[216]*216Ethridge, J.
Appellee, Gaddis and McLaurin, Inc., was a purchaser of land at a void foreclosure sale. The chancery court held that appellee had title to it by adverse possession after the sale. The question is whether the trial court [217]*217was warranted in finding that there was an onster of cotenants by a cotenant in possession at the time of the foreclosure, who thereafter continued in possession as a tenant of appellee.
On December 22, 1897, the owners of a tract of land in the Second Judicial District of Hinds County containing a little less than 100 acres conveyed it to Matt Nichols and four of his sons, J. N. or "Jim” Nichols, M. C. Nichols, Willie Nichols, and Lem Nichols. Each of these five grantees thereupon became vested with an undivided one-fifth interest in the property. Only Willie Nichols is still living. All the others died intestate before 1931, leaving numerous heirs, some of whom in turn have died, leaving other heirs. However, it appears that the eight appellants own all of the Nichols’ claim and interest in the record title to the land.
In 1915 the land was assessed to J. N. or Jim Nichols, and it continued to be so assessed to him through the year 1932, although he received under the 1897 deed only a one-fifth interest, and after his father’s death in 1900 continued to own only a fractional undivided interest in the property.
Around 1906 J. N. Nichols bought a 19-acre tract adjoining the 100-aere tract on the west side. He and his family lived in a log cabin on the 100 acres until around 1924, when he moved to a house on the 19-acre tract.
On February 3, 1928, J. N. Nichols and wife, Mary E. Nichols, executed a deed of trust to Mrs. Sallie Y. Herring, beneficiary, with H. B. Gillespie as trustee, mortgaging the 100-acre tract to secure a debt to Mrs. Herring of $1,527.77. This deed of trust was filed for record three days after its execution. Power to appoint a substitute trustee was vested in Mrs. Herring. This deed of trust purported to cover the entire fee to the land under a general warranty of title.
In 1930 J. N. or "Jim” Nichols died intestate, leaving as his heirs his wife, Mary, and five children who are appellants in this suit, James W. Nichols, Matthew Nichols, [218]*218Curtis Nichols, Welborn Nichols, and K. B. Nichols. He also left three other children as heirs, who in 1953 conveyed their interests in the property to James W. Nichols.
On February 6, 1929, Mrs. Sallie Y. Herring executed a deed of trust to Gaddis and McLaurin, of Bolton, Mississippi, a partnership consisting of J. L. Gaddis and George McLaurin, making as collateral therein to secure a debt of $15,000.00 a number of items of personal and real property, including the 1928 note of N. J. Nichols and wife. This deed of trust by Mrs. Herring was foreclosed by the trustee, acting for Gaddis and McLaurin, beneficiary, on January 20, 1932. The foreclosure deed conveyed to Gaddis and McLaurin the 1928 note of J. N. Nichols and wife, secured by the deed of trust on the 100 acres.
Although the 1928 deed of trust from J. N. Nichols and wife authorized only Mrs. Herring, the original beneficiary, to appoint a substitute trustee, on February 2, 1932, Gaddis and McLaurin attempted to appoint a substitute trustee. This appointment was invalid, because of lack of power to make it. On March 7, 1932, the purported substitute trustee attempted to execute the power of sale and to foreclose the mortgage. The trustee’s foreclosure deed conveyed the 100-acre tract to Gaddis and McLaurin, but it was void, for the reason already stated.
After the trustee’s deed of 1932 to Gaddis and Mc-Laurin ivas executed and recorded, the 100-acre tract was assessed to Gaddis and McLaurin on the assessment rolls of Hinds County, beginning with the year 1932 through 1953, and Gaddis and McLaurin had paid all taxes assessed against the land during that period. In 1937 this partnership conveyed its interest to appellee corporation.
