OPINION
BERZON, Circuit Judge.
Background
Donald Jebian, now 63, worked as a software engineer for Hewlett-Packard [1175]*1175continuously from 1983 to May 1995. In 1990 he began to suffer from a series of orthopedic impairments that caused him pain and made it difficult for him to move normally.
Jebian first developed bilateral shoulder pain. It turned out that he had a massive rotator cuff defect in his right shoulder, which was not diagnosed until 1995. In 1992, Jebian also began to experience back pain. Doctors determined that the cause was lumbar spinal stenosis.1 His doctors agree that his stenosis is congenital rather than the result of injury. Later, Jebian was diagnosed with lumbar degenerative disc disease, which exacerbated his back pain.
Jebian stopped work in May 1994 because of intractable back pain. He had a lumbar discectomy in June 1995, the first of several surgeries. Because his back pain persisted after the surgery, he had a second surgery on his back in the fall of 1995. Dr. Stark, who examined Jebian at Hewlett-Packard’s request with regard to a worker’s compensation claim in October 1995, predicted that Jebian would need yet another surgery on his back. Jebian also underwent two surgeries on his shoulders in 1996, one on each.
Jebian was a participant in an employee benefit plan (“the Plan”) covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. The Plan, self-funded by Hewlett-Packard and administered by an independent claims administrator, Voluntary Plan Administrator (“VPA”), offers both short-term and long-term disability leave. Short-term disability benefits last up to 39 weeks. An applicant for short-term disability benefits must show that “following the onset of the injury or sickness, the Member is continuously unable to perform each and every duty of his or her Occupation.”
After 39 weeks, an employee still unable to work must apply separately for long-term disability benefits. Long-term benefits are granted under the Plan if “the Member is continuously unable to perform any occupation for which he or she is or may become qualified by reason of his or her education, training or experience” (emphasis added). The Plan stipulates that disability determinations for either long— or short-term benefits are to be “made by the Claims Administrator on the basis of objective medical evidence.”
After first leaving work in May 1995 Jebian applied for and received short-term disability benefits. He applied for long-term benefits after the requisite 39 weeks of short-term benefits. VPA initially denied the application, but on appeal reversed its decision. By the time of that reversal, Jebian had returned to work, so long-term benefits were granted retroactively only for the six-week period before Jebian returned to work.
Jebian shortly left work once again due to the same medical conditions. He tried to return to work in May 1997, but within a matter of weeks he left work for a third time, this time not to return.
VPA found Jebian eligible for short-term disability benefits when he left work in June 1997. In February 1998, with the 39th week of his short-term benefits approaching, Jebian again applied for long-term benefits. VPA denied Jebian’s application for long-term disability benefits on August 3,1998.
VPA’s letter of denial based its decision on two reports that it had commissioned concerning Jebian’s condition: a “Work [1176]*1176Capacities Assessment” conducted by physical therapists employed by Health-South, a company that conducts such physical assessments for insurers and employers, and an “Employability Assessment Report” conducted by a vocational consultant employed by Rehab West, a company that provides vocational assessments.
VPA’s denial letter relied largely on HealthSouth’s representation that Jebian could tolerate “sitting, walking, trunk bending, overhead reaching, squatting,” and other functions, though the Health-South report had noted that Jebian had substantive limitations in his ability to carry out these functions. The letter also cited and adopted Rehab West’s conclusion that Jebian was professionally and physically qualified to perform four occupations' — user support analyst, data processing auditor, sales representative for computers and electronic data processing systems, and technical training instructor. The 1998 Rehab West report was identical to one that had formed the basis for the decision to deny Jebian long-term disability benefits two years earlier (a decision that, as noted, was retracted by VPA on appeal). Rehab West did not conduct its own medical exam of Jebian. Rather, the Rehab West report concluded, in one sentence, that “[i]t also appears that these occupations are within his physical capabilities as per the medical reports provided.” It is not clear from the record which medical documents were provided to Rehab West. Precisely the same sentence regarding medical reports had appeared in the 1996 Rehab West report, although Jebi-an’s medical circumstances had changed greatly by 1998.2 Further, the Rehab West report does not indicate that any of the jobs it suggests could be done by a person who can sit or stand only for limited time periods.3
In November 1998, Jebian appealed the denial of benefits. He argued that crucial records were not considered, that some medical records were misread, and that the alternative employment recommendations were based on erroneous readings of the medical information. Enclosed with his appeal was a letter from Dr. James Landes. Dr. Landes, who had examined Jebian in September 1998, reviewed medical records, the HealthSouth and Rehab West reports, and the denial letter; emphasized that Jebian is incapable of prolonged sitting or standing; and pointed out that the four jobs recommended by Rehab West all involve one or the other. Dr. Landes urged VPA to reconsider its decision.
