MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
BLUMENFELD, District Judge:
An earlier decision in this action1 was appealed to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction, 415 U.S. 912, 94 S.Ct. 1406, 39 L.Ed.2d 466 (1974). Thereafter the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to this court
“for further consideration in light of Pub.L. 93-647, and, if a relevant state criminal proceeding is pending, also for further consideration in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975).”
Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391, 393, 95 S.Ct. 2221, 2222, 45 L.Ed.2d 268 (1975).
In our original opinion, we upheld the constitutionality of Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 52-440b (1976 Supp.)2 against claims that it denied due process and equal protection, invaded the plaintiffs’ rights to privacy and conflicted with the purposes of the Social Security Act. Upon remand, this court has received briefs and heard arguments on all the issues to aid it in its further consideration of the case.3
We have been instructed to reconsider two different aspects of federalism, absten[1372]*1372tion and pre-emption. We turn first to the issue of abstention.4
I. Abstention in Light of Younger v. Harris
The fact that the adult plaintiffs in this action, with the exception of the intervenor, Linda Robustelli, are defendants in pending contempt proceedings instituted by the Commissioner under the authority of § 52-440b (1976 Supp.), raises a serious issue of abstention in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971),5 and its progeny. The intervention of Ms. Robustelli, who has been threatened with prosecution, but against whom no action is presently pending, cannot circumvent the issue, for while she may be entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief on a personal basis, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975), she cannot, under the guise of representing a class, dispense with the Younger considerations for those members of the class who are presently being prosecuted. “The requirements of Younger are not to be evaded by artificial niceties.” Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 833, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 2209, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974) (Burger, C. J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). Cf. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. at 816 n. 10, 94 S.Ct. 2191. However, in the opinion of this court Younger does not prohibit the issuance of an injunction or declaratory relief in this action. This conclusion is founded upon a determination that neither of the considerations which support the Younger doctrine apply in the circumstances of this case, and, in addition, a finding that the plaintiffs lack a state forum in which they can adequately present their constitutional arguments. The latter is an essential prerequisite to abstention under the Younger doctrine.
A. The Pending State Proceedings are not Criminal.
The first consideration which underlies the Younger abstention doctrine is the traditional reluctance of federal courts to interfere with pending state criminal prosecutions. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, 91 S.Ct. 746; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 [1373]*1373U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 46 S.Ct. 492, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926). This consideration does not apply to the present case, however, because the pending state proceedings are in the nature of civil rather than criminal contempt.6
Under § 52 — 440b, it is the Commissioner of Social Services, not a district attorney, who has a woman who refuses to cooperate with the Department of Social Services cited to appear before a judge of the court of common pleas. This factor alone has been held to distinguish civil from criminal contempt in this circuit. In re Kahn, 204 F. 581 (2d Cir. 1913). And see In re Guzzardi, 74 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1935).
The more general tests established by the Supreme Court to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt, Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911); serve to strengthen the conclusion that contempt sentences administered under § 52-440b are primarily civil, for their purpose would be to coerce testimony, rather than to vindicate the dignity of the court. Compare Shillitani, with United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972). In order to constitute criminal contempt, the statute would have to be interpreted to require proof of an intent to obstruct justice and an imminent threat to the administration of justice. In re Williams, 509 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1975).
Connecticut law recognizes and applies this distinction. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has recently stated:
“In any event, in 1965 (prior to the commencement of the present proceedings), . the basic statute pursuant to which the previous proceedings were instituted was enacted as § 52-435a in chapter 911 entitled “Paternity Proceedings.” No longer is there any reference in that section to quasi-criminal procedures such as arrest, pleas of guilty or not guilty, hearing on probable cause or binding over for trial. A plaintiff’s paternity action has been stripped of any quasi-criminal characteristics and clearly converted to an unmistakable civil action.”
Robertson v. Apuzzo, Conn., 37 Conn.L.J. No. 38; at 1, 4 (March 16, 1976).
