Dillon v. Nguyen

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: March 3, 2025
• Docket: 4:24-cv-04735
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LATONYA DILLON, Case No. 24-cv-04735-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 10 OFFICER NGUYEN, et al., Re: ECF No. 23 Defendants. 11

12 13 Before the Court is a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint (“FAC”) by 14 Defendants Officer Nguyen, Officer Caballero, Officer Hiller, Officer Leichliter, Officer 15 Rodriguez, Officer Rossi, Officer Vukasinovic, Sergeant Perez-Angeles, Sergeant Fowler, and 16 Sergeant Rowbotham, all of the Oakland Police Department (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF 17 No. 23. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion. 18 I. BACKGROUND1 19 Plaintiff Latonya Dillon brings this civil rights action against Defendants under 42 20 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution. ECF No. 21 20. Dillon claims she was wrongfully arrested and prosecuted for multiple charges stemming 22 from the criminal conduct of her brother, Rahsaan Robinson.2 Id. ¶ 19. 23 On November 14, 2020, Dillon left her daughter in her mother’s care at her mother’s home 24 in Oakland before heading to a dental appointment. Id. ¶ 20. Dillon received a call from her 25 mother, who told her that Robinson had arrived in a white Mercedes and openly brandished a gun. 26 1 For the purposes of deciding this motion, the Court accepts as true the following factual 27 allegations from the FAC, ECF No. 20. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 1 Id. ¶ 21. Concerned for her daughter’s safety, Dillon left her dentist’s office to pick up her 2 daughter from her mother’s home. Id. ¶ 23. On her way there, she called 911 to provide 3 Robinson’s name and description, report that he had a gun, and convey that she was headed to the 4 scene to pick up her daughter. Id. ¶ 24. 5 Defendants Nguyen, Caballero, Hiller, Perez-Angeles, and Fowler were the first officers to 6 arrive to the scene. Id. ¶ 27. After the officers arrived, Robinson fled on foot, leaving his car’s 7 hazard lights flashing and doors open. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. Dillon arrived after Robinson fled. Id. ¶ 30. 8 At her mother’s request, Dillon attempted to move the stranded white Mercedes out of the street. Id. ¶¶ 31–32. While she was making this effort, Dillon was approached by Nguyen, Caballero, 9 and Hiller, who questioned and detained her. Id. ¶¶ 31–33. Nguyen, Caballero, Hiller, Perez- 10 Angeles, and Leichliter searched the white Mercedes and “found a black handgun, an assault rifle, 11 and a gray duffle bag containing marijuana.” Id. ¶ 34. The officers also searched Dillon’s bag and 12 found a pink handgun legally owned and registered in her name. Id. Leichliter, Rodriguez, and 13 Rossi placed Dillon under arrest. Id. ¶ 34. 14 Dillon claims that all Defendants “participated in and/or failed to intervene in drafting 15 various reports and declarations about the events of November 14, 2020.” Id. ¶ 36. She alleges 16 that Defendants improperly drafted their police reports by describing Dillon as the driver of 17 Robinson’s car, stating that Dillon was present at the scene and in the white Mercedes when the 18 officers arrived, and mischaracterized witnesses’ statements to indicate that Dillon was the driver 19 even though the witnesses had not mentioned Dillon. Id. ¶¶ 37–40. 20 On April 6, 2021, the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office charged Dillon with: (1) 21 unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm in a city (Pen. Code § 25850, subd. (a)), to wit, a .40 Glock 22 22, with a special allegation that the Glock was not registered in her name; (2) unlawfully carrying 23 a concealed firearm within a vehicle (Pen. Code § 25400, subd. (a)(1)), to wit, a .40 Glock 22, 24 with a special allegation that the Glock was loaded and not registered in her name; (3) unlawfully 25 carrying a loaded firearm in a city (Pen. Code § 25850, subd. (a)), to wit, a semi-automatic assault 26 rifle, with a special allegation that the assault rifle was not registered in her name; (4) unlawfully 27 carrying a concealed firearm within a vehicle (Pen. Code § 25400, subd. (a)(1)), to wit, a semi- 1 in her name; (5) unlawfully possessing an assault weapon (Pen. Code § 30605, subd. (a)); (6) 2 unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle in a city (Pen. Code § 25850, subd. (a)), to wit, a 3 9mm FMK pistol; (7) unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm (Pen. Code § 25400, subd. (a)(2)), 4 to wit, a 9mm FMK pistol; and (8) unlawfully possessing marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code § 11359, subd. (b)). Id. ¶ 41. After discovery in the criminal case began, the prosecution became 5 aware that Dillon was not involved in the crimes charged. Id. ¶ 43. The prosecution then moved 6 to dismiss the assault weapon charges and reduce the remaining charges to misdemeanors.3 Id. 7 ¶ 43. On August 5, 2022, the court granted the prosecution’s motion and recommended judicial 8 diversion for the remaining charges, which were dismissed upon Dillon’s completion of the 9 diversion program six months later. Id. ¶ 44. 