In 1933 J. L. Gaddis, Jr., representing his father, drove over the 19-acre tract on one occasion and went to the fence separating the 19-acre lot from the 100-acre [219]*219tract to the east, and looked over the fence at the 100 acres. In 1934 he drove over the 100 acres. On neither occasion did Mr. Gaddis tell the Nichols of his claim. Shortly after the foreclosure, James W. Nichols, who continued to live in a house on the 19-acre tract and to farm the 100-acre tract after his father’s death in 1930, received a letter from J. L. Gaddis, Sr., asking him to come to Bolton. He did so, and Gaddis advised him that he had purchased the place at the foreclosure sale. James W. agreed to rent it from Gaddis and Mc-Laurin. On January 23, 1933, Gaddis and McLaurin leased the 100-acre tract to James W. Nichols for ten years for an annual rent of a stated amount of lint cotton from the land ginned, baled and delivered. This contract also gave James W. Nichols an option to purchase the land for $2,000.00 during the period of the lease, if he also paid the taxes, and it provided for a credit on the purchase price of any rent payments made by him. The record also reflects that in 1936, 1944, 1948, 1949, 1950, and 1951, James W. Nichols executed rent notes to Gaddis and McLaurin, and that in 1937 Gad-dis and McLaurin made a new lease of the property for five years to James W. Nichols, containing a reduced rent. None of the leases were recorded. James ~W. Nichols paid rent to Gaddis and McLaurin from 1932 through the crop year of 1951, a period of 19 years, with cotton produced on the 100-acre tract.
In 1932 when James W. Nichols began renting the land as a tenant of Gaddis and McLaurin, he was living in a house on the adjoining 19-acre tract, with his wife and children. His mother, Mary Nichols, who was a co-signer of the deed of trust, and an uncle, Charlie Nichols, who died in 1946, lived in another house on the 19 acres.
James W. Nichols’ wife knew that he was paying rent over this period of years. He said that his Uncle Charlie and his mother “might have” known that he was renting from Gaddis and McLaurin. He also obtained from them “furnish” or supplies with which'to make [220]*220the crop for those years. James W. admitted that he knew during this period that Gaddis and McLanrin were claiming to own the 100-acre tract.
Early in 1952 James W. and Mr. Gaddis were unable to agree on the rent for the land for that year. Gaddis told him to go ahead and work it for a rent of one-fourth. He thought that James W. was doing that until the fall of 1952, when Gaddis learned that James W. had not made any crop on the 100-acre tract for 1952. After that, in 1952, Gaddis and McLaurin contracted to sell the land to W. P. Taylor. James W. then approached Taylor, and offered to buy it from Taylor. During 1952 and 1953 James W. continued to live on the 19-acre tract, concerning which property there is no dispute. The only access to the 100-acre tract is across the 19 acres. The sale to Taylor was not completed because in June 1953 a tractor driver for Taylor was refused passage across the 19-acre tract by James W. Nichols. Taylor leased the land from appellee in May 1953, and made a crop on it that year.
On June 17,1953, appellee, Gaddis and McLaurin, Inc., the successor in title of the partnership of Gaddis and McLaurin, filed the present suit in the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Hinds County against James W. Nichols, seeking an injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with appellee’s right to an easement over the 19-acre tract, and to enjoin the defendant from placing his cattle upon the 100-acre tract or using the same in any manner. The bill was later amended to make other, nonresident cotenants defendants, and to pray for a confirmation of appellee’s title. The answer of James W. Nichols denied the averments of the bill, and James W. sought by cross bill to confirm title to his undivided interest. The other seven defendants filed answers but no cross bill. Appellee, cross-defendant, denied that there was a valid legal title in cross-complainants and pleaded that appellee had obtained title by adverse possession.
[221]*221The chancery court found that the foreclosure sale and deed to Gaddis and McLaurin were invalid. However, it held that appellee had obtained title to the property by adverse possession against all of the tenants in common, and that appellee had also obtained an easement over the 19-acre tract by prescription. Hence the final decree adjudged that Gaddis and McLaurin, Inc., was the owner of the 100-acre tract and of an easement across the 19 acres. The claims of appellants were can-celled.
The chancery court held that there was an ouster of all of the cotenants, including those who lived away from the land, which began the ten-year statute of adverse possession running, and that appellee had obtained title to the land by adverse possession. Appellants argue that this finding is contrary to the great weight of the evidence considered in the light of established legal principles pertinent to this issue.
Because of the mutuality of their interests, possession and obligations, the relationship between co-tenants is confidential and fiduciary in nature. Each has a duty to sustain, or at least not to assail, the common interest and to sustain and protect the common title. It is a relationship of trust and confidence between co-owners of property. 86 C. J. S., Tenancy in Common, Sec. 17.