These contempt proceedings are therefore not “more akin to [a] criminal prosecution[s]” than to civil actions and they are not “in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes.” Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1208, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). And the nature of the proceeding is not converted to criminal simply because, under the statute in question, the State is suing in place of the parent. The stated purpose of § 52-440b is to allow the State to institute and successfully prosecute a paternity action and to recover support for the child. Rather than a criminal prosecution, the action is instead more in the nature of a civil debt collection.7 The Welfare Commissioner is acting primarily as the guardian of the child, securing its rights, rather than as a criminal prosecutor or law enforcement officer “charged with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the state . . . [who] must decide when and how this is to be done.” [1374]*1374Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. at 243-244, 46 S.Ct. at 493, quoted in Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 91 S.Ct. 746. But cf. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 556-61, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
If these contempt proceedings can be said to be “in aid of and closely related to” any particular statute, it is the federal Social Security Act, and not any particular criminal law of the State of Connecticut. In these circumstances, the element of Younger which rests upon the traditional reluctance of courts of equity to interfere with a criminal prosecution simply does not “mandate restraint.” Cf. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200.
B. Federalism
The comity considerations inherent in our federal system provide the second rationale for the Younger policy of abstention. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746. As Huffman made clear, these considerations apply 'no less to an action because it is civil in nature rather than criminal. There, the Court stated that:
“Central to Younger was the recognition that ours is a system in which ‘the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.’ [Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746].”
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 601, 95 S.Ct. at 1207. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976).
However, given the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims in this action, traditional notions of federal-state relations, rather than requiring abstention, impel this court to intervene, not only to protect the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, but also to enforce the congressional intent underlying the recent amendments to the Social Security Act.
Younger, and the cases which follow it, involved, in essence, an attempt by a defendant in a pending state court proceeding to remove the action to federal court, without congressional authorization, based solely upon the dual claims that his constitutional rights had been or were being violated, and the expressed or unexpressed belief that federal courts were somehow more sympathetic to constitutional rights. These arguments were conclusively rejected in Huffman:
“. . . Art. VI of the United States Constitution declares that ‘the Judges in every State shall be bound’ by the Federal Constitution, laws, and treaties. Appellee is in truth urging us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be faithful to their constitutional responsibilities. This we refuse to do.”
420 U.S. 611, 95 S.Ct. 1211.
However, the challenges mounted by the plaintiffs in the present case are not exclusively substantive, constitutional ones. Consequently, the federalism issue must be viewed in a slightly different focus. Before this court can reach the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, it must first consider their claim that the state statute has been preempted by the recent amendments to the Social Security Act and the regulations to be promulgated thereunder. Although authority to invalidate a state law on preemption grounds is derived from the supremacy clause,8 the test of the Connecticut statute’s invalidity is whether it conflicts with federal legislation, not with a specific provision of the Constitution. The preemption doctrine, therefore, primarily involves the exercise of statutory interpretation, i. e., the determination, in the absence of specific direction, of the congressional intent behind a specific statute or regulatory program. Cf. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S.111, 86 S.Ct. 258, 15 L.Ed.2d 194 (1965).9
[1375]*1375Federalism requires a different result in cases turning on the interpretation of federal statutes than it does in the cases presented in the Younger line of decisions. In addition to their special expertise in the interpretation of federal statutes, federal courts are more likely to give the proper emphasis to congressional intent and the necessary supremacy of federal law in the case of an actual conflict between federal and state legislation. Although all judges, state and federal, are sworn to uphold the federal laws and Constitution, state judges are not sworn to protect the legitimate interests of the national government at the expense of the legitimate interests of their own state sovereigns.
This is not to say that pre-emption is common, or that it is a doctrine which should be aggressively applied by federal courts. Nor is it to say that state courts are not capable of giving proper weight to the national interests underlying federal legislation. It is simply a recognition that considerations, of federalism necessarily recognize an area of expertise in each of the two overlapping court systems. As the Supreme Court stated in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16, 84 S.Ct. 461, 465, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964):
“Abstention is a judge-fashioned vehicle for according appropriate deference to the ‘respective competence of the state and federal court systems.’ Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 [79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058]. Its recognition of the role of state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disregard for the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law.
This distinction, between plaintiffs’ claims based on substantive constitutional grounds and those based on pre-emption, is especially important for yet another reason. An additional factor in Younger cases is the hesitancy of lower federal courts to interfere in an ongoing judicial proceeding under any circumstances. A finding of preemption, however, is a finding that the intrusion has already occurred. If this court were to conclude that the recent amendments to the Social Security Act preempted any application of § 52-440b, it would be a finding that for reasons of national policy Congress had intended that the pending state court actions should not have been instituted. It would be a finding concerning the validity of the proceeding itself, not just concerning the constitutionality of the particular statute or its particular application. While this would clearly be an intrusion into a legitimate sphere of state interest, it would be an intrusion accomplished at the direction of Congress, and one which is clearly within Congress’ power to direct.