Under the Plan’s language, Jebian’s “claim shall be deemed to have been denied on review” if VPA neither responds within 60 days nor informs the claimant that it could take up to 60 days longer to respond. On March 15, 1999, 119 days after receiving Jebian’s appeal, VPA wrote to Jebian, responding to his objections but leaving the appeal pending to consider further medical documentation. VPA wrote to Jebian again in June 1999, stating that it was still awaiting some medical records and that the appeal therefore remained pending.
On September 29, 1999, Jebian filed his complaint in district court. Only after that, on November 5, 1999, did VPA send Jebian a letter finally denying his claim for long-term disability benefits.
The district court reviewed VPA’s decision for abuse of discretion and granted summary judgment to the Plan. We reverse. We conclude that the proper stan[1177]*1177dard of review of VPA’s decision in this case is de novo. Since the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the treating physician rule applies to ERISA plan decisions. Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1139 (9th Cir.2001). We remand in light of both our conclusion concerning the appropriate standard of review and our decision in
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OPINION
BERZON, Circuit Judge.
Background
Donald Jebian, now 63, worked as a software engineer for Hewlett-Packard [1175]*1175continuously from 1983 to May 1995. In 1990 he began to suffer from a series of orthopedic impairments that caused him pain and made it difficult for him to move normally.
Jebian first developed bilateral shoulder pain. It turned out that he had a massive rotator cuff defect in his right shoulder, which was not diagnosed until 1995. In 1992, Jebian also began to experience back pain. Doctors determined that the cause was lumbar spinal stenosis.1 His doctors agree that his stenosis is congenital rather than the result of injury. Later, Jebian was diagnosed with lumbar degenerative disc disease, which exacerbated his back pain.
Jebian stopped work in May 1994 because of intractable back pain. He had a lumbar discectomy in June 1995, the first of several surgeries. Because his back pain persisted after the surgery, he had a second surgery on his back in the fall of 1995. Dr. Stark, who examined Jebian at Hewlett-Packard’s request with regard to a worker’s compensation claim in October 1995, predicted that Jebian would need yet another surgery on his back. Jebian also underwent two surgeries on his shoulders in 1996, one on each.
Jebian was a participant in an employee benefit plan (“the Plan”) covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. The Plan, self-funded by Hewlett-Packard and administered by an independent claims administrator, Voluntary Plan Administrator (“VPA”), offers both short-term and long-term disability leave. Short-term disability benefits last up to 39 weeks. An applicant for short-term disability benefits must show that “following the onset of the injury or sickness, the Member is continuously unable to perform each and every duty of his or her Occupation.”
After 39 weeks, an employee still unable to work must apply separately for long-term disability benefits. Long-term benefits are granted under the Plan if “the Member is continuously unable to perform any occupation for which he or she is or may become qualified by reason of his or her education, training or experience” (emphasis added). The Plan stipulates that disability determinations for either long— or short-term benefits are to be “made by the Claims Administrator on the basis of objective medical evidence.”
After first leaving work in May 1995 Jebian applied for and received short-term disability benefits. He applied for long-term benefits after the requisite 39 weeks of short-term benefits. VPA initially denied the application, but on appeal reversed its decision. By the time of that reversal, Jebian had returned to work, so long-term benefits were granted retroactively only for the six-week period before Jebian returned to work.