An ouster is the wrongful dispossession or exclusion by one tenant in common of his cotenants from the common property of which they are entitled to possession. An ouster cannot be proved merely by acts which are consistent with an honest intent to acknowledge the rights of the cotenant. It does not necessarily imply an act accompanied by force. Because of the relationship between tenants in common, possession which in ordinary cases would constitute adverse possession is not sufficient where entry was made as a tenant in common. In the present case, before the foreclosure in 1932 James W. Nichols was in possession [222]*222of the property as a tenant in common. In order to establish ouster of cotenants by a tenant in common in possession, the cotenants out of possession must have notice of his adverse claim either “from actual knowledge or as is sometimes vaguely expressed, by acts equivalent thereto,” as by conduct so unequivocal that knowledge on the part of the cotenant out of possession must be necessarily presumed. Hurst v. J. M. Griffin & Sons, Inc., 209 Miss. 311, 46 So. 2d 440, 47 So. 2d 811 (1950). The Hurst case further holds: “The testimony of such knowledge by the other tenants in common must be clear and convincing. Fox v. Wilkins, 201 Miss. 78, 28 So. 2d 577. It is not enough that the possession to convey title should be apparently adverse but must be such with actual notice to the cotenants or shown by such acts of repudiation of their claim as are equivalent to actual notice to them.”
In accord with these principles, the trial court was warranted in finding that James W. Nichols, his mother, Mary Nichols, Lou Toy McGowan, and Charlie Nichols knew of appellee’s adverse claim and possession, and that appellee had ousted them and owned title to their interests by adverse possession. James W. admitted that he knew, during the entire period of 19 years in which he was leasing the property from appellee, that appellee claimed title to it. During this time James W. took leases from appellee and executed notes to evidence the rent which he admittedly paid. He possessed the property as appellee’s tenant, and appellee relying thereon paid the taxes on it. He voluntarily assumed the status of a tenant attorning to his landlord, the appellee. A tenant in possession is estopped to deny his landlord’s title. 51 C. J. S., Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 266. Appellants contend that an owner of an undivided interest in land cannot hold against himself as a tenant of another. This question was mentioned but not decided in Heidelberg v. Duckworth, 206 Miss. 388, 40 So. 2d 179 (1949). However, in the [223]*223present case appellee took possession of the property-through its tenant, James W. Nichols, and James W. over a period of 19 years knew of appellee’s claim to the land and acknowledged it by renting the land from appellee. It is undisputed that appellee as well as James W. acted in good faith in claiming title to the property. He is estopped by his long continued course of conduct from now denying appellee’s title to his inherited, undivided interest as a cotenant.
The chancery court was also warranted in finding that appellant Mary Nichols, the mother of James W. Nichols, and the wife of J. N. or Jim Nichols, had actual knowledge or the equivalent that appellee during the entire period from 1932 through 1951 was claiming title to the property and was in possession of it through its tenant, James W. Nichols. Mary Nichols executed in 1930 the deed of trust on the 100-acre tract along with her husband, J. N. or Jim Nichols. During all of this period she was living in one of the two houses on the 19-acre tract near to James W. and his family. The chancellor was justified in concluding that in reason and common sense she must necessarily have known that James W. was renting the 100 acres from appellee and paying appellee as rent cotton produced from that land. Guión Williams, who had been associated with Gaddis and McLaurin since 1917 and is now secretary-treasurer of the corporation, testified that he prepared the leases and rent notes, and that after the property was foreclosed in 1932, James W. and “his mother, I understood at that time,” came down and wanted to rent the 100 acres.
