#30354-SRJ 2024 S.D. 58
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF JASON R. RAVNSBORG AS AN ATTORNEY AT LAW
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
THOMAS H. FRIEBERG of State Bar of South Dakota Beresford, South Dakota Attorneys for Disciplinary Board.
MICHAEL J. BUTLER Rapid City, South Dakota
ALLISON R. SANNER Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for respondent.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 14, 2024 OPINION FILED 09/18/24 #30354
JENSEN, Chief Justice
[¶1.] This is a disciplinary proceeding involving former South Dakota
Attorney General Jason Ravnsborg, a member of the State Bar of South Dakota.
After conducting an initial investigation, the Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of
South Dakota (the Board) found that Ravnsborg’s conduct following an accident in
which he struck and killed a pedestrian with his vehicle, violated various sections of
Rule 8.4 of the South Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct. The Board filed
findings of fact, conclusions of law and a formal charging document with this Court
recommending a 26-month suspension, retroactive to the date that Ravnsborg was
impeached and removed as attorney general. After Ravnsborg denied the Board’s
findings, conclusions, and recommendation, this Court appointed a referee (the
Referee) to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Referee entered a written decision
finding that Ravnsborg violated Rule 8.4(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
recommended a public censure. We find that Ravnsborg violated Rule 8.4(c), (d),
and (e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and suspend Ravnsborg’s license to
practice law in South Dakota for a period of six months.
General Background
[¶2.] Ravnsborg graduated from the University of South Dakota School of
Law in 2001. He was admitted to practice law in South Dakota that same year and
was later admitted to practice in Iowa. Since being admitted, Ravnsborg has
continued to be a licensed attorney in good standing with the State Bar of South
Dakota.
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[¶3.] Prior to entering law school, Ravnsborg joined the United States Army
Reserve and has served several tours of duty throughout his career. His active rank
is lieutenant colonel and he is on the Army Reserve list of candidates for possible
promotion to colonel. In addition to his military service, Ravnsborg maintained a
private law practice in Yankton, South Dakota, before becoming involved in state
politics. In 2018, Ravnsborg was elected to be South Dakota’s attorney general, and
took office in January 2019.
[¶4.] On September 12, 2020, Ravnsborg drove his personal vehicle to
attend a Republican political event in Redfield, South Dakota. After the event
ended, he began driving back to his residence in Pierre. At approximately 10:30
p.m., after passing through Highmore, Ravnsborg’s vehicle struck and killed Joe
Boever, who was walking on the shoulder of the road.
[¶5.] Ravnsborg slowly brought his vehicle to a stop and called 911. He
immediately told the 911 operator, “I’m the Attorney General. And I am . . . I don’t
know . . . I hit something.” The 911 operator asked him if he hit “a deer or
something” to which he responded, “I have no idea, yeah it could be, I mean it was
right in the roadway.” Hyde County Sheriff Mike Volek was dispatched to
Ravnsborg’s location.
[¶6.] Ravnsborg and Sheriff Volek briefly scanned the surrounding area but
did not locate what Ravnsborg had hit. Shortly thereafter, Sheriff Volek offered
Ravnsborg his personal vehicle to drive back to Pierre because Ravnsborg’s vehicle
was unable to be driven.
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[¶7.] The next day, Ravnsborg returned to Highmore with his chief of staff,
Tim Bormann, to return Sheriff Volek’s personal vehicle. On the way, Ravnsborg
and Bormann stopped at the crash scene. Ravnsborg quickly discovered Boever’s
body just off the side of the road, near where the crash occurred. Bormann and
Ravnsborg then drove to Sheriff Volek’s residence to inform him of their discovery.
Sheriff Volek directed Ravnsborg to return to Pierre. Sheriff Volek contacted the
South Dakota Highway Patrol and the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI).
Because the DCI is under the direction and control of the attorney general’s office,
the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation (NDBCI) was contacted to
investigate the crash. 1 The South Dakota Highway Patrol was also involved in the
post-accident investigation. 2
[¶8.] Ravnsborg was interviewed two separate times by the NDBCI.
Ravnsborg also turned over both his personal and work cell phones to allow NDBCI
to download metadata that was generated by the phones around the time of the
1. SDCL 23-3-6 provides, “[t]he Division of Criminal Investigation heretofore established by law shall continue under the superintendency and control of the attorney general as a division of his department. The records and equipment for such division heretofore transferred to or acquired by the attorney general shall be under the custody and control of the attorney general.”