10 II. JURISDICTION 11 The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 12 III. LEGAL STANDARD 13 To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a 14 complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 15 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal “is appropriate only where the complaint 16 lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 17 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint 18 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 19 on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 20 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Factual allegations need not be detailed, but the facts must be “enough 21 to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 22 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 23 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 24 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. While this standard is not “akin to a ‘probability requirement’ . . . it 25 asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 26 27 1 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 2 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 3 relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 4 In determining whether a plaintiff has met the plausibility requirement, a court must 5 “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 6 favorable” to the plaintiff. Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1072. In so doing, “a court may not look beyond 7 the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a 8 defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 9 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted). 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 Defendants move to dismiss the two causes of action in the FAC: (1) fabrication of 12 evidence and (2) malicious prosecution, both pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 13 A. Fabrication of Evidence 14 A defendant is liable for fabrication of evidence if “(1) the defendant official deliberately 15 fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.” 16 Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2017). 17 Defendants contend that drafting choices made by officers should not be considered a 18 deliberate fabrication of evidence. ECF No. 23 at 6. “To be sure, not all inaccuracies in an 19 investigative report give rise to a constitutional claim.” Spencer, 857 F.3d at 798. Here, however, 20 Dillon sufficiently alleges that Defendants mischaracterized material witness statements and facts in their reports. See id., 857 F.3d at 798 (finding that there is direct evidence of deliberate 21 fabrication when “an interviewer deliberately mischaracterizes witness statements in her 22 investigative report”). For example, Dillon alleges that in an interview with Defendant 23 Vukasinovic, a witness named George Nesbitt described Robinson as being associated with the 24 white Mercedes but did not mention Dillon at all. ECF No. 20 ¶ 37(e) n.6. Further, other 25 witnesses who called 911 described the suspect as “a black male wearing a white sweatshirt and 26 driving for standing in front of a white or silver Mercedes.” Id. But despite those witnesses all 27 describing Robinson as the suspect, the Defendants mischaracterized these statements by 1 suggesting that Dillon was the driver of the white Mercedes. Id. at 29. 2 Defendants further argue that the FAC is conclusory as to each officer’s conduct. ECF No. 3 23 at 6–7. The Court disagrees. Dillon alleges that all Defendants participated in drafting and 4 reviewing the reports and declarations made by the officers. ECF No. 20 ¶ 36. Dillon also makes 5 specific allegations to each officer’s individual conduct. Id. ¶¶ 27–40. She alleges: (1) Nguyen, 6 Caballero, Hiller, Perez-Angeles, and Fowler were the first officers at the scene and saw Robinson 7 flee, id. ¶¶ 27, 31; (2) those officers interrogated Dillon as she explained she did not have the key 8 to the white Mercedes, id.; (3) Nguyen, Caballero, Hiller, Perez-Angeles, and Leichliter searched 9 the vehicle and her bag, id.; (4) Leichliter, Rodriguez, and Rossi placed Dillon under arrest, id.; (5) 10 Rowbotham reviewed surveillance images that showed Robinson standing near the white 11 Mercedes until the officers arrived and Robinson fled, id. ¶ 37(f); and (6) Vukasinovic knew there 12 was at least one eyewitness who described Robinson as the driver of the white Mercedes—and 13 made no mention of Dillon—in their interview with him, id. ¶¶ 37(e) n.1, 39. Accordingly, the 14 Court finds that Dillon sufficiently alleged the Defendants’ involvement to state a claim for relief 15 against them. 16 Defendants’ final argument is that the FAC fails to allege facts showing that the officers’ 17 omissions or mischaracterizations—as opposed to the guns or marijuana found in the car—were 18 the cause of Dillon’s arrest. ECF No. 23 at 7. But Dillon sufficiently alleges that Defendants 19 “caused” her prosecution by “present[ing] the district attorney with information known [] to be 20 false” and/or “knowingly withhold[ing] relevant information” from the prosecutor. See Caldwell 21 v. City and County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, Dillon alleges 22 that Defendants knew Dillon could not have been the driver of the white Mercedes or the 23 possessor of the contraband therein because (1) Dillon arrived in her own vehicle after the officers 24 saw Robinson flee, (2) Dillon did not have a key to the white Mercedes, (3) Dillon reported to 911 25 dispatchers that she was going to pick up her daughter, (4) no witnesses mentioned Dillon as the 26 suspect, and (5) surveillance footage reviewed by Rowbotham did not reveal Dillon near the white 27 Mercedes until after the officers arrived and Robinson fled. Id. ¶¶ 31–39. The Court therefore 1 caused her prosecution. 