Jebian shortly left work once again due to the same medical conditions. He tried to return to work in May 1997, but within a matter of weeks he left work for a third time, this time not to return.
VPA found Jebian eligible for short-term disability benefits when he left work in June 1997. In February 1998, with the 39th week of his short-term benefits approaching, Jebian again applied for long-term benefits. VPA denied Jebian’s application for long-term disability benefits on August 3,1998.
VPA’s letter of denial based its decision on two reports that it had commissioned concerning Jebian’s condition: a “Work [1176]*1176Capacities Assessment” conducted by physical therapists employed by Health-South, a company that conducts such physical assessments for insurers and employers, and an “Employability Assessment Report” conducted by a vocational consultant employed by Rehab West, a company that provides vocational assessments.
VPA’s denial letter relied largely on HealthSouth’s representation that Jebian could tolerate “sitting, walking, trunk bending, overhead reaching, squatting,” and other functions, though the Health-South report had noted that Jebian had substantive limitations in his ability to carry out these functions. The letter also cited and adopted Rehab West’s conclusion that Jebian was professionally and physically qualified to perform four occupations' — user support analyst, data processing auditor, sales representative for computers and electronic data processing systems, and technical training instructor. The 1998 Rehab West report was identical to one that had formed the basis for the decision to deny Jebian long-term disability benefits two years earlier (a decision that, as noted, was retracted by VPA on appeal). Rehab West did not conduct its own medical exam of Jebian. Rather, the Rehab West report concluded, in one sentence, that “[i]t also appears that these occupations are within his physical capabilities as per the medical reports provided.” It is not clear from the record which medical documents were provided to Rehab West. Precisely the same sentence regarding medical reports had appeared in the 1996 Rehab West report, although Jebi-an’s medical circumstances had changed greatly by 1998.2 Further, the Rehab West report does not indicate that any of the jobs it suggests could be done by a person who can sit or stand only for limited time periods.3
In November 1998, Jebian appealed the denial of benefits. He argued that crucial records were not considered, that some medical records were misread, and that the alternative employment recommendations were based on erroneous readings of the medical information. Enclosed with his appeal was a letter from Dr. James Landes. Dr. Landes, who had examined Jebian in September 1998, reviewed medical records, the HealthSouth and Rehab West reports, and the denial letter; emphasized that Jebian is incapable of prolonged sitting or standing; and pointed out that the four jobs recommended by Rehab West all involve one or the other. Dr. Landes urged VPA to reconsider its decision.
Under the Plan’s language, Jebian’s “claim shall be deemed to have been denied on review” if VPA neither responds within 60 days nor informs the claimant that it could take up to 60 days longer to respond. On March 15, 1999, 119 days after receiving Jebian’s appeal, VPA wrote to Jebian, responding to his objections but leaving the appeal pending to consider further medical documentation. VPA wrote to Jebian again in June 1999, stating that it was still awaiting some medical records and that the appeal therefore remained pending.
On September 29, 1999, Jebian filed his complaint in district court. Only after that, on November 5, 1999, did VPA send Jebian a letter finally denying his claim for long-term disability benefits.
The district court reviewed VPA’s decision for abuse of discretion and granted summary judgment to the Plan. We reverse. We conclude that the proper stan[1177]*1177dard of review of VPA’s decision in this case is de novo. Since the district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the treating physician rule applies to ERISA plan decisions. Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1139 (9th Cir.2001). We remand in light of both our conclusion concerning the appropriate standard of review and our decision in Regula.
DISCUSSION
I
A challenge to an ERISA plan’s denial of benefits is reviewed de novo “unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989). If a plan does grant such discretion, a reviewing court applies an “abuse of discretion” or — what amounts to the same thing — an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. See Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471 n. 2 (9th Cir.1994).
The Plan before us explicitly grants discretion to decide appeals from denials of claims for benefits to the Plan administrator. The pertinent language reads: “The Claims Administrator shall have the discretionary authority to construe the language of the plan and make the decision on review on behalf of the Organization.”