2. SDCL 1-51-2 provides that the Highway Patrol is a division of the Department of Public Safety. The Secretary of the Department of Public Safety is appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the Department of Public Safety is under the supervision of the Governor. S.D. Const. art. IV, § 9. Ravnsborg has claimed the investigation and subsequent proceedings, including this disciplinary proceeding, were influenced by politics and the Governor’s personal animosity toward him. Those concerns, however, do little to address the substance of the allegations before us which include the results of what appears to be a thorough and professional underlying criminal investigation. -3- #30354
crash. Law enforcement also drew Ravnsborg’s blood and conducted toxicology
tests. The South Dakota Highway Patrol performed an accident reconstruction and
NDBCI interviewed multiple individuals who interacted with Ravnsborg prior to
and after the accident.
[¶9.] Ravnsborg denied he had consumed any drugs or alcohol on the night
of the accident, which was confirmed by witnesses who observed him during the
evening and by the absence of any drugs or alcohol in his system at the time of the
blood test. Investigators concluded that Ravnsborg had been on his personal phone
for much of his commute from Redfield to Highmore, but that both phones were
locked at the time of the accident. It was also determined that excessive speed did
not contribute to the accident. Furthermore, despite varying opinions regarding
how far his vehicle veered off the road, investigators concluded that Ravnsborg’s
vehicle was outside the lane of travel when the accident occurred.
[¶10.] Following the investigation, Ravnsborg was charged with three Class 2
misdemeanors in February 2021. Six months later, Ravnsborg entered a no contest
plea to two misdemeanor charges: operating a motor vehicle while using a mobile
electronic device in violation of SDCL 32-26-47.1 and improper lane driving in
violation of SDCL 32-26-6. The State dismissed the third charge of careless driving
in violation of SDCL 32-24-8. Ravnsborg also entered into a confidential civil
settlement agreement with Boever’s estate. Throughout the entire criminal
investigation and after entering a no-contest plea, Ravnsborg continued to serve as
attorney general.
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Impeachment Proceedings
[¶11.] Shortly after Ravnsborg entered his no-contest plea, the South Dakota
House of Representatives established a select committee to consider whether
articles of impeachment should be issued against Ravnsborg. On March 28, 2022,
the select committee published its majority report, concluding that Ravnsborg did
not commit an impeachable offense and recommended not issuing articles of
impeachment. Despite the recommendation, two articles of impeachment were
introduced against Ravnsborg in the South Dakota House of Representatives.
Article I related to “crimes causing the death of Joseph Boever” and Article II
related to “malfeasance in office following the death of Joseph Boever.” Each article
was passed by a majority vote on April 12, 2022.
[¶12.] On June 21, 2022, the South Dakota Senate held an impeachment
trial. Ravnsborg was convicted under both articles of impeachment. As a result of
the convictions, Ravnsborg was removed from office and permanently prohibited
from holding any public office in South Dakota.
Disciplinary Board Proceedings
[¶13.] Following the impeachment proceedings, a prosecutor from the
impeachment trial filed a professional ethics complaint with the Board. The
complaint alleged that Ravnsborg violated sections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of Rule 8.4 of
the South Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct. These allegations related to the
initial car accident that occurred on September 12, 2020, as well as Ravnsborg’s
conduct following the accident. The Board investigated the complaint and held a
due process hearing. Ravnsborg was the only witness to testify at the hearing.
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[¶14.] Following the hearing, the Board filed its findings of fact, conclusions
of law, recommendation, and formal accusation with this Court. In the formal
accusation, the Board stated that the investigation was limited to Ravnsborg’s
conduct following the accident. In considering Ravnsborg’s post-accident conduct,
the Board found that:
8. Attorney General Ravnsborg is regarded as the chief law enforcement officer for the State of South Dakota. Ravnsborg believes this is a public misperception.
9. Ravnsborg would not acknowledge that as chief law enforcement officer for the State he should be held to a higher standard of conduct.
...
17. Soon after the accident became public, the South Dakota [G]overnor publicly requested that Ravnsborg take a leave of absence or resign his office of Attorney General, which he declined to do.
18. Following the September 12, 2020, incident, a thorough investigation was conducted by investigators from the State of North Dakota, because the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) was under the supervision and control of Ravnsborg.
19. In August 2021, Ravnsborg entered a Nolo Contendere or no contest plea to two misdemeanors before the Honorable John Brown who had been appointed to hear the matters by the Supreme Court of South Dakota.
26. When responding to the investigators’ questions, Ravnsborg occasionally did not appear forthright, and only willing to acknowledge certain conduct after confronted with evidence by the investigators.
27. Ravnsborg frequently identified himself as “the Attorney General,” including when encountering law enforcement for
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minor traffic violations such as speeding, and when making a 911 call from the highway shortly after killing Joe Boever.
31. Ravnsborg was not sincere in his remarks concerning how badly he felt for Boever’s family and bluntly stated “And I’m going down the road and my life changed” and that “I had no idea, to be clear, until the next morning when I found the body and it changed my life forever.”
