Doiban v. United States

• Court: United States Court of Federal Claims
• Decided: October 15, 2024
• Docket: 24-809
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

HENRY DOIBAN,

Plaintiff, No. 24-cv-809 v. Filed: October 15, 2024 THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Henry Doiban, Brooklyn, New York, Plaintiff, appearing pro se.

Elinor J. Kim, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Washington, D.C., appearing for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff Henry Doiban, 1 appearing pro se, filed a Complaint alleging a

myriad of claims purportedly based on “unlawful actions” perpetrated by “United States agencies.”

Complaint (ECF No. 1) (Complaint or Compl.) at 3. 2 Generally, Plaintiff’s claims arise from four

separate incidents: (1) the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home in New York, (2) an administrative

1 Plaintiff appears to bring this suit as the executor of his own trust. See Compl. at 1 (styling caption as “[i]n Proper Person . . . Henry Doiban executor / beneficiary”); id. at 6–7; Notice to court of Claimants Executor Letter for ORDER of Judgement Entry (ECF No. 9) (Executor Letter) at 1 (describing Plaintiff as “Executor of the estate public trust for entity HENRY DOIBAN”). A trust cannot be represented pro se. Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Rule(s)) 83.1(a)(3); see Williams v. United States, 482 F. App’x 580, 582 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Therefore, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s statements as an assertion of sovereign citizenship on behalf of himself, Henry Doiban, seeking recovery in his personal capacity. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”). 2 Citations throughout this Memorandum and Order reference the ECF-assigned page numbers, which do not always correspond to the pagination within the document. proceeding in Oregon that revoked business licenses from Plaintiff, (3) an arrest of Plaintiff in

Kentucky for possession of illegal drugs, and (4) a seizure of money by the Port of Seattle Police.

See generally Compl.; Compl. Ex. 1 (ECF No. 1-1) (Compl. Ex. 1) at 1–2. 3

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), contending

that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss (ECF No. 6) (Motion or Mot.) at 1. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion

is GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Complaint asserting claims arising under a variety of

constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, and other authorities that stemmed from four

separate incidents. See generally Compl.; Compl. Ex. 1. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on

July 25, 2024, contending that this Court lacks jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Mot. at 1.

Plaintiff responded to the Motion on July 31, 2024. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) (Resp.).

On August 9, 2024, Plaintiff attempted to file a defective pleading, which was filed on

August 13, 2024 by leave of the Court as a supplement to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss. See Order, dated Aug. 13, 2024 (ECF No. 8); Executor Letter. The next day,

on August 14, 2024, Defendant filed its Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff

attempted to file another defective pleading that contained unredacted, private information.

Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10); Order,

dated Aug. 15, 2024 (ECF No. 11) (August 15, 2024 Order). The Court returned the defective

3 Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s Complaint begins as a continuation of the relief sought. See Compl. at 12 (noting that relief is “Continued [at next page],” which matches Plaintiff’s pagination to begin exhibit one). Accordingly, the Court cites both docket entries throughout this Memorandum and Order. 2 filing to Plaintiff with leave to refile as a Sur-Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss once

Plaintiff removed the private information. August 15, 2024 Order. On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff

refiled his corrected Sur-Reply. Plaintiffs Notice of Supplement to Plaintiffs Response to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) (Sur-Reply).

The same day, on August 19, 2024, the Court granted leave for Plaintiff to file another

defective pleading, which the Clerk of Court’s office had received on August 15, 2024. Order,

dated Aug. 19, 2024 (ECF No. 12); Plaintiffs Response to Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s

Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14). On August 22, 2024, Plaintiff

attempted to file another defective pleading, which the Court rejected. Order, dated Aug. 22, 2024

(ECF No. 15).

On September 3, 2024, after briefing was complete on Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff filed

a Motion for Declaratory Judgment. ECF No. 16. The Court stayed briefing on Plaintiff’s Motion

for Declaratory Judgment pending resolution of the present Motion. See Order, dated Sept. 4,

2024 (ECF No. 17) (Order Staying Briefing). On September 6, 2024, following the Order Staying

Briefing, Plaintiff attempted to file a defective pleading in support of his Motion for Declaratory

Judgment, which was filed by leave of the Court on September 9, 2024. See Order, dated Sept. 9,

2024 (ECF No. 18); Notice of Executory Order Declaratory Judgment Supplement Rule 60 (ECF

No. 19).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges a bevy of constitutional and statutory claims. Although the specifics are

at times difficult to discern, most allegations appear to stem from four unrelated occurrences: (1)

“[h]ome mortgage [f]raud” related to the foreclosure of a New York home, Compl. Ex. 1 at 1, 4–

6, 19–30; (2) “administrative fraud” following “[f]orfeiture of licenses by color of law contested

hearings” by the Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission, see id. at 1–2, 7, 31–33; (3) an arrest 3 in Kentucky for possession of illegal drugs and seizure of Plaintiff’s property subsequent to that

arrest, see id. at 2, 8, 38–42; and (4) the seizure of $43,950 by the Port of Seattle Police, see id. at

2, 9, 43–44. Plaintiff seeks monetary redress, including pain and suffering damages related to

these incidents. Id. at 1–2. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks “[d]amages for pain and suffering by the

actions of the[] ‘STATE’.” id. at 2. This pain and suffering claim, Plaintiff asserts, stems from

“sweet equity . . . and over 40 years of physical, mental and psychological damages claimed.”

Resp. at 1.

Plaintiff points to multiple constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and miscellaneous other

authorities to invoke jurisdiction. These include a description of this Court and its jurisdiction

under the Tucker Act; Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution; Article III, Section 1 of

the Constitution; 28 U.S.C. § 132; 15 U.S.C. § 1635; the District of Columbia Organic Act of

1871; 27 C.F.R. § 72.11; “District of Columbia Circuit D-U-N-S number”; the definition of

“remedy” from Black’s Law Dictionary; and a reference to “[t]he Judgment Fund.” 4 See Compl.

at 1–2.

As noted, Plaintiff’s allegations largely stem from four separate incidents, which are more

specifically described below. First, Plaintiff alleges “[h]ome mortgage [f]raud” for a “[h]ome

purchased in 2004” on Rathbun Avenue in Staten Island. Compl. Ex. 1 at 1, 19–30. Plaintiff

asserts “tax lien title transfer fraud, . . . home sale forced closing, title company fraud and

$800,000[] [e]quity stolen from sale for fraudulent theft of equity by NYS DOF and other NY

4 Plaintiff cites additional constitutional provisions, statutes, and authorities he claims invoke this Court’s jurisdiction along with the facts of the four alleged incidents. See Compl. at 3–4; Compl. Ex. 1 at 1–2. Those are discussed below with the specific alleged incidents.

4 agencies.” 5 Id. at 1. Plaintiff attaches a filing, “Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale” for a property

in Staten Island New York with case number 1353867/2013 in the Richmond County division of

the New York Supreme Court. Id. at 1, 19–30. The pleading lists Plaintiff as a defendant in the

foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 19. Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of $920,000 in losses from the

mortgage fraud, including $800,000 in equity. Id. at 1. Plaintiff also asserts that he paid two

attorneys for ten years related to the New York foreclosure. Id.; see also id. at 3–5 (noting invoices

and payments to attorneys).

Second, Plaintiff alleges that the forfeiture of certain Oregon business licenses through

state administrative proceedings amounts to “administrative fraud” by “US agenc[ies]” acting

under “color of law.” Id. at 1–2. Plaintiff also claims that at least one of his state business licenses

was fraudulently transferred. Id. at 2. Plaintiff references seven business licenses and attaches a

document from an administrative proceeding before the Office of Administrative Hearings for the

Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission. Id. at 1–2, 31–37. The hearing document lists Henry

Doiban as a member of Integrity Management, LLC, which appears to be the holder of the relevant

licenses. Id. at 31. Plaintiff requests $1,830,000 under this claim, which includes $150,000 for

each of the seven licenses, $80,000 in legal costs, and $700,000 from his “[i]nvestment into

businesses of forfeited licenses,” which includes “[e]quipment, build outs, business furnishings,

inventory loss, etc.” Id. at 1.

5 Plaintiff does not define NYS DOF or specify which New York agencies he brings these claims against. See Compl. Ex. 1 at 1. “NYS DOF” may refer to the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, or the New York City Department of Finance. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAX’N & FIN., https://www.tax.ny.gov/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2024); N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF FIN., https://www.nyc.gov/site/finance/index.page (last visited Oct. 15, 2024). Regardless, both are state or local government agencies. 5 Third, Plaintiff seeks redress for violation and deprivation of his constitutional and

statutory rights by the “US Agency COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY LYON COUNTY”

stemming from an arrest related to illegal drugs. Id. at 2, 38–41. On May 4, 2023, after stopping

Plaintiff for an improper vehicle registration plate, Kentucky police “located a large amount of US

currency, 3 gold bars[,] over 4 grams of cocaine, marijuana, MDMA and adderall” in Plaintiff’s

vehicle. Id. at 38. Police seized these items and arrested Plaintiff. Id. On October 6, 2023, a

grand jury indicted Plaintiff on five counts stemming from the arrest. Id. at 40–41. Plaintiff’s

filings do not indicate the outcome of his criminal charges, but according to Plaintiff the

Commonwealth of Kentucky did not return the seized items. See id. at 2 (requesting compensation

for “[c]ash” and “2 one ounce gold bars”); Compl. at 6 (same).

