Dillard v. Pitchess

399 F. Supp. 1225
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedAugust 26, 1975
DocketCiv. CV 73-2947-WPG
StatusPublished
Cited by38 cases

This text of 399 F. Supp. 1225 (Dillard v. Pitchess) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F. Supp. 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1975).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

WILLIAM P. GRAY, District Judge.

This is a civil rights action in which the plaintiff seeks to challenge, on constitutional grounds, the conditions under which prisoners awaiting trial are housed and maintained in the Los Angeles County Jail facility located on the top floors of the Hall of Justice in the City of Los Angeles (the jail). A declaratory judgment and sweeping injunctive relief are requested. Part of the relief sought will be granted.

THE PARTIES.

The action was commenced on about December 19, 1973, by the filing of a handwritten complaint in which Clarence Lee Dillard raised several disturbing contentions regarding living conditions at the jail, where he was then a prisoner awaiting trial. Shortly thereafter, Terry Smerling, an attorney affiliated with the Greater Watts Justice Center, filed a comprehensive amended complaint as a class action on behalf of Mr. Dillard and all other unconvicted prisoners at the jail.

The named defendants are the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, his principal as *1227 sistants, and the members of the County Board of Supervisors.

After appropriate proceedings, the court later designated the plaintiff class to consist of all pre-trial prisoners incarcerated at the jail from December 19, 1973, until May 11, 1974, and appropriate notice was given to the members of the class.

JURISDICTION.

This court has jurisdiction with respect to the subject matter of the litigation under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), 2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp. 128 (N.D.Cal. 1972).

.However, the defendants have questioned the jurisdiction of this court to make any adjudication, because of mootness. By the time the trial began, on about June 11, 1974, Mr. Dillard had been convicted of the pending criminal charge and had been transferred to another facility to serve his sentence. 1 The defendants suggest that inasmuch as the principal plaintiff was no longer a prisoner at the jail, he could not be a proper representative of the plaintiff class.

If such a contention were to be considered valid, a constitutional challenge to conditions at a pre-trial detention center, such as the jail, could virtually never be litigated, because the claims of any particular inmate would likely be mooted within a relatively short period of time and before a ease could be brought to trial. However, it is well established that the fact that the ease has become moot as to the named plaintiff does not bar his litigating the issues on behalf of the other members of the class. Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.Supp. 93 (N.D.Ohio 1971); see Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1972).

The foregoing does not completely dispose of the contention of mootness. Almost a year has passed since the taking of evidence was completed, and a judgment has not yet been rendered. In the meantime, most, and perhaps all, of the designated members of the class may have had their detention at the jail terminated, for one reason or another. The suggestion is made on behalf of the defendants that these circumstances cast doubt upon the ability of this court to adjudicate the many issues raised on behalf of prisoners at the jail.

In the proceedings that resulted in the designation of the above-described class, it was pointed out by counsel for the defendants that the matter of living conditions of a pre-trial detainee that affect his ability to prepare for and participate in his defense at trial can be raised at such trial. The court was thus mindful of the possibility that an adjudication in this action could have res judicata effect with respect to pre-trial prisoners that might be considered to be members of the class. It was largely for this reason that a specific designation of a class was made and notices sent to the members thereof in order that they might “opt out” if so disposed. 1

A further reason for designating a class composed of prisoners occupying the jail during a specific period was to provide a means whereby evidence could be limited to a time frame coterminous with the period of incarceration of members of the class. Thus, the defendants became aware that the case that they were obliged to defend would be restricted to conditions and events occurring between December 1973, the commencement of the action, and May 11, 1974, thirty days prior to the scheduled beginning of trial.

For the reasons noted above, the court sought to follow the technical requirements of Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil *1228 Procedure. However, it was apparent to all concerned throughout this litigation that its focus was upon the matter of whether relief should be granted, not just for the benefit of current occupants of the jail, but for the benefit of all future pre-trial prisoners in the custody of the Sheriff of Los Angeles County.

The trial took about fifteen days of court time over a period of more than two months, and each side sought and was granted substantial continuances in the schedule for the filing of extensive post-trial briefs. But the principal delay in announcing a decision has stemmed from the fact that I have found it necessary to read many reported eases, review substantial portions of the record, make personal visits to the jail and the other detention facilities of the county, and do a considerable amount of pondering, in order to reach and articulate a satisfactory resolution of the many complicated issues in this matter. Under such circumstances, I cannot believe that the difficulties inherent in this task must be compounded by the requirement that a complete decision be promulgated according to a time schedule that is dependent upon the turnover of a particular group of pretrial prisoners at the jail.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) was filed in 1970 as a class action and involved a challenge of the constitutionality of Texas criminal abortion statutes. The plaintiff was pregnant when the action was instituted, but, as the Supreme Court opinion pointed out, the recoi’d did not show that she was pregnant at the time of trial or when the trial judge’s opinion and judgment were filed.

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Bluebook (online)
399 F. Supp. 1225, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dillard-v-pitchess-cacd-1975.