2 B. Malicious Prosecution 3 To establish liability for a claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove “that the 4 prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal 5 termination in [the] plaintiff’s, favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was 6 initiated with malice.”4 Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 7 Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 871 (1989)). Additionally, a plaintiff must 8 show Defendants prosecuted for the purpose of denying a specific constitutional right.5 Id. 9 1. Favorable Termination 10 The heart of the parties’ dispute is whether the prior action was terminated in the plaintiff’s 11 favor. Defendants argue that a plaintiff cannot maintain a malicious prosecution claim where 12 “‘the charges were withdrawn on the basis of a compromise among the parties.’” ECF No. 23 at 13 8, 29 (quoting Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1068 (2004)). But the Supreme Court 14 has recently held that to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff “need only show that 15 the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction” and not “that the criminal prosecution ended 16 with some affirmative indication of innocence.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022). 17 Dillon’s charges were either voluntarily dismissed or resolved through diversion court, 18 neither of which constitutes a conviction. See ECF No. 20 ¶ 44. The Thompson Court found that 19 a voluntary dismissal without an explanation from the judge or prosecutor satisfies the favorable 20 termination element. 596 U.S. at 49. Similarly here, the felony assault weapon charges were 21 dismissed while the remaining charges were reduced to misdemeanors and then ultimately 22 resolved through a diversion program. ECF No. 20 ¶ 43; see Cal. Penal Code § 1001.95(c) 23 (providing that under a court initiated misdemeanor diversion program, “[i]f the defendant has 24 complied with the imposed terms and conditions, at the end of the period of diversion, the judge 25 shall dismiss the action against the defendant”). “The favorable termination requirement serves 26 4 Defendants have not disputed that the element of malice is plausibly alleged, so the Court 27 analyzes only the first two elements. 1 multiple purposes: (i) it avoids parallel litigation in civil and criminal proceedings over the issues 2 of probable cause and guilt; (ii) it precludes inconsistent civil and criminal judgments where a 3 claimant could succeed in the tort action after having been convicted in the criminal case; and (iii) 4 it prevents civil suits from being improperly used as collateral attacks on criminal proceedings.” 5 Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44. Characterizing diversion as a favorable termination is not at variance 6 with any of these purposes, and is consistent with its holding that “[a] plaintiff need only show 7 that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction,” id. at 49. Accordingly, absent 8 compelling authority finding otherwise, the Court will not inclined to dismiss Dillon’s malicious 9 prosecution claim based on the element of favorable termination. 10 2. Probable Cause 11 In their reply, Defendants also argue that Dillon failed to allege facts showing that 12 Defendants lacked probable cause to initiate proceedings against her. ECF No. 29 at 5. As a 13 threshold matter, Defendants waived this argument by not properly raising it in their initial 14 motion. See United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the 15 general principle that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived). Nevertheless, 16 the Court finds that Defendants’ argument fails considered on its merits. 17 In a malicious prosecution case, “[p]robable cause for the initiation of a criminal 18 prosecution exists where ‘it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to suspect the plaintiff 19 had committed a crime.”’ Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1164 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 20 Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2006)). Whether probable cause existed for a 21 criminal prosecution is a question of law; however, if there is a dispute to the facts known to the 22 defendant in bringing the prior action, “they must be passed upon by the jury before the court can 23 determine the issue of probable cause.” Sheldon, 47 Cal. 3d at 877. Defendants do not dispute the 24 facts, leaving the question of probable cause for the Court. 25 Drawing inferences in favor of Dillon, the Court finds that she sufficiently establishes that 26 the Defendants lacked probable cause to initiate a case against her. As previously discussed, 27 Defendants were the first officers at the scene, witnessed Robinson flee from the white Mercedes, 1 called the police to inform them about the situation at her mother’s home. ECF No. 20 4] 19-33. 2 || Dillon has thus alleged that Defendants knew Dillon was not the driver of the white Mercedes or 3 the possessor of the contraband therein and lacked probable cause to initiate the criminal 4 || prosecution against her. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss fails on this ground. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons above, the Court denies the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Dated: March 3, 2025 . 9 JON S. TIGA 10 United States District Judge 11 a 12

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