Along with the facts of the Kentucky arrest, Plaintiff asserts a barrage of constitutional

rights, federal statutes, state statutes, and proposed statutes that were allegedly violated. Compl.

Ex. 1 at 2 (referencing deprivation of rights “under the US Constitution[] specifically the bill of

right’s [sic] and US Code specifically title 18 and others listed”). More specifically, Plaintiff cites

the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Ex Post Facto clause of Article

1 of the Constitution, Section 1-201 of the Uniform Probate Code, Kentucky Revised Statute

Section 418.005, and over twelve federal statutes across five chapters of the United States Code.

Compl. at 3–4. The federal statutes include:

12 USC § 1821 - Insurance Funds 15 USC § 77ww[w] - Liability for misleading statements 15 USC§ 77xxx - Unlawful representations 18 USC 8 “Bank Bonds” si [sic] “Currency” 18 USC § 241 Conspiracy Against Rights 18 USC§ 242 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law 18 USC 245(b)(2) Protected Activities 18 USC 514 “Fictitious Obligation” prohibited 18 USC 891-894 Extortionate Credit Transactions 18 USC 31[14] Return of seized property

6 22 USC § 611 “Foreign Relations and Intercourse” 33 USC§ 2715 - Subrogation U.S. Code

Compl. at 4.6 In later filings, Plaintiff cites the following additional statutes along with those cited

above: 11 U.S.C. § 727, 15 U.S.C. § 1635, 18 U.S.C. § 872, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, 29 U.S.C. § 1109,

and 31 U.S.C. § 3130. 7 Sur-Reply at 7

Plaintiff requests damages totaling $84,000 related to the Kentucky arrest. Compl. Ex. 1

at 2; Executor Letter at 5 (listing total for fines in fee schedule and for specific damages from each

claim). This includes $47,000 for the cash and gold bars allegedly seized; $5,000 for Plaintiff’s

bail bond; $3,000 for purported cash and travel expenses; and $25,000 for an “[i]llegal

misrepresentation by foreign agent BAR (British Accreditation Registrar).” 8 Compl. Ex. 1 at 2.

Plaintiff also requests that this court “[i]nstruct Kentucky Attorney General to Order [Lyon County

Kentucky] to dismiss all charges with prejudice and execute the instructions provided by my

executor letter.” Id.

Further, in his Executory Letter, for the first time, Plaintiff attaches a chart of damages,

styled as a “Fee Schedule,” which appears related to the Kentucky arrest. Executor Letter at 4–5.

6 Plaintiff cites 15 U.S.C. § 77ww, which does not exist. The Court construes this as a citation to 15 U.S.C. § 77www, which is entitled “Liability for misleading statements,” and matches the name of statute Plaintiff includes in his filing. See Compl. at 4. Plaintiff references 18 U.S.C. § 3141 in his Complaint as entitled “Return of seized property.” Id. However, the provision entitled “return of seized property” appears at 18 U.S.C. § 3114. Plaintiff also cites 18 U.S.C. § 3114 in his Response. Resp. at 2. Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiff’s reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3141 as 18 U.S.C. § 3114. 7 Plaintiff did not cite these statutes in his Complaint but asserted them in a later filing. See Sur- Reply at 7. As such, these claims—and other claims added in subsequent filings—are not properly before the Court. See Kimble v. United States, 991 F.3d 1238, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2021). As discussed further infra, even if considered this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. 8 The Court notes that while Plaintiff’s itemized damages related to the Kentucky arrest total $80,000, Plaintiff requests $84,000. 7 The fee schedule includes thirty-two “fines” that total $6.6 million in damages. Id. Plaintiff

includes a second fee schedule as Exhibit Four to the Executor Letter that includes 65 fines totaling

$14,239,500. Executor Letter Ex. 4 at 66–68. All 32 claims from the Executor Letter are included

in Exhibit Four to the Executor Letter. Compare Executor Letter at 4–5, with Executor Letter Ex.

4 at 66–68.

The fee schedule indicates that the “damages” for these 65 items “in part, were determined

BY THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF,” that immunity is invalid under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other

statutes, and that these “[v]iolations of law are legally unassailable due to precedents (violations

of law) established by court cases.” Executor Letter at 66, 68. These appear to mostly relate to

Plaintiff’s Kentucky arrest because the fines allege constitutional violations related to arrest,

seizure, trial, and imprisonment, which Plaintiff only alleges in his Kentucky claim. See id. at 4–

5 (including fines for “charges DENIED PROPER WARRANT(S),” “charge ARMED

VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS,” “DENIED PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION,” and

“UNLAWFUL INCARCERATION”). Further, Plaintiff’s Kentucky arrest claim alleged “[i]llegal

misrepresentation by foreign agent BAR” and the fee schedule includes a fine for “ACTING AS

AGENTS OF FOREIGN PRINCIPLES” [sic]. Compl. Ex. 1 at 2; Executor Letter at 5. As the fee

schedule claims appear to stem from the actions of Kentucky police, prosecutors, or other state

actors, the Court construes them as such.

Fourth, Plaintiff brings a claim for an “[u]nlawful seizure of property by PORT POLICE

OF SEATTLE AIRPORT.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that the Port of Seattle Police

seized $43,950 “from MARIAH ALLIANO” on February 15, 2022. Id. at 2, 43–44. In support,

Plaintiff attaches a “Notice of Hearing” in “Administrative Forfeiture Proceedings for the Port of

Seattle Police Department” under Section 69.50.501(1)(g) of the Revised Code of Washington.

8 Id. at 43–44 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.501(1)(g)). The notice of hearing listed Plaintiff as

a party to the administrative proceeding and provided a process for adjudicating the seizure. Id. at

43–44. For this claim, Plaintiff seeks the return of the alleged value lost, $43,950. Id. at 2.

Finally, beyond these four instances, Plaintiff makes passing references to copyright

claims, identity theft, breach of contracts, breach of fiduciary responsibilities, breach of trust, and

trust fraud. See Compl. at 3. Plaintiff also makes repeated references to trusts, and, as a final

remedy sought, seeks to appoint the Court and Clerk of Court as fiduciary trustees to his personal

estate. See id. at 6; Executor Letter at 1; Sur-Reply at 3–4.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

As the primary source of jurisdiction for the United States Court of Federal Claims, the

Tucker Act vests this Court with jurisdiction over any suit against the United States for money

damages “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an

executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States . . . in cases

not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign

immunity for “certain claims for monetary relief against the United States,” but it does not create

a right to relief itself. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014);

see United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 218 (1983).

Instead, to establish a right of relief under the Tucker Act, “plaintiff must identify a separate

source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.” Fisher v. United States, 402

F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216); see Todd v. United States, 386

F.3d 1091, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)).

The constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision must be “fairly . . . interpreted as mandating

compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” Testan, 424 U.S. at 400 9 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009

(Ct. Cl. 1967)). Put differently, it must “expressly create[] a substantive right enforceable against

the federal government for money damages.” LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed.

Cir. 1995) (citing Testan, 424 U.S. at 398). Accordingly, this Court’s limited subject matter

jurisdiction does not extend to “every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a

regulation.” Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216.

While this Court has jurisdiction over monetary claims against the United States, it lacks

jurisdiction over claims against private parties, state actors, or federal officials. United States v.

Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (“[I]f the relief sought is against others than the United States

the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.”); Brown v. United

States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims

jurisdiction over suits against the United States, not against individual federal officials.”). A

“[p]laintiff cannot establish jurisdiction in this Court by merely naming the United States as

defendant where the true nature of her allegations are lodged against a private party.” Richardson

v. United States, No. 23-1744, 2024 WL 1193418, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 20, 2024); Beauvais v.

United States, No. 2024-1353, 2024 WL 2860170, at *1 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2024) (“Although

[plaintiff’s] complaint lists the United States as the defendant, [she] only makes allegations about

her two prior employers. . . . Here, the suit as to these two private companies is plainly beyond the

jurisdiction of the Claims Court.”); Cooper v. United States, 771 F. App’x 997, 1000 (Fed. Cir.

2019) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Brazos Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. United States, 144

F.3d 784, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (“Although the complaint names the United States as the sole

defendant in the case caption, ‘we customarily look to the substance of the pleadings rather than

their form’ to determine whether jurisdiction exists.”); Lisa Richardson-Henderson Tr. v. United

10 States, No. 23-cv-1896, 2024 WL 3688527, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 6, 2024) (“[S]imply listing the

United States as the defendant in the caption of a Complaint is insufficient to invoke this Court's

jurisdiction.”); Fullard v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 294, 300 (2007) (“A plaintiff cannot invoke

Tucker Act jurisdiction by merely naming the United States as the defendant in the caption of the

complaint but failing to assert any substantive claims against the federal government.”).