34. During the entire length of the investigation of his conduct which led to the death of Joe Boever, Ravnsborg insisted that he was not using his cell phone and that he was entirely on the driving lane of the highway, in accordance with the rules of the road. He was charged with using his phone and of being off the road at the time of the collision. He did not contest either charge and was convicted on both counts by the judge assigned to hear the matter.
35. During the period of time from the September 12, 2020 incident in which Joe Boever was killed and while continuing in the Office of Attorney General, being the chief law enforcement officer for the State of South Dakota, Ravnsborg made no public or private apology or expression of condolences to the victim’s family; refused to acknowledge publicly his culpability; failed to understand and acknowledge that in his position as Attorney General he held a prominent position and was expected to evidence a higher standard of conduct than that expected of less prominent lawyers.
36. In his initial written response to the Board member assigned to the initial investigation of the complaint, Ravnsborg displayed a troubling lack of understanding of his obligations as a lawyer.
[¶15.] Based on these findings, the Board concluded that:
B. Ravnsborg’s conduct throughout the criminal investigation and impeachment process eroded public confidence in the legal profession.
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C. Ravnsborg violated Rule 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and his conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice as follows:
i. Ravnsborg’s repeated statements to law enforcement officers who stopped him for traffic offenses that he was the Attorney General were improper and an attempt to use his office for improper purposes;
ii. Ravnsborg’s failure to accept responsibility for his conduct in killing Boever and his failure to acknowledge the detrimental impact it had on the legal profession;
iii. Ravnsborg’s concerns over the impact of the incident were more focused on his political and military careers than the victim, the victim’s family and the public he served.
D. Ravnsborg’s conduct damaged and was detrimental to the image and integrity of attorneys, the bar association, and the legal profession as a whole.
The Board recommended Ravnsborg’s license be suspended for a period of 26
months, retroactive from June 21, 2022.
[¶16.] Ravnsborg denied the Board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law,
recommendation, and formal accusation. This Court appointed the Honorable
Bradley Zell, retired circuit judge, as the Referee pursuant to SDCL 16-19-67(4),
“for the taking of testimony and the making of findings and recommendations.”
Referee Decision
[¶17.] A hearing was held before the Referee on November 13, 2023.
Ravnsborg was the only witness to testify. The Referee also received documentary
evidence including: the transcript of the impeachment trial and related documents;
the Board’s investigative file and transcript of the due process hearing; video and
audio recordings of Ravnsborg’s interviews with law enforcement; an audio
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recording of the 911 call immediately after the accident; and video recordings of two
unrelated interactions between law enforcement and Ravnsborg.
[¶18.] Ravnsborg’s testimony and post-hearing brief addressed several
concerns that the Board identified in its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
With respect to his apparent lack of remorse and sympathy for the Boever family,
Ravnsborg testified that he attempted to express his condolences on several
occasions both publicly and privately. When asked why he remained publicly silent
during the criminal investigation and impeachment proceedings, he indicated that
he was advised by his attorneys to “basically let the process play out and be
respectful of the process but to largely remain silent.” He also claimed his attorneys
told him not to resign or take a leave of absence because such action could be
perceived as an admission of guilt. He acknowledged, however, that his decision not
to resign or take a leave of absence was predominantly motivated by his desire to
protect his professional, political, and military careers.
[¶19.] With respect to the 911 call immediately after the accident, Ravnsborg
stated that he identified himself as the attorney general because his last name is
difficult to spell, and he wanted to get help as soon as possible. He similarly stated
that the reason for identifying himself as the attorney general to law enforcement
during previous traffic stops was to identify why he was driving a state vehicle or to
respond to inquiries regarding his involvement with law enforcement.
[¶20.] The Referee filed his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision
on January 11, 2024, finding that Ravnsborg did not violate sections (b), (c), and (d)
of Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Referee acknowledged that
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many people believed Ravnsborg had been dishonest, but that much of this belief
was based upon speculation, guess, or conjecture. The Referee further found that
during the investigation Ravnsborg was not dishonest, misleading, or “otherwise
conducting himself in a manner not befitting of an attorney.”
[¶21.] With respect to Rule 8.4(e), the Referee found that Ravnsborg
displayed an “ongoing pattern” of stating his professional title as the attorney
general to law enforcement agencies for the “purpose of gaining favorable
treatment.” Regarding the traffic stops and subsequent interactions with Iowa and
Nebraska law enforcement officers, the Referee found that “Ravnsborg would not
have had to state what his title was unless asked.” As for the 911 call, the Referee
found that “[t]here was no reason for Ravnsborg to state that he was the Attorney
General.” Based on these findings the Referee concluded that “the ongoing pattern
of Ravnsborg stating his title as Attorney General to agencies engaged in law
enforcement functions would be for some purpose of gaining favorable treatment.
