Doggett v. Ritter Finance Company of Louisa

384 F. Supp. 150, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6481
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedOctober 2, 1974
DocketCiv. A. 74-13(C)
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 384 F. Supp. 150 (Doggett v. Ritter Finance Company of Louisa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doggett v. Ritter Finance Company of Louisa, 384 F. Supp. 150, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6481 (W.D. Va. 1974).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TURK, Chief Judge.

This action alleges violations of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U. S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1974), commonly known as the Truth in Lending Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq. (1974). This court has jurisdiction of this matter under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1974). Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts, the case is appropriately before the court on a motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs are husband and wife who have received an extension of credit regulated by the Act and are “consumers” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1974).

Defendant, Ritter Finance Company, Inc. of Charlottesville, Virginia, is in the business of extending credit for which the payment of a finance charge is required and is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1974).

In November, 1973, plaintiffs went to Defendant’s office for the purpose of securing a loan. Defendant agreed to lend plaintiffs the amount of $735.00, payable in 21 consecutive monthly installments of $35.00. From this amount was immediately deducted a “Finance Charge” of $149.25, at an annual percentage rate of 25.95% and insurance premiums totalling $32.08 for credit life and disability insurance. The adequacy of Defendant’s “disclosure” of the cost of these insurance premiums forms the basis of this suit. The amount of money plaintiffs actually received was $553.-67. 1 At the time of this credit transaction between plaintiffs and defendant, one of defendant’s employees exhibited a form entitled “Combined Note and Disclosures Required by Federal and State Law”, which plaintiffs signed as joint and several obligors. It is this form that plaintiffs now claim to be inadequate under the Act.

Plaintiffs assert three violations of the Consumer Credit Act.

(1) Defendant failed to include in its disclosures a statement of the type and term of insurance offered in violation of 12 CFR §§ 226.4(a) (5), 2 *153 226.8 3 and 226.402 4
(2) Defendant failed to disclose clearly and conspicuously that plaintiffs may decline to purchase Credit Life Insurance while choosing to purchase Credit Disability Insurance in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b) 5 and 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(5).
(3) Defendant failed to disclose adequately the cost of Credit Life and Disability Insurance by placing the amount of the premiums for the insurance in a different place than the place for the plaintiffs’ separately signed authorization for insurance in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (5) (ii).

I

“Disclosure” under the Act is a term of art which refers to the manner in which certain information, deemed basic by Congress to an intelligent assessment of a credit transaction, shall be conveyed to the consumer. Title 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) prescribes this manner of presentation and requires that all information that must be disclosed be set out either on the same side of the page as the promissory note or on one side of a separate statement which identifies the transaction. The Act always uses the term “disclosure”, and all grammatical forms thereof, in its technical sense to trigger the form requirements of § 226.8. Consequently, the requirements of disclosure do not apply to all information that a creditor might furnish to a borrower, but only to that information the Act requires to be “disclosed” to a borrower. This required information, in non-sale credit transaction, is set out in 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) and (d) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a). Addition *154 al information given to a customer need not be presented to a borrower in the manner prescribed by § 226.8. 6 Moreover, it is the clear legislative intent that the disclosure requirement of the act is not to restrict information flow to the borrower, but only to ensure that certain information will be clearly and conspicuously brought 'to the borrower’s attention and not obscured by other information.

Plaintiffs argue as follows: The “finance charge” is required to be disclosed under 12 C.F.R. § 226.8; the creditor must disclose the “cost” of any credit insurance under 12 C.F.R. § 226.4; in order for these disclosures to be adequate, defendant must also disclose the term of this insurance in the same manner as other disclosures. In support of this contention, plaintiffs refer this court to an interpretation by the Federal Reserve Board of 15 U.S.C. § 1605 contained in 12 C.F.R. § 226.402 and the case of Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 1255 (N.D.Ga.1973).

Section 226.402 interprets the Act to mean that when insurance is optional, as it was in this case, the Act requires disclosure of the cost of premiums for the term of the initial policy or policies written in connection with the transaction, “accompanied by a statement of the type' of insurance and the term thereof.” Plaintiffs and defendant agree that § 226.402 is a valid exercise of the Board’s authority to promulgate regulations and interpretations. Here, the parties' agreement ends. Plaintiffs urge this court to rule that the phrase “accompanied by a statement of . the term . . .’’of the insurance requires “disclosure” of the type and term of the insurance as well as the cost. Defendant on the other hand asserts that § 226.402 requires only that a statement of the term and type of insurance be supplied the borrower, which was done in this case.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Graham v. Bank of Damascus, Inc.
528 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Virginia, 1981)
Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc.
508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Virginia, 1981)
Ehlert v. Ward
588 S.W.2d 500 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1979)
Dalton v. Bob Neill Pontiac, Inc.
476 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. North Carolina, 1979)
Trist v. FIRST FEDERAL S. & L. ASS'N OF CHESTER
466 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1979)
Foundation Plan, Inc. v. Breaux
345 So. 2d 955 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1977)
Murphy v. BENEFICIAL FINANCE CO. OF CENT. OHIO
443 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Ohio, 1976)
Robert Levitan & Sons, Inc. v. Francis
88 Misc. 2d 125 (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York, 1976)
Gillard v. Aetna Finance Co., Inc.
414 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Louisiana, 1976)
Walker v. Security Trust Co.
85 Misc. 2d 614 (New York Supreme Court, 1976)
Mason v. General Finance Corporation of Virginia
401 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Virginia, 1975)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
384 F. Supp. 150, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6481, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doggett-v-ritter-finance-company-of-louisa-vawd-1974.