It is axiomatic that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions

of state or federal courts. Jones v. United States, 440 F. App’x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

Moreover, the “Court of Federal Claims cannot entertain a taking claim that requires the court to

‘scrutinize the actions of’ another tribunal.” Vereda, Ltda. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).

Indeed, “whether in state or federal court,” a plaintiff’s “recourse concerning a prior adverse

decision is ‘the statutorily defined appellate process.’” Nickerson-Malpher v. United States, No.

17-612C, 2017 WL 2303516, at *6 (Fed. Cl. May 26, 2017) (quoting Shinnecock Indian Nation v.

United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).

The Court of Federal Claims also lacks “jurisdiction over criminal matters generally.”

Jones, 440 F. App’x at 918. It is well established that this Court lacks jurisdiction over claims of

criminal conduct and “has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal

criminal code.” Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Court also lacks

jurisdiction over tort claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims

shall have jurisdiction . . . in cases not sounding in tort.”); Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195,

1197 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It is well settled that the United States Court of Federal Claims lacks . . .

jurisdiction to entertain tort claims.”). Further, the Court lacks jurisdiction over claims based on

11 sovereign citizen-type arguments. See Walby v. United States, 957 F.3d 1295, 1297, 1302 (Fed.

Cir. 2020); Potter v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 24, 29 (2022). 9

While this Court generally has “jurisdiction over express and implied-in-fact contract

claims against the United States,” it lacks jurisdiction over such claims where a plaintiff fails to

plausibly allege such a contract. Stephens v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 341, 347 (2023) (citing

City of El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also Trauma Serv.

Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“To show jurisdiction in the Court of

Federal Claims, [plaintiff] must show that either an express or implied-in-fact contract underlies

its claim.”); Starrett v. United States, No. 2022-1555, 2023 WL 152827, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 11,

2023) (“Because . . . [plaintiff] does not plausibly allege the existence of an express or implied

contract with the United States, the Claims Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case

and correctly dismissed [plaintiff’s] complaint.”). It is also well-established that constitutional

provisions are not offers to a contract. See Clawson v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 366, 370 (1991)

(citing Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985)) (“Where rights and obligations

are prescribed by statute and regulation rather than determined through the mechanics of a bilateral

exchange, there is no contract . . . .”); Taylor v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 171, 173 (2013) (noting

that the Constitution cannot be a valid contract between a private citizen and the United States).

9 Sovereign citizens often “attempt to convince courts that their status as sovereign citizens differs from the status of the fictional individuals identified by their birth certificates or their social security numbers.” Potter, 161 Fed. Cl. at 28. Sovereign citizens often advance a theory that “all Citizens were ‘pledged’ as collateral for the national debt,” thereby creating a “fictional ‘public’ person” in whose name the alleged trust is held. See id. (citing Jessica K. Phillips, Not All Pro Se Litigants Are Created Equally: Examining the Need for New Pro Se Litigant Classifications Through the Lens of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1221, 1226 (2016)). 12 When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

this Court “accepts as true all uncontroverted factual allegations in the complaint, and construes

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Estes Express Lines, 739 F.3d at 692; see also

Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In considering a motion to dismiss,

this Court must liberally construe a complaint filed by a pro se litigant because pro se complaints,

“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). Pro se plaintiffs must

still, however, demonstrate this Court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See

Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Curry v. United

States, 787 F. App’x 720, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2019). While this Court allows ambiguities in pro se

filings, it “does not excuse . . . failures” on the merits. Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799

(Fed. Cir. 1995). To that end, regardless of a plaintiff’s pro se status, this Court must dismiss

claims outside its limited subject matter jurisdiction. See Rule 12(h)(3).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims fall outside of this Court’s jurisdiction under even the most liberal

construction. Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff fails to invoke a money-

mandating statute or constitutional provision; (2) the United States is not the proper defendant for

Plaintiff’s claims and, even if it were, Plaintiff’s claims do not involve a money-mandating statute

or an implied-in-fact contract; and (3) this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear any of Plaintiff’s

remaining, miscellaneous claims.

13 I. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to Allege a Separate Source of Substantive Law that Creates the Right to Money Damages.

Plaintiff references a litany of constitutional provisions, statutes, and legal treatises to

assert jurisdiction. Compl. at 1–2 (jurisdiction section). In the jurisdiction section of his

Complaint, Plaintiff describes this Court and its jurisdiction, accurately noting that this Court has

jurisdiction “to render a money judgment on any claim against the United States founded on the

Constitution, a federal statute, a federal regulation, an express or implied-in-fact contract with the

United States, or any other claim for damages not sounding in tort.” Compare id. at 1, with 28

U.S.C. § 1491. Accordingly, the Court construes the Complaint as an invocation of the Tucker

Act.

However, invocation of the Tucker Act alone does not afford this Court with jurisdiction.

Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216. None of the authorities cited by Plaintiff carries his jurisdictional burden

to identify a “separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages,” such as

a money-mandating constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision, for jurisdiction to vest in the

Court. Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172; see also Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 748.

To begin, Plaintiff’s constitutional citations do not confer jurisdiction. See Compl. at 1–2.

Plaintiff cites Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution; Article III, Section 1 of the

Constitution; and 28 U.S.C. § 132. Id. As Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss notes, these provisions

are not money-mandating sources of law. Mot. at 3–4. Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 vests

Congress with authority over the District of Columbia and other federal land, such as military

bases. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Article III, Section 1 establishes the judicial branch itself,

while 28 U.S.C. § 132 provides for the creation of district courts, not for this Court. U.S. CONST.

art. III, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 132. Indeed, “[o]ther than the guarantee that federal judges will not have

their compensation diminished while in office, . . . no money mandate can be found” in Article III,

14 Section 1. Haddad v. United States, No. 15-1418C, 2017 WL 398353, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 30,

2017) (citing United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 560–61 (2001)). In contrast, Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not reference or relate to the portion of Article III, Section 1 that provides that the

salary of judges shall not be diminished nor is Plaintiff a judge to whom this provision would

apply. See Compl. at 4. In sum, nothing in the constitutional provisions cited by Plaintiff can be

read to “expressly create[] a substantive right enforceable against the federal government for

money damages.” See LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1028 (citing Testan, 424 U.S. at 398). As none of the

constitutional provisions cited by Plaintiff create a right to money damages, those provisions are

not a basis to confer jurisdiction on this Court.

Plaintiff’s other statutory citations also fail to confer jurisdiction. Plaintiff appears to cite

the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871, which established a territorial government over the

District of Columbia. Compl. at 2 (citing “CR Feb. 21, 1871. Vol xvil. p. 16 District of Columbia

constituted a body corporate for municipal purposes”). This statute, which established a local

government in the Nation’s capital, is entirely unrelated to any facts plead and fails to “expressly

create[] a substantive right enforceable against the federal government for money damages.” See

LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1028 (citing Testan, 424 U.S. at 398). Plaintiff also points to 15 U.S.C. § 1635,

a provision of the Truth in Lending Act. Compl. at 2; Sur-Reply at 7. However, the “Truth in

Lending Act . . . create[s] no private right of action enforceable against the federal government for

money damages.” Wilson v. United States, 404 F. App’x 499, 501 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing LeBlanc,

50 F.3d at 1028). As neither the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871 nor the Truth in Lending

Act create a substantive right to money damages, this Court similarly lacks jurisdiction over these

claims.

15 Nor do Plaintiff’s miscellaneous other authorities confer jurisdiction. For example,

Plaintiff cites a Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) regulation, 27 C.F.R. § 72.11.

Compl. at 2; Sur-Reply at 28. This appears to be the invocation of a “facially incorrect ‘crime as

contract’” legal theory that “all crimes are commercial in nature,” which has been rejected by this

Court and others. 10 See, e.g., Harris, 2009 WL 2700207, at *1 n.1 (first citing Monroe, 2007 WL

2359833; and then citing United States v. Sandoval, 365 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).

Moreover, 27 C.F.R. § 72.11 is a definitional section of a regulation related to property seized by

the ATF that does not sweepingly declare that all crimes are commercial; it is not money-

mandating. 27 C.F.R. § 72.11. Nor does Plaintiff’s reliance on the “District of Columbia Circuit

D-U-N-S number,” the definition of “remedy” from Black’s Law Dictionary, or a citation-free

reference to “[t]he Judgment Fund” confer jurisdiction. Compl. at 2. These authorities are not

money-mandating statutes that provide this Court with jurisdiction. See Testan, 424 U.S. at 400.