Such conduct is a violation of Rule 8.4(e).”
[¶22.] Relying on its findings and conclusions, the Referee recommended
Ravnsborg be publicly censured for violating Rule 8.4(e). Upon receipt of the
Referee’s report, this Court ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing their
view of the Referee’s findings and recommendations. This Court set the case for
oral argument and heard from the Board, Ravnsborg’s attorney, and Ravnsborg
personally.
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Standard of Review
[¶23.] This Court “has inherent power to supervise the conduct of attorneys
who are its officers.” SDCL 16-19-20. As such, “[t]he ultimate decision for
discipline of members of the State Bar rests with this Court.” In re Discipline of
Dorothy, 2000 S.D. 23, ¶ 16, 605 N.W.2d 493, 497 (citing Matter of Claggett, 1996
S.D. 21, ¶ 9, 544 N.W.2d 878, 880). Accordingly, when determining the appropriate
discipline to be imposed, “this Court gives no particular deference to a referee’s
recommended sanction.” Id. (citation omitted).
[¶24.] SDCL Chapter 16-19 does not address the deference this Court should
give to the findings of fact by a referee in disciplinary proceedings. Our prior
decisions, however, have given “careful consideration to [the Referee’s] findings as
they had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.” Dorothy, 2000 S.D.
23, ¶ 16, 605 N.W.2d at 497 (citation omitted). We have further stated that “[w]e
will not disturb the [R]eferee’s findings when they are supported by the evidence.”
In re Discipline of Frauenshuh, 2023 S.D. 18, ¶ 18, 989 N.W.2d 541, 549 (quoting In
re Discipline of Mines, 2000 S.D. 89, ¶ 14, 612 N.W.2d 619, 626).
[¶25.] Affording deference to the referee’s findings in disciplinary proceedings
when they are based upon live testimony is appropriate. We have not addressed,
however, this Court’s deference to a referee’s findings that are predominantly based
on documentary evidence. In other contexts, this Court has stated that a trial
court’s “superior fact-finding abilities relate to [the] opportunity to observe and
evaluate live testimony; when physical or documentary evidence is offered, the trial
court is in no better position to intelligently weigh the evidence than the appellate
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court.” Peterson v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y., 2012 S.D. 52, ¶ 17,
816 N.W.2d 843, 848–49 (citation omitted). Consequently, absent a rule requiring
this Court to give deference to a specific factfinder, we review findings based on
documentary evidence de novo. Id. ¶ 19.
[¶26.] Ravnsborg provided limited testimony at the referee hearing and the
Referee’s findings, particularly those relating to his honesty in speaking with law
enforcement, were based solely upon documentary evidence. Because the Referee
was in no better position than this Court is to weigh and consider documentary
evidence, we afford no deference to the Referee’s findings.
Analysis
[¶27.] “A license to practice law in this state is a privilege and a continuing
proclamation by the Supreme Court that a licensed attorney is an officer of the
Court, is fit to be entrusted with legal and judicial matters, and is able to aid in the
administration of justice. It is the duty of an attorney to act, both professionally
and personally, in conformity with the standards of conduct governing members of
the bar.” SDCL 16-19-31. “The purpose of the attorney disciplinary process is not
to punish the attorney.” Frauenshuh, 2023 S.D. 18, ¶ 19, 989 N.W.2d at 549 (In re
Discipline of Swier, 2020 S.D. 7, ¶ 57, 939 N.W.2d 855, 868). Rather, the three
main goals are to (1) “[protect] the public from further fraudulent, unethical or
incompetent activities” the attorney is involved in; (2) “[preserve] the image and
integrity of the attorneys, the bar association and the legal profession as a whole”;
and (3) “deter like conduct by other attorneys.” Id. (citations omitted). “The real
and vital issue to be determined is whether or not the accused, from the whole
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evidence as submitted, is a fit and proper person to be permitted to continue in the
practice of law.” Id. (quoting Swier, 2020 S.D. 7, ¶ 57, 939 N.W.2d at 868).
[¶28.] Ravnsborg was charged with misconduct under Rule 8.4(b), (c), (d), and
(e) of the South Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct. Ravnsborg challenges the
findings and conclusions of the Board and Referee that his conduct violated one or
more of these provisions. Thus, we initially consider whether Ravnsborg engaged in
professional misconduct under Rule 8.4(b), (c), (d), and (e).