Charlie Nichols, James W.’s uncle, lived with the rest of the family for most of the period from 1928 until his death in 1946. James W. first testified that Charlie lived for this entire period in an old log cabin on the 100-aere tract, but later he said that Charlie lived in a house on the 19 acres from 1928 to 1933, and that from the latter date until 1945 Charlie lived in the log house [224]*224on the 100 acres. Lonis Nichols, the wife of James W. Nichols, testified to the contrary. She said that Charlie was living in the log house on the 100 acres in 1930, but that he lived there only about a year, when he got in bad health and moved in the house with his sister-in-law on the 19-acre tract. The chancellor was justified in concluding, as we must assume that he did, that Charlie did not lived on the 100 acres but rather the 19-acre tract during the period James W. was renting from appellee, and that because the Nichols families lived together on the same tract in houses near each other, Charlie in reason must necessarily have known that James W. was renting the 100 acres from appellee. James W. testified that he did not know whether Charlie knew he was paying rent to appellee, he did not say anything to Charlie about it, but he “might have” known; and that he was “making no secret about it.”
We also think that the interest of appellant, Lou Toy McGowan, cotenant, is in the same position as Charlie Nichols’ interest is. Lou Toy is the child of Lem Nichols’ sister, Ethel Nichols, who died in 1918. Lou Toy moved on the 19 acres along with Lem and his wife, Henrietta, another appellant, in 1927. Apparently, Lem and Henrietta were taking care of her at that time. Lem died in 1930, and Henrietta moved to Louisiana. According to James W. Nichols, Lou Toy then went to live with his mother, Mary Nichols, who was living on the 19 acres. Lou Toy’s answer in this suit admits that she and also Charlie Nichols were living in 1932 in a house near the 100 acres, apparently on the 19-acre tract, and were farming the 100-acre tract. The answer admits that for the 18 years during which appellee claims adverse possession, she, along with James W. and Charlie Nichols, was living in a house near the 100 acres, and was farming that tract. Since Lou Toy was living on the 19 acres in a house near to that of James W. Nichols, and was helping him cultivate the 100-acre tract, we cannot say that the chancellor was manifestly wrong [225]*225in holding that she, as well as Charlie and Mary, either had knowledge or its equivalent to the effect that James W. was renting the land from appellee, who was claiming to own it, and attorning to appellee as a tenant. The chancellor could well have concluded that Lou Toy McGowan, living on the same small tract with her kinsmen and helping them cultivate the 100 acres, must necessarily have known of James W.’s tenancy and-of appellee’s adverse claim.
Under all of these circumstances, we think that the chancellor was justified in concluding that Mary and Charlie Nichols, cotenants, and Lou Toy McGowan knew that appellee was claiming title to the 100 acres, and knew that James W. was in possession of that tract as the tenant of appellee.
On the other hand, we do not think that an ouster of the remaining cotenants was established by appellee. There was no proof whatever that the other cotenants, most of whom lived in other states during that period of adverse possession claimed by appellee, had any actual knowledge that appellee was claiming to own the land and was possessing it adversely through a tenant, their cotenant, James W. Nichols. Prior to the 1932 foreclosure, James W. Nichols was in possession of the land as a cotenant. After the attempted foreclosure, the same cotenant, James W., continued in possession of the property without any ostensible change. In Smith v. Anderson, 193 Miss. 161, 8 So. 2d 251 (1942), it was held that this is an important circumstance; that a purchaser at a void tax sale was required to do something to denote a change in the character of possession as compared with that preceding the commencement of the three-year adverse possessory period asserted in that case; and that the change must be such as would afford notice to the former owner that the land is being appropriated by another to his use. In that case a cotenant in possession continued in possession as a tenant of the purchaser at the tax sale.
[226]*226Nor was there any physical entry by appellee which would suffice to give the other cotenants out of possession notice of appellee’s adverse claim. On one occasion in 1934 J. L. Gaddis, Jr., acting for his father, drove in his car over the 100 acres. He talked to none of the Nichols at that time. James "W. Nichols testified that the same Mr. Gaddis sometime in 1933 drove on the 19-acre tract and looked over the fence dividing it from the 100 acres, but that Mr. Gaddis did not talk with any of the Nichols at that time. Appellee paid taxes on the property, but, although that is strong evidence of a claim of title, it does not suffice to give notice of appellee’s claim to the other cotenants. McCaughn v. Young, 85 Miss. 277, 37 So. 839 (1904). The burden of paying-taxes is one which devolves equally upon all of the co-tenants, and one in possession and receiving all the profits is deemed to have undertaken the discharge of certain duties to the other cotenants, such as payment of taxes, at least to the extent of the profits he receives. 14 Am. Jur., Cotenancy, Sec. 41.