10 Plaintiff’s citations to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) appear related to this “crime as contract” theory, which seeks to construe criminal proceedings as an implied contract between a criminal defendant and the Government. See Compl. at 10; Resp. at 2, 5; Harris v. United States, No. 09-154C, 2009 WL 2700207, at *1 n.1 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 26, 2009) (noting that plaintiff’s criminal proceedings “did not constitute an ‘informal contract’ and did not give plaintiff any rights under the [UCC].”). To the extent that Plaintiff cites the UCC in relation to the crime as contract theory or his Kentucky arrest, arguing that the arrest constituted a contract, both this theory and reliance on the UCC fail as a matter of law. See Ackerman v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 612, 615 (2012); Harris, 2009 WL 2700207, at *4 (emphasis in original) (“Plaintiff’s criminal conviction is not governed in any way by the Uniform Commercial Code . . . .”); see also Mikolajczyk v. United States, 172 Fed. Cl. 15, 18 (2024) (citing Clark v. United States, 116 F. App’x 278, 279 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (“This court lacks jurisdiction over claims for damages based on the Uniform Commercial Code.”).

Finally, this claim may be based in the sovereign citizen theory, which, as discussed below, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear. See infra Section III.A; see also Monroe v. Beard, No. 05-4937, 2007 WL 2359833, at *18 & nn.14–15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2007) (noting that plaintiffs asserting crime is commercial theory “describe themselves using the language of redemption theory and claim that they are imprisoned for debts and not the commission of crimes”). 16 In response to the Government’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to cite any money-

mandating statutes, Plaintiff points to two statutes in his Sur-Reply to support his opposition to the

Government’s motion to dismiss. Sur-Reply at 17–22 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1619 and 42 U.S.C.

§ 18071). First, Plaintiff raises 19 U.S.C. § 1619 to contend this Court has jurisdiction here. Id.

at 17–22; see also id. at 18 (noting that the “[m]oney mandating statute required for subject matter

jurisdiction . . . was successfully overcome by federal statute 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1619”). Like many

of Plaintiff's other contentions, such a claim is not properly before the Court because it was first

raised in Plaintiff’s Response. Kimble, 991 F.3d at 1244. Even if considered, however, this Court

lacks jurisdiction over the claim.

Section 1619 provides that “the Secretary may award and pay” a person who “detects and

seizes [property] subject to seizure and forfeiture under customs laws[,]” or provides information

regarding “any fraud upon the customs revenue, or . . . any violation of the customs laws” if the

seizure or information “leads to a recovery of . . . any duties withheld, or . . . any fine, penalty, or

forfeiture of property incurred.” 19 U.S.C. § 1619. 11

11 (1) any person who is not an employee or officer of the United States—

(A) detects and seizes any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage subject to seizure and forfeiture under the customs laws or the navigation laws and reports such detection and seizure to a customs officer, or (B) furnishes to a United States attorney, the Secretary of the Treasury, or any customs officer original information concerning—

(i) any fraud upon the customs revenue, or (ii)any violation of the customs laws or the navigation laws which is being, or has been, perpetrated or contemplated by any other person; and

(2) such detection and seizure or such information leads to a recovery of—

(A) any duties withheld, or (B) any fine, penalty, or forfeiture of property incurred;

17 The Federal Circuit has held that Section 1619 mandates money “when a claimant [has]

met the statutory conditions.” Doe v. United States, 100 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal

citations omitted). This construction incentivizes “persons with information useful to law

enforcement to cooperate with the authorities.” Id. Otherwise, “[a]n informer would have little

incentive to give original information upon occasions at considerable personal risk to officers of

the United States if his compensation rested in the absolute discretion, almost one might say, in

the whim, of an executive officer.” Id. (alterations in original) (citing Wilson v. United States, 135

F.2d 1005, 1009 (3d Cir. 1943)).

Plaintiff’s invocation of this statute without more does not confer jurisdiction on this Court.

For this Court to have jurisdiction over a claim under Section 1619, a plaintiff must make at least

some minimal connection between the requirements of Section 1619 and plaintiff’s allegations.

See Hicks v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 76, 82–83 (2014) (finding the Court lacked jurisdiction

where the “[s]tatutes that provide rewards for informants and whistleblowers”—including Section

1619—“are plainly inapposite to [plaintiff] and the facts of his case”). Here, the facts plead are

“plainly inapposite” as they do not come close to meeting the two requirements of Section 1619.

See Doe, 100 F.3d at 1580; Hicks, 118 Fed. Cl. at 82–83. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction

over Plaintiff’s claim under Section 1619.

Courts may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the claim is “so

insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely

devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335,

the Secretary may award and pay such person an amount that does not exceed 25 percent of the net amount so recovered.

19 U.S.C. § 1619(a).

18 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)).

Plaintiff’s claim under Section 1619 is such a claim. As discussed below, the Seattle Port Police

are a local law enforcement entity. See Beesla v. Port of Seattle Police, No. C21-1155, 2021 WL

4124251, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 9, 2021). Thus, the alleged seizure was undertaken under state

law, which could not fall under Section 1619, which mandates a seizure under federal customs

laws. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1619(a), (b)(ii). Similarly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over state law claims.

Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 215–18 (describing 28 U.S.C. § 1491 as limiting the jurisdiction of this Court

to monetary claims founded upon the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes or regulations, or federal

contracts); Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Claims

founded on state law are also outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal

Claims.”); Compl. Ex. 1 at 43 (noting that “[t]he Port of Seattle asserts the property is subject to

seizure and forfeiture under [the Revised Code of Washington] 69.50.505(l)(g)” and “[t]he Port of

Seattle has the burden to prove . . . that the property is subject to forfeiture under Washington State

law”). Altogether, the Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 1619 because the facts plead are

“plainly inapposite” to the facts of the case and Plaintiff has not “asserted nonfrivolous claims.”

See Moden, 404 F.3d at 1340–41 (quoting Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 978 F.2d 679, 687–88

(Fed. Cir. 1992)); Hicks, 118 Fed. Cl. at 82–83.

Plaintiff appears to cite Section 1619 “solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.”

Moden, 404 F.3d at 1341 (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89); Sur-Reply at 17–18 (citing Report from

R. Hunter, U.S. Gov’t Account. Off, to G. Beasley, Dep’t of Just. Com. Lit. Branch, dated Mar. 4,

1985, https://www.gao.gov/products/b-217636) (“Money mandating statute required for subject

matter jurisdiction . . . was successfully overcome by federal statute 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1619 and the

opinion of the DOJ general counsel validates that this statute is ‘money mandatory.’”). In Steel

19 Co, the Supreme Court noted that federal courts lack jurisdiction where a plaintiff’s claim “clearly

appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.” Steel Co.,

523 U.S. at 89 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946)). That is the case here. Indeed,

Plaintiff passingly asserts Section 1619 for the first time in his Sur-Reply, divorced from any facts

of his case. See Sur-Reply at 17–22. There is nothing in his complaint that is remotely tied to

Section 1619. As such, Plaintiff’s reliance on Section 1619 appears to be “solely for the purpose

of obtaining jurisdiction,” and such a passing reference to the statute in his Sur-Reply does not

confer jurisdiction on this Court. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–83).

In his Sur-Reply, Plaintiff next references Section 1402 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),

42 U.S.C. § 18071 to assert jurisdiction. Sur-Reply at 22. Plaintiff relies on Montana Health Co-

Op v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 213 (2018), which, he claims, concluded that Section 1402 of

the ACA is money-mandating. Id. Section 1402 is a “cost-sharing reduction (CSR) requirement

imposed on issuers of certain qualified health plans,” which is irrelevant to any facts plead or relief

sought by Plaintiff, who is not a “health insurance issuer” as defined in the ACA. Montana Health,

139 Fed. Cl. at 215; see 42 U.S.C. § 18111 (indicating that definitions contained in 42 U.S.C.

§ 300gg-91 apply to the ACA unless defined elsewhere); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91 (defining health

insurance issuer as “an insurance company, insurance service, or insurance organization . . . which

is licensed to engage in the business of insurance in a State and which is subject to State law which

regulates insurance”). So, while Plaintiff references a money-mandating statute in his Sur-Reply,

merely mentioning Section 1402 alone is insufficient to grant the Court jurisdiction over this case

where none of Plaintiff’s claims relate to the ACA and Plaintiff is not a health insurance issuer.

See Moden, 404 F.3d at 1341 (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89).

20 II. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Claims Stemming from the Four Incidents Cited in Plaintiff’s Complaint Because the Claims Are Not Directed at the United States.

The incidents discussed in Plaintiff’s Complaint and accompanying filings allege

wrongdoing by state actors and private parties. See generally Compl.; Compl. Ex. 1. Although

the United States is named as defendant in the case caption, Plaintiff’s claims are not directed at

the United States in substance. Further, even if the claims could be construed against the United

States, this Court lacks jurisdiction.

A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Claims Directed at New York State Administrative Agencies and Private Parties.

Plaintiff alleges “[h]ome mortgage [f]raud” for a “[h]ome purchased in 2004” in Staten

Island. Compl. Ex. 1 at 1, 19–30. Along with the home mortgage fraud claim, he appears to

include claims for “tax lien title transfer fraud, . . . home sale forced closing, title company fraud

and $800,000 [e]quity stolen from sale for fraudulent theft of equity by NYS DOF and other NY

agencies.” Id. at 1. This claim is substantively directed at private parties and state actors.

