Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation v. Adobe Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided January 7, 2020·No. 4:18-cv-01553·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 DOLBY LABORATORIES LICENSING 7 CORPORATION, Case No. 18-cv-1553 YGR

8 PLAINTIFF, PRETRIAL ORDER NO. 4 RE: MOTIONS 9 V. IN LIMINE

10 ADOBE INC. F/K/A, ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED 11 DEFENDANT. 12 ____________________________________ 13 AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM 14 Before the Court are the parties’ respective motions in limine (“MIL”). (Dkt. Nos. 250, 251, 15 253, 254, 255, 254, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 274.) Having 16 considered the papers submitted, the filings to date, and the other arguments and submissions at the 17 Pretrial Conference held on December 20, 2019, the Court finds the following as to each motion in 18 limine: 19

20 Dolby’s MIL Requested Relief and Basis for Relief 21 MIL 1: Dolby need not offer the Fourth Adobe Offerings Chart into evidence with the prior versions, and that version is excluded, 22 Fourth “Adobe because Adobe should not be permitted to take back facts that 23 Offerings Chart” were undisputed until the very end of discovery.

24 The motion is DENIED. The fourth offerings chart is admissible evidence in this case, as are all prior versions of the chart, the deadline for the close of fact discovery, and Adobe’s purported 25 representations about what Dolby technology was in Adobe’s products. The jury may afford as much weight to the fourth offerings chart as it deems appropriate in light of all the evidence. 26

27 1 MIL 2: Documents and other evidence regarding versions of Adobe software products allegedly provided to certain Dolby employees 2 E Sov fi td we an rc ee Pof r oA vd ido eb de f Ro .r E“ vp ie dr .s o 4n 0a 1l , u 4s 0e 3” . )a re not relevant or admissible evidence. (Fed. for Dolby 3 Employees’ 4 “Personal Use”

5 The motion is DENIED. The proffered evidence is circumstantial evidence regarding the 6 knowledge of Dolby employees who, at the time they purportedly had access to Adobe products for “personal use,” were representing Dolby in its business relationship with Adobe. Insofar as 7 the evidence may be prejudicial to Dolby, it is not unduly so, and thus, exclusion of all such evidence is not warranted. 8

9 MIL 3: Mr. Tregillis’ testimony regarding third-party Connor Consulting’s attempted audit of Adobe’s royalty payments to 10 Christian Tregillis Dolby is based on “observations” only; because he has no opinions Testimony regarding the subject, he cannot provide admissible testimony. 11 Regarding the (Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 702.) Audit 12

13 As an initial matter, the parties may not violate this Court’s standing order by stipulating to reserve arguments for motions in limine that should be brought in Daubert motions. Dolby should have 14 raised the arguments set forth in this motion in Dolby’s Daubert motion regarding Mr. Tregillis. Thus, on this basis alone, Court is inclined to deny the motion as untimely. Further, to the extent 15 this motion raises arguments already raised in Dolby’s Daubert motion, this motion is an improper motion for reconsideration. That said, the motion appears to have some measure of merit and, 16 accordingly, is DENIED IN PART, AND GRANTED IN PART. 17 As this Court held in its order on the Daubert motions and has previously articulated, reports 18 themselves are not admissible. Insofar as Mr. Tregillis summarizes Mr. Meyer’s opinions or other admissible evidence in paragraphs 160-164 of his rebuttal report, he is permitted to testify to those 19 opinions to the extent they actually rebut opinions offered by Mr. Meyer during trial. Further, 20 insofar as the evidence referenced in paragraphs 190-206 is admitted through an appropriate source, Mr. Tregillis can rely on the same for his opinion in paragraphs 207-208. He himself 21 though cannot attest to the same. The same is true of the evidence referenced in paragraphs 209- 220 and 223-237. Mr. Tregillis’ opinion testimony may be solicited by way of hypotheticals (i.e. 22 assuming certain testimony exists or is found to be true) or by establishing the foundation for an expert opinion on a particular topic (i.e. how royalty audits are performed and the standards that 23 govern such audits) and then soliciting the opinion on the same with reference to the basis (again, 24 assuming the evidence is in the record).

25 // 26 // 27 1 MIL 4: Adobe cannot introduce evidence of alleged overpayments unless and until Adobe provides that it requested a refund or took other action to obtain a 2 E Ov vi ed re pn ac ye m o ef nts by c pr re ed ci ot n b de itf io or ne ut nh de e rn te hx et cq ou na tr rt ae cr tl .y (p Fa ey dm . Ren . t E vw ia ds . 4d 0u 1e , 1w 0h 4i (c bh ) .)is a required Adobe Before 3 Proof of Certain 4 Preliminary Facts

5 The motion is DENIED. The Court is not persuaded that there was a “condition precedent” to the 6 refund of any overpayment. Even if there was, however, the proffered evidence is relevant to the issue of damages. The jury is entitled hear such relevant evidence, which may support 7 Adobe’s position regarding overpayment, and weigh that in light of the totality of the evidence.

8 MIL 5: Dolby’s annual revenues from its overall licensing program have 9 Evidence of n Ao d ore bl ee ’v sa bn rc ee a t co h eth s i os fc ca ose n ta rn acd t t ah ne d m ino fn re inta gr ey m c eo nn ts . e q (Fu ee dn .c Res . o Ef v id. 10 Dolby’s Annual 401, 402, 403.) Licensing Revenues 11 12 The motion is GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Adobe introducing this evidence on cross- examination after asking for and receiving permission from the Court at the time of trial. Although 13 evidence that Dolby receives a portion of its revenue from licensing may be relevant to the issues in this case, the Court anticipates that the likelihood of prejudice from introducing specific revenue 14 figures may outweigh any relevance. The balancing of these issues depends on the parties’ positions at trial and the testimony of their witnesses, hence the need to discuss the issue in 15 advance with the Court.

16 MIL 6: The Court should exclude any reference during the jury trial to 17 prejudgment interest as this will be applied to the judgment by the Evidence of Court after the jury enters its verdict. (Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 18 Prejudgment 403.) Interest 19

20 The motion is DENIED. At the Pretrial Conference, Dolby represented that it was seeking prejudgment interest based on a contractual, rather than statutory, rate. As such, evidence of 21 prejudgment interest is relevant and admissible.

22 MIL 7: Dolby’s audits of other third-party licensees are entirely irrelevant 23 Evidence of Other t (o F eth di . s R c .a Ese v iw d.h 4er 0e 1 t , h 4e 0 o 2n , l 4y 0 r 3e .)le vant audit is the audit of Adobe. Audits 24 The motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Dolby reasserting the objection at the time of 25 trial on the basis of relevance or under Rule 403. Although the minute details of Dolby’s audits of third-party licensees appear irrelevant to this case, depending on the parties’ positions at trial 26 and the testimony offered by their witnesses, aspects of the proffered evidence may be relevant 27 to the credibility of the persons testifying and whether Dolby breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when performing its audit of Adobe in 2015. 1 Adobe’s MILs Requested Relief and Basis for Relief MIL 1: Motion to exclude any evidence, inquiry, or argument regarding Adobe’s 2 Form 10-Ks, including Dolby’s use of the securities filings as a vehicle to 3 A and do b Fe o’ rs m R e 1v 0e -Knu se s discuss either Adobe’s revenues or profits. (Fed. R. Evid.

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Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation v. Adobe Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2020).

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