the property must' necessarily escheat to the State. The Mississippi claimants to this property are parties to this litigation. We, [102]*102therefore, point out that although § 89-I— 23 Mississippi Code Ann., 1972, provides for all land acquired contrary to that section to escheat to the State, it must be read in conjunction with § 89— II— 1 Mississippi Code Ann., 1972, which escheats property to the State when a person dies intestate leaving no heir capable of inheriting the property (emphasis added). Under Mississippi law the non-alien heirs had a vested remainder in the land, see Mississippi College v. May, supra.
In accord is 3 Am.Jur.2d, Aliens & Citizens, § 27, page 874:
“It is a principle of the common law that while an alien cannot inherit, neither can he interrupt the descent of others, and therefore, if some of the persons answering the description of heirs are incapable of taking by reason of alienage, they are disregarded and the whole title vests in those heirs competent to take provided they are not compelled to trace their inheritance through an alien.”
And, also, 27 Am.Jur.2d Escheat, § 12, page 880:
“Incapacity of the heirs first entitled to succeed to property will not effect an escheat, but the property will pass to the persons next entitled to take as though the first heirs had not existed.”
Appellee places great weight on Guiseppe v. Cozzani, 238 Miss. 273, 118 So.2d 189 (1960); 248 Miss. 588, 159 So.2d 278 (1964); and 193 So.2d 549 (1966). This case, which made three appearances in the Mississippi Supreme Court, is distinguishable from the case at bar. Guiseppe involved tenants in common, some of whom were aliens living in Italy. Under the terms of a will left by a deceased in 1906, their rights accrued subject to a life estate which ended in 1933. In the first appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the complaint filed by the alien heirs was sufficient to state a cause of action and that the Chancery Court erred when it sustained the defendant’s demurrer. At the second trial, no evidence was taken and the Supreme Court held on appeal that the lower court had abused its discretion when it refused to grant a continuance and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. On the third and final appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that when the heirs in America filed an affidavit in Chancery Court that there were no living heirs in Italy, knowing this to be false, they perpetrated a concealed fraud on the Chancery Court and the alien relatives, and that the alien relatives were not barred by the adverse possession statute, § 15-1-9, Mississippi Code Ann., 1972, from maintaining the suit in equity. The case turned on fraud, not on an exténsion of time under a Treaty.
Under Mississippi law, when a person dies intestate and leaves no wife, children, or children of deceased children, any land owned in the State descends to his brothers, sisters, and parents in equal shares, § 91 — 1 — 3, Mississippi Code Ann., 1972.
Appellee has extensively briefed this case as if it were one involving a forfeiture of property and the District Court alludes to forfeitures. We see it, however, as one to adjudicate title to property. In all such cases the true status of the title is decided. One found to be without title is not the victim of a forfeiture. He had nothing to forfeit.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.