Plaintiff alleges fraud “by the NYS DOF and other NY agencies.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 1. In

support, Plaintiff attaches an exhibit of a foreclosure by a private party. Id. at 1, 19–30. These

claims are substantively asserted against the mentioned New York administrative agencies and

potentially the private parties to the foreclosure proceedings, not against the United States.

Because Plaintiff’s claims are not directed at the federal government, this Court lacks jurisdiction.

Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588 (“[I]f the relief sought is against others than the United States the suit

as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.”); Cooper, 771 F. App’x at

1000.

Even if Plaintiff’s claims were properly lodged against the United States, this Court would

still lack jurisdiction over any fraud claims. See Brown, 105 F.3d at 623 (citing L’Enfant Plaza

21 Props., Inc. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 1, 10–11 (1981) (“Because [plaintiffs’] complaints . . .

are grounded upon fraud, which is a tort, the court lacks jurisdiction over those claims.”));

Richardson, 2024 WL 1193418, at *4 (citing Ullman v. United States, 151 F. App’x 941, 945 (Fed.

Cir. 2005)) (“[T]his Court lacks jurisdiction over fraud claims.”); Kupersmit v. United States, No.

18-1839T, 2019 WL 1569791, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 11, 2019) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims

lacks jurisdiction over claims of fraud and deceit because such claims sound in tort.”). Plaintiff’s

multiple fraud claims, including those alleging mortgage fraud, tax lien title fraud, title company

fraud, and theft of equity fraud fail whether construed as criminal fraud or civil fraud. Compl. Ex.

1 at 1. If construed as criminal fraud, these claims must be dismissed because this Court lacks

jurisdiction over criminal matters. Joshua, 17 F.3d at 379–80; Stephens, 165 Fed. Cl. at 349–50.

Construed as civil fraud, these claims sound in tort and, therefore, fail to confer jurisdiction on this

Court. Brown, 105 F.3d at 623; Lea v. United States, 592 F. App’x 930, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Even if this Court were to construe Plaintiff’s claim liberally as a Fifth Amendment taking,

there is no government action properly alleged that would entitle Plaintiff to compensation. To

succeed on such a Fifth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must identify a “government action”

entitling him to compensation. Kalos v. United States, 368 F. App’x 127, 130–31 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

(first citing Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1370, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008); and

then citing Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Here,

a private party foreclosed upon Plaintiff’s property. See Compl. Ex. 1 at 19–30 (listing Plaintiff

in foreclosure proceedings as Nationstar Mortgage LLC). Even if governmental action were

involved, Plaintiff alleges action by the New York state government, not the federal government.

See id. at 1, 19–30. Indeed, a Fifth Amendment takings claim against New York would need to

be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, which this Court could not hear because, again, such

22 a claim is lodged against the state government, not against the United States. See Souders, 497

F.3d at 1308; see Compl. Ex. 1 at 1 (alleging bad acts by “NYS DOF and other NY agencies”); id.

at 19–30 (attaching filings from New York State foreclosure proceedings).

Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claims stemming from the New York

bankruptcy.

B. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Claims Directed at Oregon and the State Liquor and Cannabis Commission.

Plaintiff next alleges administrative fraud, including “[a]gency administrative hearings

color of law fraud,” which led to “[f]orfeiture of [business] licenses.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 1. Plaintiff

also alleges fraudulent transfer of at least one of the licenses. Id. at 2. These claims are directed

at administrative proceedings conducted by the State of Oregon Office of Administrative Hearings

for the Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission, not the United States. Id. at 31–37. While

Plaintiff’s Complaint references “US agency ‘color of law’ fraud,” in substance, this claim relates

to action taken by an Oregon state administrative agency. Id. at 1–2 (describing forfeited licenses

and referencing Oregon administrative proceedings related to the licenses); id. at 31–37 (attaching

filings from Oregon administrative proceedings). Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction because

Plaintiff’s claim is not against the United States. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Cooper, 771 F. App’x

at 1000 (finding this Court lacks jurisdiction over claim that “in substance does not appear to allege

any involvement of the federal government in the events it describes”).

Even if the claim were properly directed at the United States, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges

fraud, which, as noted, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear. Compl. Ex. 1 at 1; see Brown, 105

F.3d at 623; Joshua, 17 F.3d at 379–80. To the extent that Plaintiff’s claim could be construed as

a Due Process claim, such a claim still falls outside the scope of this Court’s limited jurisdiction

as it is well settled that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are not

23 money-mandating in nature. Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013);

see, e.g., Compl. at 4; Compl. Ex. 1 at 1. Likewise, the Court could not consider this claim even

if construed as a Fifth Amendment taking because the state of Oregon was responsible for the

alleged taking. See Souders, 497 F.3d at 1308; Compl. Ex. 1 at 1–2, 31–37. Accordingly, this

Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims related to the Oregon business licenses.

C. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Claims Directed at the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Its State Officers.

The Court must also dismiss the claims related to Plaintiff’s Kentucky arrest for lack of

jurisdiction because the claims are directed at the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its State

Officers. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Cooper, 771 F. App’x at 1000. Plaintiff’s claims relate to a

traffic stop, arrest, and seizure of personal property in Kentucky. See Compl. Ex. 1 at 2, 38–39.

This Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Kentucky arrest claims for the same reason as

his other claims: the claims allege no action by the United States Government. Rather, Plaintiff

seeks redress for actions taken by Kentucky State Police and other Kentucky state actors. Id. at 2

(alleging violation of rights by “US Agency COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY”). As this

Court only has jurisdiction over claims against the United States, and the Commonwealth of

Kentucky is not a United States agency, this Court cannot hear any of the claims related to

Plaintiff’s Kentucky arrest. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Jones, 440 F. App’x at 918.

Attempting to invoke jurisdiction for this claim, Plaintiff levies a myriad of constitutional

and statutory claims related to this arrest. Compl. at 3–4 (listing violations); Compl. Ex. 1 at 2

(listing “deprivation of enalianable [sic] rights, under the US Constitutional [sic] . . . and US

Code[,] specifically title 18 and others listed”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges “unlawful

imprisonment;” “[i]llegal misrepresentation by foreign agent BAR (British Accreditation

Registrar);” violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; the Ex

24 Post Facto clause of Article I of the Constitution; Section 1-201 of the Uniform Probate Code;

Kentucky Revised Statute § 418.005; and over twenty federal statutes across nine chapters of the

United States Code. Compl. at 3–4, Compl. Ex. 1 at 2; Sur-Reply at 7.

Even if Plaintiff had properly asserted his claims related to the Kentucky arrest against the

United States (which he did not), the constitutional Amendments invoked are not money-

mandating and accordingly cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Kenyon v. United States,

683 F. App’x 945, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges,

without reference to supportive facts, violations of nearly every right guaranteed by the Fourth,

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. at 4. However, it is well established

that this Court “lacks jurisdiction over claims based on the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments,

as well as the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because they are not

‘money-mandating.’” Kenyon, 683 F. App’x at 948 (citing Brown, 105 F.3d at 623 (“Because

monetary damages are not available for a Fourth Amendment violation, the Court of Federal

Claims does not have jurisdiction over such a violation.”); Dupre v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 706,

706 (1981) (“[T]he [F]ourth and [S]ixth [A]mendments do not in themselves obligate the United

States to pay money damages; and, therefore, we have no jurisdiction over such claims.”); Trafny

v. United States, 503 F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The Court of Federal Claims does not

have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Eighth Amendment, as the Eighth Amendment ‘is

not a money-mandating provision.’”); LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1028 (The “Due Process Clauses of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments” are not “a sufficient basis for jurisdiction because they do not

mandate payment of money by the government”)).

Plaintiff also claims that the Kentucky Police’s actions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause

of Article I of the Constitution. Compl. at 4; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. It is well established

25 that the Ex Post Facto clause also is not money-mandating. Atlas Corp. v. United States, 15 Cl.

Ct. 681, 691 (1988). Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the alleged constitutional

violations.

Plaintiff further attaches a “[f]ee schedule” listing additional proposed damages.12

Executor Letter at 4–5, 66–68. According to Plaintiff’s filings, the “damages” listed on the fee

12 The fee schedule attached to the Executor Letter cites several statutory and regulatory authorities. See Executor Letter at 66–68. None are money-mandating. Most of the statutes are from Title 18, over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. See id.; Lisa Richardson-Henderson Tr., 2024 WL 3688527, at *8 (internal citations omitted); see also Jones, 440 F. App’x at 918.

The fee schedule next cites 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15), 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and 42 U.S.C. § 1994, which are not money-mandating. See Thompson v. United States, No. 23-cv-1933, 2024 WL 795181, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 26, 2024) (citing Allen v. United States, No. 23-776, 2023 WL 3862563, at *3 (Fed. Cl. June 7, 2023)) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 3002 “does not mandate the payment of money damages”); Searles v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 801, 804 (2009) (concluding that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims under the Civil Rights Act, Title 42, because original jurisdiction is vested in federal district courts). The fee schedule also cites 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1), which is a definitional provision of the Internal Revenue Code; definitional provisions are plainly not money- mandating. See Thompson, 2024 WL 795181, at *5 (finding definitional provision to not be money-mandating).