On the wall of the chancery clerk’s office in Raymond was an ownership map of the county, stating title in this land to be in Gaddis and McLaurin, but that gave no notice to cotenants out of possession. The evidence as to general reputation of ownership in the community was ambiguous. And, for reasons hereinafter stated, we do not think that the recording of the void trustee’s deed to appellee gave any notice to the other cotenants of the grantee’s adverse claim.
The cotenants, other than James W. Nichols, Mary and Charlie Nichols, and Lou Toy McGowan, lived away from the property, and the stated circumstances wholly failed to show that they had either actual knowledge or the equivalent of that, of appellee’s claim and adverse possession of the land. The same cotenant continued in possession after the foreclosure as before, but as tenant of appellee. Accordingly, we think that the trial court [227]*227was in error in finding an ouster of the tenant in common, other than James W. Nichols, Mary Nichols, Charlie Nichols, and Lou Toy McGowan.
It is suggested that J. N. or Jim Nichols acquired full title to the 100 acres prior to his death in 1930, by paying taxes on the land from 1915 to 1930, and by living on it and claiming the same adversely to his eotenants, the other four grantees in the 1897 deed. J. N. Nichols moved off of the 100 acres and onto the 19-acre tract around 1924. The 19 acres were bought around 1906, and in later years various members of the Nichols family lived on the 100-acre tract. Neither James W. Nichols nor any other of the defendants’ witnesses testified that for more than ten years prior to 1930 J. N. Nichols was claiming the land adversely to his cotenants. Herbert Wilson, a witness for appellee, testified that he came to Mississippi in 1913 and lived on land adjoining the 100-acre tract; that he knew J. N. Nichols, and that at some indefinite time not stated by the witness, J. N. Nichols told him that the land belonged to him. But since J. N. Nichols was a cotenant in possession of the land until his death in 1930, and since the evidence clearly shows that the 100-acre tract was lived on by numerous members of the Nichols family for many years before 1930, as a family property, we do not think that J. N. Nichols acquired full title to the land before his death. Clear and convincing evidence is essential to support an ouster by a co-tenant and moreover, with the possession scrambled among various members of the Nichols family, the rule that possession by a cotenant in common with other owners is not exclusive is pertinent. 2 C. J. S., Adverse Possession, Sec. 48; 1 Am. Jur., Adverse Possession, Sec. 142.
Appellee urges that the recording of the trustee’s foreclosure deed to Gaddis and McLaurin in 1932 is sufficient within itself as a legal ouster and disseisin of the cotenants, and that the recording of the deed alone [228]*228is constructive notice to them of appellee’s adverse possession, and is sufficient to start the running of the ten-year adverse possession statute.
Appellee’s contention is based primarily upon the authority of Peeples v. Boykin, 132 Miss. 359, 96 So. 177 (1923). Mrs. M. J. Rosser died intestate in 1899, owning certain land in Bolivar County. She left as some of her heirs one son by her first marriage, W. G. Peeples, a complainant, and also the heirs of a daughter by her first marriage, Mary Peeples, also complainants. She also left as her heirs four children by her second marriage, Lena, Lillian, and Henry Rosser, and a child who died while a minor, intestate, unmarried, and without issue. The complainant lived in Grenada County, and the heirs of his sister, Mary Peeples, also lived away from Bolivar County, some of them in Oklahoma. Lena Rosser married a man named Boykin. The opinion is not clear as to whether Lena Boykin was in possession of the property at the time of her mother’s death in 1899, or immediately after. But she was in possession in 1904, when her brother and sister, Lillian, conveyed to her “our two-thirds undivided interest in and to the land inherited by us and the grantee from our mother . . . The above land is now owned by us and the grantee herein as the only heirs at law of our said mother and it is our intention to convey all interest in said land which we inherited from our said mother.” The deed was recorded in the same month that it was executed, May 1904.