1. Rule 8.4(b)
[¶29.] Rule 8.4(b) provides “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects[.]” “Although a lawyer is
personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally
answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to
law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious
interference with the administration of justice are in that category.” Matter of Hill,
144 N.E.3d 184, 190 (Ind. 2020) (citation omitted). In other words, to find a Rule
8.4(b) violation, there must be a nexus between the criminal conduct and the
attorney’s fitness to practice law. 3 Id.
[¶30.] Ravnsborg was convicted of two misdemeanor offenses: operating a
motor vehicle while using a mobile electronic device and improper lane driving. See
3. In addition to Rule 8.4(b), an attorney is subject to discipline under SDCL 16- 19-37 in the form of an immediate suspension, upon conviction “of a serious crime.” The term “serious crime” under SDCL 16-19-37 “includes any felony and [lesser crimes involving improper conduct as an attorney].” -13- #30354
SDCL 32-26-47.1; SDCL 32-26-6. Although these violations resulted in serious
consequences, they lack a clear link to Ravnsborg’s fitness to practice law under
Rule 8.4(b) and are not serious crimes within the meaning of SDCL 16-19-37.
2. Rule 8.4(c)
[¶31.] Rule 8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from “engag[ing] in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” Ravnsborg urges this Court to
adopt the Referee’s conclusion that he did not violate Rule 8.4(c). He argues that
the Referee correctly found that the facts could not prove he was dishonest,
misleading, or uncooperative throughout the investigation and any allegation to the
contrary was not based upon fact.
[¶32.] From our review of the record, several of Ravnsborg’s statements after
the accident raise significant questions about his honesty and truthfulness.
Ravnsborg’s statement to the 911 operator that he hit something “right in the
roadway” and his statements to investigators that he believed he was in the
roadway are contrary to the forensic evidence. While there was some question
regarding how far onto the shoulder Ravnsborg’s vehicle was, the forensic evidence
clearly established Ravnsborg’s vehicle was not in the middle of his driving lane
when it struck Boever.
[¶33.] In addition, Ravnsborg’s statements regarding his phone usage on the
night of the accident raise serious concerns about his truthfulness with
investigators. At the outset of his second interview with NDBCI, Ravnsborg
emphatically denied using his phone while driving back from Redfield, except for
two calls he made to his father shortly after leaving Redfield. Ravnsborg denied
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accessing his emails at any point during his commute home and stated that he did
not text anyone or otherwise recall using his phone at any time during the drive.
[¶34.] Later in the interview, investigators told Ravnsborg that they found
“internet activity” on his phone just before the accident occurred. Ravnsborg
responded by stating “I don’t not use my phone” but reaffirmed that he was not
using either phone at the time of the crash. Ravnsborg was then directly asked if
he used his phone up to the time of the crash. In response, Ravnsborg put his head
down, remained silent for a few seconds, and eventually stated “not that I can
recall.” Ravnsborg explained that he remembered setting the phone down when he
drove into Highmore because it had fallen from the vehicle’s center console during
the trip but emphasized “I was not using it at the time [of the crash].” Ravnsborg
was then asked what he was doing with the phone before he got to Highmore to
which he responded by stating, “I looked at the time . . . I glanced at it . . . but
nothing sticks out to me.”
[¶35.] Ravnsborg was then confronted with specific metadata found on his
phone shortly before he had made the 911 call at 10:24 p.m. The metadata showed
Ravnsborg had unlocked his phone, checked his Yahoo email account, accessed the
Dakota Free Press website, and clicked on a political news article minutes before
the accident. Once informed of this information, Ravnsborg’s story took another
turn. He admitted that he “looked at stuff” on his phone and then sat it down to
begin thinking about cases from work but reiterated that he was not looking at his
phone when the accident happened.
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[¶36.] Like Rule 8.4(b), the prohibition against dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in Rule 8.4(c) applies in the context of a lawyer’s professional
obligations and ability to practice law. “The purpose of lawyer discipline is to
protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not
discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely properly to discharge their
professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.”
ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 1.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1992).
“Not every lawyer misstatement poses that risk . . . [i]nstead, there must be a
rational connection between . . .” the dishonest act and purpose of attorney
discipline to protect the profession and administration of justice. In re Conduct of
Carpenter, 95 P.3d 203, 208 (Or. 2004). “If the evidence in a discipline case does not
establish such a nexus, then the lawyer is not subject to professional discipline.” Id.