Like the cited statutes, none of the cited regulations are money-mandating. 22 C.F.R. § 13.3, which has been repealed, imposed personal, monetary, and criminal liability for neglect of duty by “consular officer[s].” 22 C.F.R. § 13.3; see also 79 Fed. Reg. 43246 (July 25, 2014). Not only do none of Plaintiff’s claims relate to consular officers, but the regulation imposes the duty to pay on consular officers, not on the United States. 22 C.F.R. § 13.3. Citation to 25 C.F.R. § 11.417 similarly misses the mark, as this is a regulation governing the crime of extortion in the “Courts of Indian Offenses.” 25 C.F.R. § 11.417. This Court lacks jurisdiction over criminal offenses and nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint relates to Indian law. Jones, 440 F. App’x at 918. 32 C.F.R. § 536.77(1)(3)(vii) was promulgated under the Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2731, et seq., which is not money-mandating. See Rakowitz v. United States, 490 F. App’x 345, 347 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Finally, 42 C.F.R. § 488.301 is a definition provision in a regulation related to the survey and certification of long-term Medicare and Medicaid facilities. 42 C.F.R. § 488.301. These definitions are plainly not money-mandating. See Thompson, 2024 WL 795181, at *5.

Finally, the fee schedule cites “Title 15” in relation to a fine for “ARMED EXTORTION OF RIGHTS.” The Court is unclear to what this citation references, but the action alleged—armed extortion of rights—appears to be a crime, which would be governed by the criminal code in Title 18, over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. Jones, 440 F. App’x at 918. 26 schedule were, “in part,” “determined BY THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF.” Id. at 66. Moreover,

Plaintiff claims that immunity is invalid under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other statutes, and that these

purported “[v]iolations of law are legally unassailable due to precedents (violations of law)

established by court cases.” Id. at 68. Plaintiff fails to note against whom and for what these fees

are levied. See id. at 4–5, 66–68. The claims in the fee schedule relate most closely to Plaintiff’s

constitutional claims and references, which appear to relate back to the alleged actions of Kentucky

police, prosecutors, or other state actors during his Kentucky arrest. See id. at 4–5 (including fines

for “charges DENIED PROPER WARRANT(S),” “charge ARMED VIOLATION OF DUE

PROCESS,” “DENIED PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION,” and “UNLAWFUL

INCARCERATION”); Compl. Ex. 1 at 2 (referencing deprivation of rights “under the US

Constitution[] specifically the bill of right’s [sic] and US Code specifically title 18 and others

listed” with Kentucky arrest claim). Further, Plaintiff’s Kentucky arrest claim alleged “[i]llegal

misrepresentation by foreign agent BAR” and the fee schedule includes a fine for “ACTING AS

AGENTS OF FOREIGN PRINCIPLES” [sic]. Compl. Ex. 1 at 2; Executor Letter at 5. Moreover,

the longer fee schedule attached to the Executor Letter references immunity for these claims under

Section 1983. Executor Letter at 68. Therefore, this Court construes these claims as Section 1983

claims against the Kentucky state actors, whom Plaintiff contends violated his constitutional rights

during his arrest.

This Court lacks jurisdiction over Section 1983 actions because Section 1983 “does not

create a right against the federal government for money damages, but is instead a damages remedy

against persons acting under the color of state law.” Ganaway v. United States, 557 F. App’x 948,

949 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see

Shearin, 992 F.2d at 1197 (“It is well settled that the United States Court of Federal Claims lacks

27 . . . jurisdiction to entertain tort claims.”). Indeed, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claim because jurisdiction for such claims rests with the district courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343(a)(4); Shelden v. United States, 742 F. App’x 496, 501 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Even construed

as a Bivens claim rather than a Section 1983 action, this Court would still lack jurisdiction because

Bivens created a private right of action against “federal officials acting under color of authority

who have violated the individual’s constitutional rights.” Frank’s Livestock & Poultry Farm, Inc.

v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 601, 606–07 (1989), aff’d, 905 F.2d 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis

added). This Court’s jurisdiction, however, “involves claims against the United States, not federal

officials.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491). Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over any of

Plaintiff’s claims brought against state or federal officers.

Plaintiff also alleges unlawful imprisonment, which appears related to the alleged

constitutional violations discussed above and, therefore, to the Kentucky arrest. See Compl. Ex. 1

at 2 (referencing deprivation of rights “under the US Constitution[] specifically the bill of right’s

[sic] and US Code specifically title 18 and others listed” with Kentucky arrest claim). Because

this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim for unjust conviction or imprisonment by a state, it

cannot hear Plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment by Kentucky. 13 Machulas v. United States,

621 F. App’x 629, 631–32 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Finally, to the extent any of the claims included on

13 Even if the claim is not related to the Kentucky arrest, this Court generally lacks jurisdiction over claims for unlawful imprisonments or confinement, except in specific circumstances involving, for example, where a conviction has been reversed. Cochran v. United States, 250 F.3d 754 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (table); see also Barber v. United States, 636 F. App’x 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[Plaintiff’s] unlawful imprisonment claim also does not establish jurisdiction because recovery in the Claims Court for false imprisonment requires a conviction and subsequent reversal or pardon . . . .”). Because Plaintiff does not allege that his conviction was reversed or that he was pardoned, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this claim. Barber, 646 F. App’x at 1010 (affirming dismissal of case for lack of jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to plead “a conviction and subsequent reversal or pardon”). 28 plaintiff’s fee schedule or in his pleadings—including the claim for false imprisonment—could be

construed as torts, this Court plainly lacks jurisdiction over such claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1);

Shearin, 992 F.2d at 1197.

Plaintiff next points to a series of statutes that he contends were violated in connection with

the Kentucky arrest. Compl. Ex. 1 at 2; Compl. at 4. None provide this Court with jurisdiction.

First, Plaintiff cites 12 U.S.C. § 1821, a provision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.

§ 1811, et seq. Compl. at 4. Section 1821 vests jurisdiction in district courts, not in this Court.

See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(7), 6(d)(A)(ii), (f)(4). Second, Plaintiff cites two provisions of the

Securities Act of 1933. See Compl. at 4 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77ww[w]; 15 U.S.C. § 77xxx).

However, this Court lacks jurisdiction over claims involving securities violations. Taylor v. United

States, 168 Fed. Cl. 696, 704–05 (2023).

Third, Plaintiff relies on eleven criminal statutes within Title 18. Compl. at 4; Sur-Reply

at 7; see Compl. Ex. 1 at 2 (noting violation of “specifically title 18” in relation to Kentucky arrest).

Plaintiff cites 18 U.S.C. § 8 (obligation or other security of the United States defined); 18 U.S.C.

§ 241 (conspiracy against rights); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law); 18

U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (federally protected activities); 18 U.S.C. § 514 (fictitious obligations); 18

U.S.C. § 872 (extortion by officers or employees of the United States); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891–94

(extortionate credit transactions); 18 U.S.C. § 31[14] (release and detention authority generally).

Compl. at 4; Sur-Reply at 7. It is well established, however, that “this Court lacks jurisdiction

over the cited provisions of Title 18 because they are criminal statutes.” Lisa Richardson-

Henderson Tr., 2024 WL 3688527, at *8; see also Jones, 440 F. App’x at 918 (“[T]he [Court of

Federal Claims] correctly stated that it has no jurisdiction over criminal matters generally.”).

29 Fourth, Plaintiff cites the definitions provision of the Foreign Agents Registration Act

(FARA). Compl. at 4 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 611). “FARA requires any ‘agent of a foreign principal’

to register with the Department of Justice.” Att’y Gen. of U.S. v. Wynn, 104 F.4th 348, 351 (D.C.

Cir. 2024) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 612(a)). The government enforces FARA by seeking injunctions

to prevent violation or compel compliance or through criminal prosecution of violations. Id.

(citing 22 U.S.C. § 618(a), (f)). FARA does not permit private enforcement. See Mosafer, Inc. v.

