MEMORANDA OPINIONS AND ORDERS
NEESE, District Judge.
This is a diversity-action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for the wrongful [268]*268death of her husband, allegedly the result of his exposure to products containing asbestos manufactured and sold by the 20 defendants. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), (c). Nearly a year and 3 months after she commenced this action, the plaintiff moved for leave to amend her complaint herein so as to allege also this Court’s admiralty and maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)1 and 46 U.S.C. §§ 7402 and 761.3 A magistrate of this district recommended, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B): (1) that the motion to amend be denied, and (2) that the motion of the defendants for a summary judgment be granted. The plaintiff served and filed timely written objection to the first such recommendation.
I
The magistrate deemed the proposed amendment of the plaintiff insufficient, as a matter of law, to invoke this Court’s admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and, accordingly, recommended its denial. See Banque de Depots v. National Bank of Detroit, C.A.6th (1974), 491 F.2d 753, 757[7] (where proposed amendment appears to be insufficient as a matter of law, it may be denied).4 The plaintiff argues, however, that she should be allowed at a minimum to allege such jurisdiction, and she appears to have evidence to offer relating arguably to the existence thereof. (The plaintiff also requested an oral hearing on such motion. See Local Rule 12(c).)
As was recognized by the magistrate, the attempt of the plaintiff to assert a maritime-tort within this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction appears rather far-fetched at first blush: it is undisputed that the only basis for such jurisdiction is the plaintiff’s contention that, from 1943 through 1946, her decedent served in the United States Navy on Guam as a machinist’s-mate; and that during this period, while repairing ships, he came into contact with asbestos-containing materials allegedly manufactured or sold by the defendants herein. This, the plaintiff would apparently claim, proximately caused the death of her decedent more than 30 years afterward.
The parties appear to agree that, before the plaintiff could invoke this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, the wrongs allegedly perpetrated on her husband by these 20 defendants must have borne “ * * * a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. * * * ” Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland (1972), 409 U.S. 249, 268, 93 S.Ct. 493, 504, 34 L.Ed.2d 454, 467[4]; accord White v. Johns-Manville Corp., C.A.4th (1981), 662 F.2d 234, 239[1], certiorari denied (1982), 454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1037, 71 L.Ed.2d 319; Roberts v. Grammer, D.C. Tenn. (1977), 432 F.Supp. 16, 17[1]. The [269]*269plaintiff apparently thinks that, if given the opportunity, she can establish this relationship by proof.
Under these circumstances, the Court believes the appropriate procedure is to allow the plaintiff to amend her complaint, and for the Court thereupon to determine whether its admiralty-jurisdiction has been invoked properly. The Court will treat the opposition of the defendants to the allowance of such amendment as a suggestion of lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and will proceed to determine factually whether such jurisdiction exists. See Hopkins v. Wasson, D.C.Tenn. (1962), 227 F.Supp. 278, 279[3], affirmed C.A.6th (1964), 329 F.2d 67, certiorari denied (1964), 379 U.S. 854, 85 S.Ct. 102, 13 L.Ed.2d 57.
The Court understands that, by her proposed amendment, the plaintiff seeks to hold the multiple-defendants strictly liable to her for a tort committed against her decedent upon the high seas as well as for negligence and breach of warranties while such decedent (her husband) was serving in the naval forces of the United States. It appears that: “ * * * ‘Every species of tort, however occurring, * * * if upon * * * navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance.’ * * * ” Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland, supra, 409 U.S. at 254, 93 S.Ct. at 497, 34 L.Ed.2d at 459. “ * * * ‘[B]ut the main business of the [admiralty (as in original)] court involves claims for cargo damage, collision, seaman’s injuries and the like’ * * *.” Ibid., 409 U.S. at 254, 93 S.Ct. at 497, 34 L.Ed.2d at 459.