For these reasons we conclude that notions of federalism, the second consideration underlying the Younger doctrine, likewise do not compel us to refuse to intervene in this action.
C. Availability of a State Forum
Finally, there is an independent ground upon which abstention must be rejected. An essential prerequisite of absten[1376]*1376tion, viz. a forum in which the plaintiffs can present their constitutional claims, is not available under the special facts of this case.
In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973), the Supreme Court stated:
“. . . Younger v. Harris contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the state courts. Such a course naturally presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.”
And see Huffman, 420 U.S. at 594, 95 S.Ct. 1200.
Under the terms of § 52-440b, the Commissioner has the recalcitrant mother cited to appear before a judge of the court of common pleas. There she is ordered by the judge to testify and/or to institute a paternity action. If she refuses to do either she may be found in contempt of court. The statute contemplates a summary procedure, and does not appear on its face to allow the mother the right to challenge the authority of the Commissioner to institute the proceedings, the central issue in this case. The summary contempt procedure apparently intended by the statute, and as disclosed in the transcripts included in the record, does not appear to allow the mother an opportunity to fully litigate any defenses, much less complex constitutional and statutory issues. Cf. New Haven Tenants’ Representative Council, Inc. v. Housing Authority of City of New Haven, 390 F.Supp. 831 (D.Conn. 1975).
Furthermore, if we look beyond the theoretical concept of a court trial and consider the unique Connecticut philosophy, it appears that the court of common pleas might refuse to consider any constitutional challenge. In State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323, 326, 176 A. 401, 403 (1935), the Connecticut Supreme Court stated:
“In the absence of constitutional or statutory prohibition, any court has power to pass on the constitutionality of a statute and it may be its duty to declare it invalid, but a proper regard for the great co-ordinate branch of our government, the legislative, and for the preservation of the respect of our citizens, who are apt to look askance upon a decision of a court so limited in its jurisdiction as the city court of New Haven holding invalid the considered legislative judgment, dictates that such a court should take such action only upon the clearest ground or where the rights of litigants make it imperative that it should do so. Otherwise it is better for such a court to leave the decision to our higher courts, to which the matter may be brought by appeal or otherwise.”
While this may appear to leave room for a common pleas court to pass on constitutional issues and even to mandate that they do so in “imperative” cases, the doctrine has evolved to the point where the lower courts in Connecticut have refused to hear constitutional defenses in criminal prosecutions,11 not to mention welfare cases.12
[1377]*1377Since there is no guarantee that the plaintiffs would be able to raise their constitutional and statutory defenses in the pending state proceedings, which is the fundamental point on which abstention rests Younger does not prevent the intervention of this court at this stage to protect the plaintiffs’ rights to litigate those issues.
Having decided, for the several reasons set forth above, that our exercise of jurisdiction over this case does not jeopardize federal-state relations within the sphere of judicial authority, we turn next to the question of whether, at the legislative level, the laws enacted by the Congress conflict with the Connecticut statute challenged in this case under the supremacy clause.
II. Pre-emption
Preliminarily it should be noted that although this issue was considered in this court’s earlier opinion,13 the issue of pre-emption now comes before us in a somewhat different posture because of new federal laws enacted since that time. We must, therefore, consider this issue “in light of [the law] as it now stands, not as it once did.” Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 201, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969).
In its mandate to this court, the Supreme Court noted:
“. . . [S]ince that time Pub.L. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337, was enacted. Pub.L. 93-647 amends § 402(a) of the Social Security Act to require parents, as a condition of eligibility for AFDC assistance, to cooperate with state efforts to locate and obtain- support from absent parents but provides no punitive sanctions comparable to that provided by Conn.Gen.Stat. Rev. § 52-440b (1973).”
Section 402(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a) (1976 Supp.), has been amended once again since the Supreme Court’s ruling by Pub.L. No. 94-88 § 208(a) (Aug. 9, 1975) so that, with this most recent amendment shown in brackets, it now reads:
“§ 402(a):
“A state plan for aid and services to needy families with children must
“(26) provide that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be required—
“(B) to cooperate with the State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is claimed, or in obtaining any other payments or property due such applicant or such child [unless (in either case) such applicant or recipient is found to have good cause for refusing to cooperate as determined by the State agency in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, which standards shall take into consideration the best interests of the child on whose behalf aid is claimed]; and that, if the relative with whom a child is living is found to be ineligible because of failure to comply with the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, any aid for which such child is eligible will be provided in the form of protective payments as described in section 406(b)(2) (without regard to subparagraphs (A) through (E) of such section);
“(27) provide, that the State has in effect a plan approved under part D and operate a child support program in conformity with such plan.”