The question before us, of first impression in this circuit, is whether a plan administrator’s decision, otherwise within the administrator’s discretion,' can be accorded judicial- deference when the' purported final, discretionary decision is not made until after the claim is, according to both the terms of the plan and Department of Labor (DOL) regulations, already automatically deemed denied on review. We conclude that where, according to plan and regulatory language, a claim is “deemed ... denied” on review after the expiration of a given time period, there is no opportunity for the exercise of discretion and the denial is reviewed de novo.
Jebian’s letter appealing the denial of benefits is dated November 11, 1998 and was received by VPA on November 16, 1998. VPA did not respond until March 15¡ 1999.4 VPA’s decision after that lapse in time was in violation of both the DOL’s ERISA regulations and Plan language. Both the Plan and a DOL regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503 — l(h)(l)(i) (1998),5 required some written notice in response to an appeal within 60 days — even if only to establish an extension. Any appeal not responded to within the requisite time limit was deemed denied. The Plan stated:
If a claimant has not received written notice that additional time is required for review within sixty (60) days of the date his or her request for review is [1178]*1178received by the Claims Administrator, the claim shall be deemed to have been denied on review.
See also 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(4) (1998) (similarly providing that appeals neither timely decided nor extended were deemed denied).
The regulation and the Plan further required in all instances a final determination within 120 days (60 days plus the 60-day allowable extension) of the appeal. Again, the regulation and the Plan deemed any claim denied unless there was a final determination within that time limit. The Plan stated:
If a claimant receives proper and timely notice that additional time is required for review, but does not receive written notice of the Claims Administrator’s decision with respect to his or her claim within one hundred twenty (120) days after the date the Claims Administrator receives the request for review, the claim shall be deemed to have been denied on review.
See also 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(4) (1998) (similarly providing that claims neither timely decided nor extended on review were deemed denied).
VPA’s March 15 letter was written a day before the 120 day limit. The letter responded to Jebian’s objections but left the case open to consider further medical documentation. Thus, even if we ignore the initial failure to respond, according to the regulation and the Plan’s terms Jebian’s claim, the appeal of which was not decided within 120 days, was deemed denied on March 16.
VPA asks us, in effect, to ignore the “deemed ... denied” language in the regulation and the Plan and to treat its March 15 letter as a good faith component of the “meaningful dialogue between ERISA plan administrators and their beneficiaries,” Booton v. Lockheed Med. Benefit Plan, 110 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir.1997), reinstating the Plan’s discretion to determine the claim. We decline to do so.
Firestone directed us to abide by the principle from trust law that “a court of equity will not interfere to control” trustees “in the exercise of a discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they act.” Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111, 109 S.Ct. 948 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The instrument in this case does vest discretion, but the same instrument and the regulation that governed it set time boundaries within which that discretion must be exercised. We are just as bound by the Plan language deeming denial in the event that time limits are exceeded as we are bound by the Plan language that grants discretion to the Plan administrator. Decisions made outside the boundaries of conferred discretion are not exercises of discretion, the substance of the decisions notwithstanding. If we were to accept VPA’s suggestion, use of the language of discretion — that is, providing reasons and asking for more information — would become a talisman by which administrators could ensure deference even when they are expressly precluded by the trust agreement from exercising discretion because the time for doing so has passed. To avoid creating such a talisman, we treat Jebian’s appeal as having been “deemed ... denied” pursuant to the Plan’s plain terms, and review the denial of the claim de novo as one involving no exercise of discretion.6
Our holding is consistent with the rule in at least three other circuits on an analogous issue. Those circuits considered whether deference is owed to a decision to [1179]*1179revoke benefits when that decision is made by a body other than the one authorized by the procedures set forth in a benefits plan. Sanford v. Harvard Indus., 262 F.3d 590, 597 (6th Cir.2001); Sharkey v. Ultramar Energy, 70 F.3d 226, 229 (2d Cir.1995); Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 986 F.2d 580, 584 (1st Cir.1993). All three circuits concluded that no deference is owed under these circumstances.