However:
“ ‘[T]he maritime law, as recognized in the federal courts, * * * [includes] * * * an important exception * * * in the case of maintenance and cure. From its dawn, the maritime law has recognized the seaman’s right to maintenance and cure for injuries suffered in the course of his service on his vessel * * *.’ ”
Ibid., 409 U.S. at 259-260, 93 S.Ct. at 500, 34 L.Ed.2d at 462. Furthermore: “ * * * ‘In both death and injury cases ... it is evident that * * * distinctions based on locality often are quite relevant where water vessels are concerned.’ * * * ” Ibid., 409 U.S. at 266, 93 S.Ct. at 503, 34 L.Ed.2d at 466. “ * * * Under the locality test, the tort ‘occurs’ where the alleged negligence took effect. * * * ” Ibid., 409 U.S. at 266, 93 S.Ct. at 503, 34 L.Ed.2d at 266[3].
Under the proposed allegations of the plaintiff, the problem of “locality” for maritime and admiralty-law purposes appears minimal; a tort or breach occurring aboard a war-vessel of the United States, if such be the case, would appear to meet the “locality” requirement. Assuming a meeting successfully of the “locality” test does not suggest a meeting of the concomitant predicate for admiralty jurisdiction; i.e., the plaintiff must show in addition to “locality” a significant relationship between the wrong of the defendants and “ * * * traditional maritime activity. * * * ” Ibid., 409 U.S. at 268, 93 S.Ct. at 504, 34 L.Ed.2d at 467 cf. [4].
The jurisdictional hearing allowed, therefore, will be limited to the plaintiff’s effort to show
a significant relationship between: (a) a tortious sale by the defendants of an asbestos-product which was at the pertinent time defective and unreasonably dangerous to such decedent, as a user thereof, or negligence, or breach of a warranty, and (b) such decedent’s injury and subsequent death as related to traditional maritime activity in a manner familiar to the law of admiralty.
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MEMORANDA OPINIONS AND ORDERS
NEESE, District Judge.
This is a diversity-action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for the wrongful [268]*268death of her husband, allegedly the result of his exposure to products containing asbestos manufactured and sold by the 20 defendants. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), (c). Nearly a year and 3 months after she commenced this action, the plaintiff moved for leave to amend her complaint herein so as to allege also this Court’s admiralty and maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)1 and 46 U.S.C. §§ 7402 and 761.3 A magistrate of this district recommended, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B): (1) that the motion to amend be denied, and (2) that the motion of the defendants for a summary judgment be granted. The plaintiff served and filed timely written objection to the first such recommendation.
I
The magistrate deemed the proposed amendment of the plaintiff insufficient, as a matter of law, to invoke this Court’s admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and, accordingly, recommended its denial. See Banque de Depots v. National Bank of Detroit, C.A.6th (1974), 491 F.2d 753, 757[7] (where proposed amendment appears to be insufficient as a matter of law, it may be denied).4 The plaintiff argues, however, that she should be allowed at a minimum to allege such jurisdiction, and she appears to have evidence to offer relating arguably to the existence thereof. (The plaintiff also requested an oral hearing on such motion. See Local Rule 12(c).)
As was recognized by the magistrate, the attempt of the plaintiff to assert a maritime-tort within this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction appears rather far-fetched at first blush: it is undisputed that the only basis for such jurisdiction is the plaintiff’s contention that, from 1943 through 1946, her decedent served in the United States Navy on Guam as a machinist’s-mate; and that during this period, while repairing ships, he came into contact with asbestos-containing materials allegedly manufactured or sold by the defendants herein. This, the plaintiff would apparently claim, proximately caused the death of her decedent more than 30 years afterward.
The parties appear to agree that, before the plaintiff could invoke this Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, the wrongs allegedly perpetrated on her husband by these 20 defendants must have borne “ * * * a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. * * * ” Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland (1972), 409 U.S. 249, 268, 93 S.Ct. 493, 504, 34 L.Ed.2d 454, 467[4]; accord White v. Johns-Manville Corp., C.A.4th (1981), 662 F.2d 234, 239[1], certiorari denied (1982), 454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1037, 71 L.Ed.2d 319; Roberts v. Grammer, D.C. Tenn. (1977), 432 F.Supp. 16, 17[1]. The [269]*269plaintiff apparently thinks that, if given the opportunity, she can establish this relationship by proof.