[¶37.] In the context of attorney misconduct, we define dishonesty as “conduct
evincing a lack of honesty, probity or integrity; [a] lack of fairness and
straightforwardness[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n. of Maryland v. McDonald, 85
A.3d 117, 140 (Md. 2014) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheridan, 741
A.2d 1143, 1156 (Md. 1999)). This also “encompasses the nondisclosure of a
material fact.” In re Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 973 (Or. 2000) (citing In re
Weidner, 801 P.2d 828, 832 n.2 (Or. 1990)). This “may be a lie, a half-truth, or even
silence.” Id. (citation omitted). “A misrepresentation becomes fraud or deceit ‘when
it is intended to be acted upon without being discovered.’” Id. (quoting In re Hiller,
694 P.2d 540, 542–44 (Or. 1985)).
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[¶38.] We emphasize that Ravnsborg, just like every other criminal
defendant, had a constitutional right to maintain silence. However, once he decided
to submit to an interview with NDBCI, Ravnsborg failed to conduct himself with
honesty. His evolving explanation regarding the extent of his cell phone use while
driving involved actual dishonesty and misrepresentations within the meaning of
Rule 8.4(c). Ravnsborg initially denied ever using his phone while driving, except to
call his father. He only reluctantly admitted that he “looked at stuff” on his phone
after he was confronted with specific information found on his phone. Even then,
Ravnsborg attempted to downplay the extent of his phone usage by stating that he
only used his phone to check the time.
[¶39.] At oral argument, Ravnsborg’s explanation about his statements to
NDBCI concerning his phone usage raises even more concerns. Ravnsborg told this
Court that he denied using his phone during the trip because he believed that his
phone usage at the time of the accident was the only relevant time period regarding
his phone activity. The questions from law enforcement were clear and directed
Ravnsborg to disclose any phone use on the drive back from Redfield. Further, he
would have undoubtedly been aware that law enforcement was investigating
whether any violations of the law had occurred on the night of the accident and that
using his phone at any point while driving was a statutory violation. See SDCL 32-
26-47.1. Despite this knowledge and the clarity of the questions, Ravnsborg
continued to deny or omit this information until it became obvious that
investigators already knew the answer to their questions. Ravnsborg’s responses
demonstrated a concerted effort to avoid criminal liability, through dishonesty and
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misrepresentations, which violated Rule 8.4(c). Finally, Ravnsborg’s patent
dishonesty concerning the use of his phone, as well as the developed forensic
evidence, raise genuine questions about the integrity of his statements regarding
the night of the accident. This conduct, particularly considering Ravnsborg’s
prominent position as attorney general, reflected adversely on the legal profession
as a whole and impeded the administration of justice.
3. Rule 8.4(d) and (e)
[¶40.] Rule 8.4(d) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”
Additionally, Rule 8.4(e) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or
to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law[.]” The Board found that Ravnsborg failed to acknowledge his unique position
as attorney general and how his post-accident actions were prejudicial to the
administration of justice. The Board also found that Ravnsborg repeatedly used his
political title when interacting with law enforcement to receive a personal benefit;
failed to accept responsibility for his conduct in killing Boever; and was more
concerned with the accident’s impact on his professional career than its impact on
the victim, the victim’s family, and the public. The Referee agreed with the Board’s
findings that Ravnsborg improperly used his title as attorney general to receive
favorable treatment but did not adopt the remaining findings of the Board.
[¶41.] Ravnsborg claims that the Board’s description of his authority as the
attorney general is based on semantics and misperceptions rather than fact.
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Furthermore, Ravnsborg argues that it was important for him to continue in office,
despite the ongoing investigation, because any other action would have been
perceived as an admission of wrongdoing. He also contends that his office was
engaged in important tasks, including an investigation of the Governor, that he
believed would end if he stepped down.
[¶42.] Ravnsborg’s statements and arguments throughout the disciplinary
proceedings, including to this Court, demonstrate Ravnsborg’s lack of awareness
and unwillingness to acknowledge the unique authority and responsibility he held
as attorney general. The attorney general has “concurrent jurisdiction with the
state’s attorney” in every county of the state. SDCL 23-3-3. The attorney general
also has the “authority to sign, file, and present any and all [charging documents]
and papers of any kind which the state’s attorney might do in any criminal
proceeding, and to appear before all” courts of this state in any criminal proceeding.
SDCL 23-3-4. The attorney general further possesses the authority to appoint
assistants across the state having “the same powers with respect to the enforcement
of law as [held by law enforcement],” including “the detection, apprehension, arrest,
and prosecution of anyone violating any of the criminal laws of the state when so
directed by the attorney general[.]” SDCL 23-3-10. These statutory duties
presuppose that the attorney general is the chief law enforcement officer of the
state. See also Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 979 N.E.2d 1263, 1269 (Ohio 2012)
(“As the chief law officer for the state, the attorney general is charged with
providing legal representation and advice to all officers, boards, heads of
departments, and institutions of this state.”).