Broidy, No. 22-55296, 2023 WL 8295921, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2023); accord Comm. for a Free

Namibia v. S.W. Afr. People’s Org., 554 F. Supp. 722, 725 (D.D.C. 1982). Therefore, this Court

lacks jurisdiction because the statute does not create a private right enforceable against the federal

government for money and because the statute contemplates criminal enforcement. See LeBlanc,

50 F.3d at 1028; Jones, 440 F. App’x at 918.

Plaintiff’s citations to FARA appear to relate to his claim of “[i]llegal misrepresentation

by foreign agent BAR.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 2. This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear such a claim

against a foreign agent, even if construed more broadly than under FARA, because the Court

cannot hear claims “against others than the United States.” Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588. Plaintiff

has merely named the United States a defendant for a claim against a private party, and as such

the claim “is plainly beyond the jurisdiction of the Claims Court.” Beauvais, 2024 WL 2860170,

at *1; see Lisa Richardson-Henderson Tr., 2024 WL 3688527, at *7. Additionally, even if this

claim were properly directed at the United States, “[f]raudulent misrepresentation is a claim

sounding in tort, over which this court has no jurisdiction.” Harris v. United States, No. 18-293C,

2018 WL 2996277, at *2 (Fed. Cl. June 15, 2018).

Fifth, Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply unavailingly cites four additional statutes not previously

discussed. Sur-Reply at 7. Plaintiff cites 11 U.S.C. § 727, which relates to discharge in Chapter

30 Seven bankruptcy and 31 U.S.C. § 3130, which requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit

an annual public debt report to Congress. Id. Neither statute relates to any facts plead nor does

either “expressly create[] a substantive right enforceable against the federal government for money

damages.” See LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1028 (citing Testan, 424 U.S. at 398). Next, he cites 29 U.S.C.

§ 1109, which describes liability for fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA and is not a money-

mandating statute. Sur-Reply at 7; see Raven v. United States, No. 16-1682C, 2017 WL 2445159,

at *1 (Fed. Cl. June 5, 2017) (noting that 19 U.S.C. § 1109 is not a money-mandating statute).

Plaintiff also cites the definition section of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671,

however, as noted previously, “[i]t is well settled that the United States Court of Federal Claims

lacks . . . jurisdiction to entertain tort claims.” Shearin, 992 F.2d at 1197 (rejecting Plaintiff’s

attempt to sustain a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2671).

Finally, Plaintiff cites a subrogation provision of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.

§ 2701, et seq. (OPA). Compl. at 4 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2715). The OPA, however, “does not

create a right of action for suits against the United States.” Savage Servs. Corp. v. United States,

25 F.4th 925, 938 (11th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original); see also Rick Franklin Corp. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06-1647-SU, 2008 WL 337978, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 4, 2008) (“The

OPA does not contain a waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity from suit.”).

Even construed as a Fifth Amendment taking, Plaintiff’s claims related to the arrest and

subsequent seizure of property fail because the Kentucky government, not the federal government

was responsible for the alleged taking. Compl. Ex. 1 at 2 (indicating violation of rights by “US

Agency COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY”); id. at 38–39 (showing seizure of property by

Kentucky State Police). A claim against Kentucky would need to be brought under the Fourteenth

31 Amendment, which this Court would be unable to hear because such a claim is against the state

government, not against the United States. See Souders, 497 F.3d at 1308.

Even if the Court had jurisdiction over these claims, the Court could not enter Plaintiff’s

requested relief to “instruct Kentucky Attorney General to Order the COMMONWEALTH OF

KENTUCKY LYON COUNTY to dismiss all charges with prejudice.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 2. This

Court cannot dismiss or review criminal charges. See Reyna v. United States, No. 22-798, 2022

WL 17346196, at *4–5 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 30, 2022); Townsend v. United States, No. 16-1424C, 2016

WL 7030745, at *3–4 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 1, 2016). Plaintiff also cites Kentucky Revised

Statute § 418.005, which provides for declaratory judgments in Kentucky courts. See Compl. at 3

(citing KY. REV. STAT. § 418.005). However, this is a state law, and it is axiomatic that this Court

lacks jurisdiction to hear claims founded on state law; all claims in this Court must be brought

against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (granting jurisdiction only for claims founded “upon

the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon

any express or implied contract with the United States . . . .”); see Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588;

Souders, 497 F.3d at 1307 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)) (“Claims founded on state law are also

outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.”); see also Noll v.

United States, No. 2024 WL 3517627, at *2 (Fed. Cir. July 24, 2024) (citing Souders, 497 F.3d at

1307) (rejecting state law claims as outside of this Court’s jurisdiction).

Accordingly, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff’s claims related

to the Kentucky arrest.

D. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction over the Claim Against the Port of Seattle Police.

Plaintiff alleges an unlawful seizure of property by the Port of Seattle Police. Compl. Ex.

1 at 2. Plaintiff seeks the return of $43,950 that was seized from Mariah Alliano on February 15,

32 2022. Id. at 2, 43–44. Plaintiff’s name appears as a party on the “Administrative Forfeiture

Proceedings for the Port of Seattle Police Department,” but nothing in Plaintiff’s filings explain

his interest in the money seized from a third party. Id.

This allegation fails to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction because, aside from the potential

standing issues involved, the claim is not directed at the United States but rather at the Port of

Seattle Police Department in substance. See id. at 2 (alleging an “[u]nlawful seizure of property

by PORT POLICE OF SEATTLE AIRPORT”); id. at 43–44 (attaching “Notice of Hearing” in

“Administrative Forfeiture Proceedings for the Port of Seattle Police Department”). Plaintiff

alleges no action by the federal government.

The Port of Seattle Police Department is a local, state government entity. See Beesla, 2021

WL 4124251, at *1 (declining jurisdiction for Federal Tort Claims Act suit because the Port of

Seattle Police is a “local government entity” and the FTCA only permits suits “against the United

States”). As noted, this Court only has jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States, not

against state or local entities. See Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Cooper, 771 F. App’x at 1000.

Accordingly, as Plaintiff’s claim is, in substance, directed toward a local agency, not the United

States, and is founded in state law, this Court lacks jurisdiction.

This claim would also fail if construed as a Fifth Amendment taking. Takings by a state

entity, such as the alleged taking by the Seattle Port Police here, are governed under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Souders, 497 F.3d at 1308; Compl. Ex. 1 at 2 (claiming “[u]nlawful seizure of

property by PORT POLICE OF SEATTLE AIRPORT”). This Court, however, cannot hear a

taking claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because the proper defendant is the state itself.

Souders, 497 F.3d at 1308.

33 Plaintiff’s allegations also include a passing reference to “commercial admiralty maritime

jurisdiction.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 2. Regardless of how a claim for an unlawful seizure would invoke

maritime jurisdiction, “[t]he law is well-settled that this [C]ourt does not have jurisdiction to hear

claims arising in admiralty” because 28 U.S.C. § 1333 vests district courts with maritime

jurisdiction. Kemp v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 387, 393 (2015); 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).

Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims arising from the Seattle

Port Police’s alleged seizure of money.

III. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Miscellaneous Remaining Claims.

Beyond the four main incidents that Plaintiff describes in his Complaint, Plaintiff also

makes passing references to miscellaneous causes of action or potential remedies. Plaintiff appears

to advance multiple sovereign citizen claims, many of which relate to purported trusts, over which

this Court lacks jurisdiction. See, e.g., Walby, 957 F.3d at 1297, 1302; Potter, 161 Fed. Cl. at 29.

Further, Plaintiff appears to assert claims for copyright infringement, identity theft, discrimination,

misrepresentation, and breach of contracts. See Compl. at 3. Finally, Plaintiff requests pain and

suffering damages, on the basis of “sweet equity . . . and over 40 years of physical, mental and

psychological damages.” Resp. at 1; see also Compl. Ex. 1 at 2 (including pain and suffering in

relief section of Complaint). The Court lacks jurisdiction over all of these claims.

A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Any Sovereign Citizen Claims.

This Court lacks jurisdiction over sovereign citizen claims, generally. See Walby, 957 F.3d

at 1297, 1302; Potter, 161 Fed. Cl. at 29; Lisa Richardson-Henderson Tr., 2024 WL 3688527, at

*9–10; Robinson v. United States, No. 24-166, slip op. at 10–13 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 17, 2024), ECF

No. 37. Plaintiff’s filings contain many arguments typical of claims premised on the sovereign

citizen theory. For example, Plaintiff repeatedly distinguishes between his name, and other terms,

written in all capital letters versus capitalization of just the initial letters. Resp. at 5–6 (“The

34 motion to dismiss expressing reference to plaintiff as ‘pro sei [sic] plaintiff’, Henry Doiban and

Mr. Doiban. The plaintiff on the claim is HENRY DOIBAN, the subject matter. Whom is the

motion referencing, the plaintiff, resident, individual, natural person or executor and beneficiary

of the estate (the lawful party)?”); Sur-Reply at 32 (“The motion to dismiss expressing reference

to plaintiff as ‘pro sei [sic] plaintiff’, Henry Doiban and Mr. Doiban. The plaintiff on the claim is

HENRY DOIBAN, the RES-ID-ENTity aka the subject matter. The plaintiff on the claim is Estate

of HENRY DOIBAN Public Trust, the subject matter.”); Resp. at 5 (claiming difference between

“the United States,” as listed in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and “THE UNITED STATES” as

listed in the case caption); see Fanelli v. United States, 146 Fed. Cl. 462, 464 n.2 (2020) (citing

Bey v. State, 847 F.3d 559, 560–61 (7th Cir. 2017)); Potter, 161 Fed. Cl. at 29. Further, Plaintiff

repeatedly references trusts or, more specifically, a “cestui que vie” trust, and appears to assert

trust-related claims. See, e.g., Compl. at 3 (asserting “Trust Fraud,” “Breach of fiduciary

responsibilities, breach of Trust, [and] Identity Theft.”); Executor Letter at 14–17 (citing history

of cestui que vie trusts); Sur-Reply at 32 (“The plaintiff on the claim is Estate of HENRY DOIBAN

Public Trust, the subject matter.”); Sur-Reply at 59 (referring to self as “[e]xecutor to the [Estate]”

and referencing other trust terms); see Potter, 161 Fed. Cl. at 28–29 (noting that sovereign citizens

often reference trusts, specifically “cestui que vie” trusts). This Court lacks jurisdiction over “the

legal fiction presented by plaintiff,” which is “not based in law,” but on arguments common to

“the sovereign citizen movement.” 14 Potter, 161 Fed. Cl. at 29.

