Doris K. Jones v. Office of Personnel Management

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 14, 2015
StatusUnpublished

This text of Doris K. Jones v. Office of Personnel Management (Doris K. Jones v. Office of Personnel Management) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doris K. Jones v. Office of Personnel Management, (Miss. 2015).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DORIS K. JONES, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-0831-14-0566-I-1

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL DATE: May 14, 2015 MANAGEMENT, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NO NPRECEDENTIAL 1

Doris K. Jones, Elyria, Ohio, pro se.

Roxann Johnson, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM’s) reconsideration decision that denied her request for a survivor annuity. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add sign ificantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 The appellant filed an appeal from OPM’s reconsideration decision denying her request for a survivor annuity as the former spouse of William Jones. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. The appellant and Mr. Jones were married in 1991. IAF, Tab 6 at 52. He retired on June 30, 2004, at which time he elected a survivor annuity for the appellant. Id. at 52-53. Although the appellant and Mr. Jones divorced on May 27, 2005, he did not notify OPM of the divorce and he continued to receive a reduced annuity until his death on September 4, 2013, 108 months later. Id. at 15, 24-39. OPM denied the appellant’s application on October 30, 2013. Id. at 17. On reconsideration, OPM reversed its initial decision and determined on April 15, 2014, that she was eligible for a survivor annuity. Id. at 11. OPM subsequently rescinded its April 15 determination and affirmed its initial decision on May 6, 2014. Id. at 6. OPM denied the appellant’s application on the basis that the divorce decree did not provide for the former spouse annuity, and because Mr. Jones did not elect to provide for an annuity within 2 years of the divorce. Id. at 6-10. 3

¶3 After holding a hearing, the administrative judge affirmed OPM’s reconsideration decision, finding that the appellant and Mr. Jones divorced on May 27, 2005, that the court decree did not provide for a former spouse annuity, and that there is no court order or court-approved property settlement that provides for such an annuity. IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 5. The administrative judge found further that Mr. Jones received OPM’s annual notices in December 2005, and December 2006, which were fully compliant with statutory requirements to advise him that he had to make a new election to provide a survivor annuity for a former spouse, but that he failed to elect a survivor annuity for the appellant. ID at 3-7. To the extent the appellant argued that there is no evidence that Mr. Jones received the notices, the administrative judge found that OPM’s affidavit stating that notices were sent to all annuitants, along with copies of the 2005 and 2006 notices, was sufficient to meet OPM’s burden of showing that Mr. Jones was on notice and that the appellant did not meet her burden of showing that he did not receive them. Accordingly, the administrative judge found that the appellant had not met her burden of proving her eligibility for the survivor annuity benefit she sought. ID at 8. ¶4 The burden of proving entitlement to a survivor annuity is on the applicant for benefits. Cheeseman v. Office of Personnel Management, 791 F.2d 138, 140-41 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A divorce terminates a prior election of spousal survivor benefits. 5 U.S.C. § 8339(j)(5)(A). A former spouse of an annuitant is entitled to a survivor annuity if and to the extent expressly provided for in an election under 5 U.S.C. § 8339(j)(3) or in the terms of any decree or divorce or annulment or any court order or court-approved property settlement incident to such decree, as specified in 5 U.S.C. § 8341(h)(1). The election under 5 U.S.C. § 8339(j)(3) shall be made at the time of retirement or, if later, within 2 years after the date on which the marriage of the former spouse is dissolved. 5 C.F.R. § 831.632. Under 5 U.S.C. § 8339(j) and (k)(2), OPM is required by statute to 4

notify annuitants annually of their survivor annuity election rights. Brush v. Office of Personnel Management, 982 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1992). ¶5 On review, the appellant asserts that there are factual discrepancies in the initial decision which may have caused the administrative judge to reach the wrong result. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. For instance, she argues that, while the “divorce decree makes no mention of an annuity,” the divorce decree also does not state that there was no annuity. The appellant asserts that, because Mr. Jones had elected a survivor annuity prior to his retirement, he felt no need to mention the annuity in the decree. Id. However, where a divorce decree does not explicitly provide for a survivor annuity, as is the case here, the former spouse would have had to make a timely election under 5 U.S.C. § 8339(j)(3), which Mr. Jones did not do. The appellant also asserts that the administrative judge erred in stating that she testified during the hearing that her former spouse handled his mail with his sister, when she actually stated that his sister handled his mail after his death, not while he still was living. PFR File, Tab 1.

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Doris K. Jones v. Office of Personnel Management, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doris-k-jones-v-office-of-personnel-management-mspb-2015.