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[¶43.] Ravnsborg’s fundamental misapprehension of his responsibilities as
attorney general and his resulting actions were prejudicial to the administration of
justice. By choosing to continue to serve as attorney general during a period of time
that he was the subject of a homicide investigation, Ravnsborg was obligated to
maintain the public trust and confidence of his office. See Dann, 979 N.E.2d at 1269
(“Like judges, the attorney general has a heightened duty to the public by virtue of
his elected office.”). The incongruity of a criminal investigation involving his
personal conduct and his service as attorney general may have been irreconcilable,
but at a minimum, by choosing to continue to serve as attorney general, Ravnsborg
carried a tremendous burden to assure the public that the functions of his office,
and law enforcement across the State, would continue without interruption.
Failure to conform to these unique obligations harms the public far greater than
that of an ordinary attorney. See Hill, 144 N.E.3d at 193 (“The duty of judges and
prosecutors to conform their behavior to the law does not arise solely out of their
status as attorneys. As officers charged with the administration of law, their own
behavior has the capacity to bolster or damage public esteem for the system
different than that of attorneys otherwise in practice.”).
[¶44.] It is evident, even as of the time of oral argument to this Court, that
Ravnsborg failed to consider how his actions following the accident and the
subsequent investigation, would impact his office’s ability to fulfill its duties in such
a way that maintained the public’s confidence. During this time, Ravnsborg
concealed himself from the public eye, failed to acknowledge the seriousness of the
ongoing investigation, and perhaps most importantly, did nothing to reassure the
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public that he could continue to perform his responsibilities as attorney general
while the investigation and criminal prosecution continued. Each decision he made
was influenced by personal aspirations and political survival rather than his
responsibility to serve the public and uphold the integrity of his office. Ravnsborg’s
actions cast a cloud of needless scrutiny on the office of the attorney general. His
actions raised genuine doubts about whether he could fulfill his responsibilities as
the State’s chief law enforcement officer. Ravnsborg’s conduct necessarily
interfered with the administration of justice and violated Rule 8.4(d).
[¶45.] Additionally, Ravnsborg’s pattern of using his title as the attorney
general to gain a personal benefit also violated Rule 8.4(d) and (e). Ravnsborg
claims that each incident was for modest purposes such as explaining the
registration on his vehicle to law enforcement, identifying the purpose of driving a
state-owned vehicle, and responding to an officer’s question regarding his affiliation
with law enforcement.
[¶46.] Prior to the accident, Ravnsborg identified himself as the attorney
general on two separate occasions immediately after being pulled over for alleged
traffic violations. On one occasion, a Nebraska police officer pulled Ravnsborg over
for speeding and asked him for his license and registration. Ravnsborg’s immediate
response was to identify himself as a unit commander in the Army Reserve and
stated that “my other thing is . . . I’m also the attorney general in South Dakota.”
In a similar manner, Ravnsborg was pulled over in Iowa for running through a four-
way stop. In response to being asked for his license and registration, Ravnsborg
stated “I have a driver’s license . . . it’s a state car and I’m actually the attorney
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general [in South Dakota].” 4 In each instance, the officer released Ravnsborg
without issuing a citation. A review of each video shows ill-disguised yet successful
efforts by Ravnsborg to use his position as attorney general to avoid culpability.
[¶47.] This pattern of conduct continued on the night of the accident.
Ravnsborg introduced himself to the 911 operator on the night of the accident as the
attorney general. After the operator answered Ravnsborg’s call, Ravnsborg
immediately stated, “this is the Attorney General[,]” and did not use his real name
until asked by the operator later on in the call. At that moment in time, there was
no legitimate reason to identify himself as the attorney general. These interactions
display an ongoing pattern of conduct of using his professional title to improperly
influence government officials or receive special treatment. This conduct interfered
with the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d) and Rule 8.4(e).
Appropriate Discipline
[¶48.] This Court is authorized to discipline attorneys for misconduct, which
may include: (1) disbarment; (2) suspension for a specific period of time “not to
exceed three years;” (3) “[p]lacement on a probationary status” for a period of time
and with such conditions as this Court deems appropriate; (4) public censure; and
(5) “[p]rivate reprimand by the board.” SDCL 16-19-35. When considering the
4. At the Board hearing, Ravnsborg testified that after being pulled over in Iowa, he identified himself as the attorney general after the officer saw Ravnsborg’s badge and asked him if he was involved in law enforcement. However, the recording does not support Ravnsborg’s claim. It does not appear that Ravnsborg was ever asked if he was involved in law enforcement, and his testimony regarding this interaction lacked candor and honesty. Instead, the recording shows Ravnsborg volunteered this information on his own and without any inquiry concerning his affiliation with law enforcement. -22- #30354
appropriate discipline to impose we consider “the seriousness of the misconduct and
the likelihood that it or similar misconduct will be repeated. We also consider the
prior record of the attorney.” In re Discipline of Eicher, 2003 S.D. 40, ¶ 47, 661
N.W.2d 354, 369 (internal citation omitted). “A lawyer must be held accountable for
his or her acts, even if the results were unintended, but we must not be unfair to
the lawyer.” In re Discipline of Janklow, 2006 S.D. 3, ¶ 17, 709 N.W.2d 28, 34.