The principle underlying these wrong decision-maker cases is that although Firestone directs courts to defer to the decisions of plans in which their language grants discretionary authority, that deference applies only when the decision is made by the body vested with discretion. “When an unauthorized body that does not have fiduciary discretion to determine benefits eligibility renders such a decision ... deferential review is not warranted.” Sanford, 262 F.3d at 597. Similarly, here we will not defer when a decision is, under the Plan, necessarily the mechanical result of a time expiration rather than an exercise of discretion.7
We note that this principle may apply more generally to decisions made in violation of procedures prescribed by applicable regulations or the plan itself. Sanford explained that “[t]he logic behind [the cases denying deference to plan decisions made by a body other than the one granted discretion] is that deferential review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is merited for decisions regarding benefits when they are made in compliance with plan procedures” (emphasis added). 262 F.3d at 597. When decisions are not in compliance with regulatory and plan procedures, deference may not be warranted.
It. is already clear that procedural violations can affect the merits determination concerning whether an abuse of discretion has taken place. Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.1984) (abrogation on other grounds recognized by Dytrt v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel. Co., 921 F.2d [1180]*1180889, 894 n. 4 (9th Cir.1990)), ruled that “[o]rdinarily, a claimant who suffers because of a fiduciary’s failure to comply with ERISA’s procedural requirements is entitled to no substantive remedy,” but that if procedural violations result in “substantive harm,” then “a court must consider [such violations] in determining whether the decision to deny benefits in a particular case was arbitrary and capricious.” Blau, 748 F.2d at 1353-54. Blau left open the question whether procedural violations influence the standard of review. Id. at 1353. Moreover, Blau was decided before Firestone, when our default standard for reviewing ERISA plan decisions was “arbitrary and capricious” rather than de novo. For present purposes, we leave the more general issue open and decide only that where the plan itself provides that a particular procedural violation results in an automatic decision rather than one calling for the exercise of the administrator’s discretion, that provision is as enforceable as the provision giving the administrator discretionary authority under other circumstances. Deemed denials are not exercises of discretion. They are therefore undeserving of deference under Firestone and a de novo standard of review applies.8
II
On the merits of the denial of benefits, Jebian points out that VPA never had him examined by, or his medical records reviewed by, a doctor. Neither of the evaluations upon which VPA based its decision was prepared by a doctor. The Health-South assessment was conducted by physical therapists. The Rehab West report was prepared by a “vocational consultant.”
Rehab West found Jebian to be capable of four occupations. The report first describes those occupations as ones “Jebian can do within his education and vocational background.” The report adds: “It also appears that these occupations are within his physical capabilities as per the medical records provided,” but, as noted, it is not clear from the record which medical records were reviewed by Rehab West, and Rehab West issued identical reports in 1996 and 1998 despite changes in Jebian’s medical circumstances.
Jebian stresses, furthermore, that VPA’s decision is in tension with the opinions of several doctors, including the doctors who treated him, all of whom agree that Jebian can neither sit nor stand except for a very short time and is therefore permanently disabled. Dr. James Stark examined Jebi-an at Hewlett-Packard’s request with regard to a workers’ compensation claim. Dr. Stark wrote in October 1995, after Jebian had undergone his second back sur[1181]*1181gery, that “Mr. Jebian is not capable of working at this time because of his sitting and standing limitations. It is not clear whether he will ever be able to compete in the open labor market because of pain related physical limitations.”
Dr. Lu, who has treated Jebian since February 1995, filled out a “Physician’s Certification of Disability” for Jebian in September 1997. Dr. Lu noted on that form that Jebian “has tried to RTW [return to work] twice, but was unable to tolerate sitting more than a few. minutes at a time, or standing.” Dr. Lu filled out another Hewlett-Packard Company form on January 30, 1998. This time Dr. Lu checked a box stating that his patient is “now totally disabled from any other work.” Dr. Lu checked another box indicating that he did not “expect a fundamental or marked change in the future.” Dr. Lu commented on the form that Jebian is subject to a “[s]evere limitation of sitting and standing ([maximum 5 minutes] at a time)” and “has too much pain to sit or stand more than a few minutes at a time.”