Under these circumstances, the Court believes the appropriate procedure is to allow the plaintiff to amend her complaint, and for the Court thereupon to determine whether its admiralty-jurisdiction has been invoked properly. The Court will treat the opposition of the defendants to the allowance of such amendment as a suggestion of lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(h)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and will proceed to determine factually whether such jurisdiction exists. See Hopkins v. Wasson, D.C.Tenn. (1962), 227 F.Supp. 278, 279[3], affirmed C.A.6th (1964), 329 F.2d 67, certiorari denied (1964), 379 U.S. 854, 85 S.Ct. 102, 13 L.Ed.2d 57.
The Court understands that, by her proposed amendment, the plaintiff seeks to hold the multiple-defendants strictly liable to her for a tort committed against her decedent upon the high seas as well as for negligence and breach of warranties while such decedent (her husband) was serving in the naval forces of the United States. It appears that: “ * * * ‘Every species of tort, however occurring, * * * if upon * * * navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance.’ * * * ” Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland, supra, 409 U.S. at 254, 93 S.Ct. at 497, 34 L.Ed.2d at 459. “ * * * ‘[B]ut the main business of the [admiralty (as in original)] court involves claims for cargo damage, collision, seaman’s injuries and the like’ * * *.” Ibid., 409 U.S. at 254, 93 S.Ct. at 497, 34 L.Ed.2d at 459.
However:
“ ‘[T]he maritime law, as recognized in the federal courts, * * * [includes] * * * an important exception * * * in the case of maintenance and cure. From its dawn, the maritime law has recognized the seaman’s right to maintenance and cure for injuries suffered in the course of his service on his vessel * * *.’ ”
Ibid., 409 U.S. at 259-260, 93 S.Ct. at 500, 34 L.Ed.2d at 462. Furthermore: “ * * * ‘In both death and injury cases ... it is evident that * * * distinctions based on locality often are quite relevant where water vessels are concerned.’ * * * ” Ibid., 409 U.S. at 266, 93 S.Ct. at 503, 34 L.Ed.2d at 466. “ * * * Under the locality test, the tort ‘occurs’ where the alleged negligence took effect. * * * ” Ibid., 409 U.S. at 266, 93 S.Ct. at 503, 34 L.Ed.2d at 266[3].
Under the proposed allegations of the plaintiff, the problem of “locality” for maritime and admiralty-law purposes appears minimal; a tort or breach occurring aboard a war-vessel of the United States, if such be the case, would appear to meet the “locality” requirement. Assuming a meeting successfully of the “locality” test does not suggest a meeting of the concomitant predicate for admiralty jurisdiction; i.e., the plaintiff must show in addition to “locality” a significant relationship between the wrong of the defendants and “ * * * traditional maritime activity. * * * ” Ibid., 409 U.S. at 268, 93 S.Ct. at 504, 34 L.Ed.2d at 467 cf. [4].
The jurisdictional hearing allowed, therefore, will be limited to the plaintiff’s effort to show
a significant relationship between: (a) a tortious sale by the defendants of an asbestos-product which was at the pertinent time defective and unreasonably dangerous to such decedent, as a user thereof, or negligence, or breach of a warranty, and (b) such decedent’s injury and subsequent death as related to traditional maritime activity in a manner familiar to the law of admiralty.
No closer than 10 calendar-days to the date of such hearing, each adversary counsel will provide the Court through the clerk with a memorandum (in as brief form as feasible) of authorities contended to be most relevant to the facts likely to be developed on the hearing.
The motion of the plaintiff for leave to amend her complaint hereby is GRANTED. Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The matter of the existence of this Court’s admiralty- and maritime-jurisdic[270]*270tion is assigned for an evidentiary hearing5 to commence Monday, May 24,1982 at 12:30 o’clock, p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter can be reached on the Court’s calendar. The recommendation of the magistrate in this regard hereby is MODIFIED accordingly. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II
No timely written objection to the recommendation of the magistrate, that the motion of the defendants for a summary judgment on the claim of the plaintiff under the Texas Wrongful Death Statute be granted, having been served and filed, such recommendation hereby is ACCEPTED. Idem. As to such claim, the motion of the defendants for summary judgment hereby is GRANTED; summary judgment will enter that the plaintiff take nothing from the defendants on such claim only. Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.