Complainants sought a partition of the property. None of them had actual knowledge that their mother, Mrs. Rosser, owned any property at the time of her death. Lena Boykin advised W. G. Peeples of their mother’s death about three months after it occurred, but did not tell him that she owned any land. Complainants did not go to Bolivar County after Mrs. Rosser’s death to ascertain whether she owned any property, and never saw any of the other children until 1920, [229]*229twenty-one years after the death of Mrs. Rosser, when they learned that she had owned the land in question, and brought this suit for partition. After 1904, the date of the deed to her, Lena Boykin was in possession of the land, and in the suit she pleaded title to all of it by adverse possession under the deed from her brother and sister, to the exclusion of the complainants. She had placed mortgages upon the property in 1904, 1905, 1906, and 1907. Complainants asserted that they had no knowledge of any hostile claim of Lena, and, since she was a cotenant, she was in possession for all cotenants. The chancery court held that Mrs. Lena Boykin was the sole owner of the land by virtue of her adverse possession. This decree was affirmed on appeal. The Court said that the question was whether the recording of the 1904 deed to Mrs. Boykin and of the later mortgages was sufficient to give notice to complainants of a hostile assertion of title by her. It was held that, “the record of the deed imparts notice to the world of its contents,” and that “this is as effectual for setting the statute in motion as actual notice would have been;” that “the recording of the deed in 1904 gave notice to the claim asserted by the defendant under the deed.”
Since this decision in 1923, Peeples v. Boykin has been cited in several cases, and in at least two opinions the Court expressed doubt as to its literal correctness. In none of the cases citing Peeples v. Boykin did the Court rely upon a recorded deed alone as being notice to the other cotenants of the adverse possession and ouster of them.
In Thomasson v. Kinnard, 153 Miss. 398, 121 So. 109 (1929), the Court did not apply Peeples v. Boykin, but observed that it merely holds a fee simple deed to a co-tenant may constitute “color of title.” Color of title determines the area to which an adverse possessory claim extends, but presupposes that there is adverse possession. The following cases cite Peeples v. Boykin but involve situations where the Court found that there was [230]*230actual knowledge of the other cotenants that the person in possession was claiming- as the owner of the entire title: Farnsworth v. O’Neal, 158 Miss. 218, 130 So. 101 (1930); Davis v. Gulf Refining Co., 202 Miss. 808, 32 So. 2d 133, 34 So. 2d 731 (1947); McDonald v. Roberson, 204 Miss. 737, 38 So. 2d 189 (1948).
Alewine v. Pitcock, 209 Miss. 362, 47 So. 2d 147 (1950), stated that it was unnecessary there to invoke the decision of Peeples v. Boykin. The facts reflected the equivalent of actual knowledge. In Chatman v. Carter, 209 Miss. 16, 45 So. 2d 841 (1950), the Court cited Peeples v. Boykin in observing that the execution of a mineral deed was “evidence of an ouster,” but there were numerous other circumstances which it was thought might be sufficient on a new trial to make a question of fact as to whether the cotenant’s possession had ousted the other cotenant. In Hurst v. J. M. Griffin and Sons, Inc., 209 Miss. 381, 46 So. 2d 440, 47 So. 2d 811 (1950), and Smith v. Smith, 211 Miss. 481, 52 So. 2d 1 (1951), the Court cited Peeples, but affirmed a finding of the trial court that there had been no ouster. See also Walker v. Easterling, 215 Miss. 429, 61 So. 2d 163 (1952); Wall v. Wall, 71 So. 2d 308 (Miss. 1954).
In Boyd v. Entrekin, 209 Miss. 51, 45 So. 2d 848 (1950), the facts involved considerably more than the recordation of the 1902 deed to support an ouster of the cotenants. Appellants admitted that they thought it was their mother’s land and knew that she had possessed it as her own for over sixteen years after all of the children reached majority. She did not act in bad faith. The cotenants had been completely indifferent to their rights. Two of the appellants were present when the mother was negotiating- in 1936 to sell to Entrekin, and one was present when the deed was signed. It was held that they were so completely indifferent to their rights that they should not be permitted in equity to prevail over one acting in good faith and for a sufficient consideration. Boyd v. Entrekin was properly decided on [231]*231the facts. Peeples v. Boykin did not determine that decision. Eastman Gardiner and Co. v. Hinton, 86 Miss. 604, 38 So. 779 (1905), is not in point. A stranger there entered into possession, not a cotenant, as here.