Whatever one may think of the wisdom of these new amendments, which now condition eligibility for welfare assistance on [1378]*1378cooperation in locating and obtaining support from absent parents and which require the State to set up a separate program to accomplish this result, it is readily apparent that Congress had strong views in favor of the enforcement of the parental obligations of fathers of children of unwed mothers.14
Many strands have been woven together (including incentives for both the family and the State) in the establishment of this new legislation designed to enforce the obligations of the absent parent. Indeed, the new provisions' added to Title IV of the Social Security Act by Pub.L. No. 93-647 are so comprehensive that Congress established a new “Part D — Child Support And Establishment Of Paternity” to embrace them. Pub.L. No. 93-647 § 101 (Jan. 4, 1974), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 2, at 2716, 2732-43.15 Detailed explication of all of them is-not necessary for purposes of considering the pre-emption claim of the plaintiffs. In essence, the new amendments make an unwed mother who refuses to cooperate ineligible for benefits, a result which this court earlier held to be an illegal deprivation of benefits to her. Cf. Doe v. Norton, 365 F.Supp. at 71-72 and n. 8. To protect against an arbitrary denial of benefits, the new legislation specifically requires that the mother may not be found ineligible if she “is found to have good cause for refusing to cooperate,” under standards that “shall take into consideration the best interests of the child on whose behalf aid is claimed.” We turn now to consider whether the Connecticut legislation conflicts with the federal statute as so amended to such a degree that the state statute must be struck down.
The argument for pre-emption is that the application of the state’s statute will obstruct the effectuation of the federal policy expressed in the above statutory provisions to such a degree that the state interests must yield. Viewing the new Part D from that perspective, it cannot be denied that Congress has adopted a very expansive program for establishing paternity and collecting support, one calling for the exercise of power on so many fronts that very little area is left open for state action.
But the existence of this broad area of mutuality of purpose of state and [1379]*1379federal authority is insufficient to completely preclude state action. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976). Thus, the argument that § 52-440b is invalid because Congress has not chosen to require contempt proceedings against an uncooperative mother cannot be sustained. Congressional purpose to displace local laws must be clearly manifested. H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85, 59 S.Ct. 438, 83 L.Ed. 500 (1939). Where the federal statute has not expressly proscribed' certain action but has merely been silent there is no basis for an inference that Congress intended to forbid state supplementary action.
“ . . . [T]he intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the state. This principle has had abundant illustration.” (Citations omitted.)
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533, 32 S.Ct. 715, 726, 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912). Nor does the identity of state and congressional purpose furnish a sufficient basis for a finding of congressional intent that the state should refrain from taking steps beyond those which Congress requires of it to achieve their mutual purpose. When a similar argument was presented in New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 2514, 37 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973), the Court responded:
“We do not agree. We reject, to begin with, the contention that pre-emption is to be inferred merely from the comprehensive character of the federal work incentive provisions. . . . ”16
And see DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976).
In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941), Justice Black observed that in considering whether state laws were pre-empted by federal laws dealing with the same subject, the Court
“has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference'; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. . . . ” .
While none of these is an inappropriate description of pre-emption formulae in earlier cases, the difficulties which formerly attended a determination of pre-emption have been reduced.17 There has beeii a shift from the multifarious theories that formerly underlay pre-emption to a much narrower field for judicial analysis.
While “ . . prior cases on pre-emption are not precise guidelines,” City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 1862, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973), the situation here is comparable to that in Dublino where the Court held that state work incentive programs in the administration of the AFDC program, which were complementary to those of HEW, were not pre-empted. In that case the crux of the test for pre-emption in the context of AFDC legislation is clearly set forth:
“In considering the question of possible conflict between the state and federal [1380]*1380work programs, the court below will take into account our prior decisions. Congress ‘hás given the States broad discretion,’ as to the AFDC program, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545 [92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285] (1972); see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 478 [90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491]; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-319 [88 S.Ct. 2128; 20 L.Ed.2d 1118] (1968), and ‘[s]o long ■ as the State’s actions are not in violation of any specific provision of the Constitution or the Social Security Act,’ the courts may not void them. Jefferson, supra, at 541 [at 1729 of 92 S.Ct.] Conflicts, to merit judicial rather than co-operative federal-state resolution, should be of substance and not merely trivial or insubstantial. But if there is a conflict of substance as to eligibility provisions, the federal law of course must control. King v. Smith, supra; Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 [92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448] (1971) ; Carleson v. Remiliard, 406 U.S. 598 [92 S.Ct. 1932, 32 L.Ed.2d 352] (1972) .”