[¶49.] The Board relies on the factual similarities between this case and In re
Discipline of Janklow and recommends this Court impose a 26-month suspension
retroactive to the date Ravnsborg was impeached from office, similar to the sanction
imposed in Janklow. We have routinely stated that we must decide each
disciplinary proceeding upon its own set of unique facts. Mines, 2000 S.D. 89, ¶ 16,
612 N.W.2d at 626 (citation omitted). Moreover, Janklow is distinguishable from
the case currently before us. In Janklow, the respondent attorney was convicted of
felony reckless manslaughter arising from a motor vehicle accident, whereas
Ravnsborg was convicted of two Class 2 misdemeanors arising from the accident
that caused Boever’s death. 2006 S.D. 3, ¶ 9, 709 N.W.2d at 32. Furthermore, a
retroactive punishment was appropriate in Janklow because the attorney self-
reported his felony conviction and was subject to immediate suspension of his law
license once he was convicted, pursuant to SDCL 16-19-37. Id. ¶ 4. In contrast,
Ravnsborg was not subject to an automatic suspension of his license due to his
misdemeanor convictions. Instead, Ravnsborg voluntarily refrained from practicing
law after he was impeached.
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[¶50.] “After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances may be considered in deciding what sanction to impose.” Claggett,
1996 S.D. 21, ¶ 16, 544 N.W.2d at 881 (quoting ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 9.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1992)). Mitigating factors this
Court may consider include the attorney’s “character or reputation” and the
“remoteness of prior offenses.” ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
Standard 9.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1992). The aggravating factors we may consider
include, but are not limited to, the attorney’s pattern of misconduct, refusal to
acknowledge the nature of his misconduct, the seriousness of the misconduct, and
the impact their conduct had on the profession’s image and integrity. See Mines,
2000 S.D. 89, ¶ 17, 612 N.W.2d at 627; see also Dann, 979 N.E.2d at 1268–69.
[¶51.] Since his admission to practice law in 2001, Ravnsborg has been the
subject of one prior disciplinary complaint while in private practice. The complaint
did not proceed to the formal disciplinary process and the record is devoid of any
information regarding the nature of the complaint. Ravnsborg has not practiced
law since his impeachment, and he indicates that he does not plan to practice law in
South Dakota after these proceedings are concluded. We recognize that between his
military service and involvement in state government, Ravnsborg has been a well-
respected public servant for most of his career. He was decorated on several
occasions for his military service and is under consideration for a promotion to
colonel in the Army Reserve.
[¶52.] The accident on September 12, 2020, resulted in the death of Joseph
Boever and Ravnsborg’s conduct following the accident is the subject of this
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disciplinary proceeding. During this time, Ravnsborg dishonestly communicated
with investigators in an effort to diminish or avoid criminal culpability.
Ravnsborg’s actions while being the subject of a homicide investigation and
continuing as attorney general, were also prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Further, Ravnsborg displayed an ongoing pattern of misusing his position
as the attorney general to receive beneficial treatment. Ravnsborg’s misuse of his
position as attorney general and dishonesty toward law enforcement during a
criminal investigation are contrary to the expectations of him as an attorney and
particularly the heightened obligations upon him as attorney general. See Dann,
979 N.E.2d at 1268–69 (When a public official, such as the attorney general,
commits ethical violations it “cause[s] incalculable harm to the public perception of
the attorney general’s office and those government agencies, departments, and
institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.”). In the course of
this disciplinary proceeding, Ravnsborg has not acknowledged or accepted
responsibility for this conduct but has continued to justify his actions.
[¶53.] After reviewing the facts and weighing the relevant mitigating and
aggravating factors, the Court hereby suspends Ravnsborg’s license to practice law
in South Dakota for a period of six months. While Ravnsborg is unlikely to continue
practicing law in South Dakota, we conclude suspension is necessary to preserve the
integrity of the profession and deter like conduct by other attorneys. The six-month
suspension shall commence on the date of entry of the order of suspension.
Pursuant to SDCL 16-19-70.4, Ravnsborg shall also be responsible for reimbursing
the State Bar of South Dakota for all costs and expenses related to these
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proceedings. These costs and expenses shall be reimbursed prior to his
reinstatement to practice law in South Dakota.
[¶54.] KERN, SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN, Justices, concur.
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