14 Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff’s trust claims are not barred as a sovereign citizen claim, this Court lacks jurisdiction over such trust and fiduciary-related claims because they sound in tort. Compl. at 3; Executor Letter at 3, 6; Sur-Reply at 14–15, 25–26; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Cox v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 213, 218 (2012) (breach of fiduciary duty); Brown, 105 F.3d at 623 (fraud); Joshua, 17 F.3d at 379–80 (fraud); Krukowski v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 440, 443 (2016) (identity theft); see also Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.4th 1274, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Hopi Tribe v. United States, 782 F.3d 662, 667 (Fed. Cir. 2015)) (noting that 35 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff’s sovereign citizen claims as

they both fail to invoke this Court’s proper jurisdiction and are frivolous.

B. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Copyright Claims.

In his “Statement of the Claim,” Plaintiff briefly lists “copyright infringement” as one of

the purportedly unlawful actions committed by “United States agencies.” Compl. at 3. The

reference cites attachments on pages five through ten of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Id. However, those

pages of the Complaint do not further allege or support the reference to copyright infringement.15

Id. at 5–10; see also generally Compl.; Compl. Ex. 1. Except for statutory exceptions which are

inapplicable in this case, registration of a copyright with the United States Copyright Office is

required to bring a claim for copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); see also Reed

Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010) (holding that copyright registration is a

nonjurisdictional precondition to suit). Thus, to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction for copyright

infringement, a plaintiff “must establish that the copyright is registered in accordance with the

relevant provisions of the Copyright Act or the Copyright Office has refused to register the

copyright.” Jennette v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 126, 131–32 (2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a));

see also 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (explaining that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in

any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim

has been made in accordance with this title”). While this Court has jurisdiction over copyright

claims in certain circumstances, other judges of the Court of Federal Claims have also dismissed

copyright infringement claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where a plaintiff did not allege

the Government can only be liable in damages for breaches of its fiduciary duty if a plaintiff demonstrates a fiduciary duty “specifically accept[ed] by statute or regulation”). 15 This bare copyright assertion also appears to be a common claim by sovereign citizen plaintiffs. Potter, 161 Fed. Cl. at 29; see Lisa Richardson-Henderson Tr., 2024 WL 3688527, at *11; Miles v. United States, Nos. 14-416C, 2014 WL 5020574, at *2–3 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 6, 2014). 36 that the plaintiff had registered for or been denied a copyright. See Redmond v. United States, No.

22-60C, 2022 WL 301811, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 1, 2022); Gonzalez v. United States, No. 21-1381C,

2021 WL 2350006, at *3 n.3 (Fed. Cl. June 8, 2021) (citing Jennette, 77 Fed. Cl. at 131); Dell v.

United States, No. 20-500C, 2020 WL 4876247, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 20, 2020) (citing Jennette,

77 Fed. Cl. at 131).

This Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s copyright claim because he does not “establish

that the copyright is registered in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act or

the Copyright Office has refused to register the copyright.” See Jennette, 77 Fed. Cl. at 131–32

(citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)). To support his copyright claim, Plaintiff attaches a UCC filing, two

business licenses, and an “affidavit of truth.” Compl. at 5–10. None of these demonstrate, even

under the most liberal construction, that Plaintiff possess a valid copyright. See Lisa Richardson-

Henderson Tr., 2024 WL 3688527, at *11 (dismissing copyright claim for lack of jurisdiction

where plaintiff’s only proof of copyright was a UCC financing statement and common law

copyright notice). Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim.

C. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Breach of Contracts Claim Because Plaintiff Never Alleges Any Contract with the United States.

Plaintiff references “breach of contracts” once in his Complaint, but he never raises the

issue again and never alleges any actual contracts with the United States—either express or

implied. Compl. at 3; see also generally Compl.; Compl. Ex. 1. While the Court has jurisdiction

over express and implied-in-fact contracts, the Court lacks jurisdiction over claims that plaintiffs

fail to plausibly allege a contract. See Trauma Serv. Grp., 104 F.3d at 1325 (“To show jurisdiction

in the Court of Federal Claims, [plaintiff] must show that either an express or implied-in-fact

contract underlies its claim.”); Starrett, 2023 WL 152827, at *4 (affirming dismissal under Rule

37 12(b)(1) where plaintiff failed to allege a money mandating statute or plausibly allege the existence

of a contract).

Plaintiff has not alleged any elements of a contract with the government. See Suess v.

United States, 535 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (“The requirements for a

contract between the United States and a private party are (1) mutuality of intent to contract, (2)

consideration, (3) lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance, and (4) authority on the part of the

government agent entering the contract.”). Plaintiff makes only one, brief reference to a breach of

contract and provides no support for any element of a contract. See id.; Compl. at 3. Plaintiff need

not prove these elements at the motion to dismiss phase, “[b]ut a complaint must do more than

‘tender[] naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Richardson v. United States,

No. 23-1365 C, 2023 WL 8798072, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 19, 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (dismissing breach of contract claim under Rule 12(b)(1) where Plaintiff

failed to plead any facts to support claim in complaint). Therefore, because Plaintiff “does not

plausibly allege the existence of an express or implied contract with the United States, [this] Court

lack[s] subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.” Starrett, 2023 WL 152827, at *4; see Trauma

Serv. Grp., 104 F.3d at 1325. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over any purported breach

of contract claim.

D. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Grant Pain and Suffering Damages or Equitable Relief.

Plaintiff also requests “[d]amages for pain and suffering by the actions of the[] STATE.”

Compl. Ex. 1 at 2. Plaintiff describes his claim as one for “sweet equity . . . and over 40 years of

physical, mental and psychological damages.” Resp. at 1. Such a claim does not confer

jurisdiction on this Court.

38 Construing the claim broadly as requesting relief from purported state-imposed torts, this

Court lacks jurisdiction over torts, including intentional or negligent infliction of emotional

distress, and is unable to award any pain and suffering damages for tort claims. Cottrell v. United

States, 42 Fed. Cl. 144, 149 (1998); see also White v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 673, 678 (2011)

(internal citations omitted) (“Pain and suffering damages are a tort remedy, however, and this

Court does not possess jurisdiction over tort claims.”).

As noted, Plaintiff has failed to point to any applicable money-mandating statute or a

contract with the Government for this Court to exercise jurisdiction. Supra Section II. Therefore,

this Court cannot grant damages where it lacks jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case. See

Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216. To the extent Plaintiff is lodging a claim for equitable relief, this Court

similarly lacks jurisdiction. Resp. at 1 (describing claim as one for “sweet equity”); Executor

Letter at 5 (requesting “[e]quitable relief for monetary sweet equity”); Sur-Reply at 27–28 (using

heading “Equitable relief” before restating claims related to New York bankruptcy, Oregon

business licenses, Kentucky arrest, and Seattle seizure). Indeed, it is well established that this

Court lacks jurisdiction to provide equitable relief, except in a narrowly defined exception to the

Tucker Act’s prohibition on equitable relief for pre-award bid protest actions. See, e.g., Kanemoto

v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 644–45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (granting the Court

of Federal Claims injunctive power in pre-award bid protest cases)); Robinson, No. 24-166, slip

op. at 19; see also Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Court of

Federal Claims does not possess general equity jurisdiction . . . .”). That exception is not applicable

here as this case is not a bid protest. Kanemoto, 41 F.3d at 644–45; see generally Compl.; Compl.

Ex. 1.

39 Finally, the request for damages is directed at “the[] STATE,” which, as evidenced by

Plaintiff’s claims, means a state or its actors and not the federal government. Compl. Ex. 1 at 2.

Indeed, if Plaintiff seeks pain and suffering stemming from the incidents listed above, that request

seeks damages for state actors, not from the United States. This Court cannot consider such a

request based on actions by state actors because it has jurisdiction only over claims against the

United States. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588; Jones, 440 F. App’x at 918. Accordingly, the Court

must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for pain and suffering damages.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.

6) pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed

without leave to replead and Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment, ECF No. 16, is

DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter Judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Eleni M. Roumel ELENI M. ROUMEL Judge

Dated: October 15, 2024 Washington, D.C.