413 U.S. at 423 n. 29, 93 S.Ct. at 2518.18
The new amendments outlined above require that the eligibility of an unwed mother be determined solely under standards to be established by HEW, pursuant to the provisions of the Social Security Act. Close attention was paid by Congress to the interests of the children in requiring their unwed mothers to cooperate in establishing the parental obligations of their fathers. It is not until after a member of the plaintiff mothers’ class is found not to have “good cause for refusing to cooperate,” under “standards that take into consideration the best interests of the child on whose behalf aid is claimed,” that the defendant Commissioner may resort to the ancillary remedy available under the state statute. Leaving this determination to state administration of an AFDC program is in accord with tradition; HEW has never had direct contact with applicants for assistance. In view of the establishment of such safeguards of the child’s best interests, the state law, which comes into play only after the defendant Commissioner has complied with the provisions of the Social Security Act, can hardly be regarded as frustrating any part of the purpose of the federal legislation. On the contrary, it strengthens it.
Where the federal policy favoring disclosure of the name of the father is as strongly manifested as here, it stands logic on its head to argue that Connecticut’s statute is in conflict with that policy.19 Indeed, the whole of the new Part D would be nothing [1381]*1381but an exercise in futility if the putative father should never be identified. The ancillary remedial process afforded by § 52-440b, which is specifically designed to obtain the name of the father, builds upon a legal obligation established by the state; it supplements, but does not alter or supplant, the federal law. Rather than being inconsistent with Part D it may often be the sine qua non for any use at all of Part D. There is no reason why the State of Connecticut “might not properly beget a more serious penalty, if the [Connecticut] legislature deemed it wise.” California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 736, 69 S.Ct. 841, 846, 93 L.Ed. 1005 (1949). Even with the use of § 52-440b there is no guarantee of a successful outcome.
Applying the foregoing principles, our conclusion is that no sufficient ground appears for denying validity to the Connecticut statute under the doctrine of preemption, once the Commissioner has made the required determination regarding the best interests of the child. The statute does not cover the same ground as the new Part D of the Social Security Act and is not in conflict with it. Because we hold that the state statute is not incompatible, and is therefore not preempted by the federal statute, we must now consider the constitutional questions which the plaintiffs have presented.
III. The Constitutional Issues
The plaintiffs renew the argument that to subject an unwed mother to the sanctions of the statute must be so contrary to the best interests of her child that § 52-440b cannot be constitutionally applied under any circumstances.
We have previously dealt with'the claims of both the mothers and their children that the state statute challenged in this action violates their substantive constitutional rights. In denying those claims, each of the theories advanced by the plaintiffs were discussed at length and no useful purpose would be served by repetition here. We adhere to the conclusions reached in our former opinion.
IV. Modification of Prior Opinion
The supremacy of federal law does come into play in this case in one respect. Although § 52-440b can stand unimpaired, the defendant’s right to resort to its use must now be conditioned upon his prior compliance with conditions which did not previously exist. The new amendments to the Social Security Act require that the defendant Commissioner may not find an unwed mother who refuses to cooperate in establishing the paternity of her child born out of wedlock ineligible for benefits until he first determines that she does not have good cause for refusing to cooperate, under standards which take into account the best interests of the child.20 Compliance with these requirements does not jeopardize any legitimate interest in federalism. The defendants are required to comply with Such regulations as the Secretary of HEW shall issue (including the right to a fair hearing) [1382]*1382before continuing with the contempt proceedings against these plaintiffs. This is so even though the proceedings were commenced before, the new law was enacted. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 282, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969). Until the defendant Commissioner has made the required determinations, continuation by him of the contempt proceedings against the plaintiffs, or removing them from the welfare rolls for their failure to “cooperate,” is at the very least inappropriate. Cf. Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412, 92 S.Ct. 574, 30 L.Ed.2d 567 (1972).
We therefore order that the defendant shall not remove the plaintiff mothers from the status of eligibility or begin or continue with any pending contempt proceedings against them under § 52-440b until after full compliance with the provisions of Section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act as amended. In all other respects, however, the relief requested by the plaintiffs is denied.
SO ORDERED.
See Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 487.