Dlaikan v. Roodbeen

522 N.W.2d 719, 206 Mich. App. 591

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 6, 1994
• Docket: Docket 155595
• Status: Published

Opinions

R. D. Gotham, J.

Defendants Henry Roodbeen, Clara Seeley, and St. Pius School appeal by leave granted from the circuit order that denied their motion for summary disposition, which had asserted that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. We reverse and order the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against defendants.

This is an action by three families against various representatives of the St. Pius School and the school itself. Plaintiffs brought their action to challenge the decision of Father Henry Roodbeen, pastor of the Parish of St. Pius X, not to accept plaintiffs’ children as students at the parish school for the 1991-92 school year. At the time the circuit court denied defendants’ motion, three counts remained in the action, which were labeled intentional misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of contract.

Defendants’ sole claim on appeal is that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Whether the trial court had proper subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law for this Court to decide. Dep’t of Natural Resources v Holloway Construction Co, 191 Mich App 704, 705; 478 NW2d 677 (1991). The trial court ultimately held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis that this was a contract action.

It is claimed that plaintiffs’ admission to the St. Pius School is a contract right, that contract rights are property rights, and that civil courts have jurisdiction to determine property rights involving ecclesiastical organizations. But jurisdiction is limited to property rights that can be resolved by application of civil law. Berry v Bruce, 317 Mich 490; 27 NW2d 67 (1947); Maciejewski v Breitenbeck, 162 Mich App 410, 414; 413 NW2d 65 (1987).

Reference to the form of the claim may oversimplify the issue. We must "look to the substance and effect of [the] complaint, not its emblemata.” Natal v Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F2d 1575, 1577 (CA 1, 1989).

When the claim involves the provision of the very services (or as here refusal to provide these services) for which the organization enjoys First Amendment protection, then any claimed contract for such services likely involves its ecclesiastical policies, outside the purview of civil law. In this regard there can be no distinction between a church providing a liturgical service in its sanctuary and providing education imbued with its religious doctrine in its parochial school. A civil court should avoid foray into a "property dispute” regarding admission to a church’s religious or educational activities, the essence of its constitutionally protected function. Borgman v Bultema, 213 Mich 684, 703; 182 NW 91 (1921) (expulsion of clergy or members). To do so is to set foot on the proverbial slippery slope toward entanglement in matters of doctrine or ecclesiastical polity.

In obvious contrast, when an ecclesiastical organization enters into a contract to buy or sell property, to fix the church roof, or to interact in some other way with the secular world, its activity is governed by civil law alone. Similarly, a dispute over title to property between factions of such an organization may well be determined without reference to doctrine or ecclesiastical polity. Bennison v Sharp, 121 Mich App 705; 329 NW2d 466 (1982).

Here the pleadings demonstrate that plaintiffs’ claims are so entangled in questions of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity that the civil courts lack jurisdiction to hear them. Maciejewski, supra. Even the claim that plaintiffs’ children were denied "due process” by the failure of the parochial school to follow its own rules engages the issue of ecclesiastical polity. Natal, supra at 1577.

Moreover in this case plaintiffs allege no express written contract manifesting application of civil law alone. Under their theory of implied contract, an inquiry into the parties’ relationship again necessarily entails an excursion into ecclesiastical polity. The same is true for the claims of intentional misrepresentation and professional negligence. Furthermore, we are aware of no precedent in this state for a claim of clergy malpractice where the only allegations relate to the performance of ecclesiastical functions such as the operation of a church school.

We reverse and dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against defendants for lack of jurisdiction. MCR 2.116(C) (4).

Shepherd, P.J., concurred.