In McDonald v. Roberson, snpra, it was pointed out that the ‘ ‘ soundness of the opinion in Peeples v. Boykin has been frequently questioned, and we have mentioned it in order to disclose that we do not base our present decision upon it.” In Hurst v. J. M. Griffin and Sons, Inc., supra, the Court again indicated that it would not accept literally the expressions in that opinion.
Peeples v. Boykin was incorrectly decided. We do not think that the mere recording alone of a fee simple deed by a cotenant “imparts notice” to other cotenants of an adverse claim to land by the granteecotenant, and do not think that “this is as effectual for setting the statute in motion as actual notice would have been,” as was-held in Peeples. This ignores the nature of the relationship of tenants in common, and the fact that a tenant in common out of possession is entitled to assume that a cotenant in possession holds for all cotenants, until he is given knowledge to the contrary, or the equivalent thereof, which must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. As was said in Hulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 182, 23 S. E. 233 (1895), “No one is required to watch the clerk’s office to see that those in possession of property in privity with him or in subordination to his title are not acquiring rights adverse to him. ’ ’
The rule consistent with reason, precedent, and sound morals is that stated in 1 Am. Jur., Adverse Possession, Sec. 56.1 (1954 Supp.): “Conceivably, a court may hold that a tenant in sole possession of land may by merely recording a deed thereof purporting to convey full title to himself give notice to his cotenants of a purpose, otherwise secret, to hold the premises exclusively, but no decision unmistakably to that effect has been found . . . The general conclusion which seems [232]*232most consistent with the cases as a whole ... is that the mere record of a deed purporting to convey the entire property in land to a tenant in possession is not, as matter of law, notice to cotenants of the adverse character of the grantee’s possession; although it is true that such record taken together with significant circumstances attending the grantee’s possession may justify, and in some instances may require, a finding of notice. While, according to the view generally adopted, the record of a deed to an avowed cotenant in possession is notice to the other cotenants of the existence of the deed, such record is not, according to the prevailing view, in itself notice that the grantee is claiming adversely under the deed and not as a cotenant.” See also ibid., Secs. 53, 54, and 56; 86 C. J. S., Tenancy in Common, Sec. 38, pp. 398-399; Anno. 121 A. L. R. 1441 (1939).
The fact that here the possession by a cotenant was not for himself as owner hut as a tenant for one claiming under a void trustee’s foreclosure deed does not deflect application of these principles. He was in possession before and after the foreclosure. For these reasons Peeples v. Boykin is hereby overruled. We adopted the principles stated above.
Appellee says that Peeples v. Boykin establishes a rule of property, and the overruling of it cannot he made applicable to this case, but only prospective. However, we do not think that it is a rule of property within that sense of the.term. Peeples v. Boykin simply stated an evidential test as to the quantum and weight of evidence to he considered in determining the time when the period of adverse possession begins to run. It deals with a question of fact not law. It is not even a rule of evidence within the common law sense of that term. Cf. 21 C. J. S., Courts, Secs. 212, 213.
The inherited interests of appellants, James W. Nichols, Lou Toy McGowan, and Mary Nichols, to the extent that the ten-year statute of adverse possession has run on such interests in favor of appellee, are vested in ap[233]*233pellee. On the other hand, where the ten-year statute has not run on a particular interest inherited by these three appellants, the ten-year period being computed from the date of acquisition of such interest, appellee of course has obtained no title to that interest. The title inherited by Charlie Nichols, who died in 1946, is vested in appellee. The inherited interests of appellants, Henrietta, Curtis, Matthew, Welborn and K. B. Nichols, for reasons already stated, are vested in them and not. in appellee. The interest purchased by James W. Nichols in a deed dated March 5, 1953, from Willie Nichols and eight other cotenants is not subject to appellee’s claim, and is owned by James W. Nichols. At that time he was not a tenant of appellee. He last rented the 100 acres from appellee in 1951. Moreover, at that time he was asserting an interest contrary to appellee. And since he did not execute any instrument of conveyance under which appellee claims, the after-acquired property doctrine is not pertinent. In view of the numerous fractional interests of the parties and of the nature of the case, this cause is reversed and remanded- for further proceedings in the chancery court in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
McGehee, C. J., Robercls, Kyle, Holmes, Arrington and Gillespie, JJ., concur.