Dr. Landes, who began treating Jebian in September 1998 after Jebian moved to a new area, stated in his November 1998 letter in support of Jebiaris appeal that patients with his condition “are permanently precluded from activities requiring ... prolonged sitting or prolonged standing,” and that “[h]is current physical exam findings confirm the information in the records and support his claim of permanent disability, limiting him to sedentary work.” Dr. Landes also reviewed in his letter the particular occupations cited by the Rehab West report, concluding that Jebian could not stand or sit for sufficiently sustained periods to perform the jobs recommended. Even the HealthSouth Report relied upon by YPA, for that matter, seems to indicate that Jebian can only sit for twenty minutes at a time and stand for thirty minutes at a time. Additionally, there was medical corroboration of Jebi-an’s constant pain, in the form of extensive records concerning his participation in a study, supérvised by Dr. Lacy, of a new pain medication. To obtain' the medication, Jebian was required to keep a diary and visit Dr. Lacy’s office frequently, which he did.
VPA chose, despite this evidence, to deny Jebian benefits in accord with the suggestion of the Rehab West report that there were four occupations in the market that Jebian was capable of performing. The district court found that VPA did not abuse its discretion in doing so. After the, district court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Regula, 266 F.Bd 1130, that the treating physician rule applies to ERISA plan decisions. According to the rule, an ERISA plan administrator must “give deference to the opinions of the claimant’s treating physician, because he is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual.” Id. at 1139 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Applying the Regula rule and the de novo standard of review to the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Jebian is disabled. See Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). There is medical evidence in the record from Jebian’s treating physicians documenting the physiological basis for his back pain; the aggressive surgical treatment he underwent; the persistence of the pain, necessitating continued treatment with innovative painkillers; and professional assessments that Jebian was functionally precluded from standing or sitting for more than a few minutes at a time.
VPA argues that Jebian’s extensive medical evidence does not pertain to the relevant moment, which is-the end of the temporary disability benefit period, March 3, 1998. A trier of fact, reviewing the entire record submitted to VPA, could conclude otherwise. For example, although [1182]*1182VPA rejected records from 1995 as “immaterial” to Jebian’s disability in March 1998, in fact those records are pertinent, although certainly not determinative. They both trace the history of Jebian’s back injury and indicate that it is capable of causing total disability. Jebian’s treating physician, Dr. Lu, certified on January 30, 1998, that Jebian remained severely functionally limited due to his back injury. Dr. Lu’s opinion was based on a June 1997 office visit and over two years’ experience in treating Jebian’s back ailment. Finally, Dr. Landes, contrary to the district court’s understanding, did examine Jebian himself, in September 1998, and based his October 1998 letter in part on that examination.
A trier of fact, reviewing the evidence before VPA de novo, could infer that functional limitations confirmed by treating physicians in June 1997, May 1998, and September 1998, more likely than not existed in March 1998 as well, rather than disappearing before March 1998 and reappearing thereafter. Further, applying the Regula treating physician rule, a de novo trier of fact could conclude that VPA’s explanations of its decision to this point have provided no “specific, legitimate reasons ... based on substantial evidence in the record,” 266 F.3d at 1140 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), for rejecting this inference based on the treating physicians’ reports.
While under an abuse of discretion standard our review is limited to the record before the plan administrator, McKenzie v. General Tel. Co., 41 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir.1994), this limitation does not apply to de novo review. Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir.1995) (on remand, district court has discretion to take additional evidence “when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review of the benefit decision”).9 Neither Jebian nor the Plan has had the opportunity to consider whether, in light of the new Regula standard, they wish to submit further evidence for the trial court’s consideration. The trial court therefore has not determined whether to admit such additional evidence so as to “enable the full exercise of informed and independent judgment.” Id. at 943; see also id. at 944 (a “change in the posture of the case” can justify taking additional evidence on de novo review). We therefore remand to the district court to allow consideration of further developments of the record under the Mongeluzo standard and de novo review of the denial of the benefits claim.10
[1183]*1183Conclusion
We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Plan and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.